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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates one of the central concepts in International Relations Theory, responsibility,
and the challenges that the globalisation of production poses to its conventional understandings. As
individuals’ ties extend further beyond national boundaries, a myriad of harms enters the horizon of
their moral appraisal. A case in point, in affluent democracies consumers are often urged to buy
‘ethically’ so  that  miseries  ranging from labour  rights  violations  to  climate  change  and armed
conflicts  are  ameliorated.  However,  approaches  that  systematically  explore  the  grounds  of
consumers’ responsibility to do so are few and far between.
Does the globalisation of supply chains give rise to consumers' moral responsibility to alleviate
harms abroad? This thesis approaches the question from the perspective of global ethics. It draws on
a reading of John Dewey’s work to treat actors’ capacities as a contingent compass to navigate
through the challenges  that global production processes present  to consumers'  habitual ways of
moral thought and action. To generate the empirical basis for a plausible capacity-based argument, it
launches a close study of consumers’ means to alleviate armed conflicts linked with the resource
curse phenomenon in eastern DR Congo and southern Nigeria.
The work contributes to contemporary studies of global ethics through a mid-level approach, as it
draws on empirical  research  to  rearticulate  topical  moral  challenges.  The three  perspectives  of
guilty consumer claims, blame games and citizen-consumers weave the theoretical analysis with
contemporary  practices  of  assigning  responsibility.  While  it  is  difficult  to  ameliorate  resource-
related armed conflicts by buying differently, in some cases purchase action may constitute a step
towards a better world and individuals more capable of orienting through its ethical complexities.
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PART I
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 SITUATION
People need to think that when they turn their heat on in Europe they’re spilling pollution into the
Niger Delta.1
Without knowing it, tens of millions of people in the United States may be putting money in the
pockets of some of the worst human rights violators in the world, simply by using a cell phone or
laptop computer.2
If we imagine we are voting every time we buy something, and we use our purchase power, then
things will change.3
Child labour, armed conflicts and ravaged nature give rise to demands in affluent democracies that
global  production  processes  ought  to  be  more  responsible.  While  states,  corporations  and
international  institutions  governing the  supply  chains  are  usually  expected  to  take  up  the  task,
individual consumers buying products for their own use also frequent the list of agents called for
action. Activists in Europe, North America, Australia, and beyond encourage consumers to join anti-
sweatshop  boycotts,  to  avoid  smartphones  containing  ‘conflict  minerals’,  and  to  demand  eco-
friendly products. Voices advocating ethical consumerism, according to which consumers ought to
1 A Nigerian activist cited in: Leif Wenar, Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules That Run the World (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), xviii.
2 United States Senator Richard J. Durbin cited in: Lydia Polgreen, ‘Congo’s Riches, Looted by Renegade Troops’, 
The New York Times, 15 November 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/world/africa/16congo.html.
3 Dolly Jones, ‘How The World Has Changed Since Rana Plaza’, Vogue, 1 April 2014, 
https://www.vogue.co.uk/article/bangladesh-rana-plaza-anniversary-fashion-revolution-day.
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consider not only price and quality but also the overall social and environmental implications of
their  purchase,  are  identifying  more  and  more  targets  for  the  purchase  action  of  individual
consumers.
An academic debate is gradually emerging, but approaches that systematically explore the grounds
of consumers’ responsibility to do something about harms linked with production processes abroad
remain few and far between.4 Practitioners who take up the broad rhetoric that morally implicates
consumers with miseries of all kinds rarely take the time and effort needed to explicate the moral
theory underlying the burden placed on them. While the statements above illustrate the persistent
thrust  towards  mobilising consumers  to  act  upon harms far  away,  as Christian Barry and Kate
Macdonald point out: ‘The activists who assert special ethical responsibilities for consumers have
promoted many particular  courses  of  action,  but  have  seldom articulated  the  grounds  of  these
responsibilities or explained why they should be taken to be stringent.  And moral and political
theorists have not devoted much focussed attention to this issue.’5
The silence of theorists is alarming, given that consumption is often treated as a potent force for
change in affluent democracies.6 Advocates of ethical consumerism have conceptualised consumer
4 Waheed Hussain, ‘Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigilantism?’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 
40, no. 2 (2012): 111–143; Thomas Christiano, ‘The Tension between the Nature and the Norm of Voluntary 
Exchange’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, no. S1 (2016): 109–129; Christian Barry and Kate Macdonald, 
‘Ethical Consumerism: A Defense of Market Vigilantism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 46, no. 3 (2018): 293–
322; Nicole Hassoun, ‘Consumption and Social Change’, Economics and Philosophy 35, no. 1 (2019): 29–47.
5 Christian Barry and Kate Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to 
Address Labour Injustices?’, in Global Justice and International Labour Rights, ed. Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner, 
and Faina Milman-Sivan (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1, https://philarchive.org/archive/BARHSW-2v1. 
The version referred to throughout the thesis is behind this link.
6 Political, ethical and conscientious consumerism are among the terms used to refer to this phenomenon. Sarah 
Irving, Rob Harrison, and Mary Rayner, ‘Ethical Consumerism - Democracy through the Wallet’, Journal of 
Research for Consumers, no. 3 (2002); Rob Harrison, Terry Newholm, and Deirdre Shaw, The Ethical Consumer 
(London; Thousand oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2005); Dietlind Stolle and Michele Micheletti, Political 
Consumerism: Global Responsibility in Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Tim Bartley et al., 
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action as a way to make a positive impact in the world, and urged consumers to take up some of its
most common forms, such as boycotts, that is, to deliberately avoid or threaten to avoid certain
products and companies, and ‘buycotts’, that is, to prefer or signal a potential preference in favour
of companies and products that meet some criteria of ethical excellence.7 But as campaign rallying
cries keep on underscoring the importance of preferring fair trade, green, sweatshop-free, cruelty-
free, nationally or locally produced shopping, to name some of the most popular examples of ethical
consumerism, a puzzle emerges: even if purchase action by consumers helps mitigate and prevent at
least  some of the harms linked with production processes around the world,  it  remains unclear
whether  consumers  should engage in  such action.  Hence,  the first  research question:  Does the
globalisation  of  supply  chains  give  rise  to  consumers'  moral  responsibility  to  alleviate  harms
abroad? Put  another  way,  what  reasons,  if  any,  could  there  be  for  consumers  to  act  upon the
problems involved with producing things for them? Why should consumers care?
This thesis approaches the question above from the perspective of global ethics.8 Cosmopolitans
have for some time argued that globalisation, in its different forms, compromises the validity of the
state  and  the  community  as  a  boundary  to  ethical  discourse,  for  instance  by  claiming  that
individuals have similar duties and rights with regards to distant others as they have to their fellow
Looking behind the Label: Global Industries and the Conscientious Consumer (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2015); Clive Barnett, Nick Clarke, and Paul Cloke, ‘Whatever Happened to Ethical Consumption’, Journal 
of Consumer Ethics 1, no. 1 (2017).
7 Stolle and Micheletti distinguish four kinds of political consumerism: boycotts, buycotts, discursive acts such as 
culture jamming, and lifestyle commitments: Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism; Philippe Le Billon, 
‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, Antipode, 2006, 779; Daniel Miller, 
‘Consumption as the Vanguard of History: A Polemic by Way of Introduction’, in Acknowledging Consumption: A 
Review of New Studies, ed. Daniel Miller (London: Routledge, 1995), 1–57; John McMurtry, Unequal Freedoms: 
The Global Market as an Ethical System (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1998); N. Craig Smith, Morality and the 
Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate Accountability. (London: Routledge, 1989).
8 By global ethics I mean an ethical inquiry that stands apart from inquiries involving more conventional social 
spheres, such as domestic systems and relations between states. For a helpful discussion on the concept, see: 
Kimberley Hutchings, Global Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge; Medford, MA: Polity, 2018), 11–18.
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citizens.9 In  this  thesis,  I  draw on John Dewey’s  situationist  ethics  to  suggest  that  rather  than
conceiving of global ethics as an abstract exercise about the morally salient, stable characteristics of
the individual and the state, the very research question arises from a specific situation created as
large-scale  processes  of  globalisation  challenge  the  prevalent  notions  of  responsibility  held  by
individuals in affluent democracies.  Instead of searching for universal truths about the right, the
good,  the  bad,  and  the  wrong,  a  situationist  inquiry  aims  to  provide  consumers  in  affluent
democracies  with  a  contingent  and corrigible  moral  compass  to  reflect  on  their  role  in  a  new
situation, in which existing practices and conventions of allocating responsibilities are becoming
perplexed by consumers’ increasing connections to global processes. Ethical consumerism provides
an enticing case to those averse of the fixed ethical foundations on which cosmopolitan as well as
communitarian calls are often voiced.10 Consumers, as members of the public of these communities,
are increasingly aware of their diverse connections to miseries, conflicts and challenges in global
production processes, but lack conceptual tools for moral thought and action with regards to them.
As I will argue in chapter 2, aiming to provide guidance to resolve this specific situation is a more
9 To compare, communitarian thinkers argue that the community constitutes the appropriate sphere of ethical 
discourse and that individual morality cannot be conceived as separate from it. David Held and Anthony G 
McGrew, Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Simon Caney, Justice 
beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Thomas Pogge, ‘World 
Poverty and Human Rights’, Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 1–7; Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. 
Goodin, Global Basic Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits 
of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of 
Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
(London: Duckworth, 1985).
10 A growing literature seeks to move beyond the gap between the two camps by conceiving alternatives to the ‘thick’ 
universality often seen as inherent to their claims: Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A 
Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 275; Kimberley Hutchings suggest that the 
dichotomy might not be the most fruitful approach in exploring global ethics: Global Ethics, 15; Toni Erskine, 
Embedded Cosmopolitanism Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008).
12
fruitful approach than aiming to develop universalisable ethical claims that ill reflect the pluralist,
experimentalist and situationist nature of ethical inquiry.
In this introductory chapter, I draw contours of the harms that challenge the existing practices of
assigning responsibility,  the  contributions  this  work attempts  to  make,  and the  structure  that  it
follows. Further, while to Dewey definitions are a product rather than a starting point of any inquiry,
I start with some initial conceptualisations to help orient through the chapters to follow. First, the
concept of harm is a short-hand tool that refers to the kind of activities that have been pointed out as
potentially requiring ameliorative and preventive action from members of affluent democracies.11
The growing concern on harms in global supply chains provides pragmatist theorists an impetus for
‘a pointed inquiry and experimentation’ on consumers’ connection to them.12 Violence, exploitation
and suffering were Dewey’s enemies to fight, not because they are wrong based on any initial moral
theory, but because the presence of social practices, norms and conventions that have accumulated
over time to mitigate them indicate that they deserve attention. Such ontological ‘quasi-foundation’,
to  use  Molly  Cochran’s  term,  directs  individuals  separately  and  together  towards  ameliorating
harms,  and equips  pragmatism with  a  normative  edge  to  treat  the  international  practices  most
blatantly inhibiting human ‘growth’ as requiring a moral inquiry.13 Richard Bernstein writes that
despite all their differences, pragmatists ranging from Richard Rorty to Hilary Putnam and Cornel
West retain a deep commitment to ‘the amelioration of human suffering and humiliation, and a
positive commitment to ongoing egalitarian democratic social reform’.14 As I will elaborate in the
11 For recent approaches presuming that several moral reasons exist to hold a harm in supply chains as worth acting 
upon: Holly Lawford Smith, ‘Does Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?’, ‐ Res 
Publica 24, no. 3 (2018): footnote 1; Jennifer Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’, British Journal of 
Political Science 43, no. 4 (2013): 775–797.
12 Molly Cochran, ‘Dewey as an International Thinker’, in The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, ed. Molly Cochran 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 330.
13 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 251–52.
14 Richard Bernstein, ‘The Resurgence of Pragmatism’, Social Research 59, no. 4 (1992): 832.
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next chapter, the concern on the adequacy of existing conventions, habits and norms to mitigate and
prevent harms in global supply chains calls for an inquiry on whether the role of consumers in
affluent democracies in tackling such harms should be reconsidered.
Second, the concept of responsibility that plays a central role in this work is, as David Miller notes,
'one of the most slippery and confusing terms in the lexicon of moral and political philosophy'.15 To
guide the inquiry ahead, I follow a distinction between outcome and remedial responsibility, and
focus on the latter, which Miller defines in the following way: ‘To be remedially responsible for a
bad situation means to have a special obligation to put the bad situation right, in other words to be
picked out, either individually or along with others, as having a responsibility towards the deprived
or suffering party that is not shared equally among all agents.’16 If Jack pushes a vase off the table,
he would by default be considered outcome responsible for breaking it. This does not necessarily
mean that  he is  remedially responsible for repairing the vase or compensating for the damage.
Jack’s remedial responsibility might arise even if he had not pushed the vase, for instance if he has
the best means to pay for the reparations or if his son breaks the vase. A remedial responsibility can
be established on many different grounds, and the context of harms linked with global production
processes lacks formal institutional mechanisms or premeditated answers on who should remedy
them.17 Evaluating whether any of the grounds articulated in the global ethics literature resonates
with the way consumers are connected to these harms constitutes a central component in this study. 
15 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 82.
16 David Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, Journal of Political Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2001): 454; Tony Honoré, 
Responsibility and Fault (Oxford; Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1999).
17 The terms 'prospective responsibility' and ‘forward-looking’ responsibility are sometimes used interchangeably with
'remedial responsibility'. They highlight the perfectly valid point that not all responsibilities, such as a parental 
responsibility to look after one's child, are linked with acting upon a harm one has causally brought forth. For the 
sake of consistency, I prefer the term ‘remedial responsibility’ throughout this work.
14
Third,  besides  grounds,  this  thesis  aims  to  clarify  the  relative  stringency  of  consumer
responsibilities. Even if  plausible grounds for consumers’ responsibility to act upon a harm are
established, the stringency of a responsibility indicates whether it might be overridden under some
circumstances.18 While often interwoven, both the grounds and stringency of consumers’ remedial
responsibility are discussed in this work. Fourth, and equally, I refer to remedial responsibilities as
distinct from duties and obligations. Joel Feinberg writes that responsibility refers to a specific
outcome that an actor is expected to bring forth, whereas duties and obligations are linked with a
specific act that an agent is supposed to undertake.19 A responsibility gives more discretion to its
bearer on how to realise the outcome desired, whereas a duty requires that its possessor undertakes
a  specific  action.  As Robert  Goodin  succinctly  puts  it:  ‘Duties  dictate  actions.  Responsibilities
dictate  results.’20 With  these  definitions  in  mind,  the  work  in  hand focuses  on  the  grounds  of
consumers’ remedial responsibility to act upon harms linked with global production processes.21 
1.2 HARMS
The 21st century boasts new processes, institutions and ideas that motivate an inquiry into ethical
consumerism. Surely, active citizens in affluent democracies have called for boycotts, buycotts, and
other forms of consumer action as tools of political campaigning at least since the 18th century.22
18 Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 224; on perfect and imperfect duties, see: Robert E. Goodin, 
Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995), 28–30.
19 Joel Feinberg, ‘Duties, Rights, and Claims’, American Philosophical Quarterly 3, no. 2 (1966): 137–44.
20 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Responsibilities’, The Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 142 (1986): 50.
21 The terms are also used interchangeably: Anne Schwenkenbecher, ‘Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations’, 
Ratio 26, no. 3 (2013): 311.
22 E.g. William Fox, an 18th century British pamphletist: ’If we purchase the commodity we participate in the crime. 
The slave dealer, the slave holder, and the slave driver, are virtually agents of the consumer, and may be considered 
as employed and hired by him to procure the commodity… In every pound of sugar used… we may be considered 
as consuming two ounces of human flesh. ‘Address to the People of Great Britain, on the Propriety of Abstaining 
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Yet, I suggest that the diversity of contemporary harms with which consumers are linked requires
more nuanced taxonomies than currently available, because over the last thirty years geographically
more distant and causally more complex phenomena have entered the scope of consumers' moral
appraisal, challenging their conventional ways to conceptualise their responsibilities.23 There is a
material  change  underlying  the  diverse  claims,  according  to  which  consumers  are  morally
implicated in completely new issues: the emergence of global supply chains.24 Supply chains consist
of sequences of activities through which technology is combined with material and labour inputs,
and  then  assembled,  marketed,  and  distributed.25 The  term 'global'  here  simply  means  that  the
complete  process  takes  place  in  more  than  one  country.26 According  to  UNCTAD's  World
Investment Report focusing on global supply chains, around 80 percent of global trade accounts for
such supply chains, global or regional, intra-firm or inter-firm.27 More than half of manufactured
imports are primary goods, components, semi-finished products, and other intermediate products.28
Countries have always traded with each other, but nowadays the production process of a single item
from West India Sugar and Rum’ (London, 1791), 3.
23 David Schwartz, Consuming Choices: Ethics in a Global Consumer Age (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2010).
24 Jennifer Bair, ‘Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward’, Competition & Change 
9, no. 2 (2005): 162.
25 Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’, Review of 
International Political Economy 12, no. 1 (2005): 78–104; Bruce Kogut, ‘Designing Global Strategies: 
Comparative and Competitive Value-Added Chains’, Sloan Management Review 26, no. 4 (1985): 15.
26 Cf. ‘[w]hile “internationalization” refers to the geographic spread of economic activities across national boundaries,
“globalization” implies the functional integration and coordination of these internationally dispersed activities’: 
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’, 100.
27 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development’ 
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013), x.
28 Koen De Backer and Sébastien Miroudot, ‘Mapping Global Value Chains’, OECD Trade Policy Papers (Paris: 
OECD, 2013), 5.
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often stretches across several countries, drawing a complex map of stages and processes that are
less dependent on geographical closeness to final markets than before.
While Immanuel Wallerstein suggests that geographically extensive commodity chains have been
integral to the capitalist world-economy since the ‘long sixteenth century’, it is not an exaggeration
to say that the contemporary scale of fragmentation is unprecedented.29 Richard Baldwin argues that
the introduction of global supply chains amounts to 'perhaps the most momentous global economic
change in the last 100 years'.30 The globalisation of production has taken place in two stages. The
first unbundling became possible when steam machines were introduced in the 1830s. While goods
had  travelled  across  the  world  before,  steamships  and  railways  made  it  profitable  to  spatially
separate production and consumption across the world, as long as quantities were sufficiently large.
The second unbundling became possible in the 1980s through advances in ICT technology. In the
1970s cargo containers that could be loaded on massive freighters had already been introduced,
making it affordable to move vast quantities of unfinished products to be refined or manufactured
elsewhere.  However,  modern  communications  technology  enabled  the  coordination  of  complex
stages  of  production  in  which  developed-economy technology was  combined  with  developing-
nation labour. While before the second unbundling most sourcing from other countries was done
between mature economies, such as the United States and Canada in the auto industry or the intra-
EU trade in machines, by the 1990s Asia, with its abundant supply of labour, had surpassed western
economies  as  a  site  of  low to  intermediate  stages  of  production.  This  time  around,  the  wage
29 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Essential Wallerstein (New York: New Press, 2000), 2; Sven W. Arndt and Henryk 
Kierzkowski, Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001).
30 Richard Baldwin, ‘Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going’, in 
Global Value Chains in a Changing World (Geneva: World Trade Organization; Fung Global Institute; Temasek 
Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations, 2013), 13.
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differences between rich and poor countries were the necessary condition to make the extension of
commodity chains profitable.31
The roots of the globalisation of production are manifold: economies across the world are certainly
interacting more and more not only because of technological advances, but also because political
facilitation, such as multilateral negotiations on trade and finance, have made global constellations
of production possible.32 Nevertheless, what makes the globalisation of production morally salient
from the perspective of an individual consumer, who engages with markets to acquire a product for
his or her personal use, is that the average purchase has passed through more countries on its way to
becoming a finished commodity than a similar product would have 20 years ago. Some stages, such
as  assembly  and  manufacturing,  are  more  and  more  scattered  across  poorer,  labour-abundant
countries, whereas stages that add the most value to the product, such as development and retail,
take place in the rich world. Similarly, raw materials, such as oil and rare minerals, are tapped from
diverse resource-rich countries and shipped for refinement elsewhere. The degree of fragmentation
varies  among  industries  and  the  trend  is  especially  accentuated  in  industries  such  as  those  of
communications, motor vehicles and garments.33
Understandably, research on controlling, thriving and profiting from this new mode of production
has been in much demand. Economists have suggested that developing countries ought to move
from  extractive  and  manufacturing  industries  to  more  profitable  stages  of  commodity  chains,
31 Baldwin, ‘Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going’; Richard 
Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).
32 Eric Thun, ‘The Globalization of Production’, in Global Political Economy, ed. John. Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 353; Gilbert Winham, ‘The Evolution of the Global Trade Regime’, in Global Political 
Economy, ed. John Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
33 De Backer and Miroudot, ‘Mapping Global Value Chains’, 14–15.
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especially  research,  development  and  retail.34 Corporate  strategists  have  provided  a  wealth  of
literature to businesspeople on managing supply chains in a way that reduces vulnerabilities across
wide-stretched  networks.35 Security  experts  have  voiced  geopolitical  concerns  about  major
manufacturing  countries,  usually  China,  exploiting  their  position  as  the  global  factory  of  daily
electronics for spying.36 Corporate, public and civil society actors have advanced mechanisms and
agreements  to  ensure  that  human  rights  are  protected  in  transnational  production  processes.37
Political  scientists  have argued that  the increased involvement  of  non-state  actors  in  governing
global supply chains is reshaping the patterns of global political power.38
Harms that are in one way or another involved with the production processes are a diverse category
in  which  drawing  similarities  and  differences  raises  issues  of  its  own.39 For  instance,  David
Schwartz argues that consumers can be involved with  four distinct types of wrongdoing: harms,
injustices,  bad consequences,  and moral  offenses.40 Andrew Linklater  categorises  nine kinds  of
harms in world politics that humans try to control by various harm conventions.41 Reinecke and
Ansari refer to ‘wicked problems’ and ‘grand challenges’ as global issues, the complexity of which
is  so great  that  attributing  a  responsibility  for  them to  any specific  actor  or  actors  is  close  to
34 Deborah Kay Elms and Patrick Low, Global Value Chains in a Changing World (Geneva: World Trade 
Organization, 2013).
35 Ian Goldin and Mike Mariathasan, The Butterfly Defect : How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to 
Do about It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
36 Economist, ‘Huawei Has Been Cut off from American Technology’, 25 May 2019, 
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/05/25/huawei-has-been-cut-off-from-american-technology.
37 John Ruggie, Just Business : Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2013).
38 Kate Macdonald, The Politics of Global Supply Chains: Power and Governance beyond the State (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2014).
39 Bair, ‘Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains’, 161.
40 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 7, 41.
41 Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), chapter 1.
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impossible.42 The harms to which consumers are connected through their purchases can be framed
using several of the taxonomies suggested above, and some issues will still fall through the cracks. I
will steer my work by suggesting a typology according to which consumers have been linked with
three  kinds  of  harms  in  public  debate:  those  faced  by  workers  involved  with  the  production
processes; those faced by societies in which stages of production takes place; and those faced by the
planet locally or as a whole. The categorisation is not exhaustive, and categories overlap in actual
cases. Yet, they establish some order among the diverse challenges that call for a reconsideration of
the existing practices of assigning responsibilities. 
To illustrate each of them, activists, consumers and policy-makers have first focused attention on
the working conditions in which production abroad takes place. For instance, violations of labour
agreements and standards in garment factories in Bangladesh, China and Vietnam, from which the
garments are sold to consumers in rich countries under fashionable brands, have sparked heated
debate.43 News about sweatshops, or workplaces in which national and international standards for
minimum wages, working hours, and labour safety are broken, as well as documented instances of
enslaved and child labour, have raised public concerns about the hidden human costs behind a lower
price tag on clothes and other products.44 Such concerns are accentuated each time a major disaster,
such as the Rana Plaza disaster in 2013, captures international headlines.45
A second source of public concern has been the role of global production in feeding authoritarian
rule, violent conflicts, and criminality. The integration of global markets has opened the way for
42 Juliane Reinecke and Shaz Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems: The Role of Framing in the Construction of 
Corporate Social Responsibility’, Journal of Management Studies 53, no. 3 (2016): 299–300.
43 Meenakshi Ramesh Kurpad, ‘Made in Bangladesh: Challenges to the Ready-Made Garment Industry’, Journal of 
International Trade Law and Policy 13, no. 1 (2014): 80–96.
44 Lucy Siegle and Jason Burke, We Are What We Wear: Unravelling Fast Fashion and the Collapse of Rana Plaza 
(London: Guardian, 2014).
45 Siegle and Burke; Iris Marion Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, Journal of Political Philosophy 
12, no. 4 (2004): 366–70.
20
both state and non-state actors in control of natural resources to finance their activities by selling to
international  buyers.  Campaigners  and  activists  in  affluent  democracies  have  for  some  time
advocated that buyers ought to avoid the purchase of ‘conflict resources’, such as diamonds and
minerals,  which are legally traded but linked with violent conflicts  in countries where they are
extracted.46 Similar  concerns  have  been raised  about  illegal  drugs,  such as  cocaine  and heroin,
which rebellious or criminal groups utilise to finance their operations in countries such as Columbia
and Afghanistan.47 The trade in rough diamonds involves probably the best-known example of a
public measure taken against conflict-feeding trade: the Kimberley Certification Scheme aims to
ensure that diamonds sold to consumers in international markets do not finance criminal or militant
rebel groups seeking to overthrow governments.48
Third, buyers in global supply chains have received at least some of the blame for the local and
global environmental damage inflicted by industries producing commodities for global markets.
The  more  permissive  and  sometimes  blatantly  corrupt  regulatory  environment  in  many  poor
countries hungry for foreign investments has made it possible to spare consumers in rich countries
from the negative externalities of pollution at the expense of host communities. For instance, the
damage to the environment inflicted by long-term oil drilling in the Niger River Delta, as well as
the extraction of rare minerals for smartphones in Inner Mongolia, have reached the attention of the
international media.49 Globally, individual consumption decisions have been linked with the process
46 John Prendergast, ‘Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in 
the World’ (Enough Project, 2009), https://enoughproject.org/reports/can-you-hear-congo-now-cell-phones-conflict-
minerals-and-worst-sexual-violence-world; Global Witness, ‘Conflict Minerals’, 2015, 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/conflict-minerals/.
47 E.g. Count the Costs, a campaign: https://idpc.net/profile/count-the-costs
48 Virginia Haufler, ‘The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict 
Prevention’, Journal of Business Ethics 89, no. 4 (2010): 403–16.
49 Tim Maughan, ‘The Dystopian Lake Filled by the World’s Tech Lust’, 2 April 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150402-the-worst-place-on-earth.
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of climate change. The habits of a middle-class citizen in many affluent democracies, such as taking
long-haul  flights  for  holidays,  driving  a  fuel-thirsty  car  for  commuting,  and  the  vigorous
consumption  of  animal  products,  are  discussed  as  unsustainable  practices  that  responsible
consumers ought to avoid.50
These are the kinds of conditions to which consumers have become increasingly connected as the
global  production  processes  expand  and  become  more  complex.  While  starting  with  a  wider
discussion that encompasses all these harms, in the second and third parts of the thesis I will focus
on the resource curse, and the related discussion on  the responsibility of consumers to act upon
armed conflicts  that  are  linked with the trade and extraction of  raw materials  used to  produce
commodities for them.51 Over the last 20 years, civil society campaigners especially in Europe and
North America have voiced concerns  about  'blood'  that stains natural resources stemming from
conflict-ridden areas, and have called for companies, states, and consumers to ensure that products
including  raw  materials  of  such  questionable  origins  have  no  place  in  international  markets.52
Nowadays, more and more corporate due diligence processes53, multi-stakeholder initiatives54, state
50 Surely, conceptualise the environment as a moral agent that can be harmed requires theoretical footwork: David 
Evans, Daniel Welch, and Joanne Swaffield, ‘Constructing and Mobilizing “the Consumer”: Responsibility, 
Consumption and the Politics of Sustainability’, Environment and Planning 49, no. 6 (2017): 1396–1412; Schwartz,
Consuming Choices, 35; Arne Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long range Ecology Movement. A Summary’, ‐
Inquiry 16, no. 1–4 (1973): 95–100; Hugh P. McDonald, John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2012).
51 In what follows, I will use the concepts of civil war, violent conflict and armed conflict interchangeably. Cf. 
Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton; London: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 145.
52 Some prominent NGOs and campaigns around the issue are: Global Witness (https://www.globalwitness.org/en-
gb/campaigns/conflict-minerals/), Enough Project (http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/), Amnesty 
(https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/09/europeancompanies-allowed-reap-rewards-deadly-conflict-
mineral-trade/), and IMPACT (https://impacttransform.org/en/)
53 For a lucid example of corporate action, see Intel's campaign against conflict minerals: 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/conflict-free-minerals.html
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legislation55, and  institutional  guidelines56 aim  to  ensure  that  mineral  supply  chains  are  not
implicated in war and violence.  The second research question interrogates the normative basis for
consumers to take part  in these efforts:  Which factors affect consumers'  responsibility to try to
alleviate  armed conflicts  that  persist  in  some countries  from which  the  raw materials  of  their
purchases originate?
All  harms listed above have generated calls  for  consumer action in  affluent  democracies.  Why
would conflicts deserve such a close study?57 One answer is given by Molly Cochran, who suggests
that a pragmatist resistance to absolute answers spills over to resisting absolute acts, such as the
taking of a life and use of force, which violent conflicts necessarily involve.58 Dewey, first in favour
of international military action and then disillusioned by the First World War, calls in his later work
for  wars  to  be  outlawed  and  eradicated.59 My  answer  builds  on  both.  Many  domestic  and
international  practices,  including  norms,  rules,  and  institutions,  are  established  and  maintained
precisely due to the painful memories of wars bygone and in order to prevent new social conflicts
from escalating as violent. Rather than the wrongness or the unethicality of wars based on some
54 The most visible initiative has been the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on raw diamonds: Haufler, ‘The 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’.
55 E.g. the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States: Daniel M. Firger, ‘Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: 
Examining the New Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the DODD-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 
2010’, Georgetown Journal of International Law 41 (2010): 1043; European Commission, ‘The EU’s Law on 
Conflict Minerals’, 8 June 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/conflict-minerals-
regulation/index_en.htm.
56 See the focus areas of the 12th OECD Forum on responsible mineral supply chains held 17-20 April 2018 in Paris: 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/forum-responsible-mineral-supply-chains.htm
57 In this thesis, I prefer the term armed conflict to wars or civil wars, because in cases of Congo and Nigeria to be 
discussed the concept of wars extrapolates the nature of latent, intermittent violence in the areas. The term armed 
conflict captures this characteristic better and is aligned with the use in contemporary scholarship.
58 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 252–54.
59 Cochran, ‘Dewey as an International Thinker’; John Dewey, ‘Ethics and International Relations’, Foreign Affairs 1,
no. 3 (1923): 85–95; for a criticism of Dewey’s approach to war: Randolph S. Bourne, War and the Intellectuals: 
Collected Essays, 1915-1919, ed. Carl Resek (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999).
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initial theory, it  is the existence of established social and international practices to prevent wars
together  with  consumers’ ambiguous  connection  with warzones  through their  purchases,  which
indicates a need for an ethical inquiry to help resolve this tension. The severity of other harms faced
by workers, societies and the planet is not to be belittled: they are equally targeted by mitigative and
preventive schemes. Yet, the approach I take up in the second part of the thesis benefits from an
empirically informed view that can be generated through an empirically informed close study of a
narrower topic. Armed conflicts linked with ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ resources used to make things for
consumers in affluent democracies constitute a topical target for such a study.
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS
Having now set the impetus and the context for this work, I discuss three needs that it aims to serve.
First, this thesis complements the emerging global ethics  scholarship on ethical consumerism by
striving  towards  a  practical  guideline  that  attempts  to  manage  the  scope  and  stringency  of
responsibilities in a global context. Even if one subscribes to Cochran’s view that the pragmatist
‘weak’ impetus to cultivate growth involves advancing ‘the incorporation of marginalized groups in
world  politics  and  the  possibilities  for  improving  beyond  the  actually  existing  institutions  of
international practice’, burdening consumers with a responsibility to act upon vast global challenges
is a step not to be taken lightly.60 Individuals have limited resources for moral action, and they
engage in painful prioritising to set an order among the many morally appealing projects that seem
worth pursuing. Shmuel Nili captures something important in stating that philosophers often argue
about what ought to be done rather than what ought to be done first.61 As Barry and Øverland write:
‘[I]t is one thing to recognize a terrible problem and quite another to establish who, if anyone, is
60 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 272.
61 Shmuel Nili, ‘Global Justice and Global Realities’, Journal of International Political Theory 12, no. 2 (2016): 205.
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responsible for doing something about it and what they might sensibly do.’62 This setting calls for
tools to think about consumer responsibility in a way that goes beyond a blanket assignation or
absolution.63
I emphasise the prioritising inherent to ethical thought and action, because if the challenges linked
with widening the scope of responsibility to the global context are not recognised, the function of
assigning responsibility to recreate the world, including the responsibility-bearers themselves, is
circumscribed.  To  Dewey,  responsibility,  as  in  holding  someone  accountable  (or  outcome
responsible,  to  use  the  term  introduced  above),  is  central  to  human  growth,  because  holding
someone praiseworthy or blameworthy for a past state of affairs guides the way she operates in the
world by setting expectations on the consequences of her future action.64 I  suggest  that such a
transformative,  forward-looking function is  inherent to all  assignations of responsibilities to act
upon  harms,  regardless  of  whether  voiced  in  retrospective  or  prospective  terms.  And  while
pragmatist ethics skirts away from establishing rules and procedures set in stone, for thinking about
one’s responsibility in relation to global supply chains, a plausible guideline needs to, in Samuel
Scheffler’s words, include a ‘set of clear,  action-guiding and psychologically feasible principles
which would enable individuals to orient themselves in relation to larger processes, and general
conformity  to  which  would  serve  to  regulate  those  processes  and  their  effects  in  a  morally
satisfactory  way’.65 Existing  scholarship  on  consumer  responsibility  has  done  a  good  job  in
62 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 1.
63 Lisa Herzog, ‘Who Should Prevent Sweatshops? Duties, Excuses, and the Moral Division of Labour in the Global 
Economy’, Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie 7 (2016): 2, 5. The version used in the thesis is behind this link: 
https://www.academia.edu/26515692/Who_should_prevent_sweatshops_Duties_excuses_and_the_moral_division_
of_labour_in_the_global_economy.
64 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (London: University of London Press, 1921), 177; John Dewey, 
‘Ethics’, in The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 7, 1925 - 1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2008), 303–5.
65 Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 39.
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mapping the potential grounds of consumer responsibility. However, fewer studies are poised to
provide advice that helps individuals manoeuvre in this non-ideal context in which a myriad of
moral projects seems to call for their scarce resources. Without such a guideline, responsibility faces
the same threat  that  Laura Valentini  recognises as  permeating the concept  of justice in  current
political theory: it tends to ‘over-inflate’ and thereby lose its ’normative currency’.66
I  emphasise  this  risk,  because  the  call  for  such  a  practice-based  guideline  on  consumer
responsibility seems to be implicit in much current literature. Theorists of global ethics writ large
recognise  the  risk  of  making  responsibility  unwieldy  by  expanding  it  along  global  production
processes. Iris Marion Young articulates a similar concern as a ‘vertigo of political responsibility’
that emerges if responsibility is not confined by nation or location.67 Leif Wenar coins the ‘problem
of  intermediate  goods’ to  remind  that  burdening consumers  with  stringent  responsibilities  with
regards to miseries in global supply chains is difficult, because it is very hard for consumers to
know which products are ‘tainted by moral toxicity’.68 David Schwartz points out that the act of
shopping becomes  an ‘ethical  minefield’,  when everything a  consumer  does  is  implicated  in  a
wrong-doing of some kind.69 Such concepts are only partially adopted in actual campaigns. Rob
Harrison, director of the Ethical Consumer, a British NGO, quips: ‘I think you are responsible for
everything. And Ethical Consumer has a special magazine to try help navigate the responsibilities
without  going  mad,  particularly  with  products  such  as  the  mobile  phone,  which  carries  very
complex processes.’70 This thesis takes the risk of ‘going mad’ seriously by acknowledging that
responsibility cannot cover ‘everything’. At the same time, it attempts to answer Scheffler’s call,
66 Laura Valentini, ‘The Natural Duty of Justice in Non-Ideal Circumstances: On the Moral Demands of Institution 
Building and Reform’, European Journal of Political Theory, 2017, 2.
67 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 123–24.
68 Wenar, Blood Oil, xx.
69 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 12.
70 Interview #57: Rob Harrison, Director, Ethical Consumer
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albeit  in  a qualified sense: guidelines or ‘principles’ for assigning responsibility  in  this  context
constitute contingent rules of thumb to be experimented on rather than generalisable principles that
apply to all situations alike.
To illustrate,  a responsibility to avoid ‘tainted hands’ by buying only ethically produced goods
irrespective of whether one’s purchases make any positive or negative difference to the harms in
question  is  one  guideline  for  moral  thought  and  action  regarding  harms  in  supply  chains.  A
situationist approach does not reject such blanket principles prior to practice. It treats such a rule,
just as any other device, as to be evaluated on the basis of whether it is suitable for a context in
which  several  aims  call  for  consumers’ moral  attention  and  the  prioritisation  between  them is
complicated  by  interwoven  normative  considerations.  Presuming  that  such  pluralism  is  an
inescapable characteristic of the world, some guidelines are likely to turn out better poised as moral
compasses for specific situations than others.71 No rules of thumb, such as ‘do not buy unethical
goods’, are rejected based on a rational abstraction, but equally can no single guideline be fixed
permanently above others even if found useful for a situation in hand.  The choice of a guideline is
to  be  made,  experimented  on  and  continuously  recalibrated  in  the  changing  situations  that
individuals try to manage.72 As Elizabeth Anderson writes on Deweyan ethics: 
Value judgments are tools for satisfactorily redirecting conduct when habits fail… We
test our value judgments by putting them into practice and seeing whether the results are
satisfactory — whether they solve our problems with acceptable side-effects, whether
71 Here, pluralism denotes a contrast to ethical monism. Pragmatism presumes that 'commitments, aims and attitudes 
towards the natural world’ held by different persons originate from different theoretical starting points, and works 
towards the best way to approach practical problems, given the plurality. Christopher H. Pearson, ‘Does 
Environmental Pragmatism Shirk Philosophical Duty?’, Environmental Values 23, no. 3 (2014): 337–38; for a 
criticism, see: J. B. Callicott, ‘The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a 
New Discourse’, Environmental Values 11, no. 1 (2002): 3–25.
72 Cf. deontological, consequentialist, contractualist and discourse ethics, which Hutchings discusses under the rubric 
of rationalist ethical theories: Hutchings, Global Ethics, 23–24, 36–37.
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they enable successful responses to novel problems, whether living in accordance with
alternative value judgments yields more satisfactory results.73
Second, although my focus is on conceptualising consumers’ responsibility in the changing global
context,  the  inquiry  generates  insights  about  the  responsibilities  of  other  actors.  Global  supply
chains are governed by a panoply of legislative, corporate, and soft law codes of behaviour, which
implicate states, companies, international institutions, and civil society organisations in resolving
harms linked with the production processes. In this multi-layered system, the relation between the
responsibilities of individual and collective agents remains debated. On the one hand, theorists of
collective responsibility often suggest that assigning responsibility to institutions is more important
than to individuals, because individuals cannot respond to the systemic changes needed to resolve
large crises, such as climate change.74 Consumers are a case in point. Divided by factors such as
location, nationality, social class, gender, values, and religion, nothing unites consumers besides
their involvement in global markets. With only some extrapolation, calling consumers responsible
for  harms  in  global  supply  chains  resembles  obliging  humanity  as  a  whole  to  bear  such  a
responsibility. An argument follows that responsibility assigned to such a diffused group most likely
remains  unrealised,  whereas  powerful  collective  agents  such  as  companies  and  states  would
constitute a more suitable bearer of remedial responsibilities.75
On the other hand, consumers are often assigned remedial responsibility for harms in supply chains
precisely on the grounds that the collective agents are failing to deliver what they are expected to
do. Michele Micheletti and Andreas Follesdal claim that ‘political’ consumerism, to use their term
73 Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Stanford University, 2018).
74 Toni Erskine, ed., Can Institutions Have Responsibilities?: Collective Moral Agency and International Relations 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
75 Michael F. Maniates, ‘Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?’, Global Environmental Politics
1, no. 3 (2001): 31–52.
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of choice, has emerged as a partial answer to the vacuum of government action that allows for
human rights abuses.76 Josée Johnston suggests that the retreat of the 'neo-liberal state' from social
and ecological concerns makes space for corporations and the NGO sector to fill the gaps, tempting
individuals to experiment with new ways to shape morally relevant issues.77 Schwartz portrays the
rise  of  ethical  consumerism  as  a  response  to  government  failure  to  regulate  decentralised,
multinational  companies  conducting  business  around  the  world.78 Hence,  the  existence  of
collectives running the supply chains might establish rather than override consumers’ responsibility
to  act  upon harms.  For  instance,  Boris  Holzer  articulates  the  view that  corporations  with their
border-crossing operations connect consumers with production across vast distances that are not
covered by other  political  spheres.79 Instead of  collective agents  being more suited for bearing
responsibility than consumers, consumers come to bear responsibility for harms faced by distant
others by buying things the purchase of which has been made possible by the collective agents.
Acknowledging both perspectives, in chapters 3 and 11 I explore the ambiguous relation between
the responsibilities of individual and collective agents in the global economy. Andrew Linklater
suggests  that  harm  conventions,  as  practices  through  which  societies  control  the  ways  their
members can harm each other, and especially their cosmopolitan variants, deserve further attention
in the study of International Relations Theory.80 Researchers of global regulatory processes less
often treat individuals as important agents alongside states, companies and international institutions.
76 Michele Micheletti and Andreas Follesdal, ‘Shopping for Human Rights. An Introduction to the Special Issue’, 
Journal of Consumer Policy 30, no. 3 (2007): 173, 175; Michele Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping: 
Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action (New York: Basingstoke by Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
77 Josée Johnston, ‘The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and the Case of Whole Foods Market’, 
Theory and Society 37, no. 3 (2008): 256.
78 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 10–12.
79 Boris Holzer, ‘Framing the Corporation: Royal Dutch/Shell and Human Rights Woes in Nigeria’, Journal of 
Consumer Policy 30, no. 3 (2007): 281–301.
80 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations.
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A pragmatist inquiry into consumer responsibility elucidates one perspective to the relation between
the  remedial  responsibilities  of  individual  and collective  actors  for  harms in  global  production
processes.
Third, this thesis is by itself a pushback against  the suspicion that consumers do not constitute a
viable object of ethical and political inquiry. Thinkers linked with the Frankfurt School, such as
Herbert Marcuse and Vance Packard, argue that consumers are subjected to marketing, branding and
other forms of influencing to the extent that a study considering their responsibilities is too detached
from  reality  to  be  meaningful.81 The  desires  of  consumers  are  largely  controlled  by  larger
corporations  or  capitalist  institutions,  meaning  that  consumers  lack  the  free  will  that  is  a
conventional  characteristic  of  a  moral  agent.  Modern  variations  of  the  sceptical  vein  consider
ethical consumerism as emblematic of neoliberal governance and ‘a perverse turn to consumption to
solve the problems caused by consumption’.82 Alternatively,  one can argue that an emphasis on
purchase decisions leads people to replace public and civic activism with private,  consumer-led
lives, and constitutes a cause or an expression of the triumph of the markets over democratic means
in realising moral and political projects.83
81 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964); Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders. (London: Longman, 1957).
82 Cf Evans, Welch, and Swaffield, ‘Constructing and Mobilizing “the Consumer”: Responsibility, Consumption and 
the Politics of Sustainability’, 1399.
83 For an overview of criticisms against political consumerism, see: Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism, 
205–9; Clive Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility: The Political Rationalities of Ethical Consumption 
(Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 32.
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Ethical consumerism is not a panacea.84 However,  as Frank Trentmann points out, many of the
critics misleadingly presume a juxtaposition between consumer and civic action. As I will discuss in
chapter  12,  seeing  a  zero-sum  game  between  other-regarding  citizenship  and  self-regarding
commerce ignores that historically purchase decisions have been harnessed to support various forms
of ideas, ranging from nationalism to radicalism, progressivism and socialism.85 Many studies adopt
a more reflective vein, treating consumer behaviour as 'a highly significant if not preferred venue
for political  participation',  and suggesting that consumers use 'the market to vent their  political
concerns', 'combining morality and the market' to serve other than their immediate material needs
through purchase decisions.86 Consumers being more and more informed about and sensitive to the
effects of production processes, and conceiving purchases as a form of micro-politics that shapes
the political and social environment does not mean that other fora in which moral and political aims
are pursued will dissolve. Boycotting and buycotting are embedded in wider practices of political
activity,  and  the  sceptics,  as  Nick  Clarke  articulates,  disregard  ‘the  political  character  of  such
consumption  –  the  way  in  which  such  consumption  is  organised  and  mobilised  by  social
84 Julie Guthman, ‘Commentary on Teaching Food: Why I Am Fed up with Michael Pollan et al.’, Agriculture and 
Human Values 24, no. 2 (1 June 2007): 261–64; Maniates, ‘Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the 
World?’; Thomas Princen, Michael Maniates, and Ken Conca, Confronting Consumption (MIT Press, 2002); 
Andrew Szasz, Shopping Our Way to Safety: How We Changed from Protecting the Environment to Protecting 
Ourselves (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Robert B. Reich, ‘The Case Against Corporate 
Social Responsibility’, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2008); Robert B. 
Reich, Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2007); Zygmund Bauman, ‘Exit Homo Politics, Enter Homo Economicus’, in Citizenship and Consumption,
ed. Frank Trentmann and Kate Soper (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
85 Frank Trentmann, ‘Knowing Consumers: Histories, Identities, Practices: An Introduction’, in The Making of the 
Consumer, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2005), 13; Frank Trentmann, ‘Introduction’, in 
Citizenship and Consumption, ed. Kate Soper and Frank Trentmann (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008); Frank Trentmann, Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century to 
the Twenty-First (London: Allen Lane, 2016).
86 Johnston, ‘The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid’, 230–31; Dietlind Stolle, Marc Hooghe, and Michele Micheletti, 
‘Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation’, International Political 
Science Review 26, no. 3 (2005): 284.
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movement[s] and other organisations, and the way it acts as a medium through which commitments
are registered, policymakers lobbied, and claims made on legislators’.87
Of course, one has to remain cautious. While much literature appreciates the function that ethical
consumerism serves as a part of ‘multifaceted strategies for reforming global industries’, theorists
and activists acknowledge that acting politically through consumption and commodities involves
‘contradictions, limitations, ambivalences, and unintended effects’.88 Even more so, the rifts in the
literature underline the importance of a further inquiry into ethical consumerism, the normative
dimensions of which are fortunately accruing increasing attention from moral theorists. This thesis
joins these efforts by taking up Dewey’s situationist approach to explore ethical consumerism in the
very context in which the question rises, and to provide means through which individuals in affluent
democracies, separately and together, may orient themselves in this complicated ethical landscape.89
1.4 OUTLINE
In three parts, the thesis starts with theory, dives into empirics and then surfaces with mid-level
perspectives  on  consumer  responsibility.  Chapters  2-5  explore  scholarship  on  the  agency  and
responsibility of consumers. Chapters 6-9 present a pragmatist, capacity-based approach and the
close study of the resource curse phenomenon linked with armed conflicts in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (‘Congo’) and the southern Federation of Nigeria (‘Nigeria’). Chapters 10-12
introduce  three  perspectives  to  guide  thought  and action  regarding consumer  responsibility  for
armed conflicts. Chapter 13 concludes.
87 Nick Clarke, ‘From Ethical to Political Consumption’, Geography Compass 2, no. 6 (2008): 6. Italics omitted.
88 Bartley et al., Looking behind the Label, 5; Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the 
(Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, 779.
89 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 303–5.
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Chapter 2  lays  out  the  philosophical  underpinnings  of  this  work in  John Dewey’s  situationist
ethics.  While  traditional  ethical  theories  are  well  poised  to  provide  grounds  for  consumer
responsibility, I draw on Dewey’s work to suggest that by striving for fixed ‘strong’ answers, they
are insensitive to the pluralist and contextual nature of ethical inquiry. Drawing on Molly Cochran’s
pragmatist inquiry in International Relations, I suggest that the ‘quasi-foundation’ of pragmatism,
articulated as a push towards human growth and against suffering, oppression and violence, enables
treating harms in global supply chains as potentially requiring a moral response from consumers,
and grounds the kind of normative claims that  remain open to continuous experimentation and
scrutiny.
Chapter 3 presents the main actors, consumers in affluent democracies, and their stage, markets.
Assigning consumers with a responsibility to do something poses a dual challenge to conventional
conceptions of moral agency. On one hand, consumers as individuals are trivial elements in vast
global processes, making it seemingly meaningless to burden them with a responsibility to mitigate
and prevent harms far away. On the other hand, although as a collective they have a vast potential to
shape the  global  supply chains,  they  lack  all  the  characteristics  that  are  usually  expected  of  a
collective  moral  agent.  Marion  Smiley’s  framework  of  future-looking  collective  responsibility
provides  a  working  solution  to  this  problem.  As  a  definition  of  consumers’  hypothetical
responsibility, I suggest that they share a responsibility to collectivise into an entity or entities that
are better geared towards mitigating harms in supply chains than as individuals.
Chapters 4 and 5 adopt  the toolbox of global ethics to explore potential grounds for consumers’
remedial responsibility. Building on David Miller’s work, Christian Barry has differentiated four
principles  to  justify  an  allocation  of  responsibilities  against  the  backdrop  of  transnational
challenges, such as global poverty and climate change, which most agents see as worth tackling,
although it  remains unclear  who among them ought to  do so and bear the costs.  I  explore the
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principles of contribution, association, benefit, and capacity as an organising device in order to i)
create  an  orderly  view  of  the  existing  approaches  to  vesting  consumers  with  remedial
responsibilities; and to ii) examine whether the principles, together or separately, establish plausible
grounds for consumer responsibility.
Chapter 6  begins the second part  of the thesis,  in  which I  introduce a pragmatist  approach to
responsibility. I return to Smiley’s work to argue that actors’ capacities to alleviate harms is a useful
yardstick for exploring consumers’ remedial responsibility in this global context, and suggest that a
pragmatist  variant  of  the  capacity  principle  satisfies  the  criteria  for  a  practical  guideline  on
consumer responsibility better than monist, ideal-based variants of consequentialism. The normative
application of pragmatist theorising I advocate bears a similarity with pluralist, mid-level ethics as
presented by Jennifer Rubenstein. The latter part of the chapter suggests that a close study is needed
to generate an empirical basis for conceptualising consumers’ capacity to ameliorate specific harms,
and argues that consumers’ connection to the resource curse and armed conflicts in Congo and
Nigeria constitutes a suitable object for one.
Chapter  7  lays  out  the  current  state  of  literature  on  the  resource  curse.  As  a  multi-faceted
phenomenon,  resource  curse  refers  to  problems  related  to  economic  growth,  regime  type,
governance quality and violent conflicts that seem to co-occur with abundant natural resources.
Based  on  a  literature  review,  I  conclude  that  although  not  all  negative  effects  discussed  as
symptoms of the curse are as extensively evidenced, there are valid grounds for holding armed
conflicts as associated with some natural resources, especially oil. In developing plausible responses
to individual resource-linked conflicts, I suggest that detailed case studies can well complement the
large-N scholarship.
Chapters 8 and 9 zoom in on the recurrent conflicts in Congo and Nigeria. In both cases, violent
groups accrue funds from the extraction and trade of raw materials, which are sold to produce items
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for final consumers in affluent democracies. Several activists and scholars suggest that curbing the
militants’ access to these funds will help decrease the levels of instability and violence in these
areas. Based on fieldwork, I agree that natural resource management policies can be an important
tool in conflict mitigation and prevention. However, whether the current means fully realise this
potential  remains  an  open  question.  In  the  Kivu  provinces,  the  effects  of  mineral  traceability
schemes  that  currently  spearhead  such  policies  remain  ambiguous.  Similarly,  adopting  narrow
‘blood oil’ policies in the Niger Delta would ignore the more pervasive forms of oil theft that have
to be addressed to ameliorate the violence.
Chapter 10 starts the third part of the thesis. In this chapter, I engage with ‘guilty consumer’ claims
sometimes harnessed to motivate consumers in affluent democracies to act by suggesting that they
causally  contribute to  conflicts  through their  purchases.  I  suggest  that  such arguments  are  best
analysed by looking at the consumers’ remedial capacity in two components, influence and costs.
The influence  of  consumers  is  shaped by the  policies  that  the  advocates  who aim to  mobilise
consumers for remedial action see as the most suitable solution to the problem in hand. Further, the
costs of remedial action vary across different harms. Costs also play a role, for instance as it is very
difficult for consumers to disengage through individual purchases from raw materials that permeate
critical  societal  functions.  The  chapter  suggests  that  actual  and  potential  influence  as  well  as
acceptable and excessive costs  are  rudimentary but  useful  components when individuals set  an
order among the many harms they are demanded to act upon through guilt-inducing arguments.
Chapter 11 engages with Iris Marion Young’s shared conception of responsibility to argue that in
order to alleviate harms in global supply chains it is sometimes better to let the less capable actors
off the hook than to distribute responsibility among too many actors. The conflicts in Nigeria and
Congo illustrate a context in which ‘blame games’ are accentuated when no clear guidelines exist to
differentiate responsibilities between agents such as companies, importing states, host states, and
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consumers.  Consumers  constitute  an  unstructured  collective  agent  that  has  no  potent  means to
alleviate conflicts in comparison to those wielded by structured collective agents, such as states and
companies.  Lacking all  attributes  of  a  collective  agent,  changes  in  global  production  processes
happen  for  rather  than  because  of  consumers,  an  insight  that  implies  allocating  remedial
responsibilities to collective agents more capable of resolving the conflicts, and to individuals in
positions in which they are better capable of harnessing ‘their’ collectives for such purposes.
Chapter 12 returns to the division between citizens and consumers, suggesting that they are best
analysed as roles that come not only with their own capacities, but expectations on the kinds of
capacities  individuals  in  them  are  to  nurture.  There  is  no  general  argument  based  on  which
capacities vested in either role would be superior to or exclusive of the other. A role responsibility
approach teases  out  a  Deweyan point  regarding the transformative  dimension of  responsibility:
assigning to individuals in different roles is shaped not only by the best way to realise a specific
moral project, but by differing understandings on the kinds of individuals and communities that best
thrive in the complicated ethical landscape brought forth by the vast processes of globalisation. 
Chapter 13 concludes. While ameliorating resource-related armed conflicts in global supply chains
through ethical consumerism is challenging, the practices of purchase action may constitute a step
towards a better world and individuals capable of orienting through its ethical complexities. The
three perspectives illustrate that Dewey-inspired normative theorising can provide contingent tools
that are sensitive to the plural and interwoven normative considerations underlining assignations of
responsibility. Such mid-level tools help resolve the situations brought forth as the conventional
practices of assigning responsibility are perplexed by harms in global supply chains, and views on
the role that consumers can and should play in tackling them diverge.
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2 JOHN DEWEY’S ETHICS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I first suggest that John Dewey’s situationist ethics constitutes the most compelling
ethical theory for considering whether harms faced by workers, societies and the planet in global
supply chains potentially require moral action from consumers.90 Global ethics scholarship provides
ample frameworks, often woven around the concepts of the duty, the right and the good, which can
be harnessed to justify a positive answer. I suggest that the ‘strong’ foundations of the so-called
traditional ethical theories hinder their usability as practical guidelines: ethical inquiry is not about
finding fixed and universalisable answers rather than developing solutions to unique situations in
which conventions, norms, and habits of thought and action have been found lacking. 
Second, I suggest that besides providing  a pluralist, contextualist and experimentalist alternative
through which answers provided by traditional ethical  theories can be recast  in  methodological
terms, Dewey-inspired ethics can ground normative claims. Deweyan ethics come with a ‘weak’
ontological  commitment  to  growth,  which  guides  individuals  towards  expanding  the  sphere  in
which they, together and separately, conceive oppression, violence, and exploitation as requiring
ameliorative  action,  and  towards  cultivating  and  using  their  means  to  do  so.  Such  ‘quasi-
foundationalism’, to use Molly Cochran’s term, provides a reason for exploring whether harms in
global supply chains fall among the challenges that consumers in affluent democracies ought to
address.
90 I thank Molly Cochran, Frank Martela, Pentti Määttänen, Sami Pihlström, and all participants in the Philosophy and
Public Policy seminar at the University of Helsinki in March 2019 for helpful discussions and correspondence on 
views presented in this chapter.
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2.2 SITUATIONIST ETHICS
Kimberley  Hutchings  suggests  that  the  nature  and  scope  of  global  ethics  revolves  around  a
systematic investigation of four kinds of questions: why, what, who, and how. More specifically, the
scholarship in global ethics includes:
‘(a) different accounts of how we are to ground the authority of moral claims
about global issues (why); (b) different substantive answers to moral questions
about  war  and  peace,  the  global  political  economy,  the  global  environment,
clashes of incommensurate values exacerbated by globalized conditions (what);
(c) different views about the identity and nature of morally relevant actors in the
global sphere (who); and (d) different practical implications drawn from the above
for  the  entitlements  and  obligations  of  individual  and  collective  moral  actors
related to each other through conditions of globalization (how).91
Although in this work I will explore consumers and their obligations, this chapter paves the way for
the inquiry by discussing the ‘why’ and ‘what’ questions following Hutchings’s categorisation. I
will present John Dewey’s situationism as providing a plausible answer, which differs from those
provided by the foundationalist underpinnings of ‘traditional’ ethical theories.92 Dewey was an early
20th-century  philosopher  usually  labelled  alongside  Charles  Peirce  and  William  James  as  a
forerunner  of  American  pragmatism.  To  Dewey,  the  need  for  ethical  theorising  lies  in  people
seeking new solutions to ‘situations’, that is, obstacles, confusions, conflicts, unmet needs, or other
problems that  disrupt  their  everyday habits  and conventions  through which  they  usually  orient
themselves. Managing these situations requires using one’s critical ethical judgment to continuously
experiment on and readjust the solutions that have worked in previous, reminiscent cases. While
91 Hutchings, Global Ethics, 17.
92 E.g. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 25.
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these situations are faced by individuals, ethics is inherently a creative, social and political activity
that  takes  place  in  a  public,  an  instrument  through  which  ‘problem-solving’  is  socially
coordinated.93 No truths exist to be extracted: what can be achieved is ‘warranted assertability’ of
the current way of thinking and doing being helpful for those concerned.94 In Dewey’s own words,
the task of such a philosophy is
to  face  the  great  social  and moral  defects  and troubles  from which  humanity
suffers, to concentrate its attention upon clearing up the causes and exact nature of
these evils and upon developing a clear idea of better social possibilities; in short
upon projecting an idea or an ideal which,  instead of expressing the notion of
some other world or some far-away unrealizable goal, would be used as a method
of understanding and rectifying specific social ills.95
How does  such an approach differ  from established ethical  theories?  Global  ethics  scholarship
provides several frameworks for treating harms in supply chains as requiring a moral response from
consumers. To illustrate, deontologically oriented theories often derive such arguments from the
capacity of individuals to discover through innate reasoning rules and principles that they do not
want to violate due to respect for their own rational faculties. From this perspective one could, for
instance, argue that by buying garments produced in ‘sweatshop’ conditions, consumers conduct a
moral wrong by getting involved in an exploitative arrangement that fails to meet workers’ basic
needs.96 To compare,  contractualists  could  suggest  that  the  moral  authority  of  claims  lies  in  a
93 Cochran, ‘Dewey as an International Thinker’, 325.
94 Molly Cochran, ‘Pragmatism and International Relations. A Story of Closure and Opening’, European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy IV, no. 1 (2012): 14.
95 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 124.
96 This is an application of Jeremy Snyder’s argument: ‘Needs Exploitation’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11, 
no. 4 (2008); libertarians defend some forms of ‘sweatshop’ labour: Benjamin Powell and Matt Zwolinski, ‘The 
Ethical and Economic Case Against Sweatshop Labor: A Critical Assessment’, Journal of Business Ethics 107, no. 
4 (2012): 466–71.
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hypothetical or actual contract to which independent and rational individuals enter with each other.
Here, reaping benefits from the trade of minerals that finances and motivates violence against the
population  unfolds  as  consumers  supporting  violations  of  human  rights  that  they  should  be
honouring on a contractual basis.97 Further, proponents of utilitarian approaches could argue that
moral action is best articulated as an activity that maximises aggregate happiness, welfare, pleasure
or other desiderata of choice,  to a maximum number of people.  For instance,  some patterns of
consumption by individuals in affluent democracies could be morally wrong, if the accumulated
damage inflicted on the planet both locally and globally outweighed the benefits generated through
workers’ employment, capitalists’ profit, and consumers’ access to cheap items.98
While the examples above do not do justice to the wealth of ethical arguments built on these and
other  traditions,  they  help  capture  a  difference  between traditional  theories  and the  situationist
approach.  To  Hutchings,  deontological,  contractualist  and  utilitarian  ethics  represent  rationalist
ethical  theories  united  by two tenets:  rationality  plays  an  important  role  in  establishing ethical
claims, and these claims can be articulated by a theorist exercising her rationality in abstraction
from actual ethical practice.99 To pragmatists such as Paul Thompson, rationalism is a problematic
presumption in  doing ethics,  as it  means engaging with real-life  debates,  such as  those on the
legitimacy of  abortion,  war  or  lying,  with  a  ready set  of  tools  that  are  applied  to  abstract  the
philosophically salient characteristics of the situation.  Real-life disputants are ‘beckoned’ to the
academia in which their arguments are cleaned of complexities and empirical fuzziness, classified
97 Thomas Pogge draws on both contractualist and deontological reasoning in his argument. ‘World Poverty and 
Human Rights’, 2005; World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge; 
Malden, MA: Polity, 2002).
98 Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–243.
99 The fourth rationalist theory Hutchings discusses is Habermasian discursive ethics, which roots ethical principles to
inter-subjective processes: the right takes the shape of universalisable principles, although it is reached through 
discourse. Global Ethics, 23–24, 36–37; Molly Cochran, ‘Deweyan Pragmatism and Post-Positivist Social Science 
in IR’, Millennium 31, no. 3 (2002): 541.
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‘according  to  their  particular  theoretical  cast’,  and  evaluated  against  each  other  in  their  pure,
abstract form by pointing out their internal inconsistencies or by arguing for the strength of another
foundation. This kind of applied ethics is to help disputants, once they return to the ‘real’ world, to
make a right decision on what is to be done and why.100
To Thompson, such a procedure is unlikely to solve the conundrums, and potentially might even
make them worse. Starting with a set of fixed foundations steers the inquiry towards creating the
kinds of ‘dilemmas’ that characterise much philosophical thought. For instance, it is not likely that
disagreements are resolved, as each disputant settles with a rigid foundation that seems useful for
defending their own view, but changes one’s foundationalist argument when deemed useful. Kelly
Parker argues that such pluralism is ‘a fact encountered in experience’, and suggests an alternative
procedure.101 Instead of subscribing to any particular foundation theory, an ethical inquiry is to first
pinpoint those characteristics in the connection between consumers in affluent democracies and
harms in global supply chains that are currently experienced as in tension with the current practices
of assigning responsibility to act upon such harms. Once the political and social context in which
the situation rises has been identified, ethical inquiry unfolds as an effort to improve one’s ethical
experience by imagining and testing a new end in view that reconstructs the problematic situation as
manageable. Such a process is ‘social, imaginative and artful in character’ rather than an application
of existing tools to a situation in hand, and dismissive of contrasts between ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’,
‘desire’ or  ‘imagination’ often  drawn  by  philosophers.102 This  revising  of  ends  to  resolve  the
100 Paul B. Thompson, ‘Pragmatism and Policy - the Case of Water’, in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light 
and Eric Katz, Environmental Philosophies Series (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 203–6.
101 Kelly Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’, in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric 
Katz, Environmental Philosophies Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1995), 25, 33.
102 Richard Bernstein, ‘The Normative Core of the Public Sphere’, Political Theory 40, no. 6 (2012): 776; Steven 
Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2003), 2.
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situation involves not only observing the immediate consequences but self-reflection on the kind of
people that actors become by adopting any new goal.103 
As Elizabeth Anderson describes Dewey’s approach: ‘Value judgments are tools for satisfactorily
redirecting  conduct  when habits  fail.’104 Ethical  theorising  drawing on Dewey’s  work  does  not
abandon the deontological, contractual, utilitarian or other established philosophical approaches, but
views  them  through  specific  metaethical  lenses  grounded  in  developmental  and  social
psychology.105 By treating ethics as a rationalist inquiry aiming for firm answers through abstract
reflection, traditional ethics tend to promise universalising and non-contingent answers that they
ultimately cannot deliver. Thompson offers pragmatist deconstruction as a pedagogical tool to end
‘moral gridlocks’ and to build communities in which solutions to problems can be decided on.  If
understood as  seeking ‘truths’ rather  than  as  tools,  as  arising  from ‘contemplation’ rather  than
‘action’, and as aiming to provide objective and non-contingent characterisations of the morally
salient features of harms, philosophy asserts certainty where none is to be had.106 However, when
treated as constructs that previous generations have developed to resolve the specific problems they
have faced, established moral concepts such as duties, rights, and the good constitute a set of tools
that may be reworked and honed to provide potentially  useful  solutions to currently pertaining
problems.
To apply, rules can be useful guides to action, but subscribing to  them is not to be driven by a
respect for one’s rational will central to Kantian accounts. In Dewey’s words, a moral law is
103 Joe Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights: A Pragmatist and Pluralist Inquiry into Global Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 115–19.
104 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
105 Anderson.
106 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 128–31.
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not something to swear by and stick to at all hazards; it is a formula of the way to
respond  when  specified  conditions  present  themselves.  Its  soundness  and
pertinence are tested by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim or authority
rests finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be dealt with, not
upon its own intrinsic nature—as any tool achieves dignity in the measure of the
needs served by it.107
Similarly, a contractualist approach, such as monumental and influential work by John Rawls, aims
for a geometrical system of culturally and historically contextual principles from which guidelines
to action are to be derived.108 These first principles bear little resemblance with the real behavioural
tendencies of people weaving through everyday situations.109 Rights and duties can be reconstructed
as tools to be evaluated based on how they resolve political problems and the kinds of ideals they
help realise.110 An ethical inquiry that harnesses them in this way has to respect the richness and
complexity of moral experience as lived; after all, it is the very fuzziness and uncertainty in such
experiences that gives rise to it.
A utilitarian theorist would allocate responsibility solely as a means to reach a final goal, such as the
minimising of suffering in the world.  While to Dewey looking into consequences of acts  is an
appealing  approach,  the  idea  of  ethical  action  as  geared  towards  a  single  aim,  be  it  pleasure,
welfare, unity, or other maximand, is a misunderstanding. 
Up to a certain point, [utilitarian ethics] reflected the meaning of modern thought
and aspirations. But it was still tied down by fundamental ideas of that very order
107 John Dewey, ‘The Quest for Certainty’, in The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 4, 1925 - 1953, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 222.
108 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2005).
109 Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination, 28.
110 Cf. Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, abstract.
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which it thought it had completely left behind: The idea of a fixed and single end
lying  beyond  the  diversity  of  human  needs  and  acts  rendered  utilitarianism
incapable of being an adequate representative of the modern spirit. It has to be
reconstructed through emancipation from its inherited elements.111
Consumers, just as individuals in general, are not guided by one moral end. The ‘ends-in-view’
they endorse might include ameliorating harms taking place in supply chains, but no single ideal
captures why the harms are worthy of such moral attention.112 In Dewey’s understanding of the
process of ethical judgment, ends to which individuals aspire are interwoven with the means they
possess, and striving for an aim changes the way individuals consider its desirability.113 A strict
separation between means and ends, as well as instrumental and final goods, which serves as a
guideline in utilitarian ethics writ large, cannot be maintained. While consequences of action are
morally significant in Deweyan ethics, assigning to consumers a responsibility to act upon harms in
global supply chains cannot be justified on the basis of a single ideal, such as happiness, which
ameliorating harms in global supply chains would serve to realise.
Instead of subscribing to any such principle, which descends out of the ‘a priori blue’ or from a
‘moral Mount Sinai’, a pragmatist inquiry first strives to get a clear view of the public and the
situation that it  is facing.114 A situation calling for such an inquiry seems to persist  in affluent
democracies with regards to consumer responsibility. Calls to reform global production processes
have been voiced powerfully  among their  publics,  as consumers  become aware of  the various
human tragedies, social ills, and environmental disasters occurring as things are made for them to
buy. For instance, many consumers feel anxious when encountering the claim that they are feeding
111 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 183.
112 John Dewey, ‘Theory of Valuation’, in The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 13, 1925 - 1953, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 220.
113 Dewey, 220, 233–34; Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 308–9.
114 Dewey, ‘Theory of Valuation’, 219. I thank Molly Cochran for highlighting this point.
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brutal  civil  wars,  mass rapes  and slave labour  by their  indirect  purchases of  ‘blood’ minerals,
diamonds and oil. Joe Hoover, who takes up Dewey’s ethics in his pragmatist analysis of human
rights, suggests that such ‘emotional and visceral responses to experience are central to ethics, as
they  provide  the  spur  to  self reflection  and  reconstruction,  which  in  turn  inspires  social  and‐
political action to reform custom and alter the social order’115. To Anderson, identifying a problem
calling  for  an  ethical  inquiry  starts  with  ‘often  inchoate  experiences  of  doubt,  confusion,
apprehension,  frustration,  distress,  anger,  conflict,  and  so  forth,  which  call  for  articulate
diagnosis’.116 In  Dewey’s  psychological  theory,  emotional  responses  are  inherent  to  desires,
interests, and habits that arise out of individuals’ lifelong interaction with the external world.117 As
an ethical naturalist and cognitivist, to him moral problems are to be resolved by theoretical and
empirical experimentation just as any other natural phenomena.118 Equally, the solutions developed
are not fixed rather than contingent, subject to revision by considering the widest consequences for
everyone that following them involves.119
Pragmatism recognises as emotive-cognitive challenges the kind of questions linked with consumer
responsibility that many moral philosophers would treat as to be solved in abstraction. To illustrate,
Samuel Scheffler, a liberal thinker, argues that there is a gap between the ‘conventional conception
of  responsibility’ tied  to  local  and  national  levels  and  a  more  universalist  conception  gaining
currency  through globalisation.  The  conventional  conception  operates  on  a  phenomenology  of
agency according to which 'acts  have primacy over  omissions,  near effects  have primacy over
115 Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 126.
116 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
117 In Dewey’s terminology, ‘affective-motor conditions of action’ unite with the ideational or intellectual in a process 
in which desires and interests are cultivated. Dewey, ‘Theory of Valuation’, 218, 237.
118 James Bohman, ‘Ethics as Moral Inquiry: Dewey and the Moral Psychology of Social Reform’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Dewey, ed. Molly Cochran (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 207–8.
119 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
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remote  effects,  and  individual  effects  have  primacy  over  group  effects'.120 To  him,  such  a
disposition functions well in individual daily lives as long as attention is not paid to the level of
transnational  processes.  However,  if  the  transnational  is  observed,  a  plethora  of  complicated
connections with distant others appears that seem meaningful although they do not resonate with
the  conventional  phenomenology  of  agency.  In  other  words,  the  current  phenomenology  is
becoming  a  bad  guide  for  understanding  socially  significant  human  action:  individuals  are
‘subsumed’ under larger processes from which they are unable to abstain, about which they cannot
gather  reliable  information,  and about  which they are unsure how to contribute to in  different
ways.121
Although  only  one  of  the  many  possible  articulations,  Scheffler’s  conventional  conception  of
responsibility can be read as pinpointing a practice of assigning responsibility the shortcomings of
which as a habitual guideline to individuals’ thought and action give rise to an ethical inquiry to
improve  it.  Pragmatist  ethics  does  not  suggest  that  tools  characteristic  of  a  deontological,
contractualist, consequentialist or any other position cannot be taken up as a starting point for this
task. Rather, it reminds that a responsibility established on a ‘strong’ view of traditional ethics that
strives to produce universalisable, non-corrigible and rationalist claims is not likely to provide a
remedy  to  the  emotionally-loaded  uncertainty  that  consumers  face  amidst  global  production
processes. Dewey’s ethics provides a background theory that does not attempt to determine any of
these accounts as ‘a bedrock principle’ for an ethical argument; it treats rules, principles, virtues,
rights, duties, and so on, as supplementing rather than constituting ethics.122
Seminal moral concepts, such as duties, rights and the good, are independent factors that societies
and individuals in the past have developed to address situations they have faced; they cannot be
120 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 44–45.
121 Scheffler, 44–45; Iris Marion Young reaches a similar conclusion: ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 374.
122 Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination, 3, 57.
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reduced to each other.123 In this way, Deweyan ethics uproots substantive answers provided by
traditional  accounts  to  harness  them in  methodological  terms  as  fallible  and changing tools.124
Accordingly, this work does not venture further into metaphysics by establishing a foundational
theory, a move which is likely to leave unsatisfied those hoping for ‘certain’ answers.125 Equally, it
does not aspire to give a complete account or a final judgment on consumers’ responsibilities.126
Rather,  a  Dewey-inspired  approach  I  adopt  identifies  consumer  responsibility  as  deserving  an
ethical  inquiry,  because  the  conventional  practices,  conceptions,  and  habits  of  assigning
responsibility in affluent democracies are perceived as increasingly inadequate as guidelines to
thought and action regarding consumers’ responsibility for miseries in global production processes.
2.3 NORMATIVE EDGE
In the previous section, I suggested that situationist ethics can be harnessed to argue that harms in
supply chains require moral action from consumers. Yet, it is an oft-heard criticism that pragmatist
ethicists  are  not  prone  to  justify  normative  claims:  even  sympathisers,  such  as  Cornel  West,
characterise  Dewey  as  evading  rather  than  solving  traditional  philosophical  questions.127
Pragmatism shares a challenge posed to poststructuralism: how does one create an ethics that does
not  rely  on  fixed  foundations  or  is  not  articulated  as  universalisable,  non-corrigible  claims?
Subsequently,  pragmatists  writ  large  engaging  with  real-life  debates  are  sometimes  accused  of
123 John Dewey, ‘Three Independent Factors in Morals’, in The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 5, 1925 - 1953, ed.
Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008).
124 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
125 Joel Mintz, ‘Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection’, Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 31, no. 1 (2004): 25.
126 Cf. Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 5; Donald Koch’s introduction to: John Dewey, Lectures on Ethics, ed. 
Donald Koch (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), xxx, xxviii.
127 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, Wis: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), 72; Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 121–22.
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providing rough and ready prescriptions without grounding them on any normative theory. While
Marion Smiley suggests that pragmatism is  not to be confused with answering purely practical
questions, such as ‘how do we solve problem X?’ and ‘what do we do now?’, the concern pertains:
does pragmatism come with a normative edge?128
Instead of hovering above or dredging below crucial normative questions, Dewey’s ethics contains
several  normative  threads  that  have  been  woven  further  by  contemporary  theorists.  To  Molly
Cochran, Dewey’s ethics ‘brings together empirical and normative lines of inquiry backed by a
philosophy of valuation.’129 In her book  Normative Theory in International Relations, she shares
poststructuralists’ distrust of philosophical foundations, but concedes that normative ethics has to
involve at  least  some degree of universalisation and foundationalism.130 As a solution,  Cochran
suggests  that  the  task  of  ethics  in  International  Relations  is  to  strengthen  moral  inclusion  in
international practices from a ‘quasi-foundationalist’ angle: building contingent normative criteria
to guide intersocietal relations, and pointing out ways to create a consensus around them, is what a
pragmatist  critique  can  do.131 Existing  institutional  arrangements  and  ethical  criteria  are  to  be
interrogated and reimagined without presuming that a ‘strong’ ontological basis for such an activity
can be attained. As above, ethical questions do not arise as perennial, abstract inquiries into a moral
128 Smiley disagrees with a reading of pragmatism as a form of ‘instrumental rationality’ or ‘policy science’ that she 
conceives Ronald Dworkin as advocating. Marion Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of 
Community : Power and Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 23; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 151–75.
129 Cochran, ‘Pragmatism and International Relations. A Story of Closure and Opening’, 13.
130 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 121–42; Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Geopolitics of 
Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
12, no. 4 (1987): 403–434; R. B. J. Walker, International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
131 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 168–69, 255, 278. Cochran refers later in the book as 
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sphere that hovers above practical experience, and answers to them are to be situated, hypothetical
and fallible; ‘[t]hat which is objective is that which settles a practical problem to the extent that
doubt can be put aside for the time being.’132 
Accordingly,  Cochran suggests that a pragmatist ethical theory cannot sanctify the use of military
force, because its denial of absolutes involves not supporting absolute acts, such as that of taking a
life. While other systems, such as international law, may provide an instrumental reason for use of
force, calling a doctrine that does so an ethics would not acknowledge the responsibility that the
contingency  of  ethical  claims  involves.133 More  generally,  pragmatist  ethics  in  International
Relations  aspire  to  the  moral  inclusion  of  marginalised  groups  in  world  politics:  very  diverse
situations ranging from unfair working conditions and wages in factories to child soldiering, use of
military force for unilateral ends, and arms and drug trade, may call for a pragmatist ethical inquiry
and experimentation.134
Joe Hoover conceives human rights as a valid tool for advancing a democratising ethos, which calls
for respect for difference and awareness of exclusion and vulnerability. To Hoover, ‘[h]uman rights
are  only  as  good  as  the  ends  they  help  us  realize’,  and  best  pursued  as  an  agonistic  politics
manifesting values that are plural, incommensurable and irreducible to each other. Hoover treats
pluralism as  a  distinct  position  of  pragmatist  thinking:  drawing  on work  by Isaiah  Berlin  and
Bernard Williams, he suggests that any attempt to prioritise a value over another is a political act,
which involves an existential commitment.135 Yet, it is the radical democratising potential of human
rights that to Hoover conveys the value of adopting them as a contested but useful framework of
132 Cochran, ‘Deweyan Pragmatism and Post-Positivist Social Science in IR’, 544.
133 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 252–54; Cochran, ‘Dewey as an International Thinker’; 
Dewey, ‘Ethics and International Relations’.
134 Cochran, ‘Dewey as an International Thinker’, 330.
135 Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 108–9.
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moral action. He develops further the strong affiliation that Dewey makes between democracy and
growth, suggesting that human rights may help push for ‘more inclusive and fully  democratic’
world politics that transcend the limitations of the nation state.136
Marion Smiley draws partially on Dewey’s ethics to expand the sphere of actors that can be held
responsible for external harm from individuals to groups, such as clubs, corporations, and nation
states.  She  suggests  that  the  prevalent,  modern  conception  of  responsibility  has  peculiar
characteristics,  as it  conflates  blameworthiness with causal responsibility,  and presumes that an
actor has to possess a free will if it is to be assigned a responsibility for an external harm. With a
strong affinity to Dewey’s view, Smiley reconceptualises causal blame: for instance, underlying the
question of whether American capitalists  were contributing to  the apartheid in South Africa by
financing it are considerations including what is expected of capitalists, what they should take into
account  in  their  investment  decisions,  what  are  the  benefits  of  their  activities,  is  the  black
population in South Africa part of the community they ought to care for, and so on. The assignation
of blame is a forward-looking enterprise geared to resolving social ills rather than an inquiry into
actors’ internal attributes, such as free will.137
Environmental philosophers have taken up pragmatist ethics as an approach that moves beyond the
entrenched  debates  concerning  anthropocentric  and  non-anthropocentric  approaches  towards
nature.138 Andrew  Light  distinguishes  metaphilosophical  pragmatism  from  philosophical
pragmatism. The former is an activity of providing rules within which environmental philosophy
should be done, and which embraces pluralism in the assessment and communication of normative
issues on environmental policy. The latter is closer to the classical American tradition, including
Dewey’s work, as it engages with environmental ethics ‘on their own ground’ in debates on whether
136 Hoover, 2–3.
137 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 303–5; and Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 24–26.
138 Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination, 89.
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nature ought to be treated as a resource, as God’s domain, as  property, as a mother, as a living
organism and  so  on.139 The  philosophical  variants  of  environmental  pragmatism are  poised  to
articulate views on daily issues such as policies related to climate change and nature conservation.
While one can argue that all pragmatist work is metaphilosophical, Light suggests that a distinction
is useful in understanding the variety of projects that take place under environmental pragmatism.140
These are explicitly normative projects. What could be characterised as linking them to Dewey’s
work is an inclination to advance growth, which is closest to a foundation present in his situationist
ethics.141 Well aware that such a concept is easily misinterpreted as an objective ground for ethics or
as a product of a means-end distinction, he writes:
the  process  of  growth,  of  improvement  and  progress,  rather  than  the  static
outcome and result, becomes the significant thing. Not health as an end fixed once
and for all, but the needed improvement in health - a continual process - is the end
and good. The end is no longer a terminus of limit to be reached. It is the active
process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but
the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living…
Growth itself is the only moral ‘end’.142
As  individuals  overcome  situations  that  compromise  their  existing  habitual  ways  of  orienting
themselves in the world, they are themselves changed in the process. To Dewey, the attainment of
new skills, knowledge and embracing of culture were marks of growth, not means to reach it. 143
139 Andrew Light, ‘Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy’, in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. 
Andrew Light and Eric Katz (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 330.
140 Light, 336.
141 Fesmire emphasises that the idea of growth in Dewey’s thought is more substantively expressed as artistic creation 
that moral deliberation involves. Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination, chapter 7.
142 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 177.
143 Dewey, 185.  
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Growth means maturing from spontaneity  to  the  use  of  a  reflective  and critical  attitude,  from
moving to esteem to estimation, from prizing to appraising, in establishing ends in view.144 Alison
Kadlec accurately emphasises that this process is inherently a public endeavour: individuals are not
atomised entities rather than collective and communicative creatures, whereby to grow entails both
enhancing an individual’s capacity for social  intelligence as well as translating this  capacity to
generate  concrete  goods.145 As I  elaborate  further  in  chapters 6 and 12,  the reflective,  socially
embedded concept of growth distinguishes Dewey’s situationist ethics from utilitarianism, although
he appreciates the latter’s original vigorous spirit for social welfare and reform:
Like utilitarianism, the theory subjects every form of organization to continual
scrutiny and criticism. But instead of leading us to ask what it does in the way of
causing pains and pleasures to individuals already in existence, it inquires what is
done to  release  specific  capacities  and co-ordinate  them into working powers.
What sort of individuals are created?146
Importantly,  to  Dewey outcome responsibility  is  assigned in  order  to  direct  the  actors  towards
growth. A child is not held accountable for a damage he has done because he possesses a free will to
choose  his  actions  but  because  blaming or  praising  him for  the  damage  is  to  entice  desirable
changes in his character, which then hopefully shapes his future acts.147 He writes that ‘[b]eing held
accountable by others is,  in  every such instance,  an important  safeguard and directive force in
growth’.148 It  cultivates  characteristics,  or ‘virtues’ needed in a critical  inquiry,  such as ‘[w]ide
144 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 264.
145 Alison Kadlec, ‘Reconstructing Dewey: The Philosophy of Critical Pragmatism’, Polity 38, no. 4 (2006): 537.
146 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 198.
147 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 304.
148 Dewey, 305.
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sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, balance of interests’.149 In
this way, assignations of both outcome and remedial responsibility shape not only the outcomes but
the actors themselves, serving as a central component in growth.
In this thesis, growth, as in ‘making better and more meaningful worlds for ourselves’, creates the
normative force for holding harms in global supply chains as worthy of moral  action.150 While
growth  could  be  deemed  as  an  inherently  internal  activity,  in  Dewey’s  ethics  growth  includes
engaging with the social sphere to ameliorate harms that individuals face, and to cultivate one’s
capacities to do so. Growth harnesses pragmatism with a normative edge: mitigating exploitation,
oppression, and violence deserve a privileged role in driving ethical judgment and motivating social
change,  because such conditions  have been experienced as  inhibiting  human flourishing in  the
past.151 Here,  ‘human  flourishing’ is  a  loose  concept,  linking  individual  problem-solving  and
Dewey’s  affinity  with democratic  processes,  as  individuals  flourish when they can realise  their
autonomy and possibilities for self-development.152 This call is shared by many: Richard Bernstein
reminds that despite their differences Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and Cornel West, who are some
of the  leading figures  in  the resurgence  of  pragmatism since  the 1970s,  all  testify  to  the  deep
commitment  of  pragmatism to  ‘the  amelioration  of  human suffering  and humiliation’ and to  a
pursuit  of an ‘ongoing  egalitarian democratic social  reform’.153 True to its  weak ontology, such
commitments of pragmatism are not established on any universal and objective foundations. Yet, its
normative force is nothing to belittle: potentially growth is the most widely acceptable grounds on
149 The paragraph contains, essentially, a Deweyan view of virtue ethics. Reducing ethics to a person’s characteristics 
misrepresents that behavioural dispositions are to be evaluated as per the consequences that those possessing them 
are inclined to produce. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 164; Cochran, Normative Theory in International 
Relations, 251; Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
150 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 18.
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152 Hoover, 249.  
153 Bernstein, ‘The Resurgence of Pragmatism’, 832.
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which consumers can be called to act upon sweatshop labour, the extraction of ‘blood’ resources,
environmental degradation, and other miseries in global supply chains.
Surely, Dewey left the concept of growth characteristically open. Does any situation, conflict or
disruption, such as how to eradicate ethnic minorities in an authoritarian nation-state, deserve equal
attention? Such a disposition, when read without a sensitivity to Dewey's normative inclination to
moral inclusion, could be read in statements such as: 'Anything that in a given situation is an end
and good at all is of equal worth, rank and dignity with every other good of any other situation, and
deserves  the  same  intelligent  attention.'154 To  answer,  I  have  indicated  above  that  growth  is
intimately linked with the aim of moral inclusion pertinent in Dewey’s thought. Cochran phrases the
inclination of a pragmatist  critique in international ethics as to create relationships that include
marginalised  groups  and improve  existing  institutions  of  international  practice.155 For  instance,
consumers in affluent democracies resolving the moral anxiety of facing harms in global supply
chains by becoming calloused enough to ignore the suffering of others is not a solution aligned with
moral inclusion. Instead of recommending consumers to develop an emotionally numb mind-set,
one can read this thesis as an exploration of the conditions under which a responsibility can be
assigned in an era in which vast global processes threaten to ‘succumb’ the agency of individual,
and of whether consumers embracing a responsibility for harms in global supply chains captures the
pragmatist thrust towards moral inclusion.
Such an aspiration to growth can nevertheless be interpreted as a ‘strong’ foundation. To Dewey,
experience, while always interpreted for and by someone, still constitutes a pedestal from which to
exert ethical judgments of social practices. Cochran suggests that this solid ground, when connected
with the maturing of individuals’ critical intelligence, generates a kind of teleology in his work that
takes  harmony  within  a  democratic  public  as  occurring  naturally,  as  a  part  of  social  and
154 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 175–76.
155 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 272.
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technological  progress.  Such ‘naturalistic  teleology’ can create  a  problematic  thread of  ‘strong’
foundations in Dewey’s work: the tendency to harmony among individuals’ identities, values and
aspirations is  not to be presumed, because growth has to be able to manifest  in different ways
beyond the minimum requirements of sympathy and sensitivity.156 To answer,  Cochran gestures
towards Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism that presumes no experience or reality on which to draw as
an authoritative base for social critique. Tensions in theory and societal practice give rise to new
vocabularies,  and  moral  inclusion  may  take  place  as  common  narratives  that  create  solidarity
between actors shape the ‘we’ communities in which practices are shared.157 Rorty believes that
expanding solidarity and sensitivising one’s society to the suffering of others is an intellectual’s
responsibility. This process, however, is not captured in Dewey’s naturalistic teleology.158
This thesis emphasises the commonalities rather than divergences between the widely Deweyan and
Rortyan positions.  Cochran  points  out  that  the  commitment  to  human flourishing through self-
development and human autonomy is shared by both, although they see it realised in different ways,
Dewey as social commitments and Rorty as private creativity.159 Surely, the former has his focus on
problematic situations, whereas the latter works on the tensions in human conduct that give rise to
new, potentially useful redescriptions of the social world. Both material and discursive inquiries are
to be included, and if conducted in an experimental fashion, allow for an expansion of the ‘we’
communities without succumbing to totalising claims or a teleological view on growth.160 Rorty’s
position is useful in introducing to the pragmatist tradition the Wittgensteinian insight that language
156 Cochran, 249.
157 Cochran, 240.
158 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), part III; Bjørn 
Ramberg, ‘Richard Rorty’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 
2009).
159 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 204.
160 Cochran, 206–7, 241.
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encompasses  social  worlds  much  more  thoroughly  than  an  innocent  statement,  such  as  that
experience is always interpreted, may initially reveal.  161 Yet, Rorty’s wider theorising that treats
lightly the risk of relativism need not be embraced to appreciate the insight that growth does not
necessarily  lead  to  social  harmony.  As  Bernstein  reminds,  there  are  pragmatisms rather  than  a
school  of pragmatism, and both Dewey and Rorty subscribe to  an ‘ethical-political’ strand that
focuses  on  the  ‘practical’ social  life  rather  than  to  the  more  abstract  pursuits  interacting  with
analytical  philosophy.162 In  line  with  Cochran’s  reading,  I  suggest  that  both  theorists  retain  an
aspiration to growth as an important normative element in their work and that there is a possibility
of a synthesis between their positions.163
To summon one more potential concern, Dewey’s work can be read as not contributing to global
ethics. Instead of international affairs, he focused considerably on clarifying the relation between
science, ethics, and democracy in western societies, especially in the United States. This reading
may be seen as supported by the way Dewey’s key concept of growth is linked with his concept of
democracy to the extent that they can be read as being one thing.164 To answer, while Dewey was
not averse of talking about ‘democratic faith’ or ‘ethos’ as a constituent of growth, to him the public
involvement that would lead to improved ethical experience was not in any essential sense tied to
national boundaries:165
161 Smiley argues that Rorty treats the ‘we’ communities as too homogenous. Glossing over their diversity is against 
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[Democracy] is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when
its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of
which  men  and  women  form  groups  -  families,  industrial  companies,
governments, churches, scientific associations and so on.166
A public is not necessarily demarcated by national boundaries. In this thesis, the public in question
consists of the political communities of affluent democracies, as it is in them in which calls for
ethical consumerism have been most vocally voiced. Dewey saw in democratic practices, be they
domestic,  national or global,  the social  idea that human capacities are best  unlocked in as free
interaction as possible.167 Whether acting as a consumer is conducive to such growth is a question to
which  I  will  return  in  chapter  12.  At  this  stage,  I  retain  that  Dewey’s  situationist  ethics  can
contribute  to  debates  on  consumers’ cross-boundary  responsibility  for  harms  in  global  supply
chains.168
2.4 CONCLUSION
First, I argued that John Dewey’s ethics can provide a normative, ‘quasi-foundationalist’ framework
for  treating  harms  in  global  supply  chains  as  to  be  ameliorated.  A key  step  in  adopting  such
situationist  ethics is the appropriate framing of the research question and the answer to follow.
Rather than as an endeavour into an abstract and objective sphere of ethics, the question arises from
the ‘situation’ faced by consumers in affluent democracies who grow aware of the harms linked
with  global  production  processes,  but  find  the  conventional  habits,  norms,  and  practices  of
allocating responsibility as compromised amidst such global connections. The answer, which might
involve suggesting tools conventionally linked with traditional ethical theories, is  to be read as
166 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 209–10.
167 Cochran, ‘Dewey as an International Thinker’.
168 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 247.
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experimental, as in to be revised by the actor if it does not help regain continuity in his or her
ethical experience, and situationist, as in to be understood as a solution relevant to the challenge in
hand rather than a general guideline to reminiscent cases.
In  the  second  part,  I  suggested  that  such  situationist  ethics  comes  with  a  normative  edge.  A
responsibility to act upon some harms may be ‘weakly’ founded on the pragmatist commitment to
growth,  which  includes  expanding  one’s  moral  sphere  and  exercising  and  developing  one’s
capacities to ameliorate suffering, violence, and exploitation. This wide inclination, expressed in
different  ways across  the  many varieties  of  pragmatism,  is  normative  despite  it  rejecting  what
Dewey conceives as the quest of traditional ethics for certain, fixed moral answers. As an open-
ended  ‘aim’ that  urges  individuals  together  and  separately  to  ameliorate  the  worst  of  human
conditions,  growth  serves  as  the  normative  thrust  for  consumers  in  affluent  democracies  to
deliberate whether harms in global production processes potentially deserve their remedial action.
58
3 MORAL AGENCY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This  chapter  establishes a  theoretical basis  for treating consumers  as agents capable of bearing
moral responsibilities. In the introductory chapter,  I noted that while most attempts to mobilise
consumers for alleviating miseries in supply chains presume that consumers’ collective action holds
tremendous potential  to  alleviate  harms, the way consumers  constitute  a  moral  agent  or  agents
remains unclear. This chapter engages with the ‘who’ question by discussing the various alternatives
through which consumers’ moral agency can be conceptualised, a step to be taken prior to exploring
the grounds of the moral responsibility they potentially bear.169
I  suggest  that  while  consumers as an entity  do not  resonate with the conventional  accounts of
individual  or  collective  moral  agency,  a  pragmatist  framework  of  future-looking  collective
responsibility enables treating them as moral agents on the basis that together they could ameliorate
harms  in  global  production  processes.  This  potential  establishes  individual  consumers  with  a
potential duty to collectivise into organised groups that have better capacities to coordinate their
remedial efforts for this purpose. I adopt these characterisations of consumers’ moral agency and
responsibility as working definitions for this thesis, and suggest that markets provide a platform in
which such a responsibility can be discharged.
169 I.e. the third question on ‘different views about the identity and nature of morally relevant actors in the global 
sphere’: Hutchings, Global Ethics, 17.
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3.2 DOUBLE CHALLENGE
3.2.1 RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
In  comparison  to  debates  on  the  moral  responsibilities  of  states,  companies,  international
institutions, and other powerful collective agents that often get the attention in normative studies of
International Relations, inquiries on consumer responsibility are tormented by a double challenge
surrounding the agency of their object.170 On one hand, acts of a single consumer matter little in the
global markets, in which only larger shifts in consumer demand are of significance to the suppliers.
The ‘causal impotence’ of an individual consumer stands in the way of holding individuals as moral
agents capable of bearing responsibilities with regards to harms in global production processes. On
the other hand, consumers do not constitute a structured collective capable of organised, purposeful
action  in  the  same  way  as  corporations,  states  and  organisations  do.  Because  of  these  two
challenges,  it  is  hard  to  pinpoint  who  exactly  would  bear  the  remedial  responsibility  were
‘consumers’ attributed  with  one.  This  section  explores  the  double  challenge  and  its  potential
solutions. 
To  articulate  the  first  half  of  the  challenge,  some  theorists,  such  as  David  Schwartz,  discuss
consumer action as an instance of the collective action problem. Schwartz laments that a central
challenge  of  adopting  a  bottom-up  strategy  to  reforming  global  production  processes  is  that
mobilising  a  critical  mass  of  consumers  to  demand  changes  is  difficult  because  individual
consumers  hardly  consider  themselves  as  causally  relevant  actors.171 Julia  Nefsky  defines  the
challenge as the ‘problem of collective impact’, or the challenge of ‘how to move from facts about
the  power  of  collective  consumer  demand  to  conclusions  about  what  one  ought  to  do  as  an
170 Erskine, Can Institutions Have Responsibilities?
171 David Schwartz, Consuming Choices: Ethics in a Global Consumer Age (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 
67–70, 123.
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individual consumer’.172 Michael Pollan writes about the motivational problem of being a ‘drop-in-
the-bucket’: even if big challenges ahead, such as climate change, were more or less driven by
countless everyday choices, any single purchase decision by an individual consumer appears as
utterly  inadequate  to  alleviate  them.173 The  ‘causal  impotence’ of  an  individual  is  especially
disruptive for liberal thinkers, such as Samuel Scheffler. Losing one’s self-conception as a causal
actor  is  a  major  impediment  for  pushing  for  social  and  political  change,  and  thus  must  be
reconciled.174 Reclaiming the status of individuals and providing an account of their  correlative
responsibilities is the primary concern of the ‘individualist’ camp, as contrasted to the ‘collectivists’
I will discuss below.175 
Schwartz suggests that two approaches widely based on causality and complicity have emerged to
show that individuals retain moral agency also when participating in large-scale, uncoordinated and
harmful processes alongside many other individuals.176 By and large, the proponents of the causal
approach  attempt  to  show  that  an  individual  consumer  has  had  and  maintains  influence  over
harmful  production  processes.  Derek  Parfit  makes  a  distinction  between  perceptible  and
imperceptible harming, claiming that the latter  kind of action is also morally condemnable.  An
individual  consumer's  contribution qualifies for the latter:  the impact  of an individual purchase
172 Julia Nefsky, ‘Consumer Choice and Collective Impact’, in Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, ed. Anne Barnhill, 
Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1.
173 Michael Pollan, ‘Why Bother?’, The New York Times Magazine, 20 April 2008, http://michaelpollan.com/articles-
archive/why-bother/.
174 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 67–70, 123.
175 Simo Kyllönen, ‘Climate Change, No-Harm Principle, and Moral Responsibility of Individual Emitters’, Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 2016, 2.
176 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 57; there are alternative categorisations. Nefsky considers instrumental, non-
instrumental, and expressive reasons for buying ethical food products, and Sassatelli discusses consumer 
responsibility as a virtue: Nefsky, ‘Consumer Choice and Collective Impact’; Roberta Sassatelli, ‘Virtue, 
Responsibility and Consumer Choice’, in Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives, ed. John Brewer and Frank 
Trentmann (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 219–50.
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decision is too small to be perceptible, but when joined with others produces a perceptible effect.177
Julia  Nefsky suggests that a morally relevant instrumental contribution to a harm can be separate
from what  is  seen as  ‘making a  difference’.178 Shelly  Kagan develops  a  threshold approach of
expected utility, presenting the mere chance of contributing to a harm as a morally relevant factor.
For instance, if buying an individual steak has the likelihood of incentivising the cattle farmer to
slaughter more cattle, an individual consumer ought to refrain from purchasing it.179
These approaches might seem challenged when reflected against the sheer empirical complexity of
global  production  processes.  As  Kagan  states,  in  the  ‘good  old  days’  examples  used  by
consequentialist ethicists fared better than in more contemporary cases in which a plethora of actors
interacts in complicated processes that generate the harmful outcomes.180 A wider variant of the
causality approach is what Nefsky refers to as the ‘indirect outcomes approach’.181 For instance,
Holly  Lawford-Smith  develops  an  argument  in  favour  of  consumer  responsibility  to  signal  a
willingness to come together to form collectives that can prevent harms in global supply chains,
arguing that treating purchase decisions as signals consumers send to each other better reflects the
way they can make a difference.182 Such approaches conceptualise purchase action by individual
consumers as causally consequential, but in a wider sense than based on direct market pressure it
places on companies.
To consider  an alternative approach,  an individual  consumer can be portrayed as a  meaningful
moral agent in global supply chains also from a widely complicity-based perspective. Christopher
177 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 86.
178 Nefsky, ‘Consumer Choice and Collective Impact’.
179 Shelly Kagan, ‘Do I Make a Difference?’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, no. 2 (2011): 105–141.
180 Kagan, 105.
181 Nefsky, ‘Consumer Choice and Collective Impact’.
182 Holly Lawford Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’, Ethics & International Affairs 29, no. 3 ‐
(2015): 315–330.
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Kutz addresses what he sees as the failure of traditional consequentialist and Kantian accounts to
provide  tools  to  address  individual  contributions  to  collective  wrongdoings.  According  to  his
complicity approach to responsibility, ‘I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally
participate in the wrong they do or harm they cause. I am accountable for the harm or wrong we do
together, independently of the actual difference I make’.183 Intentional participation to a harm rather
than the harmful outcomes of one’s acts grounds individual culpability. Kutz suggests that one can
accrue culpability by being complicit in what he calls ‘unstructured collective harms’.184 Such a
case  manifests  when  individuals  are  aware  of  a  damage  they  inflict  while  operating  in  an
uncoordinated fashion others, for instance when people harm the environment by using fridges and
automobiles with Freon coolants.185
Kutz claims that unstructured groups, such as consumers, can be complicit in harms, because they
are actually often more structured than one initially thinks: even unstructured groups share ‘deeper,
systemic,  forms  of  collective  action’ and  participate  in  ‘a  culture  of  way  of  life’.186 Schwartz
suggests  that  Kutz’s  definition  of  the underlying cultural  structures  is  too vague.  To Schwartz,
saying that also unstructured groups are structured does not stay focused on specific wrongdoings
and sets too much weight on the ‘passive fact of collective membership’ rather than on consumers’
agency.187 To adjust the argument, Schwartz proposes that the level of structure does not determine
individual  culpability;  individuals  belonging to  unstructured  groups can  bear  as  much remedial
duties  as  individuals  in  structured  groups.  It  is  the  intentional  participation  in  a  collective
183 Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 122.
184 Kutz, Complicity, 146.
185 Kutz discusses extensively the example of Dresden fire-bombers as a local example of complicity in a harm: 171–
72.
186 Kutz, 167.
187 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 80.
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wrongdoing that matters, and ultimately justifies holding consumers as complicit in harms taking
place in global supply chains.188
Schwartz’s adjustment of Kutz’s complicity view runs on a Kantian vein: what makes complicity in
harms as morally condemnable is that one ought not to treat people as mere means when interacting
with them. While I agree with Schwartz’s view that Kutz’s cultural interconnectedness is a vague
description of  the diversity  of  practices  in  which consumption  takes  place across  the  world,  it
appears that Schwartz’s response places a heavy weight on intentionality. Often, although surely not
always, consumers are unaware of the harmful practices in production processes to the extent that
would justify an indictment that they intend to be complicit in them. Schwartz’s approach gives the
ability to influence harms less central a role in determining agency than the widely causality-based
approaches,  but  holding  consumers  as  responsible  on  these  grounds  nevertheless  requires  that
consumers have significant empirical knowledge about the production processes, about the roots of
potential harms taking place in them, and about the alternative paths of action to alleviate the harm.
Showing that consumers possess such knowledge needed to intentionally participate in the harms in
global supply chains remains an obstacle in Schwartz’s account, at least if consumers are to be held
responsible for a wide variety of harms to workers, societies and the planet that potentially loom in
complicated supply chains.
Complicity-based  arguments  on  consumer  responsibility  are  not  built  only  on  Kutz’s  seminal
account,  and  alternatives  are  growing  more  and  more  articulated.  Lawford-Smith  takes  up  a
complicity  framework  by  Robert  Goodin  and  Chiara  Lepora  to  suggest  that  companies  and
corporations  are  the  primary  perpetrators  of  injustices  in  production  processes,  and  consumers
causing such injustices is at best a ‘by-product’ of the companies and corporations’ causing them in
the first place. Yet, consumers remain complicit in a more subtle manner, such as by conniving in
188 Schwartz, 80–82; for a distinction between structured and unstructured collectives: Schwenkenbecher, ‘Joint Duties
and Global Moral Obligations’.
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and condoning harms.189 Consumers being complicit  in one or several  of these ways may well
provide a broadly non-causal articulation of the role that individual consumers play in relation to
harms  in  supply  chains.  Yet,  it  is  worth  noticing  that  to  Lawford-Smith  complicity  is  a  weak
grounds for responsibility: it activates only when no other grounds are valid and even then its moral
implications are similar to that of benefiting from an injustice.  As I argue in more detail in chapter
5, benefiting from an injustice is unlikely to give rise to stringent moral responsibilities. Hence, at
this stage it makes sense to pursue another articulation of moral agency that then may give rise to
weightier remedial responsibilities.
The causality and complicity approaches offer two overlapping pathways to frame the individual
consumer as a moral agent in the context of global production. In very crude terms, the difference in
emphasis  between  them is  that  the  former  considers  an  individual  consumer  as  a  moral  actor
because her acts are causally significant, whereas the latter because she possesses the faculties to
choose whether or not to participate in wrongdoings linked with global production.190 The advocates
of  the  former  approach  are  prone  to  engage  in  causal  theorising  to  show  that  an  individual
consumer’s actions  make a  difference,  whereas those in favour of the latter  approach focus on
showing that the moral agency of a single consumer lies on an individual’s inherent capacity to
choose whether or not to be complicit in collective action that treats those involved with production
processes as mere means. However, both approaches acknowledge that the ability to cause things is
part and parcel of what it means to be a moral agent. As pinpointing the way consumers play a
causally meaningful role in the vast production processes remains a challenge to both approaches, I
now consider whether consumers would be more conveniently considered as a collective that bears
responsibilities.191
189 Lawford Smith, ‘Does Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?’‐
190 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 157–58; Kutz, Complicity, 138.
191 A further inquiry into free will and determinism stands outside the scope of this work. As Francois Raffoul points 
out, judicial, penal and legal definitions of responsibility presuppose a certain conception of human being as a 
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3.2.2 RESPONSIBLE COLLECTIVE
Treating consumers as a collective moral agent would sidestep some of the difficulties encountered.
A venerable line of theorising attempts to reclaim individual agency threatened by processes of
globalisation by articulating collective agents, whose causal roles in complicated processes is often
easier to discern, as moral agents. These approaches generally aim to show that collectives can have
the  morally  relevant  characteristics  traditionally  conceived as  belonging to  individuals,  such as
intentionality and a unified self. While such a move has been criticised by individualists, David
Cooper  points  out  that  as  in  the  real  world  collectives  are  nevertheless  continuously  ascribed
responsibility and blame, such theoretical work is timely and well-placed.192
Recent  examples  of  theorising  collective  moral  agency  abound.  Toni  Erskine  states  that  the
discussion of institutions as moral agents in the study of International Relations is impoverished,
and that institutions, such as the United Nations, can be held as agents capable of purposive action
in different degrees, and thus can incur responsibilities.193 Peter French proposes that corporations
are artificial moral agents because they satisfy two criteria: they are separate from mere crowds by
having centralised decision-making structures which make them capable of formulating purposes
capable agent. Also this thesis presupposes individuals as grounds and causes of their acts. Here, I follow Bernard 
Williams’ warning against making the concept of responsibility ‘metaphysically deep’, that is, presuming there are 
profound forces, such as fate, that threaten individual responsibility. François Raffoul, The Origins of 
Responsibility (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010), 6, 24; Bernard Williams, Shame and 
Necessity (Berkeley, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), chapter 3; also Peter F. Strawson, ‘Freedom and
Resentment’, in Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 48: 1962, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), 1–25.
192 D. E. Cooper, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Philosophy 43, no. 165 (1968): 258; Jan Narveson argues that ‘[n]othing 
else [but the individual] can literally be the bearer of full responsibility.’ Jan Narveson, ‘Collective Responsibility’, 
The Journal of Ethics 6, no. 2 (2002): 179.
193 Toni Erskine, ‘“Blood on the UN’s Hands’’’? Assigning Duties and Apportioning Blame to an Intergovernmental 
Organisation”’, Global Society 18, no. 1 (2004): 21–42; Toni Erskine, ‘Coalitions of the Willing and 
Responsibilities to Protect: Informal Associations, Enhanced Capacities, and Shared Moral Burdens’, Ethics & 
International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2014): 115–145.
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for their action, and by having an identity over time, which makes them distinct from spontaneous
gatherings.194 Christian List and Philip Pettit suggest four conditions that ‘a system’ has to satisfy in
order  to  qualify as  an agent:  it  forms representational  and goal-seeking states  (e.g.  beliefs  and
desires,  or  judgements  and  plans);  in  forming  and  revising  these  states  it  satisfies  appropriate
conditions of rationality; it acts or intervenes in the world on the basis of these states to realise its
goals; and it exhibits these three properties not just contingently but robustly.195
Consumers constitute, to use Kutz’s term, an unstructured group and thus unlikely to meet these
conditions.  As an ‘aggregate collectivity’,  or mere collections of people,  they are distinct from
‘conglomerate  collectivities’,  or  organisations  of  individuals  the  identity  of  which  cannot  be
reduced to identities of the persons in the organisation.196 John Searle suggests that shared action is
distinguishable from ‘mere summation of heap of individual acts’ by the former being intentional; it
is necessary that there is a ‘we do’ intention rather than only ‘I do’ in the action.197 While this ‘we-
intention’ might take various forms, it nevertheless has a central role in most accounts of shared
action.198 To  be  sure,  consumers  share  similar  sentiments  by  seeking  their  own  welfare  in  an
identical  but  independent  fashion  through  market  interactions,  and  some  consumers  indeed
communicate with each other to organise collective action, such as boycotts and ’buycotts’, in a
way that might qualify calling them an organised group. However, it is still far-fetched to claim that
consumers disaggregated around the world or even within a single political community are sharing
194 Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
195 Christian List and Philip Pettit, ‘Group Agency and Supervenience’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 51 
(2006): 87.
196 French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, 5, 13.
197 John Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, in Intentions in Communication, ed. Philip R. Cohen, Martha E. 
Pollack, and Jerry Morgan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 401–415.
198 For instance, Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller take a reductionist individual view that does not need an element 
of cooperation between individual members: ‘We-Intentions’, Philosophical Studies 53, no. 3 (1988): 367–389; 
Abraham Sesshu Roth, ‘Shared Agency’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(Stanford University, 2017).
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a ’we-intent’. Despite a rising segment of consumers interested in buying ’ethically’, consumers, as
a general category, share no intentions in common.
This  does  not mean that  prospective duties  cannot  be ascribed to  very disparate  groups.  Some
theorists have taken up the difficult task of considering under what conditions crowds and mobs,
which  lack  decision-making  procedures,  whose  members  are  not  related,  and  which  often  act
chaotically and irrationally, can be held as moral agents.199 Raimo Tuomela argues that mobs can be
collectively responsible if at least some of their members contribute directly to harm and others
either facilitate these contributions or fail to prevent them. Mob members are ‘implicated’ in mob
action even if they do not organise themselves to produce a specific harm. To Tuomela, even if
crowds and rioters do not think of themselves as doing so, they perform their acts as members of a
group.200 Similarly, Virginia Held suggests that a ‘random collection of individuals’, as distinct from
a mob, is an entity that can bear retrospective responsibility if its members choose not to take action
to prevent a harm in a situation where they could do so. Passersby who witness a victim being
beaten to death in their full sight can be blamed for the victim’s death. They share a particular
challenge and are able to communicate with each other, which makes them a ‘related’ rather than a
‘random’ group.201
Yet, these arguments on mobs and crowds operate in a different context than that of consumers in
the global economy. They attempt to capture moral responsibility in a local and temporally confined
setting instead of describing the responsibility of disaggregated individuals across the world who do
199 Marion Smiley and Edward N. Zalta, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Stanford University, 2017).
200 Raimo Tuomela, ‘Actions by Collectives’, Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 476; Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo 
Miller, ‘We-Intentions’, Philosophical Studies 53, no. 3 (1988): 367–389.
201 Virginia Held, ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?’, The Journal of Philosophy 67, 
no. 14 (1970): 471–481; on a similar vein, Stanley Bates argues that such groups are not as ‘random’ as they might 
seem: ‘The Responsibility of “Random Collections”’, Ethics 81, no. 4 (1971): 343–349.
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not  communicate  with  each  other  in  any  meaningful  manner,  or  even  the  responsibility  of
consumers confined within a specific political community, such as an affluent democracy. While it
seems possible to argue that sometimes also groups that have little in common can come together to
bear responsibility, aiming to stretch the conventional criteria of collective moral agency to apply to
consumers is a discouraging task.202
3.3 SHARED AGENCY
Neither conceptualising the individual consumer as a moral agent in vast production processes, nor
arguing that  consumers constitute a  collective moral  agent,  completely satisfies as a theoretical
framework for arguing that consumers in affluent democracies constitute a moral agent capable of
bearing remedial responsibilities with regards to harms in global supply chains. In this section, I
claim that consumers share agency in the global markets in a way distinct from both individual and
collective accounts discussed above. They are less than a collective, but more than a mob, which
qualifies consumers as being able to bear shared responsibilities that can be discharged only through
joint action. To be sure, a Kantian notion of moral responsibility and moral agency are distant from
this view. A Kantian advocate of collective responsibility would insist that collective entities qualify
as moral agents if they bear enough resemblance with individuals, for instance by having structures
in place that resemble having a free will and a unified moral self. The framework I adopt rejects
these conditions and allows a more diverse selection of collective entities to be considered as moral
agents.
In  political  theory,  the  concept  of  shared  responsibility  is  usually  harnessed  in  the  context  of
political collectives. Larry May argues that all members of a community in Southern post-bellum
America  were  responsible  for  violent  acts  of  racism,  as  the  community  nurtured  attitudes  and
202 Cf. Lawford Smith, ‘Does Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?’‐
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sentiments  that  ultimately  encouraged  some  members  to  act.203 Neha  Crawford  suggests  that
individual citizens of a democratic society come to bear responsibility for military atrocities and
unjust  wars  conducted  by  their  state,  instead  of  responsibility  hovering  ‘over  and  above’ its
individual members.204 Farid Abdel-Nour has also explored responsibility that individual citizens
bear for harms conducted by their state. He uses Bernard Williams's concept of agent regret to argue
that  as  the  compliance  of  citizens  is  necessary  for  a  state  to  conduct  atrocities,  citizens  are
responsible for the outcome, although not in a robust sense that would justify anyone else but the
citizens  themselves  to  say  that  they  ought  to  remedy the  bad deed.205 Marion  Smiley  offers  a
succinct definition that captures the conventional use of the concept:
Collective responsibility refers to the responsibility of a collective entity, e.g., a
corporation, a nation state, or a club, for harm in the world. Shared responsibility
refers to the responsibility of group members for such harm in cases where they
acted together to bring the harm about. Collective responsibility is associated with
a single, unified, moral agent. Shared responsibility is associated with individual
moral  agents  who  contribute  to  harm  as  members  of  a  group  either  directly
through their own actions or indirectly through their membership in the group.206
203 Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); May develops the concept of 
‘putative’ as opposed to ‘actual’ groups or collective agents in: ‘Collective Inaction and Responsibility’, in 
Individual and Collective Responsibility, ed. Peter French (Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books, 1998), 218; also 
Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, ‘Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape’, Hypatia 9, no. 2 (1994): 
134–151; Paul Kirby, ‘Refusing to Be a Man?’, Men and Masculinities 16, no. 1 (2013): 93–114.
204 Bill Wringe, ‘From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional Obligations’, Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, 
no. 1 (2014): 172.
205 Farid Abdel-Nour, ‘Responsible for the State: The Case of Obedient Subjects’, European Journal of Political 
Theory, 2014.
206 Marion Smiley, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, 
2017).
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To be sure,  global  markets  are  a sphere of  action very different  from political  communities as
discussed  by  May,  Crawford,  and  Abdel-Nour  above:  whereas  in  the  standard  accounts  those
sharing responsibility are demarcated by communal boundaries, global supply chains extend well
beyond  them.  However,  Iris  Marion  Young  has  developed  an  elaborate  notion  of  shared
responsibility  in  this  global  context.  Aiming  to  negotiate  between  the  isolating  concepts  of
individual responsibility and undiscriminating claims about collective responsibility, she suggests
that there is a specific kind of shared responsibility to which civil society activists refer when they
claim that buyers in industrialised countries have a responsibility to act upon injustices in the global
garment industry, such as labour and human rights violations.207 Individual consumers come to share
political responsibility by ‘belonging together with others in a system of interdependent processes
of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realize projects’.208 No
membership in a political  community is  needed for individuals to share responsibility;  political
institutions rise as a response to these obligations rather than ground them.209
I will return to Young’s treatise in the following chapter. While her model of shared responsibility
treats processes of global production as morally relevant, and usefully deepens the range of harms
for  which actors  may bear  responsibility  together,  her  account  remains  tensioned regarding the
connection between the actors sharing responsibility. May, Crawford and Abdel-Nour all broadly
suggest that shared responsibility arises out of ‘contributing to a harm as members of a group’.210
Young rejects this path as too blame-oriented, suggesting instead that the mere ‘belonging together’
207 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, 8.
208 Iris Marion Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model’, Social Philosophy and Policy 
23, no. 1 (2006): 119.
209 Young, 102; for a contrast, Rawls argues that political institutions constitute the sphere of justice: Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice.
210 Smiley and Zalta, ‘Collective Responsibility’.
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to a system of interconnected processes suffices as grounds of shared responsibility.211 As I will
detail,  this leaves open the role that contribution plays in her account. Drawing on contributory
language  still  seems  necessary  when  differentiating  between  actors’ responsibilities,  making  it
unclear whether Young’s model of shared responsibility ultimately distinguishes consumers as a
group to which special responsibilities ought to be assigned.
The challenge of differentiating consumers as a group capable of bearing shared responsibilities is
better  managed  by  a  pragmatist  framework  of  future-looking  collective  responsibility  (FLCR),
which stands apart from conventional accounts of collective responsibility in two senses.212 First,
Marion  Smiley  emphasises  that  most  conceptions  of  collective  responsibility  fail  to  distinguish
backward-looking responsibility, as an agent having caused an existing state of affairs, from future-
looking responsibility, as an agent being morally charged with bringing about a specific state of
affairs.  She argues that future-looking responsibility does not necessarily rest  on a causal story
about the agent’s past involvement with the harm; remedial responsibility can be ascribed on a
variety of grounds, only one among which is an actor’s contribution to a harm. Second, the FLCR
framework relaxes the requirement that the collective moral agent has to exhibit at least some kind
of an individual-like intentionality in order to be able to bear responsibility. Assigning responsibility
does not aim to ‘capture an agent’s will’ rather than to ‘distribute moral labor’; instead of resting on
a metaphysically intricate view of a collective mind or we-intentions, a group can be a moral agent
if it is 'able to do something in the world and take responsibility for making things happen’.213 
211 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 380.
212 Future-looking and forward-looking are here used interchangeably. Peter French and Howard Wettstein, eds., 
Forward Looking Collective Responsibility, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXXVIII (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2014).
213 Smiley and Zalta, ‘Collective Responsibility’.
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Smiley suggests that the most important criterion in identifying a group as a collective moral agent
is its capacity to do something about a specific problem, for instance poverty, hunger, or racism.214
Treating  individuals  and  groups  alike  as  agents  capable  of  discharging  moral  responsibility  is
theoretically possible not because their internal organisation matches with some preset criteria, but
because in  some cases conceptualising them as moral  agents offers a solution to contemporary
moral challenges. From this perspective, holding consumers as a collective moral agent is justified
if doing so seems like a realistic way to get something done. The metaphysical burden of showing
that consumers as a group have certain ‘internal’ characteristics is replaced by worldly ‘external’
considerations of ends and means. In ascribing moral responsibilities, gauging the capacity of the
consumers to ensure the success of a particular moral project becomes a pivotal consideration.
To be sure, the framework shares with Young's conception the struggle to ascertain the role that
causing a harm has in acquiring remedial responsibilities.215 Smiley, for instance, claims that if one
does not want to reduce the FLCR framework to pure utilitarianism, one must assume that the
collective in question has at least ‘produced’ the harm.216 Initially, giving ‘producing’ a harm such a
central role threatens to slide her approach towards holding outcome responsibility as a necessary
condition  to  acquiring  remedial  responsibilities.  Yet,  the  framework  is  clearer  on  the  role  of
outcome responsibility than Young’s model. Were assigning responsibility treated ‘only’ as an act of
dividing  the  ‘moral  labour’,  many modern  social  institutions  operating  on  highly  sophisticated
notions of causation, such as legal courts, might be threatened. Hence, presuming a causal linkage
between a responsible party and a harm is ‘necessary’ in a pragmatist rather than metaphysical
sense,  a  testimony  to  the  persistence  of  evoking  guilt  as  a  central  tool  among  contemporary
214 Cf. David Schmidtz and Robert E. Goodin, Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 50.
215 Smiley and Zalta, ‘Collective Responsibility’.
216 Smiley and Zalta; also: Kenneth Shockley, ‘Programming Collective Control’, Journal of Social Philosophy 38, no.
3 (2007): 442–455.
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considerations,  such  as  ‘judgments  of  fairness  and  obligations’,  which  guide  the  allocation  of
remedial responsibilities.217
Smiley’s work explicitly aligns with Dewey’s ethics, as she suggests that responsibility is meant to
guide forward-looking action to achieve different moral projects, whereby concepts related to free
will  and  agents’  internal  states  are  only  instrumentally  relevant.218 From  these  pragmatist
underpinnings,  it  becomes  possible  to  treat  consumers  as  sharing  agency.  This  move is  not  as
radical as it might sound. Autonomous and capable individuals are usually able to make things
happen, whereby assigning responsibilities to them makes sense. To compare, some groups, such as
those  lacking  decision-making  mechanisms,  are  less  likely  to  achieve  ends  than  their  more
structured cousins, such as companies and states, whereby it might not be useful to treat groups of
the former kind as moral agents. Smiley recognises that remedial responsibility is usually placed on
structured collective agents, such as states, companies and institutions, as they are more likely up to
realise  different  projects.  However,  the  status  of  a  group  or  an  individual,  including  that  of
consumers, as a moral agent is not preset but subject to recalibration. Consumers’ potential to shape
the supply chains by acting together makes it worth asking whether treating consumers as a moral
agent would unlock resources to alleviate harms in them.
3.4 DUTY TO COLLECTIVISE
Drawing  on  emerging  literature  on  consumers’ collectivisation  duties,  I  suggest  as  a  working
definition of consumer responsibility that by virtue of ‘belonging together’ in the global markets,
consumers  share a duty to  organise themselves into collectives  that  are  capable of  pushing for
217 Tracy Isaacs writes that an actor being causally implicated in a harm leads to a ‘heavier burden of obligation’ 
among the various grounds for collective obligations: ‘Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation’, 
Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2014): 47.
218 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 25–26.
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reforms  in  global  production  processes.  Collectivisation  duties  are  usually  elaborated  in  more
confined cases. As it comes to applications in a global context, Erskine refers to a responsibility
shared by individual states, non-state actors and intergovernmental organisations to create together a
‘coalition of the willing’ for the purpose of stopping a gross violation of human rights. As such
collectivisation wields agents with ‘enhanced capacities’ to inhibit harms, those agents who are able
to  create  or  already  find  themselves  in  such  associations  are  to  be  burdened  with  magnified
individual responsibilities.219 Stephanie Collins argues that duties to collectivise may arise when
individuals face certain predicaments which can be solved only by collective action.220 Such duties
are borne, for instance, by individual swimmers on a beach who can save a drowning person only
by working together.  Instead  of  each swimmer  having a  duty to  rescue,  each of  them ‘has  an
individual duty to act responsively to others with a view to there being a collective that can rescue
the swimmer, if such a group would incur a duty to do so’.221 Elizabeth Cripps calls some groups as
‘weakly  collective’,  and  suggests  that  each  member  of  such  an  unstructured  collective  has  a
derivative individual duty to promote the formation of a collective.222 On a related note, Stephen
Gardiner  discusses  the  conditions  under  which  momentarily  gathered  groups  may  come  to  be
related rather than random on right conditions.223
219 Erskine, ‘Coalitions of the Willing and Responsibilities to Protect’, 134–35.
220 Stephanie Collins, ‘Collectives’ Duties and Collectivization Duties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2012, 
231–48.
221 Collins, 247; Similarly, Anne Schwenkenbecher takes up the concept of ‘joint duties’ to remind that such duties are 
distinct from a duty of a collective to act in a certain way: Schwenkenbecher, ‘Joint Duties and Global Moral 
Obligations’.
222 Elizabeth Cripps, Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 142–46.
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However, also wider applications exist.224 Bill Wringe takes a global approach that is of interest to
my argument, as he argues that a collective has a duty to organise itself in a way that discharging its
obligations becomes possible, if spontaneous action on the part of its members is highly unlikely to
resolve the situation.225 Duties of individuals to collectivise are conceptually distinct from duties of
the collective; the former are ‘grounded’ on the latter. From these underpinnings, Wringe draws the
argument that every person living on the Earth has a duty to bring into existence the institutions that
enable  the  ‘global  collective’ that  constitutes  the  humanity  as  a  whole  to  realise  its  moral
obligations to take care of global challenges that current institutions are unable to resolve.226
Wringe’s is a rather extreme interpretation of collectivisation duties. Anne Schwenkenbecher offers
an empirical rebuttal, writing that such a global obligation cannot exist, because joint action works
best on a small to medium scale, for instance in case of five passersby having the chance to help in
a traffic accident.227 Whether members of an unstructured group hold joint duties depends on a
number  of  contingent  factors,  including  capacities  of  individual  actors  and  the  ease  of
collectivisation, which in the case of a global collective are low. Wringe retorts by limiting his view:
a duty to collectivise applies only if the problem in question is urgent enough. Taking a Kantian
line, he suggests that the stringency of creating a global collective arises out of ‘a large number of
significant violations of individuals’ basic rights’.228 This is not enough to Schwenkenbecher, who
rejects  Wringe’s claim that humans have the potential  for creating a ‘global collective agency’.
Instead, she suggests that specific ’subgroups of ”humanity”’ are better equipped to combat such
problems and are thus more suitable bearers of such collectivisation duties.229
224 E.g. Erskine, ‘Coalitions of the Willing and Responsibilities to Protect’.
225 Wringe, ‘From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional Obligations’, 182.
226 Wringe, 176.
227 Schwenkenbecher, ‘Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations’, 321.
228 Wringe, ‘From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional Obligations’, 178.
229 Schwenkenbecher, ‘Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations’, 327.
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I  agree with Schwenkenbecher  that a global duty to collectivise is  unlikely to be realised,  and
recognise that a duty held by consumers to organise themselves into collective agents might be
attacked on similar grounds. Obliging every individual to join together in a single collective entity
has low chances of bringing forth much positive change, as such a duty ceases to be manageable.
However, one can still  argue that her criticism does not ultimately apply to consumers’ duty to
collectivise.  Wringe  grounds  obligations  to  collectivise  on  humanity,  in  abstraction  from  any
political  or  social  structure,  whereas  consumers’  duty  to  collectivise  is  grounded  on  their
involvement with the markets. Although the scope of the argument is global, because transactions
linked with global production processes extend across state boundaries, it is not universal, as in
applying to every individual in the world.
As written above,  Holly Lawford-Smith takes up the debate and applies it directly to the case of
consumers. She suggests that unorganised groups ought to organise themselves only when there is a
probable chance that a beneficial impact will be created, and argues that consumers are a group in
which such potential lies. Consumers have an obligation to signal that they are ready to join up
together with each other to put an end to serious harms faced by persons and the environment in
production processes.230 This signalling takes place by, for instance, refraining from some products
while  favouring  others  in  costly  and  visible  enough  a  manner  that  convinces  others  of  the
authenticity  of  the signal.  With this  move,  Lawford-Smith shifts  the desired outcome closer  to
consumers. While it is difficult to show that an individual consumer’s purchases make a difference
in relation to harms in global production processes, burdening her with a duty to signal an interest to
form a collective that could end harmful practices has a chance of being efficacious relative to that
end. Lawford-Smith’s argument is a consequentialist approach to reclaiming individual agency; as
she writes, ‘[a]n individual’s obligation to signal her conditional willingness to get together with
others in pursuit of a morally important end has a consequentialist justification, but of a broader sort
230 Lawford Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’, 316.‐
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than is typically offered’.231 She takes a very different route to reach the same outcome as Wringe: a
collective can distribute roles to its members to see that its task is done. However, where she differs
from Wringe is  that  a  ‘non-collective’ such as  consumers  cannot  bear  duties,  which  are  to  be
replaced with individuals’ collectivisation duties.232 As I will elucidate in the third part of the thesis,
this  leaves  her  argument  somewhat  vulnerable  to  regression,  as  it  lacks  an  underlying  moral
principle to limit the scope of consumers’ responsibility to collectivise in the first place.233 
Yet, I contend that hers is a valid working definition of consumers’ responsibility: consumers share
a duty to collectivise into associations that are able to alleviate harms in global supply chains.  A
duty to collectivise is shared in the sense in which Young uses the term: it is impossible to discharge
without getting together with others. Embracing such a duty does not presume a fixed ontological
position on whether the origins of responsibilities lie in the collectives of which individuals are
members, or whether the responsibilities of collectives derive from those of individuals. As the
central  function  of  assigning  responsibility  is  to  realise  diverse  moral  projects,  the  main
consideration  is  whether  assigning  a  responsibility  to  any  particular  actor  or  actors,  be  they
individuals or groups, creates the kind of a world and agents that align with the ends in view. This
consideration does not take place ad hoc, as contingently derived from an actor’s capacity to realise
a  particular  project.  Acknowledging the  Deweyan insight  that  assigning  responsibility  involves
shaping the habits, conventions and behavioural patterns to which actors resort in order to orient
among the diverse ‘situations’ they face, the moral projects in relation to which actors are treated as
moral agents span beyond a specific point in time and space.
231 Lawford Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’, 325.‐
232 Holly Lawford Smith, ‘What “We”?’, ‐ Journal of Social Ontology 1, no. 2 (2015): 244.
233 Wringe criticises Collins of a similar move: Wringe, ‘From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional 
Obligations’, 179.
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The hypothetical responsibility discussed here concerns primarily individuals. Assigning duties to a
‘non-collective’ of consumers would be superfluous and misleading, as there is no ‘we’ to bear any
moral obligation.  Rather,  the elusive potential  that consumers could harness together to redeem
harms in global production processes gives rise to individual consumers’ shared duty to collectivise,
to create a ‘we’.234 This starting point is not to be taken for granted, as there might be instances in
which assigning responsibilities to structured collective agents is more conducive to realising a
moral  project.  For  instance,  Onora  O’Neill  suggests  that  there  is  more  potential  in  burdening
existing institutions than individuals with responsibilities,  because institutions can better  predict
consequences, keep more systematic and accurate memories, as well as carry through plans and
influence other agents.235 I will return to this aspect in chapter 11, and in what follows discuss a
responsibility shared by individual consumers that they can discharge by creating collectives that
potentially have responsibilities of their own.
3.5 MARKETS
So far, I have focused on the main actor, consumers, but their stage remains unexplored. In this final
section,  I  discuss  whether  markets,  the  social  institution  in  which  individuals  are  defined  as
consumers,  constitutes  a  sphere  of  action  in  which  moral  responsibilities  can  be  discharged.
Matthew  Hilton  argues  that  seeing  markets  as  a  forum for  positive  moral  action  is  largely  a
contemporary phenomenon: from the 18th to the mid-20th century consumption was subjected to a
largely negative moral judgment, whereas the late 20th century saw an attempt to ‘remoralise’ the
market.236 Nowadays, the proponents of ethical consumerism suggest that even if most shopping
234 Lawford Smith, ‘What “We”?’, 243–47.‐
235 Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 
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236 Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain: The Search for a Historical Movement (Cambridge: 
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decisions people make are individualised, materialistic, privatised and self-interested, consumers
should  take  ethical  concerns  into  account  when deciding  upon the  ‘best  deal’ available  in  the
markets.237
In this final section, I side with the view that markets constitute a forum in which pursuing moral
goals  is  possible.  Lisa  Herzog  has  distinguished  three  positions  vis-à-vis  markets  as  a  system
capable of realising various ethical values, such as equality, individual liberties, and efficiency in
creating social welfare. Criticism against ethical consumerism can be summoned from each of the
three camps, and I will address them in turn. First, Herzog refers to thinkers inspired by widely
Marxist and Rousseauian traditions as ‘foes’ of the markets. To them, the challenges linked with
ethical consumerism stem from the very definition of the markets: all interaction in the markets is
by  default  self-interested,  as  distinct  from,  for  instance,  gift-giving  for  the  sake  of  building
relationships, and other activities in which goods and services are exchanged.238 Hence, markets
operate on a logic of self-interest that sits uneasily with the expectation that consumers ought to
engage in other-regarding projects by their purchases.
To foes,  ethical consumption can be helpful  at  most  as attempts to  veil  and unveil  commodity
fetishism in more or less successful ways.239 Such an approach is taken by some advocates of world-
system research, which constitutes a major research agenda on global supply chains.240 Immanuel
Wallerstein’s work alludes that while asking consumers to act ethically is unlikely to change the
exploitative capitalist system to which markets are inexorably linked, drawing cognitive maps about
18th Century’, Journal of Consumer Culture 4, no. 1 (2004): 101–23.
237 To be sure, the concepts of ethical and political consumerism that refer to actions that consumers can take up in the 
markets are often used interchangeably. Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, 13, 15, 41–42.
238 Lisa Herzog, ‘Markets’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 
2016).
239 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, 2.
240 Bair, ‘Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains’.
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the origins of products in modern supply chains is needed to expose the alienating and deleterious
effects of the markets, and to resolve affluent consumers of their commodity fetishism.  Activists
can highlight the problems upstream in order to motivate practical action to deconstrue a destructive
system encompassing  commodification,  accumulation  and  exploitation.  Yet,  attempts  to  ‘tame’
markets into being ethical are by themselves misguided.241
To counter, much of the criticism by the ‘foes’ too easily discards purchase action as intrinsic to the
‘supposedly  all-encompassing  capitalist  monolith’.242 Leyshon,  Lee  and  Williams  suggest  that
ethical consumerism can be seen as a form of ‘practical, day-to-day experiments in performing the
economy otherwise’.243 Disregarding such everyday practices is to lose sight of the groundwork
needed for a higher-level structural transformation. Exposing information on production conditions
to  shake  people  of  their  ‘commodity  fetishism’ does  not  exhaust  reasons  to  conduct  ethical
consumerism. Such consumerism might well have some unknown beneficial effect to the market
system  as  a  whole,  for  instance  in  a  hypothetical  situation  in  which  most  consumers  would
subscribe to it. As long as such scenarios remain among the possible futures, taking an agnostic
stance rather than blatantly dismissing ethical consumerism as redundant or even harmful is a more
promising path.
Not accepting the most dismissive views of ‘foes’ of the markets does not exhaust the arguments
that ethical consumerism is misplaced. Following Herzog’s categorisation, a ‘friend’ of the markets
241 Jennifer Bair, ‘Global Commodity Chains: Genealogy and Review’, in Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research, ed.
Jennifer Bair (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 7–8; Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Introduction to Special 
Issue on Commodity Chains in the World Economy, 1590 to 1790’, Review 23, no. 1 (2000): 1–13; David Harvey, 
‘Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographical Imagination’, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 80, no. 3 (1990): 418–34.
242 Nick Clarke et al., ‘Globalising the Consumer: Doing Politics in an Ethical Register’, Political Geography 26, no. 3
(2007): 10.
243 Andrew Leyshon, Roger Lee, and Colin Williams, Alternative Economic Spaces (Gateshead, UK: SAGE 
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sympathetic to the contemporary, liberal international order of freer trade could state that markets
ought to remain a sphere of self-interested action. If actors make choices in the market in other than
a self-interested manner, the social benefits of markets as the best available mechanism of realising
good  ethical  values,  such  as  individual  liberties  and  maximising  social  welfare,  will  be
undermined.244 The only responsibility that consumers are to honour is to respect their contractual
obligations. Milton Friedman writes that the mere window-dressing of market behaviour as acts of
‘social  responsibility’,  or  justifying  one's  choices  as  a  faster  way  of  solving  pressing  social
problems, is to slide towards a ‘centrally controlled system’; it welcomes ‘pure and unadulterated
socialism’ by  framing  the  seeking  of  profits  as  immoral  and  wicked  activity  to  be  curbed  by
political mechanisms.245
To add, a ‘critical friend’ might not be happy with all of Friedman’s prognostications, but would
still  concur  that  other  than  self-interested  aims  are  best  realised  outside  the  markets.  Political
participation and acts of philanthropy are needed, because being able to choose between products,
which is the primary activity of the consumer in the markets, is not truly moral action.246 In line
with some of the concerns raised by ‘foes’, markets can barely achieve their goal of efficient and
just  allocation  of  resources  without  substantial  public  oversight.  Moral  aspirations  are  more
efficiently manifested elsewhere,  such as in the realm of citizenship,  which to some liberals  is
worryingly being replaced by consumerism as the primary forum of public action. For instance, the
Economist, at times, acknowledges that there is a growing market in green, ethical, organic goods
and services,  but recommends voting as the primary means of reaching ‘ethical’ and ‘political’
goals.247
244 Cf. Hussain, ‘Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigilantism?’, 137–38.
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I find that also these concerns can be resolved to the extent that moral action in the markets is
possible. Many accounts that are easily interpreted as portraying markets as a domain of narrowly
self-interested behaviour allow for other modes of operation. To illustrate, Friedman is distrustful of
ethical  consumerism,  claiming  that  ‘activists’ who  entice  stockholders  and  consumers  towards
pressuring companies to contribute to social causes are essentially imposing taxes, which is a task to
be reserved for political decision-makers only.248 To me, although consumers, just as individuals in
general, are surely subject to external influences, treating consumers as agents completely separate
from 'activists' is to mischaracterise their agency. Friedman might be right in saying that the aim of
the businesses is to make money. However, as Nicole Hassoun points out, markets do not constrain
consumers from including more sophisticated factors, such as ethical and political values, besides
price and quality when considering between different products.249 If consumers are willing to pay
for ethical products, it is in the interest of stakeholders to answer such demand, which then unfolds
as the CEOs’ obligation to reform the business models accordingly.
Equally,  the  argument  of  the  ‘critical  friends’ runs  on  a  stylised  distinction  between state  and
markets. Barnett et  al suggest that consumer choice ought not to be described as a narrow and
misleading  way  of  doing  politics,  because  this  view  implies  a  romanticised  view  of  civic
behaviour.250 Portraying  consumer  behaviour  as  self-centred  instead  of  public-regarding,  and
claiming that  consumption  distracts  people  from realising  their  civic  obligations,  easily  frames
citizenship as a virtuous activity that runs on the public good. Michael Schudson argues that being a
citizen is  not all  about selflessly pursuing the common good together with others,  whereby the
juxtaposition  between  citizens  and  consumers  is  too  hasty.251 Empirical  studies  suggest  that
248 Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’.
249 Hassoun, ‘Consumption and Social Change’, 314–15.
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consumer action is positively connected with political engagement.252 Rob Harrison et al state that
ethical  consumerism  is  often  just  an  element  in  a  wider  campaign  of  civic  action,  including
‘shareholder actions, political lobbying, pickets and non-violent direct action’.253 To be sure, it is not
to  be  mistaken  as  a  form  of  ‘global  citizenship’ that  operates  purely  on  cosmopolitan  and
humanitarian  grounds.  Micheletti  reminds  that  consumption  can  equally  well  gain  nationalistic
undertones, such as when consumers prefer domestic products, and is often entangled in national
public  debates.254 Waheed Hussain  suggests  that  the  contemporary  acts  of  ethical  consumerism
ought  to  be  treated  as  impermissible  vigilantism,  only  some  of  which  is  acceptable  as  proto-
legislative  activity.255 Subsequently,  the  distinction  between  civic  and consumer  action  remains
blurred, a division to which I will return in chapter 12.
The ongoing debate on the markets as a system capable of realising ethical values reminds that
ethical  consumerism is  not  to  be  idealised  as  an  antidote  to  contemporary  problems of  global
production processes. Clarke et al point out that while what exactly counts as ethical consumerism
is  open  to  debate,  ‘ethical’  shopping  is  more  conveniently  understood  in  political  terms.256
Conceiving  ethical  consumerism as  a  form of  politics  that  is  done  in  an  ethical  register,  and
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especially using the register of responsibility, usefully elucidates the diverse functions of markets as
a sphere of action, but also that consumers themselves might not be the primary actors framing their
shopping in ethical terms: organised activities by strategic actors, such as corporations, join up to
conclude that ethical consumerism is not purely a bottom-up process.257 The ‘consumer’ is not so
much a sovereign agent rather than a ‘rhetorical figure and point of identification only contingently
related to the politicization of consumption’, which conceals the range of roles and motivations that
bring people to take part in ethical shopping campaigns.258 Keeping an eye on these diverse uses of
the ethical consumer narrative, I suggest that moral action in the markets remains possible. It is the
practical conditions, or whether markets can actually be used to effectively advance moral projects,
which comprise a more salient question to be discussed in the last part of the thesis.
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this dense chapter, I first argued that it is possible to hold consumers as agents capable of bearing
moral  responsibility,  although  characterising  their  status  in  global  production  processes  is
challenging as per conventional accounts of individual and collective moral agency. The choices
made by an  individual  consumer  make but  the  smallest  difference  in  global  demand,  whereby
treating him or her as a moral agent capable of interacting positively with the harms in supply
chains  requires  delicate  theoretical  footwork.  A  collective  they  are  not:  consumers  are  an
unstructured group with no we-intentions and organisatory structures, whereby they do not qualify
as structured collective agents capable of bearing moral responsibility as individuals do.
My solution has been to suggest that consumers are able to share responsibilities by the virtue of
their potential to come together to alleviate harms in supply chains. The theoretical blueprint for this
move is provided by the pragmatist framework of future-looking collective responsibility, which
257 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, 34.
258 Barnett et al., 19, 13.
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emphasises external rather than internal criteria for moral agency: remedial responsibilities can be
ascribed to groups if such an assignation helps realise moral projects in the world. Drawing on this
approach, I suggested that one way to specify consumer responsibility is that individual consumers
share a duty to collectivise into associations that tackle harms in global production processes, and
concluded that markets constitute a sphere of action in which such a duty can be discharged. While
the  role  that  consumers  play  in  the  global  economy  remains  elusive,  a  pragmatist  framework
provides sufficient reasons to turn to the potential grounds for their remedial responsibilities.
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4 CONTRIBUTION AND ASSOCIATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The following two chapters explore the diverse grounds based on which consumers in  affluent
democracies could have a moral responsibility to do something about harms that take place abroad
when items are produced for them. By grounds I mean simply ‘the criteria or reasons for attributing
responsibilities  to  different  agents’.259 The  pragmatist  approach  I  outlined  in  chapter  and  will
continue to develop in chapter 6 treats any assignation of a remedial responsibility not as an abstract
application  of  a  single  principle  rather  than  as  embedded  within  the  norms  and  conventions
prevalent in the public in question to cope amidst the diverse situations its members face in their
everyday  lives.  An  exploration  of  the  grounds  of  responsibility  as  theorised  in  global  ethics
literature is a useful starting point for clarifying the limits and opportunities these practices provide
for consumers to articulate their relation to harms in supply chains. 
To organise the task ahead, I take up a framework introduced by David Miller and further developed
by Christian Barry, which consists of principles of contribution, association, benefit, and capacity.
This chapter engages with the first two approaches. First, I argue that the contribution principle, as
advanced by Christian Barry and Kate Macdonald,  taps on the socially  prevalent  categories of
blame and fault but does not fully explicate the considerations, such as those on actors’ remedial
capacities, their communal allegiances, fairness, and the distribution of power, which affect what
kind of connections are considered as causally relevant in the first place. Second, I suggest that the
association principle, as elaborated by Iris Marion Young, struggles to qualify as an independent
259 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 3.
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grounds of  responsibility:  its  underpinnings  in  notions  of  political  responsibility  complicate  its
transfer from a communal to a global context without resorting to vocabularies of contribution.
4.2 FOUR PRINCIPLES
The underlying reason for exploring different grounds of remedial responsibility is that while many
theorists of global ethics consider the so-called conventional view as inadequate amidst individuals'
deepening connections  to  harms that  take place  beyond social  and communal  boundaries,  they
disagree on the kind of conception that could be used to allocate responsibilities in such a global
context. I have referred to some of these theorists in the introductory chapter. Samuel Scheffler
argues  that  there is  a  gap between the conventional  conception,  according to  which  'acts  have
primacy over omissions, near effects have primacy over remote effects, and individual effects have
primacy  over  group  effects',  and  a  more  universalist  conception  gaining  currency  through
globalisation.260 Iris Marion Young develops Scheffler's thought further by pointing out that the
conventional understanding is institutionalised not only in communal practices but also in the law,
which provides a distorted but persistent model for thinking about, for instance, consumers' moral
connection  to  sweatshop  labour  conditions.261 Marion  Smiley  suggests  that  the  'modern'
understanding  of  responsibility  is  not  universal  rather  than  shaped  by  communal  practices  of
blameworthiness,  or  inherently  practical  judgments  that  help communities  prevent  and mitigate
harms.262
Accordingly, moral philosophers have articulated several conceptions of responsibility potentially
more fitting to the context of global production processes. Christian Barry identifies four principles
260 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 39.
261 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’.
262 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 177–79, 258, 267.
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that have been used to justify an allocation of responsibility against the backdrop of transnational
problems. According to his categorisation, actors can be assigned remedial responsibility if they
contribute to a harm, are associated with those who suffer, benefit from a harm, or are capable of
helping those who suffer.263 His work is in turn an adaptation of categories introduced by David
Miller who writes about reasons based on which an agent is 'picked out, either individually or along
with others, as having a responsibility towards the deprived or suffering party that is not shared
equally  among  all  agents'.264 Miller  separates  six  grounds:  moral  responsibility,  outcome
responsibility, causal responsibility, benefit, capacity, and community.265
The  two  frameworks  are  close  to  each  other,  but  some  differences  are  worth  noticing.  Barry
discusses under the contribution principle much of what Miller separates as moral, outcome, and
causal  responsibility,  and  replaces  the  community  principle  with  the  association  principle  to
emphasise that morally relevant connections among individuals transcend communal boundaries.
Miller conceives primarily states and international institutions as agents, arguing that the discussion
on  responsibility  ought  to  focus  on  the  kind  of  principles  that  apply  to  those  institutions  that
primarily determine people's life chances.266 To compare, some of the work by Barry that is of most
relevance  to  this  thesis  examines  large  categories  of  individuals,  and especially  consumers,  as
bearers of moral obligations.267
263 Christian Barry, ‘Global Justice: Aims, Arrangements, and Responsibilities’, in Can Institutions Have 
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266 For instance, Miller suggests that: [w]orld poverty is a macro-problem that requires a systemic solution, and so 
thinking about it in terms of individual moral obligations seems an irrelevance.’ Miller, 10–12.
267 E.g. Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’; Barry and Macdonald, ‘Ethical Consumerism’; Christian Barry and Kate Macdonald, Ethics for 
Consumers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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In the following two chapters, I will use Barry’s framework to arrange the discussion on the diverse
grounds of consumer responsibility.268 To be sure, his categorisation belongs to the realm of ideal
theory: acknowledging one or several of the principles does not lead into any of the responsibilities
to be fulfilled. Further, their relative order of importance is initially left open by both philosophers.
Miller  explicitly  advocates  a  pluralist  view,  suggesting  that  actors  can  often  be  pinpointed  as
remedially  responsible  for something using more than one principle.  Although it  is  possible  to
arrange the principles into a hierarchy or challenge the distinctions between them, to him preferring
one principle over another ultimately is a matter of moral intuition; there is no 'algorithm' to solve in
actual situations which principle ought to be used.269
This  thesis  takes  such  pluralism as  a  starting  point,  but  suggests  that  it  is  both  possible  and
necessary to move beyond ‘mere’ moral intuition by providing at least contingent conceptual tools
that help people manoeuvre in specific contexts. I will return to the concept of pluralism in chapters
5 and 6. The four-part framework is a useful starting point, because save for presentations by Barry
and  Miller,  the  principles  based  on  which  one  can  attribute  remedial  responsibility  for  harms
beyond communal and state boundaries are conceptually unorganised and implicit across the bulk
of theoretical work. Each principle has been harnessed or can be applied to develop an argument in
favour of consumer responsibility. By serving as a device to organise the scattered scholarship, the
framework helps illuminate at least some complexities that arise from ambiguous terms of debate.
Being aware of the differences and similarities between the various arguments is a step towards
268 With a slight adjustment by referring to the ‘connectedness’ principle as ‘association’ principle, as Barry also does 
in: Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty.
269 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 100–105, 107; such guidelines are nevertheless present in 
policy-making, as illustrated by the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities on environmental 
protection. De Vito Lucia, ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility for the Global Environment’, SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2008).
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assessing  whether  they,  together  or  separately,  provide  plausible  tools  in  a  situation  in  which
conventional conceptions of responsibility are perplexed.
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4.3 CONTRIBUTION PRINCIPLE
4.3.1 AIM
The aim of this  section is  to  evaluate  an application of  the  contribution or ‘fault’ principle  on
consumer responsibility as portrayed by Christian Barry and Kate Macdonald.270 It is convenient to
start  with  the  contribution  principle,  because  causing  a  harm seems to  enjoy a  special,  almost
intuitive  status  as  a  grounds  for  an  actor's  moral  obligation  to  ‘put  a  bad  situation  right’. 271
Conventionally, the linkage between causation and moral responsibility is well established. Bernard
Williams points out that in standard accounts being a cause is a primary and necessary condition for
an agent to bear responsibility. While difficult cases such as collective harming make it sometimes
difficult to trace the causal roots of a harm to individual actors, problems in applying do not blur its
status.272 Similarly,  Scheffler  calls  as  'common-sensical'  the  intuition  that  agents  are  more
responsible for what they do than for what they fail to prevent.273 Marion Smiley points out that the
'modern' conception of responsibility conflates causation and blameworthiness together, making it
crucial to show that an actor is a cause of harm were he or she to be shamed, socially excluded or
legally punished.274
At the same time, normative theorists recognise that causation as a grounds of moral obligations in
contexts  such as  global  supply chains  has  its  limits.  Scheffler  points  out  that  global  processes
‘subsume’ the causal role of individuals, making it close to impossible to trace down individual
270 Daniel Butt refers to the ‘fault’ principle in: ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, 
no. 1 (2007): 138.
271 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 84.
272 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 56.
273 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 44–45.
274 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 4, 179.
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responsibility.275 Considerable ‘empirical uncertainty’ prevails in complex processes that generate
social injustice.276 Robert Goodin argues that when causes are intertwined and complex, attempts to
identify individual responsibility might be too costly to be worthwhile, and a no-fault based system
of assigning obligations superior. In transnational settings, an overt focus on causal inquiry can
distort the discourse on responsibility, leading to a point where harms are less effectively mitigated
and prevented.277 For instance, focusing only on emitters when combating climate change might not
be an effective or ‘fair’ way to alleviate the global problem, whereby alternative grounds to allocate
tasks have been introduced.278
A claim that consumers causally contribute to harms abroad by purchasing products has been voiced
in different forms. To use an example central in the latter part of the thesis, an advertising summary
of Peter  Eichstaedt’s  book on armed conflicts  in  eastern  Congo aptly  summarises  the  rhetoric:
‘Every time you use a cell phone or log on to a computer, you could be contributing to the death toll
in the bloodiest, most violent region in the world: the eastern Congo.’279 Philippe Le Billon points
out that an aim of the Fatal Transactions campaigning against ‘conflict diamonds’ from Angola or
Sierra Leone was, among other things, about awakening citizens to their responsibility as ‘terrorist
consumers’,  who  indirectly  perpetuate  acts  of  violence  against  civilians  by  their  consumption
practices.280 As I will elaborate in chapter 10, civil society campaigners resort to ‘guilty consumer’
275 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 44–45.
276 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 5.
277 Robert E. Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 
chapter 3.
278 E.g. Edward A. Page, ‘Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle’, International 
Theory 4, no. 2 (2012): 300–330.
279 Advertising summary. Peter Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo: War and Conflict Minerals in the World’s Deadliest
Place (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011).
280 Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, 779.
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claims to carve out a connection between a ‘peaceful’ space of consumption and ‘violent’ spaces of
exploitation.281
Such campaigns comprise a stellar example of moral responsibility being established on an indirect
connection between a very disparate class of actors and a complex harm. However, consumers are
merely one among the many potential culprits from which remedial action based on their causal role
could be demanded: also companies, host states, and importing states regularly get woven into such
narratives. Socially and institutionally established categories for assigning remedial responsibility in
this  global  context  are  lacking.  Hence,  finding out  whether  consumers’ contribution is  morally
relevant  remains  a  question  that  cannot  be  answered  based  on  empirical  inquiry  only.  It  also
requires explicating the understanding of responsibility that sets the contribution of consumers to a
harm as more or at least equally pivotal as contributions by other actors.
4.3.2 LEGAL THEORIES
What  kind  of  an  understanding  of  responsibility  would  underlie  the  claim that  consumers  are
contributing to harms in global supply chains? The most rigorous studies of causation as grounds of
responsibility are jurisprudential, as courts require clear rules for determining legal responsibility in
a fixed and predictable manner.  The notion of causation has many uses; my following argument
concerns the use of causation in attributing agents with a remedial responsibility for outcomes that
they  themselves  cause.  I  follow  an  established  convention  in  legal  scholarship  and  refer  to
‘causation’ as a form of contribution that is elevated as being of heightened importance among the
various contributions that different actors have made to a specific state of affairs. 282
281 Le Billon, 782.
282 The concept of causation has invigorated a critical vein of theorising: Raffoul, The Origins of Responsibility; 
following Tony Honoré’s insight on causation as a ‘multi-purpose tool’, the notion of cause serves at least 
predictive, explanatory and attributive functions. My argument concerns the third function: ‘Causation in the Law’, 
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010.
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Tony Honoré writes that theories of causation that help the courts weave through complex cases fall
roughly  into  two classes.  First,  the  cause-in-fact  theories  present  a  condition  that  an  action  or
intervention must satisfy in relation to the outcome to count as causal. The most common test for
determining such a condition is the sine qua non test, or the but-for test, which asks whether the
harm would have occurred without an act or omission of the defendant. Second, the proximate
cause theories define limits to causation. They save legal liability from expanding infinitely when a
chosen test of causation is met. Honoré illustrates the abstract notion by claiming that without a
proximate cause theory the mother of a murderer can be held responsible for the murder due to her
causal role in bringing her son to the world. In order to cut the chain of causation, these limiting
theories  separate  'proximate',  'adequate'  or  'direct'  causes  from  'remote',  'indirect'  or  'legally
inoperative' causes.283
While this general framework provides an analytical tool for understanding the kinds of theoretical
challenges faced by those portraying consumers’ contribution as morally relevant, I suggest that
legal  theories  themselves  can  be  only  of  limited  guidance.  Legal  conventions  are  inclined  to
singling  out  individual  actors  as  causes,  whereas  the  contribution  to  a  harm  that  consumers
supposedly engage in by their purchases is not dependent on purchase decisions of any individual
consumer. As argued in the previous chapter, it is difficult to build a convincing argument that an
individual consumer makes a causal difference. Hence, harms such as labour rights violations and
violent conflicts linked with global production quickly overwhelm the legal theories taken outside
their natural habitat of domestic courtrooms. Jamie Cassels illustrates such challenges by recalling
the Bhopal gas plant disaster in 1984, a disaster that exposed more than 500,000 people to toxic gas
and ensued in decades of lawsuits against multinational companies in both Indian and American
courts:
283 ‘Causation in the Law’.
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Intricate  systems  of  production,  control,  and  distribution  make  the  lines  of
causation like the strands of a spider's web rather than the linear chain envisioned
by tort law...284
and that
... individualistic conceptions of legal responsibility and causation do not fit well
when the incident is the result of a complex combination of individual, corporate,
and governmental decisions, actions, and omissions. It will often be impossible to
isolate responsibility by focusing on the individual actions or omissions of only a
few  actors,  and  blame  can  easily  be  shifted  from  shoulder  to  shoulder  ad
infinitum.285
Legal  liability  can,  to  be  sure,  also  accommodate  more  general  categories  of  actors.  Crude
counterfactual dependence in the form of the sine qua non clause has already been ‘widely rejected
in  law  and  by  theorists  of  criminal  and  tort  law’.286 Cassels,  for  instance,  recommends  more
probability-based  methods  among  the  range  of  tests  for  allocating  liability  in  cases  involving
several actors, and there are other legal constructs that expand liability over a range of actors in
causally indeterminate situations.287 
Christian Barry has, however, pointed out a more fundamental issue in drawing on jurisprudential
sources for making sense of actor’s moral responsibility to act upon global challenges. He argues
284 Jamie. Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal. (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 1993), 80.
285 Cassels, 83.
286 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 8; H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), 112, 128; Michael Moore, ‘For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines’, The San 
Diego Law Review 40, no. 4 (2003): 1181–1272.
287 Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law, 89.
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that the legal theories imported from courtrooms to moral contexts tend to be accompanied by their
‘standards of application’. Such standards, for instance those used for establishing the standard of
proof,  deciding  on who bears  the  burden of  proof,  and what  kind of  evidence  is  admitted  for
assessing which agents have contributed to a harm, might be inadequate outside their conventional
contexts. There are differences already within the legal sphere: in criminal law the threshold of error
in the law is set to minimise potential social costs of erring by ensuring that as few innocents as
possible  are established as guilty,  whereas in  civil  law the judgments  are not that stigmatising,
making it more a system of allocating costs than the criminal law.288
By pointing out that there are socially justified reasons behind establishing different standards in
different circumstances, Barry warns against applying any such standard to a new context of global
challenges  without  justifying such a move.  To apply such a thought to the case of consumers’
contribution, the activists pointing at consumers’ contributions to a harm make a justified move in
the sense that their conception of causation can be valid despite being unrecognisable to lawyers.
The framework by Honoré helps to understand that causation and proximity can be articulated in
different ways. However, the standards of application applied in legal contexts do not directly help
address  questions  that  relate  to  consumers’  moral  responsibility;  such  standards  need  to  be
articulated separately. Legal theories offer a nuanced understanding of causation plausible in the
courts, but can provide only limited analytical clarity on challenges that are involved with assigning
liability in other environments.
4.3.3 CHRISTIAN BARRY AND KATE MACDONALD
Global ethics literature provides a recent example of defining consumers’ remedial responsibility in
causal terms that differ from those recognised by courtrooms. Barry acknowledges both the intuitive
288 Christian Barry, ‘Applying the Contribution Principle’, Metaphilosophy 36, no. 1 2 (2005): 9; Robert Nozick, ‐ The 
Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 85.
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strength of the contribution principle vis-à-vis other principles as a grounds of responsibility, as
well  as the difficulties that follow from a crude import of the conventional repertoire of causal
connections applied in the law to a moral context. Together with Kate Macdonald, he suggests that
the contribution principle can be applied to argue that consumers have a moral responsibility to act
to improve the working conditions of garment factory workers, whose labour and human rights are
frequently  violated.  I  will  discuss  their  work as  the  most  nuanced available  application  of  the
contribution principle to the case in hand.289
Barry  and  Macdonald  suggest  that  consumers’  moral  responsibility  is  a  form  of  ‘liability’
attributable to them as an ‘identifiable class of agents’.290 A harm can be traced to consumers as a
class rather than as specific individuals, because they share a common connection to a harm. The
connecting link between consumers and labour injustices is ‘causal influence’. Evidencing that an
actor  has  causal  influence  does  not  rely  on  showing  an  agent’s  direct  and intentional  conduct
leading to an injustice,  rather than on the relative capacity of an actor to act in a way that the
injustice  could  be  or  could  have  been  avoided.  Crucially,  this  capacity  includes  exploring
institutional relationships and structures through which actors are related to harmful outcomes, as
well as the capacities to act otherwise that with reasonable effort would become accessible to them.
Barry and Macdonald argue that their expanded liability model is applicable ‘even where influence
is highly diffused, where influence can be identified only in relation to general classes of actors and
harms, and where cooperative action is required to achieve effective remedy’.291
289 A forthcoming book by Barry and Macdonald on consumer responsibility is likely to provide a more comprehensive
presentation of their argument than the version discussed here. Ethics for Consumers.
290 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 17.
291 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’; with Øverland, Barry articulates a more nuanced three-part distinction between doers, enablers, and 
allowers: Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty.
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Their  liability  conception  is  articulated  as  a  criticism  of  non-contributory  conceptions  of
responsibility, such as Iris Marion Young’s social connection model, to which I will return in the
next chapter. In order to examine their argument, one has to first answer the underlying question
Barry himself poses about the reasons why it should be adopted. As with different standards of fault
operating in criminal and tort  law, reasons for such a global application have to be explicated,
especially  because their  account  of contribution as causal  influence clearly diverges from more
common, courtroom-inspired understandings of contribution. In his earlier work, Barry proposes
that for allocating moral responsibilities based on contributory fault in situations where evidence is
unclear,  one  ought  to  apply  the  ‘vulnerability  presumption  principle’,  according  to  which  ‘a
willingness to err in favor of the acutely deprived subjects’ ought to guide the evaluation.292 Hence,
one  justification  for  adopting  extended  new standards  of  liability  that  include  consumers  as  a
remedially responsible group would be that the costs ensuing from erring on the evidence would be
serious  and  carried  by  ‘the  acutely  deprived  subject’,  such  as  garment  factory  workers.293
Conversely, consumers discharging their subsequent moral responsibility to act upon the injustices,
for  instance  by  demanding  companies  to  reform  their  sourcing  policies  or  calling  for  stricter
regulatory oversight, could have a positive effect on the situation.
I find it plausible that many supporters of consumers' responsibility to buy differently or otherwise
act upon harms in global supply chains implicitly rely on a vulnerability presumption principle of
some kind. Taking up this principle would, among other things, call for relaxing the burden of proof
needed to instigate consumers with a remedial responsibility. No empirical certainty on the impact
of consumers’ purchases contributing to the violations as would be suitable for criminal or tort law
proceedings is needed. Rather, what would be needed is an agreement that the cost of erroneously
assuming that consumers do not contribute to the violations in a way that justifies burdening them
292 Barry, ‘Applying the Contribution Principle’, 225.
293 Barry, 225.
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with a remedial responsibility would be intolerable to the already precarious workers. In the end,
Barry's articulation is not revolutionary; his is a call for more 'just in case' thinking that highlights
the potential risks to the most vulnerable that any act might involve. 
Alas, identifying the terms of debate does not resolve whether the conception of causal influence
identified  by  Barry  and  Macdonald  ought  to  be  embraced.  Holding  consumers  as  remedially
responsible implies that it is justified to demand consumers to, for instance, pay a higher price for
garments or use their time to campaign for tighter regulation of the garment industry.294 Choosing
new standards of application will shift the allocation of responsibility between various actors, and
will thus meet resistance. As Deborah Stone suggests, conflicts take place over these causal stories,
because portraying a harm as a product of human action often paves the way to reallocating the
costs of remedial action among the agents.295
Hence, exposing that any contribution-based argument in favour of consumer responsibility runs on
embracing certain standards of application moves the debate onto a new theoretical level rather than
resolves it. This level remains often unexplicated: instead of engaging with the background debates
on causation, theorists and practitioners alike less explicitly bring up their reasons for elevating
some connections among the many as causal in order to allocate responsibility. As Barry points out
about heated debates on HIV/AIDS and other global issues: 'These disputes seem to depend on
substantial disagreement about how  causation  should be understood in social contexts, and also
about other non-causal ways that conduct and social rules can plausibly be said to contribute to
294 Barry discusses the conditions in which failing in one’s moral responsibility will make it permissible for others to 
enforce that the responsibility is discharged: Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 192.
295 Deborah A. Stone, ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas’, Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 
(1989): 281–300.
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global problems.'296 The standards of application are an inherent but less acutely explored element
of the debates on who caused what rather than an issue preceding them.
Precisely how are such considerations interwoven with causal inquiry? One conceptualisation is
offered  by  David  Miller,  who  distinguishes  causal  responsibility  as  a  component  of  outcome
responsibility.  His  view  is  that  in  determining  causal  responsibility  we  ask  why  something
happened,  and  in  answering  this  question  human  agency  has  no  special  status,  whereas  when
assigning outcome responsibility we are affected by normative purposes. Causal responsibility is
unaffected by blaming or praising an agent that assigning outcome responsibility involves, and can
hence be traced down also to entities lacking moral agency, such as to most animals and natural
phenomena, which are incapable of bearing outcome responsibility.297 From here it is convenient for
Miller to consider identification and assignation as separate steps in the process of determining an
agent's responsibility. The former is about finding out if anybody meets the relevant conditions for
being responsible. The latter, by contrast, involves attaching costs or benefits to an agent, regardless
of whether the relevant conditions are met. While we usually want our assignations of responsibility
to  track  identified  responsibility,  this  is  not  necessary:  'Unlike  identifications,  assignments  of
responsibility can be justified or unjustified, but they cannot be correct or incorrect'.298
The vocabulary of justification implies that to Miller, assigning responsibility is the step in which
normative concerns of ends come to affect the conclusions drawn whereas the precluding step of
identifying whether the relevant conditions for being responsible are met is free of these concerns. I
think it is misleading to make the distinction between identifying and assigning responsibility too
sharply. When responsibility for bringing forth the event is assigned to an agent, only one or some
of the connections between different actors and a harm are elevated as causal whereas others are
296 Barry, ‘Global Justice’, 228.
297 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 96–97.
298 Miller, 84.
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rendered out as irrelevant. The process of filtering relevant causal linkages is not independent from
normative  concerns  that,  as  Miller  seems  to  suggest,  step  in  only  at  the  time  of  assigning
responsibility. To be sure, Miller does not argue that there is a single correct answer to the question
of why something happened.299 But although there are several causal theories out there, he does not
give  an  account  of  how the  question  should  be  answered.  More  precisely,  his  presentation  of
outcome responsibility  omits  the  crucial  stage  of  laying  out  the  criteria  based  on which  some
conditions out of all the potential candidates available are selected in order to give an account of the
course of events.
Zooming back on the case of consumers, Barry writes that the contribution principle inevitably
incorporates the vulnerability presumption principle, as those subscribing to the former implicitly
hold that contributing to an acute deprivation is a serious wrong. Rather, I suggest that pointing at
the vulnerability presumption principle masks diverse considerations that also guide the argument
on consumer responsibility he develops with Macdonald.  To flesh out my argument,  in the last
section I draw on Smiley’s work to illustrate four such considerations.
4.3.4 INTERWOVEN CONSIDERATIONS
While often treated as a fundamental grounds of assigning responsibility, the contribution principle
is  interwoven  with  considerations  that  are  not  usually  recognised  as  part  of  a  factual  inquiry.
Assignations of remedial responsibility, or saying that A caused B whereby A has to remedy those
harmed by B, have to be evaluated by explicitly discussing the values  that  underlie  the causal
analysis.  Barry recognises  that  there could be contributory and  ‘non-causal’ principles that  can
ground remedial responsibility. I emphasise that such non-causal considerations are woven into all
contributory claims that are aimed as justifications for allocating remedial responsibility among
agents.
299 Miller, 86.
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The first of these implicit considerations is an actor’s capacity to advance a specific goal of choice,
often that of remedying the harm in question. Consumers’ capacity to alleviate labour injustices is a
component  also  in  the  liability-based  argument  on  consumer  responsibility  by  Barry  and
Macdonald: arguing that consumers having causal influence over the injustices is interwoven with
an analysis that diagnoses consumers as having potential to amend these injustices sometime in the
future. Such a forward-looking aspect is alluded to in their description of the concept:
influence in this sense can refer not only to information or capacity that actors
have  at  a  given  time,  but  also  capacities  and  information  that  might,  with
reasonable effort, become accessible to them. Part of their responsibility in other
words  may be  building  capacities  to  better  understand and monitor  the  social
connections in which they are enmeshed, the consequences of these, and their
feasible alternatives.300
Merging  what  consumers  have  caused  with  what  they  could  be  causing  is  a  forward-looking
element of the contribution principle more generally, and well recognised among legal and moral
theorists  of  responsibility,  who  are  aware  that  causation  is  not  only  an  ‘individualistic  and
mechanical’ inquiry into facts.301 Joel Feinberg reminds that causes are those issues we want to
control to invoke a certain effect.302 Likewise, Tony Honoré states that policy and other purposes are
taken into account when determining which candidates can even potentially be held responsible for
an outcome.303 Nicola Lacey suggests that law promotes a rigid understanding of responsibility, or a
‘metaphysical fantasy’ that presupposes responsibility as a thing that can be discovered rather than a
300 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 10.
301 Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law, 76.
302 Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton; London: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), 162.
303 Honoré, Responsibility and Fault, 3.
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normative device,  ‘a matter of construction and ascription'.304 Reinecke and Ansari  suggest that
‘[s]ocial problems and those responsible do not exist in any objective sense but rather are ‘named’
as a result  of collective practices.’305 Such claims parallel  Dewey’s view on responsibility as a
forward-looking device, and help tease out that by introducing contributory language Barry and
Macdonald attempt to frame consumers and their purchase action as a handle by which the lot of
garment workers could be improved.306
Another consideration underlying causal claims is that of community. Smiley suggests that what is
considered as a cause interacts with the boundaries of community. Causation is not an object of
factual discovery rather than a tool that might potentially redraw the boundaries of who belongs to
those of having special moral importance.  Accordingly, campaigners for consumer responsibility
make a novel interpretation of the implicit rules based on which someone is to be conceived as a
cause of a state of affairs,  because they want to extend the ethical discourse beyond their present
boundaries. Smiley’s argument on the interaction between causation and community reminds that
assigning a responsibility for harms in global supply chains to consumers in affluent democracies
challenges political communities as sharply demarcating independent spheres of moral discourse,
and includes new actors among those whose interests community members should be treated as
worth pursuing.307
Third consideration is that of power. Smiley highlights that accounts of causal responsibility are
sensitive to the distribution of power in social and political contexts, because power affects what is
identified as a cause of an effect in situations in which such a ‘discovery’ involves differing and
304 Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’, Journal of Political Philosophy 9, no. 3 (2001): 
275.
305 Reinecke and Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems’, 320.
306 Cf. R.G. Collingwood, to whom causal responsibility serves as ‘the handle’ by means of which a particular state of 
affairs can be controlled: An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 296–97.
307 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 23, 258, 267.
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conflicting  interests.308 Causal  claims  do  not  hover  above  or  precede  asymmetries  in  power
between,  for  instance,  the  garment  workers,  factory  owners  and the  multinational  corporations
governing the supply chains. However, power relations do not determine assignations either, as the
relationship works both ways: by making causal judgments to blame actors for a harm one can
challenge  its  prevalent  distributions.309 Although  power  is  a  component  that  Dewey  gives  less
attention, Smiley highlights that debates on causes of things are sensitive to its use.310 
The  fourth  consideration  involves  fairness,  which  comes  into  play  when  evaluating  volitional
excuses people use to avoid being blamed for their actions. Volitional excuses relate specifically to
actors’ inner states of mind instead of external circumstances. To Smiley, at least three kinds of
fairness are relevant in evaluating the narratives that people weave to show that they are not to be
held responsible for their actions: rules and norms that govern the relationship between the blamed
and the blaming community; equality in sharing burdens; and reciprocity in treating other people.
Arguing openly about what kinds of excuses are valid involves scientific discussions on mental
capacity as well  as normative debates on expectations set  on agents,  and includes the potential
responsibility-bearers and those who accept and reject one’s volitional excuses in practice. In this
way, fairness enters contribution-based assignations of responsibility  as a  tool to  demarcate  the
valid excuses that absolve an actor of remedial duties linked with contributing to a harm.311
These four elements illustrate the normative considerations in play when remedial responsibilities
are assigned based on actors’ causal roles in bringing forth a harm. Barry and Macdonald frame
their  argument  for  consumer  responsibility  as  a  defence  of  a  liability-based  understanding  of
308 Smiley, 185, 191–93.
309 Smiley, 211.  
310 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 183.
311 Marion Smiley, ‘Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15, 
no. 1 (2016): 85–101.
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responsibility,  and  in  so  doing  well  pinpoint  the  prevalent  importance  of  blame  and  fault  in
contemporary practices of assigning responsibility. Ultimately evaluating any  assignation of this
kind requires exposing and discussing the underlying considerations, such as whether consumers
are capable of changing the workers’ situation, whether foreign workers’ interests are a goal worth
striving for as a community, whether doing so is aligned with or against the current distribution of
power among the relevant actors, and so on. As Robert Goodin phrases: 'The notion of “causal
responsibility”  is  not  the  unambiguous,  technical  term  it  seems.  The  ascription  of  causal
responsibility for an outcome represents the conclusion of a moral argument, not the premise of
one'.312 Contribution-based allocations of responsibility are a site of interwoven considerations, the
elaboration of and being honest about which lies at the core of a pragmatist analysis.313
312 Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social Responsibilities (Chicago; London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 126.
313 Marion Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility: A Preliminary Analysis’, ‐ Midwest Studies In 
Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2014): 11.
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4.4 ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLE
4.4.1 AIM
The aim of this section is to explore whether the association principle of responsibility resonates
with the way consumers are linked to harms taking place in global supply chains.314 The theories of
responsibility  discussed  here  under  the  broad  category  of  the  association  principle  share  three
grounding  ideas.  First,  not  all  connections  between  an  actor  and  a  harm  grounding  remedial
responsibilities are contributory relationships. Second, remedial responsibility derived from non-
contributory connections are not primarily borne by individuals rather than shared by several actors.
Third, ties reminiscent of, but not equal to communal bonds can ground a responsibility of actors to
help distant others. By engaging with work of Iris Marion Young, whose social connection model is
among the most developed applications of the approach on the case in hand, I argue that it is hard to
distinguish the association principle from the contribution principle as a stand-alone grounds for
consumer responsibility.
Before presenting my argument, a terminological caveat. David Miller uses the term ‘connection
theory’ to refer to his overarching theory, which includes six criteria that can be combined in a
pluralistic manner to harness actors with a responsibility to act upon a harm.315 The understanding
of association I explore here is not to be confused with Miller’s concept. Rather, I discuss a global
application of what  Miller  somewhat  narrowly refers  to  as the communal  criterion.  Communal
approaches to responsibility pay attention to bonds such as family or friendship ties, collegiality,
religion, and nationality, and consider remedial responsibility arising from these bonds as preceding
314 I thank Paul Kirby and other participants in the Aberystwyth-LSE-Sussex Theory Colloquium in Sussex, May 2016,
for comments on this chapter.
315 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 100–105.
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and being independent from the moral grounds of fault discussed above.316 Their advocates consider
bonds shared by community members as being of special moral importance, and vest community
members with weightier responsibilities towards their kin than towards distant others.
I  prefer Barry’s refurbishment of Miller’s  theory,  which expands the communal criterion to the
context of global challenges. For the purpose of the work in hand, exploring responsibilities held by
community members in relation to their kin is not enough, as the form of consumer responsibility
being studied concerns harms that take place far away or globally. That is why my main discussant
is Young, whose social connection model treats the non-causal connections between consumers and
global structural injustices as a grounds of shared remedial responsibility.317 I will argue below that
the theoretical baggage her model inherits from this strongly communal background wears down its
applicability  to  the  situation  consumers  in  affluent  democracies  face.  In  order  to  defend  this
position, I will first discuss work on political responsibility that has inspired her theorising.
4.4.2 KARL JASPERS AND HANNAH ARENDT
Arguably  the  vein  of  theorising  that  wields  significant  influence  on  Young’s  contemporary
application  of  the  association  principle  on  consumer  responsibility  traces  back  to  the  post-war
context of the 1940s, and more specifically to work by Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers on political
responsibility. After the Second World War both worked on the question of whether responsibility
for the atrocities conducted over the course of war by the Nazi state was borne also by ordinary
Germans, or was it justified to limit responsibility, and compensatory, retributive and mitigative
duties to follow, to the German leaders.318 In his essay on German guilt, Karl Jaspers answers the
question by claiming that Germans of his time bear criminal, political,  moral, and metaphysical
316 Miller, 104.
317 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 3.
318 Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt (New York: Dial Press, 1947), 33.
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guilt. While the first two can be assigned by others, such as criminal courts or victors of war, the
last two are beyond the reach of social realm: only individuals can assign moral guilt to themselves
through self-reflection, whereas metaphysical guilt is observed by God only. To Jaspers, being held
liable is separate from moral guilt, as grounds for each are different.319
The concept of political guilt, which is shared by definition, is the most interesting form of guilt in
terms of the more recent applications of the association principle. By political guilt, Jaspers means
citizens’ burden of ‘having to bear the consequences of the deeds of the state whose power governs
me and under whose order I live’.320 To Jaspers, this kind of guilt is less discriminating than other
forms of guilt as it ‘lets no man dodge’; indeed, no community member can be fully absolved of
it.321 The grounds of political guilt are not the causal connections considered important when legal
liability is assigned.322 Political guilt is borne by members of a political community in which the
harm takes place, not because the harm is a consequence of their individual acts rather than because
they are subjects to the state that has realised the harms.
The concept of political guilt was taken further by Hannah Arendt, who considered Jaspers’ view as
somewhat blame-focused. To her, guilt is not what most Germans bear; guilt is to be reserved for
those who conducted individual deeds, not for ordinary Germans who were only indirectly involved
in the organised killing of people. To Arendt,  ‘[w]here all  are guilty, nobody is’;  while Jaspers
correctly shows that those who are not guilty in a legal sense also carry a responsibility of some
kind,  his  theory  does  not  indicate  how  such  responsibility  could  be  vested  for  a  productive
purpose.323 As  a  response,  Arendt  suggests  that  ordinary  Germans  of  her  time  hold  political
319 Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt.
320 Jaspers, 31.
321 Jaspers, 62.
322 Jaspers, 62.
323 Hannah Arendt, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah 
Arendt, ed. S.J. James and W. Bernauer, vol. 26 (Boston, MA; Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1987), 43.
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responsibility for the atrocities done during the Nazi reign.324 The concept of political responsibility
complements legal liability. It is needed to properly provide reconciliation after atrocities and to
prevent new ones, as judging an individual for monstrous acts is likely to leave unexamined the role
of the surrounding community that enabled the individual to commit them.325
Jaspers and Arendt both articulate the view that  ‘cogs in the wheel’ ought not to be left without
responsibility of some kind despite not having been in a direct causal connection with a harm.
Jaspers considers in contributory terms all kinds of activities through which community members
are linked with a harm, but tones down the social repercussions of moral and metaphysical kinds of
guilt that follow from certain kinds of contributory linkages. Jasper’s approach is in this sense more
explicit: also ordinary Germans are guilty for harms that were enacted within their community,
although the kind of guilt they bear does not imply similar formal repercussions that follow from
breaking a law. He defines ‘guilt’ as an attribute shared by almost everyone in Germany in the same
way as Arendt sees responsibility as being distributed across the society, but leaves some forms of
guilt as socially inconsequential by not linking any remedial responsibilities to them. To compare,
Arendt carries the work further by conceptualising why Germans are not directly guilty, but still
responsible in another way.
To me, Arendt succeeds only partially in distinguishing a communal membership as an independent
grounds  of  remedial  responsibility  from a  being  form of  contribution.  This  is  not  an  obvious
tension: it becomes visible only in certain passages, for instance when Arendt discusses the diverse
connections that Germans had with the atrocities. I follow here Young’s interpretation, according to
which in Arendt’s writings one can distinguish those guilty of crimes; those not guilty, but who gave
324 Arendt, ‘Collective Responsibility’; Hannah Arendt, ‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility’, in Essays in 
Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 2005).
325 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York, NY, USA: Penguin Books, 
1994).
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at least passive support to the guilty; those who somewhat resisted and distanced themselves from
the atrocities; and those who publicly opposed and resisted the actions.326 While this is not Arendt's
own categorisation, I find Young's reading of Arendt convincing enough to adopt it here.
Although Arendt claims that guilt for past deeds is reserved only for individuals who break the law,
her writing remains ambiguous on whether the rest of the community is not guilty because they are
not contributing to a harm or because they are contributing but their guilt cannot be distinguished by
using the legal means available.327 Arendt does not set out her reasons for establishing the boundary
between  the  guilty  and  the  responsible  where  she  sets  it,  that  is,  she  does  not  justify  why
contribution ought to be understood along the same lines as law courts do. A practical reason surely
exists: no large numbers of people can be effectively put to trial. However, this does not mean that
the  rest  of  the  Germans  would  not  be  in  a  contributory,  and  potentially  morally  relevant,
relationship  to  the  Nazi  crimes.  Above  I  introduced  the  argument  by  Barry  and  Macdonald,
according to which large classes of actors can also be held liable, especially if the purpose is not to
assign legal repercussions rather than to provide a moral justification for collective action. 
Such extended notions of liability are not given space in Arendt’s theory. In her treatment of guilt,
Arendt leaves a vast majority of the German population as 'merely' politically responsible, which is
distinct from both moral and legal understandings. To Arendt, the role of those passively supporting
the Nazi atrocities cannot be seen as contributory, although by adopting a lens of a more expansive
account  of  contribution,  such  as  the  one  suggested  by  Barry  and  Macdonald,  those  passively
supporting could just as well be seen as contributing to the murders, albeit in more indirect senses. I
concur with Young that Arendt ultimately offers a sparse account of the relation between guilt and
326 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 81–92.
327 M.C. McKeown writes that Young adopts and revises Arendt’s distinction, according to which ‘[g]uilt is a function 
of legal and moral responsibility; political responsibility is something distinct’: ‘Responsibility without Guilt: A 
Youngian Approach to Responsibility for Global Injustice’ (Doctoral Thesis, University College London, 2015), 23.
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responsibility.328 The sparsity emerges especially in borderline cases in which a connection with a
harm could be seen as contributory using a wider definition of contribution than the one Arendt
adopts. It is not clear  in all instances whether the difference she makes between contributory and
non-contributory linkages to  a harm is  of kind or of degree.  Although she insists  that political
responsibility is rooted in one’s membership in the community, Arendt does not completely manage
to differentiate contributory and communal linkages that ground her distinction between guilt and
responsibility.
4.4.3 IRIS MARION YOUNG
Balancing between the contributory and non-contributory grounds of shared responsibility pertains
to much contemporary theorising.  As described in the previous chapter,  Larry May argues that
individual community members share responsibility for a harm if they are indirectly involved with
bringing it forth, referring especially to the context of the Southern communities of post-bellum
America in which a significant majority nurtured racist attitudes that enticed some to violence.329
Farid Abdel-Nour distinguishes internal responsibility from external responsibility, out of which
only the latter may justify punishment and exclusion from society. For instance, being a citizen of a
state conducting atrocities does not necessarily invoke citizens’ remedial duties rather than ‘agent
regret’, or an emotional response in an actor who realises her causal connection to a harm.330 To
Onora  O’Neill,  moral  responsibilities  in  global  economic  systems  can  be  established  through
institutionalised  linkages  that  individuals  share  across  countries.  Such  responsibilities  arise  in
328 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 87, 143.
329 May, Sharing Responsibility, 27, 52.
330 Farid Abdel-Nour, ‘National Responsibility’, Political Theory 31, no. 5 (2003): 696; Abdel-Nour, ‘Responsible for 
the State’, 10; also Neta Crawford, ‘Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity’,
Journal of Political Philosophy 15, no. 2 (2007): 187–212.
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proportion to the capacity that one has to affect the state of the deprived and vulnerable working
under the same institutional scheme.331
Iris Marion Young builds on such work by asking who ought to act upon labour and human rights
violations  in  the  global  garment  industry.  It  seems  that  sometimes  it  is  inadequate  to  identify
individuals  as responsible  for bad things  that happen: there are  transnational  processes that are
produced by unorchestrated collective action in a way that a single agent cannot be held as causally
responsible for them.332 However, the theories Miller labels under the communal criterion are not
satisfying conceptual tools to think of responsibility for such processes. Likewise, Arendt’s work is
too  focused  on  nation-states,  disregarding  that  individuals  clearly  share  morally  relevant
connections across state boundaries. To Young, Arendt is inconsistent in her treatment of whether
political responsibility spills over to other communities and countries.333 
As a  response,  Young suggests  a  social  connection  model  of  responsibility  to  complement  the
conventional 'liability model of responsibility’. Young’s model concerns especially actors, such as
‘apparel  manufacturers,  institutional  purchasers  of  apparel,  and  individual  consumers’,  as  it
attempts to articulate their responsibility in relation to complex issues in which they are involved
neither as a community nor alone but through interdependent processes.334 Global supply chains
form an objective economic structure that is operated by and affects several actors scattered across
different countries. While theories that vest community members with responsibilities are somewhat
unwieldly  in  addressing  the  kinds  of  harms  that  are  linked  with  such  transnational  economic
structures,  Young  refurbishes  Arendt’s  notion  of  political  responsibility  to  the  level  of  global
331 Published under a pseudonym ‘Onora Nell’. Onora O’Neill, ‘Lifeboat Earth’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 3 
(1975): 286.
332 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 371, 374; Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’, 122.
333 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 60, 86–87; McKeown suggests that Arendt has good reasons to bind political 
responsibility with membership of a political community: McKeown, ‘Responsibility without Guilt’, 32.
334 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 388.
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processes.335 Young argues that there is much more than what Arendt calls as ‘being born into a
historical  continuum’  of  a  political  community  that  constitutes  a  ground  for  political
responsibility.336
To  Young,  political  responsibility  arises  ‘from belonging  together  with  others  in  a  system  of
interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim
to realize projects’.337 Whereas Arendt builds her theory to address the atrocities conducted in and
by Nazi  Germany, a  specific  harm pertinent  in her time,  Young keeps her model very general.
Political responsibility is needed to face a wide set of challenges she labels as structural injustices,
which are not produced intentionally rather than through agents' ordinary behaviour and activities.
A structural injustice
exists  when  social  processes  put  large  categories  of  persons  under  systematic
threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their
capacities, at the same time as those processes enable others to dominate or have a
wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.338 
In  contrast  to  Barry  and  Macdonald,  Young  argues  that  consumers  in  high-income  countries
shopping the garments made in ‘sweatshop’ conditions cannot be said to bear responsibility on any
meaningful contribution-based account. Her social connection model, she claims, manages better
than the ‘liability’ understanding of responsibility in five respects. First, political responsibility does
not isolate anyone by holding her alone responsible, because that would imply that others involved
are absolved of responsibility. Second, in contrast to the liability model of responsibility that seeks
335 Indeed, in some of her work Young calls her model a conception of political responsibility: Young, Responsibility 
for Justice, 122.
336 Young, 80.
337 Young, 47.
338 Young, 52.
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to  find  out  those  that  have  done  wrong  by  deviating  from  a  baseline  situation,  political
responsibility evaluates processes of domination and exploitation inherent in everyday situations.
Young uses the anti-sweatshop movement to illustrate how political responsibility has been taken up
in a global context to challenge the 'normal' course of consumerism and production.
Third, assigning political responsibility aims to prevent wrong things from happening in the future,
or  identifies  institutional  injustice  in  order  to  encourage  reforms.  It  is  forward-looking  by
highlighting cooperation to resolve a problem instead of a search for culprits behind it. Surely, a
backward-looking conception of responsibility can also shape future action by instilling sanctions as
deterrence.  However,  political  responsibility  mobilises  behind the reform resources  not  only  of
those who were to blame for problems rather than of everyone who can contribute to the results –
including the victims.339 Fourth, political responsibility is discretionary regarding actions to take up
to discharge the responsibility. Young subscribes to a distinction between responsibility and duty,
arguing  that  the  former  varies  based  on  a  variety  of  ‘parameters’,  whereas  the  latter  is  more
stringent.340 Fifth, political responsibility is shared: acting on one's responsibilities means joining
with others in a public discourse to find the best way to ameliorate the problem at hand.341
Jessica  Payson  argues  that  Young  does  a  better  job  in  stepping  beyond  individual  guilt  than
contributory  theorists  by ‘decentralizing’ causality  as  a  central  building  block of  responsibility.
According to  her,  Young focuses  on  structures  instead  of  institutions,  thus  acknowledging that
individuals  are  socially  embedded,  while  also retaining  their  role  as  moral  agents  despite  their
negligible role in vast transnational processes. This suffices for an enhanced way to conceptualise
the responsibility that causally limited individuals have in a nonideal world.342 I agree that Young
indeed has an edge in attaching individual responsibility within economic and social systems of
339 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 379.
340 Cf. Goodin, ‘Responsibilities’.
341 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 16.
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interaction instead of political institutions. She ventures further than O’Neill in showing that being
involved with  purchases  and market  transactions  does  not  have  to  be  conceived as  a  form of
contribution rather than as a connection of a completely different quality that is perpetuated by one's
everyday  purchase  decisions;  ‘a  matter  not  of  degree,  but  of  kind’,  as  Young  describes  the
distinction Arendt makes between responsibility and guilt.343
Further, Young does her best to accommodate the co-existence of liability and social connection
models of responsibility: she emphasises that the latter aims not to replace rather than serve as
‘separate from and additional to’ the former.344 There still remains a need to assign blame for many
harms, although some massive global issues lack sole or primary cause and thus remain beyond the
scope of  the  liability  model.  Moreover,  she  emphasises  that  backward-looking inquiry  remains
important: ‘[a]ssigning responsibility, whether under the liability model or the social connection
model,  always has  both backward-looking and forward-looking aspects.’345 A crucial  difference
between the models is one of a ‘temporal emphasis’, which however does not eliminate the need for
either.346
However,  I  suggest  that  the  challenge  that  Hannah  Arendt  faces  in  showing  that  political
responsibility  is  an  independent  principle  of  responsibility  instead  of  an  application  of  the
contribution principle redressed to match with contexts in which many actors contribute a harm
together only accentuates in the global context that Young seeks to capture. The ambiguity pointed
out above in Arendt's notion of political responsibility remains, as Young does not give an account
of the contributory underpinnings in her own theory despite resorting to contributory vocabulary. To
342 Jessica Payson, ‘Individuals, Institutions, and Structures: Agents of Political Responsibilities in Cohen, Pogge, and 
Young’, Social Theory and Practice 38, no. 4 (2012): 645–62.
343 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 92.
344 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 375, 381.
345 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’, 121.
346 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 121.
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defend her claim that individual consumers bear  a responsibility for unjust  labour practices far
away, Young writes, for instance, that individuals 'contribute by their actions to perpetuating the
structural  conditions,  incentives  and  constraints  that  condition  the  actions  of  the  owners  and
managers  whose  actions  are  the  most  immediate  cause'.347 Examining  ‘contributions’ involves
looking at agents’ past actions, omissions, and affiliations in an inquiry that ultimately demands
similar  backward-looking  methods  as  finding  out  about  one's  liability.  Such  ambiguity  only
accentuates in the context of global processes, the boundaries of which are harder to demarcate than
boundaries of political communities. As McKeown points out, Young never defined ‘connection’
but fluctuated between ‘participation’, ‘causation’, and ‘contribution’ when giving it more specific
content.348 As  a  result,  the  importance  of  a  past  inquiry  into  contributions,  to  Young  a  vital
component  in  a  blame-oriented approach to  responsibility  from which she tries to  distance her
theory, remains a strong element also in the social connection model. 
The underplayed role  of contribution in her  theory emerges in Young's  attempts to  advise how
individuals, including consumers, could reason about their own responsibilities. In her two major
articles on the social connection model, she acknowledges that an account of a particular agent's
responsibilities  is  needed  if  a  theory  is  to  convincingly  differentiate  between  remedial
responsibilities, and advises to look at four 'parameters of reasoning', power, privilege, interest and
collective  ability,  to  determine  an  individual's  degree  of  responsibility.349 Yet,  identifying  an
individual’s  role  in  processes  leading to  undesirable  outcomes  by using  the  parameters  is  also
heavily reliant on an empirical inquiry that is unlikely to be any easier than when identifying those
directly  generating  the  harms.  This  conclusion  is  also  reached  by  Christian  Barry  and  Kate
Macdonald. They agree with Young’s view that liability models of responsibility run into trouble
347 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 382–83; Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’, 114.
348 McKeown, ‘Responsibility without Guilt’, 33.
349 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’, 125; Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’.
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when used to define and bind the responsibilities of individual agents in institutionally mediated
settings.350 At the same time, they point out that in Young’s approach identifying the boundaries of
the social system in which an individual is connected to an injustice ‘boils down to roughly the
same empirical question as asking who is causally implicated in the generation of harms in the first
place’.351
To  be  sure,  Young  recognises  that  her  parameters  of  understanding  are  rudimentary  tools  for
reasoning about individual responsibility.352 As commentators point out, she did not have the time to
finalise these tentative moves for specifying individual responsibility.353 Some of them would likely
respond to my concern by reminding that demarcating between contribution and association as a
difference of kind rather than of degree still remains meaningful, because the contribution principle
alone cannot adequately address the shared and uncoordinated way through which consumers are
involved with harms taking place in the production process of their purchases. This criticism is
valid, because as shown above, contribution-based claims on consumer responsibility have to be
evaluated against the backdrop of underlying normative considerations. 
Yet, Young struggles to show that her conception ‘stands on its own feet as an independent source
of  remedial  responsibility’,  as  Miller  describes  the  conventional  communal  approaches.354
Macdonald  and  Barry  point  out  well  that  Young’s  scepticism  of  the  ‘liability’  models  of
responsibility relies on a narrow reading of liability-based accounts available and exaggerations of
the difficulties that follow from applying it to more indirect outcomes. The tacit reliance on the
350 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 3.
351 Barry and Macdonald, 23.
352 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’, 130.
353 Genevieve Fuji Johnson and Loralea Michaelis, eds., Political Responsibility Refocused: Thinking Justice after Iris 
Marion Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
354 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 104.
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contribution principle only grows stronger when Young transfers her social connection model from
the context of a political community in which Arendt developed her own answer to the questions on
responsibility  for  German  atrocities.  In  the  fluctuating  and  massive  process  of  globalising
production, the distinction between the contribution and association principles becomes even harder
to maintain.
4.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I introduced a four-part framework of responsibility as suggested by David Miller
and honed by Christian Barry, and then explored the principles of contribution and association as
potential  grounds  for  consumers’  remedial  responsibility  for  harms  in  supply  chains.  The
contribution principle remains a formidable tool for assigning remedial responsibilities: those actors
who  cause  harms  are  obliged  to  compensate  for  them,  suffer  a  punishment  or  reform  their
behaviour. However, legal theorising on liability is only of limited help in addressing the indirect
and shared way in which consumers are linked with distant harms. A direct application to the case
of consumers in global ethics is provided by Barry and Macdonald. Their treatise well captures the
prevalence of blame-based practices in affluent democracies, but does not fully explicate the diverse
normative considerations interwoven to the judgment of whether consumers’ connection to harms in
production processes ought to be seen as a morally relevant cause.
The association principle provides an initial response to the challenge of articulating the complex
linkages that consumers may have with global production processes. Iris Marion Young builds on
work by Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt to assign a shared responsibility to consumers without
resorting  to  troubled  causal  vocabularies.  However,  her  social  connection  model  retains
contributory underpinnings, the importance of which only accentuates when vast global processes
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replace the political community as the platform on which remedial responsibilities are distributed
among the diverse candidates.
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5 BENEFIT AND CAPACITY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the benefit and capacity principles. First, I suggest that the benefit principle
is an auxiliary principle: although consumers can be argued to be involuntarily benefiting from
injustices  in  global  supply  chains,  the  ensuing  moral  burden  does  not  qualify  as  a  remedial
responsibility. Second, the monistic, consequentialist variation of the capacity principle treats an
analysis of actors’ relative capacities to advance an ideal as a basis to which all other grounds of
responsibility  are  reducible.  I  claim that such an ideal-based approach does not place adequate
weight on the diversity of moral considerations that people use to orient themselves in the social
world.
5.2 BENEFIT
5.2.1 AIM
While different veins of the benefit principle have been advanced, in this section I will discuss the
benefit principle as presented by Daniel Butt, one of its main proponents.355 To Butt,  most people
intuitively think that while moral responsibilities held towards others are usually acquired through
actions done voluntarily, such as by promising to do something or harming someone, they also
accept that sometimes responsibilities emerge without voluntary action. For instance, at least the
most rudimentary version of the capacity principle, in the form of having a duty to rescue someone
355 Norbert Anwander, ‘Contributing and Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims of Injustice’, Ethics & 
International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 39–45; Robert Huseby, ‘Should the Beneficiaries Pay?’, Politics, Philosophy
& Economics 14, no. 2 (2015): 209–225; articles in: Avia Pasternak and Edward Page, eds., ‘Special Issue: 
Benefiting from Wrongdoing’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014).
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in  an  emergency if  able  to  do so with  negligible  costs,  is  in  general  recognised.  If  a  child  is
drowning in a shallow pond next to John, he has a duty to rescue if doing so is of no burden to him
even if John had not brought forth the dire situation.356
It is less clear, Butt continues, whether on a more general level one can come to bear responsibilities
through actions of others. By introducing ‘benefiting from acts of injustice committed by others’ as
a distinct principle of responsibility, Butt argues that sometimes this might be the case.357 To him,
the benefit  principle  stands as a principle of responsibility to be recognised alongside those of
contribution,  association  and  capacity.  In  this  section,  I  suggest  that  consumers  may  indeed
sometimes benefit involuntarily from harms taking places in global production processes. However,
the  benefit  principle  is  an  auxiliary  rather  than  a  stand-alone  principle,  and  the  remedial
responsibilities ensuing from such benefiting are of little moral significance.
5.2.2 DANIEL BUTT
Unlike principles of contribution and association explored above, the benefit principle has not been
systematically  advanced as  a  grounds of  consumer  responsibility.  To Iris  Marion Young,  while
benefit does not constitute a ‘parameter of reasoning’ she develops to differentiate individual actors’
responsibilities,  she  nevertheless  places  some  moral  weight  on  the  concept  by  writing  that
‘[p]ersons who benefit relatively from structural injustices have special moral responsibilities to
contribute to organized efforts to correct them, not because they are to blame, but because they are
able to adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation.’358 As per the quote
above, benefiting from an injustice is morally relevant because the beneficiary is better off and
hence  more  capable  of  alleviating  the  injustices.  This  reveals  a  central  difference  between
356 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 341.
357 Butt, 129, italics omitted.
358 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’, 126–28.
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expositions of responsibility between Young and Butt:  to the former,  benefit  indicates capacity,
whereas to the latter,  being a beneficiary composes an independent grounds of responsibility.359
Further,  the  injustices  Young  has  in  mind  are  structural:  they  are  condemnable  aspects  of  the
‘normal’ baseline situation, including unfortunate aspects of the everyday, such as ethnic and gender
discrimination and sweatshop labour. The injustices to which Butt ties his approach are relational in
the sense that they are tied to specific acts of wrongdoers, be they states or individual actors, who
distort the overall distribution of good, which, although not perfectly just, is at least ‘legitimate’.360
As I will elaborate below, Butt’s definition of an injustice is central to evaluating his approach. To
compare with the claims made by the anti-sweatshop campaigners that Young articulates through
her social connection model, Butt’s primary examples are historical and intergenerational injustices.
As the argument goes, even though contemporary citizens of former colonialist nations, such as
France and the United Kingdom, have inherited their material wellbeing involuntarily, their affluent
way of life is built on past unjust treatment of the former colonies, whereby they have an obligation
to compensate. Another real-life case Butt refers to is that of positive discrimination, such as when
companies  or  corporations  prefer  others  than  white  male  candidates  when  recruiting  new
employees.  While such practices  might  not be justified on the assumption that  every particular
white  male applying for a job harms ethnic groups and women, positive discrimination can be
justified on the grounds that every white male has benefited from the unjust social structures that
discriminate against other groups. By positive discrimination white male job-seekers end up bearing
some, if not all, of the costs and losses generated by the injustice from which they benefit.361
359 Cf. Thomas Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties’, Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 1 
(2005): 69–74.
360 Daniel Butt, ‘“A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable”: Defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle’, 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): 337.
361 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 136.
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While the benefit principle has been harnessed in different contexts as a grounds of responsibility,
for  instance  in  relation  to  climate  change,  it  has  also  encountered  substantial  criticism.362 Butt
acknowledges that the first ones lining up to shoot down his proposition are those who take a rigid
stance  towards  the  common law principle  of  ‘risk  bearing’,  according  to  which  losses  should
generally  lie  where  they  fall.  He discusses  with  Robert  Fullinwinder  who writes  that  the  only
justified diversion from letting losses lie where they fall  is  to  oblige those who cause them to
compensate for damages - that is, to apply the contribution principle.363 Fullinwinder portrays it as
counter-intuitive that someone becomes remedially responsible, because they benefit from a scheme
to which he or she has neither consented nor actively participated.364 There are no precedents in tort
and  criminal  law  for  treating  benefit  as  grounds  of  liability:  standard  deviations  from  the
conventional liability model are justified on the basis of risk-sharing among those most likely to
cause  a  harm,  or  on  the  basis  of  distribution  of  losses  on  a  society  as  a  whole  on  broadly
communitarian grounds. Legal courts set a good example for rejecting any approach that punishes
involuntary third parties benefiting from a harm. Echoing David Hume, Butt recognises that the
benefit  principle  can  be  held  as  a  principle  ‘quite  new…  and  altogether  untenable’,  lacking
precedents and summoning undesirable consequences - a way of thinking about responsibility that
ought not to be encouraged.365
Butt addresses this criticism by specifying the benefit principle in four steps. First, he tames down
its demandingness: benefiting from an injustice might oblige an actor to compensate to suffering
parties  only  partly,  ‘up  to  the  point  where  they  are  no  longer  beneficiaries  of  the  injustice  in
362 Christian Barry and Robert Kirby, ‘Scepticism about Beneficiary Pays: A Critique’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 
34, no. 3 (2015); Holly Lawford Smith, ‘Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change’, ‐ Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): 392–404.
363 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 136, 139–40.
364 Robert K. Fullinwinder, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy. A Moral and Legal Analysis (Maryland: 
Maryland University, 1980).
365 David Hume as cited in: Butt, ‘“A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable”’, 336.
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question’, instead of requiring her to compensate for the losses of the deprived in full. 366 Second, he
narrows down its stringency: sometimes benefiting involuntarily from an injustice might not lead
into compensatory obligations at all, as parties may have more acute responsibilities that stem from
having  been  involved  in  bringing  forth  the  injustice.  Butt  concedes  that  in  general  remedial
responsibilities accrued from conducting an injustice override those accrued by benefiting from one.
However, he refuses to set any ‘lexical priority’ between the principles: the contribution principle
has only ‘presumptive priority’ over responsibilities of beneficiaries.367 This is because there might
be instances in which making the offender foot the full bill would be too stringent or unrealistic,
whereby the benefit principle takes the primary role.
Third, Butt distances his approach from the vocabulary of ‘obligation’ by introducing the ‘modified
beneficiary  principle’,  according to  which  ‘[a]gents  can  be  morally  blameworthy for  failing  to
disgorge in compensation benefits which they involuntarily receive as a result of wrongdoing which
harms other agents’.368 Removing the language of enforceable obligations makes the principle more
manageable especially to libertarians who insist that enforceable obligations can only result from
voluntary action. Finally, he sets benefit as an element of subject-based morality that cannot be
authoritatively  determined  or  enforced  from  the  outside.369 Because  there  is  a  considerable
‘subjective  welfare  element’ in  determining whether  someone has  benefited  or  not,  the  benefit
principle is best seen as a guide of internal responsibility, to apply Farid Abdel-Nour’s term, rather
than a guideline that even in theory could be legally or socially enforceable.370
366 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 142.
367 Butt, 142.
368 Butt, ‘“A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable”’, 343.
369 Butt, 341–42.
370 Butt, 346; Abdel-Nour, ‘Responsible for the State’.
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5.2.3 CONSUMERS AS BENEFICIARIES
The  four  qualifications  above  set  the  benefit  principle  as  a  complementary  ground to  the  less
disputed contribution principle, and a principle of a kind that nudges towards rather than morally
obligates people to remedy the injustices from which they benefit. Having set up the broad lines of
Butt’s view, I now turn to explore whether consumers’ responsibility to alleviate harms in global
supply  chains  could  be  grounded on such a  principle.  Initially,  the  principle  seems applicable.
Adopting the definition of the principle above, consumers are involuntary beneficiaries to injustices
writ large taking place in global supply chains. Their connection to the injustices is not contributory,
as other agents are the ones causing the harms. Holly Lawford-Smith agrees that one can conjure a
scenario in  which  consumers  buying products  with  affordable prices  are  beneficiaries,  whereas
shareholders of companies governing different stages of the supply chains in which the injustices
take place are the contributory wrongdoers.371 Because of their shopping practices, consumers are
also  morally  blameworthy,  although not  obliged  to  act  upon  the  injustices  in  the  production
processes.
This depiction can be challenged by saying that benefiting frames consumers as too detached from
the unjust processes. Consumers do not merely hover above the unjust transactions, as the benefit
principle  can  be  read  to  imply,  because  their  purchase  patterns  are  a  central  condition  to  the
production  processes  operating  as  they  do.  Lawford-Smith  suggests  this  argument  against  the
complicity view of individual responsibility discussed in chapter 2, but I think it well applies also to
the benefit principle.372 Here, Barry and Øverland provide an unintended but useful alternative by
discussing  the  concept  of  exploitation.  Criticising  Thomas  Pogge’s  oft-cited  claim  that  rich
371 Lawford-Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’, 317–18.
372 Lawford-Smith, 318; Kutz, Complicity; Lawford-Smith presents a different complicity-based application in: ‘Does 
Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?’
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countries are contributing to global poverty in a way that leads to remedial responsibilities, they
suggest that rich countries exploiting poor countries is  a more accurate description of the non-
contributory but still morally relevant connection between the countries. They define exploitation as
engaging in an transaction which leaves all parties better off, but some less than they should based
on a chosen threshold of justice.373 Leaving for now aside what  ‘just’ in the previous statement
exactly means, the concept of exploitation comprises an alternative depiction of consumers’ non-
causal linkage with injustices. While exploitation has many things in common with benefit,  the
former portrays consumers as having a deeper and more active kind of a connection with a harm.
To answer, I think exploitation is unnecessarily deep; describing consumers as beneficiaries is more
fitting  than  as  exploiters.  Exploitation  implies  a  direct  transaction  with  the  exploited  and  the
exploiter. Such a connection does not exist in intermediated supply chains, in which consumers deal
with the retail  shops and other  downstream sellers.  It  might be more appropriate in  relation to
agents  proximate  to  the  harms:  factory  managers  dictating  working  conditions,  armed  groups
extorting miners, even shareholders agreeing on environmentally hazardous corporate strategies, to
apply  Lawford-Smith’s  thought.374 Further,  in  terms  of  moral  relevance  whether  one  calls  the
relationship  as  one  of  exploitation  or  of  benefiting  from  an  injustice  does  not  make  a  great
difference. Just as Butt emphasises the internal and non-obligatory nature of responsibilities arising
from benefiting from an injustice, Barry and Øverland, from their position of holding contribution-
based responsibilities as primary, conclude that responsibilities arising from exploitation are weaker
than those arising from either contributing to or having a capacity to remedy a harm: ‘Although
exploiting  people  is  often  morally  wrong,  exploitation-based  responsibilities  are  much  less
constraining than contribution-based duties; in fact, they seem to be less constraining even than
373 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 140.
374 The vocabularies of exploitation, benefit, and injustice struggle if the object of mistreatment is not an animate 
object rather than the planet. Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long range Ecology Movement. A Summary’.‐
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assistance-based responsibilities. Confronted with a choice of failing to assist and exploiting, all
else being equal, it is typically better to exploit.’375
This  does  not  mean that  benefiting  from an injustice is  morally  irrelevant.  However,  a  central
challenge in applying the principle to the case of consumers concerns the form of injustice from
which consumers benefit. Lawford-Smith points out that in applying the benefit principle to argue
for consumer responsibility it is not easy to pinpoint the injustices that take place. In some cases it
might be that not engaging in some transactions would even lead to those exposed to an injustice
being worse off.376 The paradigm case of sweatshop labour illustrates the complexity. Libertarians,
such as Benjamin Powell and Matt Zwolinski, remind that it is not certain whether, for instance,
introducing a higher minimum wage would improve workers’ wellbeing without leading to layoffs
and light-footed corporations moving their  purchases elsewhere, thus harming the workers even
more.377 As per Zwolinski, there ought to be more talks of injustices in specific sweatshops rather
than  calling  as  unjust  by  default  all  businesses  which  operate  in  labour-abundant,  low-wage
countries.  Clothing firms that  commission factories and hire  people for work in  such countries
might be morally preferable than firms that do not outsource their production.378
Lawford-Smith’s call to clarify the concept of injustice underlining the benefit principle rings true.
Harms to people, societies and the planet in supply chains are different phenomena. For instance,
Barry  and  Øverland  point  out  that  the  claim that  buying and utilising  raw materials  from the
conflict-ridden areas of DR Congo and Nigeria is exploitative depends on empirical contingencies,
or on whether the Congolese and Nigerians are better or worse off due to the transactions.379 Again,
375 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 148.
376 Lawford-Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’, 318.
377 Powell and Zwolinski, ‘The Ethical and Economic Case Against Sweatshop Labor’.
378 Matt Zwolinski, ‘Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation’, Business Ethics Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2007): 712; Joshua 
Preiss, ‘Global Labor Justice and the Limits of Economic Analysis’, Business Ethics Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2014): 55.
379 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 145.
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exploitation and benefit as moral grounds both depend on the conception of injustice harnessed.
Butt’s solution is to say that remedial obligations follow if the acts and schemes from which one
benefits result from ‘wrong-doing by other agents’.380 Wrong-doing, then, comprises a distortion
within the ‘overall scheme of distribution’, gaining from which signifies that one’s resources can be
tapped to annul losses accrued from it.381 In this distinctively Aristotelian framework, discharging
one’s remedial responsibility is to conduct acts  of corrective justice for the ‘maintenance of an
equilibrium of good between members of society’.382 
However, portraying justice as a balance does not yet reveal what kind of a situation qualifies as the
‘just’ equilibrium  for  which  one  ought  to  strive,  that  is,  what  would  be  a  good  way  to  take
advantage of abundant labour in Bangladesh or mineral riches in Congo. Butt does not establish a
categorical threshold, such as a person’s basic needs, the violation of which by definition would
count as an injustice. Problematising the use of any absolute criterion as a method of separating just
from unjust acts, he prefers a more fluid notion: if an act that wrongs and harms a party makes the
party worse than they would have been had the act never occurred,  the act is unjust. This step
anchors  his  understanding  of  injustice  on  counterfactual  thinking,  i.e.  being  able  to  imagine
alternative but realistic  trajectories of events.383 As Butt  articulates it,  a useful morally  relevant
counterfactual scenario to a wrong-doing from which actors benefit approximates the automatic
effects of injustice while still holding persons accountable for their actions and omissions.384 If such
a scenario can be identified in the supply chains, the equilibrium of distribution is distorted and
380 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 143.
381 To be sure, Butt does not claim that benefit is the only grounds of distributing responsibilities. He refers to Miller’s 
‘connection theory’, according to which moral intuitions indicate which principle is invoked in a specific case, and 
that one or several grounds at the same time may justify calls for remedial action. Butt, 133; Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice, 100–105.
382 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 134–35.
383 Butt, 135–36.
384 Butt, 147.
129
consumers  are  involuntarily  benefiting  from  injustice  in  a  way  that  makes  them  morally
‘blameworthy’.385
This is easier said than done. In his flagship example of colonial injustices, Butt recognises that
specifying the cases in which someone has been put to a disadvantage is complicated because the
longer time passes from the colonial times the more difficult it becomes to differentiate whether
deprivation  in  some  former  colonies  results  from  the  historical  injustice  or  from  autonomous
decisions,  policies  and processes  in  the  countries  themselves.386 Similarly,  while  one  can  quite
confidently say that consumers are in a materially better position because of the affordable clothes
the global  garment  industry brings  to  their  convenience,  it  is  less obvious that  those toiling in
sweatshop conditions are always put to a disadvantage. A similar argument can be woven about
Nigeria and Congo, the two cases to which I will return in the latter part of the thesis. As Lawford-
Smith points out,  sometimes  ‘we end up with an incongruous situation where we seem to both
commit an injustice against someone while also making them better off’.387
Such scenarios are possible as consumers benefit from a myriad of different supply chains, some of
which might be more easily judged as unjust than others. Further, the tension created by facing an
unjust but mutually beneficial relation between consumers and those harmed can be reconciled: in
classic cases of paternalism in which someone’s personal rights are violated as he is forced to take
medical treatment in order to heal him, a wrong-doing is allowed for a greater good.388 The very
practical challenge in applying Butt’s concept of injustice to consumers is that requiring remedial
action from them demands substantial empirical groundwork in order to build alternative scenarios
to the schemes from which they benefit. Relying on counterfactual thinking more than Young, for
385 Butt, ‘“A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable”’, 343.
386 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 147–50.
387 Lawford-Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’, 318.
388 Lawford-Smith, 318.
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instance in her definition on structural injustices, Butt makes the concept of injustice reliant on
empirical inquiry.389
5.2.4 AN AUXILIARY PRINCIPLE
Although a strong reliance on counterfactuals makes applying the benefit principle challenging in
practice, I suggest that the principle may be a plausible way to ground consumer responsibility. As I
will  elaborate  in  the  second  part  of  the  thesis,  an  approach  to  responsibility  relying  on  an
empirically  informed  view  of  specific  cases  can  be  fruitful.  The  benefit  principle  has  some
characteristics that make it stand apart from the contribution and association principles. Advocates
of the benefit principle do not engage in the tedious task of reasoning out an expanded notion of
contribution to ground responsibility, nor do they resort to a plethora of parameters to establish a
connection  between  consumers  and  structural  injustices.  To  Butt,  the  grounds  of  moral
blameworthiness is a relational rather than a structural connection to wrongs conducted by others.
Yet, the remedial responsibility derived from such a connection might not ultimately matter that
much. To remind, the benefit principle is inherently an auxiliary principle in many respects. Butt
recognises that the connection between benefit and contribution principles becomes apparent in real
world compensation claims.390 Referring to George Sher’s work, he points out that if one concedes
that the affluence of western countries rests on benefits accrued from injustices of the colonial era,
and then proceeds not to act upon this insight, he or she turns into a wrong-doer by withholding due
compensation and thus compounding the unjust situation; the beneficiaries become liable although
they are not faulty.391 Also, to remind, Butt gives the contribution principle a ‘presumptive’ priority,
acknowledging that the moral task of beneficiaries from injustice is to chime in when the wrong-
389 To be sure, Young’s approach is not straightforward either. She accepts well-known human rights and labour 
standards as thresholds of injustice, while at the same time gearing her thesis towards exposing injustices in the 
baseline situation of the ‘normal’: ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 369, 378.
390 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 151–52.
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doers are for some reason not up to the task of compensating for what they have done.392 Finally,
what constitutes an unjust act depends on the kind of interactions one treats as morally relevant
under the contribution principle. No one can be identified as benefiting from an injustice without
first  identifying what  kind of an act  is  unjust.  Showing that  consumers  gain responsibilities  as
beneficiaries requires having a background theory on what is a morally relevant contribution, a
question I highlighted in the first section of this chapter.
Ultimately, benefit as a moral ground activates when those who cause the harms have not or will not
discharge their responsibility. Even then consumers face no remedial responsibilities in the same
way as  those  having caused an  injustice  might:  benefiting  from an injustice  does  not  obligate
anyone to remedy the injustice, although doing so is not supererogatory either.393 As no external
responsibilities arise even as per Butt, an advocate of the principle, it is questionable whether the
moral burden that consumers can impose on themselves on the basis of benefiting from injustices
deserves to be called a responsibility. Hence, the benefit principle ought to be considered as grounds
of consumer responsibility only if other principles do not seem to ground more serious remedial
responsibilities.
391 Butt, 152; George Sher, ‘Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 10, no. 1 (1981): 3–17; 
also: Janna Thompson, ‘Collective Responsibility for Historic Injustices’, Midwest Studies In Philosophy 30, no. 1 
(2006): 154–167; Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
392 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 142.
393 Butt, ‘“A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable”’, 346.
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5.3 CAPACITY PRINCIPLE
5.3.1 AIM
Both Iris Marion Young and Daniel Butt, whom I presented as advocates of the association and
benefit  principles,  concede  that  the  contribution  principle  remains  a  formidable  grounds  of
demanding remedial action. Despite the difficulties in applying a contributory approach to distribute
remedial responsibility for harms in causally complex global processes, the alternative grounds they
develop  are  to  complement  rather  than  to  replace  the  contribution  principle.  As  per  Bernard
Williams’s  insight,  causation  remains  a  central  grounds  in  the  conventional  conception  of
responsibility, a tenet that those hoping to overcome its shortcomings in global processes have to
accommodate one way or another.394
The variation of the capacity principle I will discuss, according to which the agent who is the most
capable  to  act  upon  a  harm has  a  responsibility  to  do  so,  challenges  the  cardinal  role  of  the
contribution principle.395 In order to examine this approach in more detail, I engage with work by
Peter Singer and Leif Wenar, who broadly claim that individuals living in affluent democracies have
a duty that transcends communal boundaries to act upon a range of issues, such as global poverty
and  the  resource  curse.  I  show that  these  consequentialist  approaches  are  very  relevant  to  the
question of consumer responsibility, but tend to define all grounds of responsibility as reducible to
an analysis of actors’ relative capacities to realise steps towards a chosen ideal.396 Applying Dewey’s
criticism, I argue that treating capacity as the fundamental ground of remedial responsibility does
not adequately reflect the pluralist, contextual and contingent nature of ethical inquiry.
394 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 56.
395 E.g. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 103.
396 Wenar, Blood Oil, 364.
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5.3.2 PETER SINGER AND LEIF WENAR
The capacity principle is one of the most established approaches in global ethics that extends the
sphere of moral discourse beyond communal boundaries. In his seminal article Famine, Affluence
and Morality,  Singer suggests that citizens of  affluent countries have a positive duty to alleviate
famine and poverty in distant parts of the world as long as helping those suffering does not involve
citizens sacrificing anything of  comparable moral  significance.  This  responsibility  treats  distant
strangers as moral equals to one’s family, community or nation. If the suffering that an individual
can most efficiently alleviate by the resources she has available is faced by those far away, then the
distant ones are to be helped rather than those who are closer by but in less distress. Neglecting
one’s own community and family does not automatically follow: often special relationships with
those one holds close on broadly association-based grounds are justified on the basis  that their
distress cannot be as effectively alleviated by those far away. To Singer, including distant others to
the moral calculus is a consequence of embracing a maxim that an agent’s remedial responsibility is
a function of his or her unrealised potential to minimise suffering.397
To make the extent of his argument clear, Singer uses a now famous analogy between rescuing a
child drowning in a shallow pond and resolving global poverty. Whether one’s clothes get soggy
while saving the child is not of much moral significance compared to the moral cost of a child
losing his or her life if the person nearby did not jump into the pond to rescue. Similarly, citizens of
affluent  liberal  democracies  ought  to  do  much more  than  they  currently  do to  alleviate  global
poverty, because the costs of helping more are negligible. Accordingly, Singer’s work serves as an
inspiration to a social movement of ‘effective altruism’, which urges affluent individuals in rich
397 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’; Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press, 2002).
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countries  to  spend  a  larger  share  of  their  income  on  charities  that  effectively  mitigate  global
poverty.398
To compare, Leif Wenar writes that individuals broadly in ‘the West’ ought to take action to reform
global  trade regimes that  allow importing of products  from morally  questionable origins.399 He
draws on empirical research on the resource curse phenomenon, stating that a country possessing
abundant  natural  resources  is  more  likely  to  encounter  slow economic  growth,  to  be  ruled  by
authoritarian  and corrupt  regimes,  and to  undergo violent  armed conflicts  than  those with  less
abundant  natural  resources.  Among  the  countries  suffering  from  the  curse  are  many  oil-rich
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, but also countries with other kinds of sought-after raw
materials, such as the conflict-torn DR Congo with its vast mineral riches. Many of these countries
suffer from ‘pathologies’ of the resource curse at the same time as they export raw materials used to
make products sold to consumers in affluent democracies.400
In his book  Blood oil,  Wenar takes up a myriad of arguments to push ‘citizens, consumers and
leaders’ in the West towards acting upon the resource curse phenomenon.401 He claims that the
instability linked with the ‘pathologies’ will inevitably spread to affluent democracies, for instance
as  the  resource-exporting  countries  provide  feeding  ground  for  terrorism and  mass  migration.
Further, as neither the regimes of the ‘cursed’ countries, such as that of the authoritarian president
Obiang  controlling  oil  production  in  Equatorial  Guinea,  nor  the  armed  rebels  incentivised  and
financed by the resource trade, such as the diverse militias in eastern Congo, have the consent of the
398 Peter Singer, The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas about Living Ethically (New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2015).
399 Wenar, Blood Oil, 54–62; Leif Wenar, ‘Poverty Is No Pond: Challenges For the Affluent’, in Giving Well: The 
Ethics of Philanthropy, ed. Patricia Illingworth, Thomas Pogge, and Leif Wenar (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 104–132.
400 Wenar, Blood Oil, xxiv–xxvii, 54–62.
401 Leif Wenar, ‘Book’, 2018, http://www.wenar.info/books#book-summary.
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population to tap on these resources, buying raw materials from them equals to buying stolen goods,
which  in  many  domestic  legal  systems  is  illegal.402 He  also  summons  a  contribution-based
argument,  pointing out that the importing states, and indirectly consumers, are perpetuating the
curse by funding and incentivising the rulers and rebels to continue their  activities. Further,  he
suggests that there is a moral taint that stains products made using commodities stemming from
suspicious origins,  and finally  evokes a historical  analogy, stating that the current  trade in raw
materials has much in common with the now morally abhorrent and illegal slave trade.403
While the arguments harnessed are diverse compared to those taken up by Singer’s in his early
article, ultimately in both cases the responsibility of individuals in affluent democracies to mitigate
suffering, harms and problems far away is grounded on their ample means to remedy the situation.
In order to further flesh out these means, Wenar carves out practical steps towards mitigating the
resource curse by reforms in international trade. As affluent democracies ceasing to buy products of
suspicious origins would leave the resources in ‘cursed’ countries to be bought in by less scrupulous
competitors, such as China, a two-step policy framework to guide import practices is needed. First,
an international Clean Trade policy framework, according to which countries judged by a neutral
body as facing the most severe authoritarianism or state failure would be disqualified from resource
exports, is to be established. Second, to be airtight, this framework would be complemented by
individual Clean Hands Trusts, to which money gathered by taxing imports from countries that
break the Clean Trade policy would be saved for future use of the people in the suffering country. In
Blood Oil, showing that steps to resolve the resource curse are mapped and feasible comprises an
402 One of Wenar’s broad strategies to generate moral motivation for remedial action is to portray the buying of imports
from ‘cursed’ countries as a case of mala fide rather than bona fide: ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, no. 1 (2008): 17–19.
403 Wenar, Blood Oil, chapters I-II.
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overarching case in favour of individuals in the West having a responsibility to do their best to
ensure that they are taken.404
To highlight the consequentialist ethical theory that underlines Singer’s and Wenar’s claims, neither
of the theorists places intrinsic moral value on acts. A conduct is evaluated as morally good or bad
based on its outcomes,  or more specifically in case of utilitarianism, how consequences of acts
shape the aggregate level of utility among all the actors concerned.405 While specific rules, such as
do not harm, can be sometimes useful as practical guides to moral conduct, consequentialists do not
see rules as foundational in the sense that replacing them with another set of rules leading to better
outcomes would be morally impermissible.406 When an issue such as the resource curse is to be
remedied, both to Wenar and Singer the moral way of dividing the labour and costs involved is to
allocate them among the potential actors in a way that the desired ideal is realised with least costs.
Wenar writes about his choice of setting ‘free unity among individuals’ ends’ as the ideal: 
Policies, treaties, institutions, offices, traits, even what are conceived of as basic
rules of interpersonal morality are ultimately to be evaluated by their contribution
in their time, within a specific social world, to increasing or decreasing free unity
among individuals’ ends.407
And
404 Leif Wenar, ‘Fighting the Resource Curse’, Global Policy 4, no. 3 (2013): 304; Wenar, Blood Oil, chapter IV; Leif 
Wenar et al., Beyond Blood Oil: Philosophy, Policy, and the Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2018); Similarly, Pogge’s Democracy Panel sets the criteria for who can sell resources. To compare, 
Wenar does not to frame the resource curse as a democratic deficit rather than as a violation of property rights and 
popular resource sovereignty: Thomas Pogge, ‘The Influence of the Global Order on the Prospects for Genuine 
Democracy in the Developing Countries’, Ratio Juris 14, no. 3 (2001): 326–43.
405 Wenar, Blood Oil, 363.
406 Utilitarians can also use rules to guide moral conduct. See: R. M. Hare, Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993); Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy.
407 Wenar, Blood Oil, 363.
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[t]his is an ideal-based consequentialism - a theory that judges everything by its
contribution to the ideal, and with the ideal set by the maximum achievement of
freely  unified  ends.  The  theory  has  many  levels,  including  acts,  rules,  roles,
principles,  and  identities.  And the  rule  ordering  these  multiple  levels  is  again
unity. A person should reason on these levels as will result in the greatest free
unity.408
A monistic consequentialist answer to the research question of the thesis would be that, despite the
many paths of reasoning present in Blood Oil, consumers’ responsibility to act upon harms in global
supply chains is shaped by their capacity to efficiently advance projects in their time that comprise
steps  towards  this  ideal.  Individuals  in  the  West  possess  a  variety  of  tools,  such as  taking  up
purchase action, calling for corporations to stop bad practices, and pressuring legislators to impose
responsible import policies, to mitigate the resource curse that Wenar identifies as a major obstacle
in the way of realising free unity among individuals’ ends.  These individuals,  be they citizens,
consumers, or leaders, are in a key position, even more so than those directly involved with or
suffering from harms, as the latter group might not be able to act without incurring significant costs
to themselves. In this case, the responsibility to act upon harms cascades down to individuals in
affluent  democracies.409 Apportioning remedial  responsibility  in  this  way follows  a  vision  of  a
better, reachable future; can implies ought. 
408 Wenar, 364.
409 Leif Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, in Freedom From Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to 
the Very Poor? Co-Published with UNESCO, ed. Thomas Pogge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28–29.
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5.3.3 UNIFORM THEORY
Ideal-based variations of consequentialism have been extensively discussed over the years.410 For
instance, Samuel Scheffler claims that consequentialist approaches to responsibility in general fail
to appeal to individual morality in the context of global processes.411 To him, although Singer’s
argument on global poverty seems useful in surpassing the shortcomings of the conventional notion
of responsibility in the global era, the lack of limits it sets on individual responsibility makes the
principle  ‘non-internalizable’.412 To  be  sure,  Singer’s  retort  to  the  general  accusation  that  he
conflates the boundaries between moral and supererogatory acts is that such criticism exposes the
inconsistencies in ordinary standards set for moral behaviour, not in his argument. Acting morally is
not  easy.  Very  few people  actually  do  everything  that  they  ought  to  do,  whereby  his  way  of
following people’s presumptions on what is moral to the bitter end might actually convince them to
take their responsibilities extending beyond communal boundaries seriously.413
In what follows, I suggest that such a variant of the capacity principle runs a risk of being non-
internalisable in a more fundamental sense. To start, the variation discussed below is monistic and
ideal-based in a sense that all assignations of responsibility are derived from an analysis of the steps
to be taken to realise the final goal, here ‘the maximum achievement of freely unified ends’.414 This
variant treats the principles of contribution, benefit, and association discussed above as established
on the capacity principle, although, to remind, Young and Butt themselves tend to envision their
410 J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, Utilitarianism - for and Against (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973).
411 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 42–46; McKeown, ‘Responsibility without Guilt’, 10–12.
412 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 42–43.
413 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, 235–37.
414 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’, 783; Wenar, Blood Oil, 364 Below, I suggest that Wenar’s variation 
might leave some (unelaborated) space for endorsing further grounds of responsibility.
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approaches as complementary to the contribution principle.415 I will engage with Wenar’s approach,
because his argument broadly aligns with such an ideal-based monistic approach, and because his
discussion of consumers well matches with the focus of this thesis.
The role of the capacity principle as a general theory of responsibility is less visible in Blood Oil,
which harnesses diverse rhetoric to usher individuals in the West to fight the resource curse. Yet, it
is explicit  in Wenar’s earlier article  Responsibility and Severe Poverty,  which  presents  ‘a unified
explanation of where to locate responsibility for averting threats to basic well-being’.416 As per him,
almost all assignations of responsibility are guided by the ‘least-cost principle’, according to which
a ‘responsibility for averting threats to basic well-being should be located in the agent who can most
easily avert the threat’.417 To illustrate, firefighters are assigned to fight a harm, because having an
identifiable group to quench outbreaks of fires is the least costly way to systematically reduce the
risk of serious damage; biological parents are considered as responsible for taking care of their
children, because their proximity and natural affection to their child put them in the best position to
do so; the driver of a trailing car rather than that of a leading car is usually held legally responsible
for a collision, because the former is more able to avoid such an accident; and so on.418 
To Wenar, the least-cost principle is vital in understanding and debating allocations of responsibility
both in one-off situations and when systems involving roles such as those above are designed and
evaluated. There is no competing logic to the adage:  ‘With power comes responsibility, and with
great  power  comes  great  responsibility’.419 Also  the  conventional  notion  of  responsibility  that
theorists of global ethics try to revamp, according to which the individual actor with a direct and
415 Wenar, Blood Oil, 364; Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’.
416 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 2.
417 Wenar, 5.
418 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’.
419 Wenar, 18.
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proximate contribution to a harm bears the remedial responsibility, is a contingent application of the
least-cost  approach.  Although  usually  the  least-cost  approach  presses  remedial  responsibility
‘inward’ to the very individuals suffering from a harm on the basis that they are most capable of
helping themselves, in the case of the resource curse phenomenon this will not do.  The economic
and political power accumulated in importing countries to efficiently take steps towards mitigating
the resource curse that stands in the way of unity among human ends vests individuals in them with
a remedial responsibility to fight the phenomenon.
As per the ‘weak’ normative edge of pragmatism I described in chapter 2, aims set both by Singer
and Wenar are broadly valid: both minimising suffering and free unity of ends among all humans
comprise valid goals for action in specific situations.420 However, here I highlight that these aims
can be interpreted in pluralist terms and that various grounds can be adopted in ‘context-specific
constellations’ to assign responsibilities to actors on a case-by-case basis.421 As Dewey points out,
taken as ultimate goals ideals do not easily turn into guides to thought and action: ethical inquiry
involves experimenting on different frameworks to find out which one seems the most useful in
individual situations, and reappraising the ends-in-view as their valuation might change in action.422
Setting one principle as grounding all others fails to acknowledge this pluralism ‘encountered in
experience’.423
Pluralism, as in acknowledging that there are several values that may guide moral reasoning, is
illustrated in difficulties that follow when other grounds of responsibility are reduced to an analysis
of  actors’ remedial  capacities.424 In  what  follows,  I  engage  with  the  way  Wenar  refutes  the
420 Bernstein, ‘The Resurgence of Pragmatism’, 832.
421 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 100–105, 107; Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’.
422 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 183, 198.
423 Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’, 25.
424 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’, 776; Elinor Mason, ‘Value Pluralism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 2018).
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contribution  principle,  which  he treats  as  the  most  prominent  competitor  to  the  capacity-based
approach. Wenar discusses the principle as a duty to compensate, which activates ‘when one person
has  harmed  another,  and  the  harm to  the  victim  constitutes  a  continuing  threat  to  their  basic
wellbeing’.425 To me,  this  definition  likens  the  principle  of  compensation  with  the  contribution
principle  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  according  to  which  those  who  cause  a  harm  are
primarily responsible for mitigating and compensating for it, regardless of whether they are most
capable of doing so.
Wenar considers the contribution principle as limited and ‘surrounded’ by the least-cost principle in
five ways.426 First, the principle activates only when there is a harm, whereas in many cases in
which someone’s well-being is threatened there is no identifiable person that has harmed or is going
to harm another. Second, the identification of those persons who are held responsible for having
caused the harm in question is also guided by the least-cost principle; that is,  causal inquiry is
guided by considerations  on actors’ capacities.  Third,  the  least-cost  principle  is  superior  to  the
principle of compensation, because the former overrides the latter in emergencies, such as in traffic
accidents when the need to help those who are hurt is acute. Fourth, compensation is a ‘shallow’
principle compared to the capacity principle, because it does not indicate to whom a secondary
responsibility should be assigned if those with a primary responsibility are unable or unwilling to
fulfil their duty. And fifth, applying the contribution principle is unfeasible in complex cases, such
as global poverty, in which it is impossible to convincingly reason who caused a harm, or if there is
a harm in the first place.427
As it comes to the first point, there are definitely instances in which causes of harms cannot be
traced to actors capable of carrying responsibility, whereby other means to allocate responsibilities
425 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 20.
426 Wenar, 20–22.
427 Wenar, 20–22.
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are needed. However, there are many instances in which such tracing can be done as long as one
does not rely only on narrow legal understandings of liability. In the previous chapter, I discussed
the notion of causal influence as suggested by Barry and Macdonald. Many concepts in criminal
and tort law, such as that of conspiracy, identify degrees of causal connection that can differentiate
involved actors’ relative fault in complex cases, illustrating that contributing to a harm is not a
binary rather than a scalar issue.428 Surely, there are situations in which harms are too complex,
whereby  relying  on  the  capacity  principle  to  build  a  no-fault  based  system  to  allocate
responsibilities may be more useful.429 Yet, tools exist to identify harms and their perpetrators in
diverse situations beyond the standard case in which ‘one person has harmed another’.430
This argument is linked with Wenar’s fifth point. As Scheffler alludes, while finding out the causes
of global  poverty is  an extremely challenging task,  determining the extent to which actors can
alleviate it  equally requires vast  knowledge of their  respective capacities.431 When applying the
capacity principle, empirical complexity permeates a cost-benefit analysis to appraise an actor’s
responsibility at least as much as it does attempts to apply the contribution principle in causally
complex cases. Wenar’s least-cost principle is harder to apply than it sounds. For instance, treating
national boundaries as an implausible limit to moral discourse in resolving grand problems, such as
global poverty and the resource curse, invites a vast number of empirical factors to be taken into
account when computing who among the many actors are the most capable of pushing towards the
maximand. Such a computation is challenging, to say the least, at least as much as an inquiry into
causes of harms.
428 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’
429 Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy, chapter 3.
430 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 20.
431 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 42.
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I will return to the second and fourth points below. The third criticism, according to which the least-
cost principle is superior, because it overrides the compensation principle in emergencies, implies
that alleviating emergencies is more important than affecting the structural factors that enable such
emergencies to take place. While a single famine can be partly alleviated by charity and donations,
the underlying factors behind famines in general - such as speculative markets in global crop prices,
failed agricultural  policies, recurrent civil  wars,  and climate change, to name some explanatory
factors – fade to the background if emergencies are prioritised as the events in which threats to
people’s wellbeing are best averted. While it is quite intuitive to think that whoever is able to help
when encountering a traffic accident should do so, a traffic engineer might have a more stringent
duty to redesign the roundabout so that fewer accidents in the roundabout will happen in the future.
The least-cost principle overriding the compensation principle in emergencies does not necessarily
make the capacity principle any more ‘fundamental’; it might be the blame-inducing contribution
principle that obliges traffic planners to take up the invaluable task of removing structural faults,
such as ill-designed roundabouts increasing the likelihood of accidents. 
Wenar’s fourth claim about the contribution principle as a ‘shallow’ principle could be turned on its
head: contribution principle is actually primary, because it is the first device used to assign primary
responsibility, and the capacity principle is only an auxiliary principle, because it activates if those
having caused a harm are unwilling or unable to discharge their responsibility. As written above,
some legal theorists take the view that redistributing costs of a harm from where they fall is justified
primarily only if the responsibility is assigned to those who caused the harm.432 
Finally, Wenar’s second criticism, which suggests that least-cost reasoning guides causal inquiry, is
the most fundamental out of the five. If the least-cost reasoning guides causal inquiry, an analysis of
actors’ remedial capacities underlines assignations of contribution-based responsibility rather than
432 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’, 136, 139–40; Fullinwinder, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy. A Moral
and Legal Analysis.
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constitutes one of the considerations interwoven into them, as I suggested in the previous chapter.
While  I  agree  that  the  capacity  principle  constitutes  an  important  lens  through which  one  can
evaluate the extent of responsibilities that consumers have in relation to harms in global supply
chains, I find sufficient reasons not to consider the principle as a uniform or  ‘general theory’ of
responsibility.433 What is easily masked by the alleged simplicity of the capacity approach is that
further moral considerations guide its application. To illustrate, David Miller points out that the
capacity principle by itself combines at least two elements, effectiveness and costs: a person can be
able to mitigate a harm with best results but at a great personal cost, or with sufficient results and
low personal  costs.  Consequentialist  thinkers,  then,  have to strike a balance between these two
elements in order to refine their appraisal of who is the most able act into practical guidelines. 434
Singer balances his approach by introducing limiting clauses, such as that the costs involved to a
single  actor  are  not  to  be ‘excessive’ or  of  ‘comparable  moral  significance’ or  ‘importance’ in
relation to the harm in hand.435 Similarly, Wenar qualifies his least-cost principle by emphasising
that  discharging one’s  responsibilities  is  not  to  generate  ‘excessive  costs’ to  the  responsibility-
bearer. If costs are too high, it is better to transfer the responsibility to the actor next capable in the
line.436
Ideal-based consequentialists define such clauses or principles against the final end that looms in
the distance: ‘to a great extent, the ends justify the principles that constrain the means’.437 On this
basis, limits to costs could be justified, because too taxing demands might exhaust people, which
would lead into the harms not being resolved and the ideal of freely united ends unrealised. Surely,
establishing such clauses on this basis is a gargantuan empirical task not of the kind that resonates
433 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 1.
434 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 104.
435 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, 388; McKeown, ‘Responsibility without Guilt’, 10–11.
436 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 7.
437 Wenar, Blood Oil, 364.
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with the way people engage in moral action in their daily lives, and of complexity that matches with
the efforts needed to apply the contribution principle in the context of global processes. The sheer
amount of information needed about the global impact of different paths of action obstructs using
the  principle  as  a  guideline  to  practical  moral  thought  and action,  for  instance  as  it  comes  to
deciphering what counts as an excessive cost.438 
Surely,  there  are  ways  around  this,  for  instance  those  provided  by  rule  utilitarians,  to  whom
everyday action can be guided by principles built on a utilitarian calculus.439 Yet, my main concern
is not about the prospects of ‘operationalising’ ideal-based consequentialism rather than about its
foundations  and  its  relation  to  the  existing  practices  of  assigning  responsibility.  Wenar
acknowledges that existing conventions and habits of assigning responsibility are powerful as he
harnesses  very  diverse  arguments,  ranging  from  blame-based  vocabulary  to  moral  taint  and
historical  analogies,  in  order  to  motivate  individuals  to  fight  the  resource  curse.  However,  an
important function that these arguments serve is to make western individuals reconsider the limits to
costs  they  should  bear  in  order  to  mitigate  the  resource  curse.  This  is  one  of  the  ways  the
conventions carry independent moral weight that goes largely unrecognised in monistic accounts:
showing through a calculus that consumers have a capacity to alleviate the resource curse, which in
turn is a step towards realising the ideal of unity, does not resonate with the way existing habits,
conventions and practices shape the solutions that  can be taken up to orient  in morally salient
situations.440 The limits to how much one has to do in order to discharge one’s responsibility are set
using a plurality of considerations, involving communal boundaries, power, involuntary excuses,
438 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 42–43.
439 Hare, Essays in Ethical Theory.
440 Henry S. Richardson, ‘Beyond Good and Right: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism’, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 24, no. 2 (1995): 126.
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and blame-based rhetoric, whereas monistic accounts strive to derive such limits from the ideal
itself.441 
My point on further considerations shaping excessive costs does not conclude the discussion. For
instance, one can argue that more pluralist forms of consequentialism, which allow for two or more
moral reasons for assigning responsibility, can overcome this challenge. Both in  Blood oil  and in
Responsibility and Severe Poverty Wenar resorts to a kind of vocabulary that retains a possibility for
further considerations: by acknowledging that the capacity principle guides thinking in ‘almost’ all
instances, that the contribution principle is ‘surrounded’ by rather than reducible to the least-cost
principle, and that ends justify the principles that constrain means ‘to a great extent’ he leaves some,
albeit unelaborated, space for other principles of responsibility to co-exist.442 In the next chapter, I
suggest  an  approach  that  does  not  enthrone  the  capacity  principle  as  a  general  theory  of
responsibility,  but nevertheless retains it  as a yardstick for assessing consumer responsibility in
global production processes.
5.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has introduced the principles of benefit and capacity. First, I discussed Daniel Butt’s
claim that it is justified to harness resources of an actor benefiting from an injustice to compensate
for the injustice, even if the actor is neither directly involved with conducting the injustice nor
voluntarily reaping the benefits. No nuanced applications of the benefit principle to the question of
consumer  responsibility  exist,  but  I  have  suggested  that  it  indeed  can  be  used  to  argue  that
consumers bear a moral burden. Yet, the responsibilities that follow from adopting a benefit-based
441 As Smiley points out, utilitarians sometimes frame their argument on other forms of reasoning in order to 
strengthen the motivational power of their claims. Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 
171–72.
442 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 2, 20; Wenar, Blood Oil, 364.
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approach are modest: the principle is conceptually an auxiliary principle that complements cases in
which those having caused an injustice are for some reason not discharging their responsibilities. As
per Butt’s own view, ‘obligation’ is too strong a term to describe the moral burden that actors may
take up based on them involuntarily benefiting from an injustice.
Second, I introduced the capacity principle, whose ideal-based consequentialist advocates argue that
all  assignations  of  moral  responsibilities  are  to  be  guided  by actors'  capacities  to  advance  the
realisation  of  a  morally  desirable,  fixed  end.  Engaging  with  Peter  Singer’s  and  Leif  Wenar’s
arguments, I argued that monistic consequentialist approaches do not manage to  ‘crowd out’ the
need for further moral considerations,  which people draw on to orient themselves in the social
world. In line with the weak foundations of the pragmatist approach I introduced in the previous
chapters, the grounds for assigning remedial responsibility are contextual, contingent, and plural,
which has to be acknowledged in order to develop useful tools for ethical thought and action.
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PART II
6 A PRAGMATIST APPROACH
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I first suggest that ethical situationism drawing on Dewey’s work forms a basis for
exploring consumers’ remedial responsibility for harms in global supply chains from a capacity-
based  perspective.443 When  harnessed  to  produce  normative  guidelines,  the  approach  bears  a
resemblance but  stands  apart  from some variants  of consequentialism.  It  acknowledges  that  all
assignations of responsibility are interwoven with existing practices; striving for ends in view is a
creative activity, which changes the responsibility-bearers as well as the valuation of the ends; and
consumers’ capacity to alleviate harms in global supply chains is a hypothetical rather than a fixed
grounds for considering their responsibilities.  
Second, I establish a rationale for supporting the capacity-based approach with a close study on
armed conflicts linked with the resource curse phenomenon in some supply chains. I suggest that an
overview  of  the  empirical  literature  and  conducting  field  research  is  needed  for  building  an
informed argument on consumers’ remedial capacities.  Accordingly, I elaborate the reasons and
design  for  investigating  consumers'  linkage  with  the  conflicts  in  eastern  Congo  and  southern
Nigeria. As a guideline to ethical thought and action, the approach bears a similarity to pluralist,
‘mid-level’ theorising, as it makes use of empirical research to rearticulate topical moral challenges.
443 As in chapter 2, I thank Molly Cochran, Frank Martela, Pentti Määttänen, Sami Pihlström, and all participants in 
the Philosophy and Public Policy seminar at the University of Helsinki in March 2019 for helpful discussions and 
correspondence on this chapter. Further, I thank Helen Frowe and other participants in the Humanitarian Ethics and 
Action conference at the University of Birmingham in June 2017 for comments on the function of the close study. 
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6.2 CAPACITY REVISED
As this chapter begins the second part of the thesis, a recap of the steps taken so far is in order. In
chapter 2, I aligned my approach broadly with John Dewey’s situationist ethics, and suggested that
its inclination to growth, interpreted by Molly Cochran as a weak normative foundation, establishes
the possibility that harms in global supply chains require moral action from consumers. In chapter
3, I drew on Marion Smiley’s framework of future-looking collective responsibility, which treats a
group’s potential capacity to realise moral projects as a basis of its moral agency, to justify holding
consumers as potentially sharing remedial responsibilities. Chapters 4 and 5 explored four grounds
that have been or can be used to argue that consumers, among the many potential candidates, bear
such responsibilities with regards to harms in global supply chains. The categorisation between the
principles of contribution, association, benefit, and capacity, as developed by Christian Barry and
David Miller, provided a useful framework for this task.
In  this  chapter,  I  suggest  that  Deweyan situationism provides  a  basis  for  experimenting  on an
approach in which consumers’ remedial capacities constitute an important guideline for assessing
their responsibilities to act upon harms in supply chains. Placing moral importance on outcomes
that an actor can generate is usually seen as a domain of consequentialist accounts, such as those
discussed in the previous chapter. However, the approach I advocate stands apart from ideal-based
consequentialism. I treat ethical inquiry as a fallible and situated tool to resolve disruptions that
people experience in their habitual ethical thought and action, highlight the internal reconstruction
that individuals undergo as they embrace and strive for plural ends-in-view to resolve them, and
recognise that existing practices of assigning responsibility shape the context in which suffering,
exploitation and violence are to be ameliorated. While the emphasis on consumers’ capacity as a
ground  of  responsibility  in  the  following  chapters  may  be  partially  read  through  a  pluralist
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consequentialist  lens,  I  suggest  that  this  approach  differs  from  work  usually  characterised  as
consequentialist.
In  chapter  2,  I  pointed  out  that  Dewey rejects  the  means-ends  distinction,  which  characterises
utilitarian  theorising,  and in  chapter  5  applied  his  view to  claim that  monistic  consequentialist
variants of the capacity principle might not be that applicable as guidelines to thought and action
regarding consumer responsibility. To continue,  the logic of the accounts that establish an ideal
goal,  such  as  the  minimising  of  suffering,  in  order  to  focus  on  means  to  achieve  it  are  not
adequately sensitive to the transformative nature of ethical inquiry and deliberation. As Elizabeth
Anderson  describes  Dewey’s  approach:  ‘[t]he  point  of  inquiring  into  means,  and  into  ends
considered as means or causes of further consequences, is not merely to determine how to achieve
an end, but to appraise the value of the end itself’.444 Grasping the course of action needed to reach
an end gives a better view of whether the end is worth achieving, and cultivates novel ways to cope
with  the  diverse  situations  people  face.  The  value  that  his  pragmatism  nurtures  is  growth  in
individual and social critical intelligence, and the cultivation of the kind of mature and reflective
individuals  who are sensitive to and capable of  ameliorating human suffering,  exploitation and
violence in ever-widening moral spheres. Fixing such an activity to any specific ultimate goal is but
to ‘arrest growth’.445
This  concern on individuals’ internal processes,  on the kind of individuals they become,  aligns
Dewey-inspired  pragmatists  with  some  of  consequentialism’s  most  established  criticisms.  To
Bernard Williams, utilitarians such as J.J.C. Smart do not appreciate the importance of individual
integrity.  When  subjected  to  a  utilitarian  calculus,  individuals  are  detached  from  their  own
444 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
445 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 306; Dewey, ‘Theory of Valuation’, 210–19; John Dewey, ‘Human Nature and Conduct’, in The 
Middle Works of John Dewey, Volume 14, 1899 - 1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston and Ralph Ross (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 2008), 4–7.
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commitments and projects. Expectations placed on them can shift and change, and individuals are
treated as ‘channels’ between the input of projects held by everyone, including themselves, and an
output  of an ‘optimific  decision’ that  aims at  an ultimate end, such as happiness.  In so doing,
consequentialists ignore that people are identified with their actions flowing from their deeply held
attitudes and projects, and that demanding changes in those attitudes and projects is an attack on
their  individual  integrity.446 To  me,  a  strong  parallel  exists  between  Williams’s  criticism  and
Dewey’s emphasis on habits and conventions that are to be improved rather than discarded through
ethical inquiry. The latter’s social psychological account of ethics does not reject but is wary of
radically detaching individuals from their existing practices of thought and action in order to resolve
a  tension  in  them.  Habits  are  vital  for  individuals  steering  themselves  through  the  everyday;
‘blocked habits’ are to be improved rather than discarded.447
Accordingly,  Marion  Smiley  takes  up  Williams’s  criticism to  argue  that  to  maintain  individual
integrity one has to pay close attention to the prevailing practices of assigning responsibility. A
downside of the consequentialist accounts is that, although useful and ‘metaphysically accessible’ to
the extent that they do not presume free will or an intention to cause harm, they lack means to
generate moral motivation.448 The social practices of shaming, ideas on just deserts, and emotional
linkages with those suffering from a harm are among the prevalent components in getting people to
do something; telling to most people that calculation and utility oblige is not enough.449 Smiley’s
point is not conservative as in individual integrity and the existing conceptions of responsibility to
446 Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism - for and Against, 116–17.
447 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’; Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 125.
448 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 174; Richard B. Brandt, ‘A Utilitarian Theory of 
Excuses’, Philosophical Review 78, no. 3 (1969): 337–361.
449 ‘Utilitarians are in general reluctant to put forward their own, purely utilitarian, notion of moral responsibility, since
thinking about blame in terms of utility always brings with it the possibility of draining blame of its power to 
influence behavior, i.e., its utility.’ Marion Smiley, ‘From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking 
Collective Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Law and Policy, no. 1 (2010): 191.
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be left as they are. In discussing Peter Singer’s thesis on a duty to help, she points out that even if
distant strangers are to be included to individuals’ sphere of moral responsibility, in practice one has
to think about ‘the institutions and practices’ that motivate individuals to embrace responsibilities,
and  about  how  the  distant  others  who  suffer  could  be  included  to  an  individual’s  ‘realm  of
concern’.450 Treating  the  grounds  of  responsibility  as  universal  and  separate  from  established
practices, as consequentialists tend to do, is not likely to support such aspirations.451 
Building  an  alternative  approach  on  Deweyan  underpinnings,  Smiley suggests  that  allocating
forward-looking collective responsibilities takes place by using a ‘cluster of values and principles’,
whereby it is not useful to treat one principle as fundamentally prior to others. Moral values simply
do not function like that, although arguments about them often so imply.452 People use several moral
rules,  principles  and other  devices  they and the generations preceding them have developed to
orient in the social world, and a suitable analysis starts from acknowledging the contingency and
interwovenness of these existing categories. Such an analysis is situated rather than objective and
universalisable,  and  precisely  due  to  its  underpinnings  on  ‘worldly  considerations’,  Smiley
suggests, may create opportunities for the moral inclusion of actors previously held outside moral
discussion.453 Accordingly,  she  encourages  ‘arguing  openly  and  honestly  about  our  moral
responsibility  for  external  harm in  cases  where  we  are  now unable  to  communicate  with  one
another’.454
To illustrate, in affluent democracies in which calls for ethical consumerism have been voiced, the
contribution  principle  rules  supreme,  forming  the  core  of  both  legal  and  often  also  social
450 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 173–75.
451 Surely, a consequentialist counterargument could be that consequentialist benefits may be motivated by non-
consequentialist reasons: Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy.
452 Smiley and Zalta, ‘Collective Responsibility’.
453 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 14.
454 Smiley, 13.
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assignations of remedial responsibility. While other grounds, such as that of association, benefit,
and capacity, can indeed complement contribution-based assignations, they are often vested in such
blame-based rhetoric, because it resonates with powerful sources of moral motivation. Williams and
Farid Abdel-Nour refer to ‘agent regret’ when describing the emotional response that most people
face when they ‘discover’ they have caused a harm, no matter if there are circumstances, such as
involuntariness  or  unintentionality,  which  in  legal  settings  usually  mitigate  one’s  liability.455 In
Williams’s classic example, a lorry driver feels an emotional wave for having driven over a child
who without any warning ran to her way. Smiley’s analysis highlights that an agent’s self-reflection
on whether she caused a harm is shaped by interweaving considerations,  such as her notion of
communal boundaries, the distribution of power in the society, and the kinds of volitional excuses
that are generally seen as acceptable. While regret is a powerful visceral response, a pragmatist
analysis reminds that it is invigorated by the driver’s conception of responsibility, which is in turn
embedded in contemporary social practices; regret is not inevitable per se.
I suggest that Smiley’s analysis serves as a stepping stone towards treating consumers’ remedial
capacities  as  a  ground  of  remedial  responsibility  in  a  way  that  differs  from  ideal-based
consequentialism. To  her,  Robert  Goodin  provides  a  promising  example  of  a  capacity-based
approach, which can be honed into an account that acknowledges the need to prioritise between
various ends without embracing capacity as a foundational ground of responsibility.456 Whereas to
the  monistic  consequentialist  vein  being  ‘honest’ means  acknowledging  that  the  contribution
principle as well as other principles are underlined purely by capacity-based considerations, the
pragmatist  vein interprets  being ‘honest’ as recognising the plurality of considerations weighted
against as well as intersecting with each other when remedial responsibilities are assigned using any
455 Abdel-Nour, ‘Responsible for the State’; Williams, Shame and Necessity.
456 Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 9; Schmidtz and Goodin, ‐ Social Welfare and Individual 
Responsibility, 50–55.
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grounds. A pragmatist approach lets go of the ‘quest for certainty’, and, as Kelly Parker phrases it,
strives towards ‘creative mediation of conflicting claims to value, aimed at making life on the planet
relatively better than it is’.457 It gives up the search for general principles in order to locate rules that
guide the current practices of assigning responsibility, be they based on contribution, capacity or
other lines of reasoning.458
Can such an approach provide enough discipline to satisfy as a guideline for thought and action?
The  capacity-based  approach  I  argue  as  worth  experimenting  on  presumes  a  pluralist  setting,
echoing  David  Miller's  ‘connection  theory  of  responsibility’.  Each  ground  of  responsibility
corresponds at least partly to the way people reason about moral duties in everyday situations, and
there is no in-built hierarchy for handling conflicts between them. Each of them is relevant as long
as all actors involved agree on a common purpose ‘to relieve P, and the necessity of identifying a
particular agent as having the obligation to provide the relief’; ‘intuitions’ guide the choice of a
ground in actual situations, as no specific ‘algorithm’ or a rank order can establish which one to
prefer  in  resolving  conflicts.459 Miller’s  view,  as  he  points  out  himself,  is  indeterminate.  The
relations between the principles are left ambiguous, in some passages as ‘independent’ grounds of
responsibility, and in others distinguished only by blurred boundaries.460
Jennifer Rubenstein takes up the task of providing an organising device for Miller’s pluralist setting.
She points out that even if some aims, such as resolving global poverty, are embraced by almost all
discussants endorsing diverse ethical theories, the very plurality of reasons may lead to problems, as
they lead to disagreements on who should act and what kind of remedial activities each actor should
take up to ameliorate the commonly recognised issue. Rubenstein raises these ‘case-centered’ and
457 Parker, ‘Pragmatism and Environmental Thought’, 27.
458 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 21, 23.
459 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 100, 107.
460 Miller, 100–105; Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’.
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‘agent-centered’ questions on allocating responsibilities as secondary but still important challenges
to be tackled if global poverty is to be alleviated, and suggests three different ways of ordering the
‘mid-level’ moral reasons: counting reasons, that is, counting for which path of action there are the
most reasons to follow and which actor there are the most reasons to assign responsibility to; setting
up a general ranking of reasons that applies across different situations; or establishing assignations
of responsibility based on the strongest ‘context-specific constellation of reasons’ in a particular
situation.  Her  conclusion  is  that  while  the  third  device  is  not  a  perfect  guide  to  allocating
responsibility, it nevertheless serves as a more convincing organising principle than the other two:
agreeing with Miller, she states that the grounds interact with each other, making it impossible to
decipher which ones are stronger or weaker without looking at the particular situations in which
responsibilities are allocated.461
Surely, pointing at context-specific constellations of reasons is a fuzzy compass. By embracing a
capacity-based approach I do not attempt to explain the plurality away, or ‘replace quarrel with
calculation’, a move characteristic of consequentialist thinking.462 As Barry and Kirby put it, ‘giving
up on pluralism seems a very high price to pay to gain in precision’.463 The situationist approach I
advocate treats as contingent the ontological status of both ‘foundational’ reasons for treating a state
of  affairs  as  deserving  moral  action,  as  well  as  of  the  ‘mid-level’  reasons  for  allocating
responsibilities to act upon it  in a specific way. Despite being averse of foundations, the weak
normative commitment of pragmatism to growth orients ethical inquiries towards ameliorating the
worst  forms  of  exploitation,  violence,  and  oppression,  and  provides  a  ‘quasi-foundation’ from
which to proceed to the ‘mid-level’ questions to which Rubenstein formulates a blueprint of an
461 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’ Rubenstein lists ten ‘mid-level’ sources of remedial responsibility: 
causal, intention, capacity, humanitarian grounds, equality between moral persons, utilitarianism, association, 
benefit, promise, and office-based reasoning.
462 Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 124.
463 Barry and Kirby, ‘Scepticism about Beneficiary Pays’, 9.
156
answer. Even if there is no fixed North Star to help navigate this complicated ethical landscape,
bearing responsibilities remains central to cultivating human growth. Assignations of responsibility
encapsulate both the conventions and habits using which individuals have, together and separately,
oriented through their everyday lives in the past, as well as their attempts to improve these habits in
order to cope with the novel situations the world presents them with.
This might seem insufficient. Indeed, if no general hierarchy can be attained, one can ask why an
exploration of actors’ remedial capacities, an approach mostly familiar to consequentialist ethics, is
to  be  preferred  even  as  a  hypothetical  guideline  to  consumer  responsibility  over,  for  instance,
constructing  a  system  of  prima  facie  duties,  or  taking  up  the  ‘do  no  harm’ principle  as  an
overarching principle?464 The first part of my answer  flows from the analysis I presented in the
introductory chapter: a focus on capacities seem to be one way to limit the erosion of responsibility
in the context of global production processes, which I diagnose as the most salient characteristic of
the situation that this work attempts to resolve. The reason to pause and reflect instead of burdening
consumers with more and stronger demands to consider harms in supply chains in their purchase
decisions is that simply extending their moral sphere along supply chains might not lead individuals
to cultivate and use their critical intelligence for activities that are conducive to growth, including
the moral inclusion and the amelioration of harms. As I suggested in the first chapter, venturing too
far from the conventional, spatially and communally bound practices of assigning responsibility by
extending consumers’ responsibilities  to  cover  ‘complex’ or  ‘intermediate’ goods  risks  creating
shopping as an ‘ethical minefield’ that excites a ‘vertigo’ or paralysis at the height of discharging
them. To me, starting with a capacity-based approach is justified, because it shows potential to help
tackle this important characteristic of the situation.
464 W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, British Moral Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Mary B. 
Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
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Whether the approach actually meets these expectations is not asserted rather than subjected to
empirical and theoretical experimentation. This lack of an anchoring point exposes both the strength
and weakness of Deweyan naturalist  ethics.465 On the one hand, it  treats  value judgments to be
studied as natural phenomena, starting with hypotheses to be tested and revised against evidence.466
On the other hand, neither the hypotheses to be tested nor the standards of whether the hypotheses
pass these tests are set outside practice: whether the tools provided are useful or not is tested against
experience, both of the actors and of those affected by their acts.467 Hence, although I draw on
Smiley’s example to suggest that actors’ capacities can serve as a useful approach to allocating
responsibilities,  I  readily  concede  that  other  tools  could  be  taken  as   ‘hypotheses’  to  be
experimented on.
As the second part of my answer, I suggest that the ‘weak’ normative edge in Dewey’s ethics guides
the gaze on consequences when normative guidelines are sought for specific cases. Pointing out
veins of consequentialism in Dewey’s work is a not an uncommon reading.  Jennifer Welchman
suggests that in modern terms Dewey’s normative philosophy can be defined broadly as ‘pluralist
welfare consequentialist’.468 James Bohman considers whether Dewey could be characterised as a
consequentialist thinker, although not necessarily a utilitarian, by his endorsement of statements
such as ‘judge an act by its consequences’.469 Elizabeth Anderson notes that pragmatism in ethics is
often  regarded  as  a  form  of  teleology  or  consequentialism.470 Indeed,  thinkers  of  both
465 Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 18–21.
466 Bohman, ‘Ethics as Moral Inquiry: Dewey and the Moral Psychology of Social Reform’, 207–8.
467 Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 218.
468 Jennifer Welchman, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, ed. Molly Cochran 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 182; for an indicative view on welfare as a standard 
rather than an end: Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 281.
469 Bohman, ‘Ethics as Moral Inquiry: Dewey and the Moral Psychology of Social Reform’, 187.
470 Anderson is sceptical of such readings, reminding that Dewey rejected accounts of the right that defined it in terms 
of the good: Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’.
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consequentialist and pragmatist views have engaged with the wide framework of future-looking
collective responsibility.471
Rather  than embracing Dewey’s  work as  outright  consequentialist,  I  contend that  such a  move
might  not  satisfy  those  conventionally  identifying  their  work  as  consequentialist.  A pragmatist
commitment to ethical inquiry as an experimentalist, transformative and situated process, and to
conceiving the moral aims people strive to realise as plural and changing, would be disconcerting to
many consequentialist theorists building prescriptions regarding personal or social conduct on one
or several ‘strong’ ideals. The capacity-based approach in this thesis takes habits, conventions and
norms seriously:  while actors’ remedial capacities are indeed an important factor when allocating
responsibilities to advance various moral goals, replacing all other considerations with this criterion
would not only imply radical shifts in the everyday practices of responsibility, but disregard that
such habits, conventions and norms are the backbone using which individuals navigate through
situations  calling  for  an  ethical  inquiry.  Situationism recasts  ethical  theories  in  methodological
terms as tools stemming from and potentially useful in improving these practices, whereas most
consequentialist  variations  are  inclined  to  portraying other  than  efficiency calculi  as  somewhat
misguided distortions or, at best, instrumentally useful manifestations of a capacity-based approach.
A case  in  point,  situationism treats  deontology  and  consequentialism not  as  reducible  to  each
together, but as situated answers to different problems that people face and have faced in the past. 472
Deontological  accounts,  by harnessing  the  concept  of  the  right,  portray  the  value  attributed  to
claims that individuals and groups make against one another within the cooperative practices they
share,  whereas  consequentialist  accounts,  by  taking  up  the  concept  of  the  good,  capture  what
471 Smiley, ‘From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs’, 191; Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 9–‐
10; as above, Smiley draws on Robert Goodin’s work: Schmidtz and Goodin, Social Welfare and Individual 
Responsibility, 50–55; also: Marion Smiley, ed., ‘Special Issue: Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility’, 
Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2014).
472 ‘Three Independent Factors in Morals’.
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people, uncritically or based on intelligent reflection, prize, desire and see worth striving towards.473
Dewey aspired to move not only beyond a Kantian inclination to treat reason as a power that issues
commands to restrict desire, but also beyond the consequentialist inclination to hold aims as fixed.
The authority of claims made towards others is to be assessed and reassessed based on individuals’
‘affective-ideational’ interaction with the world, and the ethicality of their activities based on their
propensity to cultivate growth on a temporal continuum in which ‘each successive stage is equally
ends and means’.474 For instance, Henry Richardson argues that ‘constructive ethical pragmatism’
gives up both on deontology and consequentialism: in ethical deliberation one cannot reach a point
in  which  a  moral  principle  has  been  worked  out  sufficiently  to  declare  it  as  inflexible.  Such
deliberation involves specifying norms to particular situations and integrating the conceptions of the
good and the right in new ways.475
Yet,  Dewey-inspired  readers  differ  on  their  understanding  of  the  exact  relationship  between
metaethical and ethical theorising: to use Light’s categorisation, my reading is philosophical rather
than metaphilosophical.476 In drawing normative guidelines, I emphasise ‘the widest consequences
for everyone of following them’ as a leitmotif that runs through the criteria for evaluating whether
different ways to approach a situation deserve ‘warranted assertibility’, and suggest that a capacity-
based  constitutes  a  promising,  although  not  the  only  alternative  that  potentially  matches  these
criteria.477 Hugh  McDonald’s  rightly  suggests  that  Dewey  ‘transforms’  consequentialism  by
considering an act’s consequences as an important but not a foundational factor in assessing its
473 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’; Welchman, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’, 177–79.
474 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 308–9; Dewey, ‘Human Nature and Conduct’, 138; Dewey, ‘Theory of Valuation’, 218, 234–37.
475 Richardson, ‘Beyond Good and Right: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism’, 140.
476 Light, ‘Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy’, 330.
477 Anderson, ‘Dewey’s Moral Philosophy’; Cochran, ‘Deweyan Pragmatism and Post-Positivist Social Science in IR’, 
547.
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moral value.478 If pragmatism is treated as a form of consequentialist ethics, consequentialism risks
becoming redefined as something else than what the term usually captures.  As long as Dewey’s
meta-ethics and moral psychology are held as careful caveats, situationism allows constructing a
normative guideline that treats consumers’ remedial capacities as a contingent yardstick of their
responsibility to help alleviate harms. 
6.3 CLOSE STUDY
Based  on  the  discussion  above,  in  the  remaining  thesis  I  launch  an  inquiry  into  consumers’
connection with the resource curse and armed conflicts. As I started elaborating in the first chapter,
and will continue to do so in the following one, armed conflicts in the extractive stages of some
supply chains are one of the harms in supply chains flagged as important  by advocates of ethical
consumerism. In a world of complex supply chains in which, to adopt David Schwartz's language,
having completely ‘clean hands’ is impossible for most people, investigating this connection may
reveal meaningful steps towards at least cleaner hands, an objective that resonates with the need to
respond to the moral anxieties that many consumers in affluent democracies are facing.479 Further, a
close study can produce insights of a kind that a theoretically inclined research dwelling less on the
empirical complexities of the harm in question may not be able to articulate, as the latter is not that
sensitive to the actual practices of assigning responsibilities.
Again,  Rubenstein’s  approach  carries  methodological  insights  importable  to  my  approach.
Rubenstein  suggests  that  great  challenges,  such  as  global  poverty,  can  be  reconceptualised  as
comprising of smaller components that better fit with the moral reasons actors recognise, and which
make  the  actor-specific  and  case-specific  questions  involved  easier  to  manage.480 She  treats
478 McDonald, John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy, 117.
479 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 94.
480 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’, 792–94.
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empirical work as useful in teasing out such mid-level insights on complex ethical challenges. To
illustrate, her book  Between Samaritans and States  conceptualises four moral predicaments that
international non-governmental organisations, such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières, face
when  trying  to  help  deprived  people  in  conflict  areas.  Taking  up  interviews,  participatory
observation and archival research in what she calls a ‘cartographic’ approach, Rubenstein aims to
'draw distinctions, offer re-conceptualizations, deploy normative arguments, and otherwise try to
make (one kind of)  sense of  a dauntingly complex terrain'.481 Maps are a  useful  analogy:  they
highlight  characteristics,  such  as  differences  in  altitude,  ecology,  human  and  animal  densities,
depending on the purpose for which they are drawn, without alluding that the complete complex
ethical terrain can be portrayed on a single presentation.
Surely, Rubenstein is not alone, as researchers inclined to pragmatist and non-ideal theorising have
in different terms voiced a need for mid-level approaches to ethics.482 The empirical part of the close
study in this work commences in two stages. First, a convincing argument on consumers’ capacity
to help alleviate conflicts in supply chains requires an informed view of the linkage between armed
conflicts and natural resources. I will establish an overview of the resource curse in the next chapter.
By itself,  the overview is unlikely to yield practical insights on consumers’ remedial capacities:
even if  countries  with  very  different  characteristics  are  treated  as  ‘cursed’,  the  intricate  causal
481 Jennifer C. Rubenstein, Between Samaritans and States: The Political Ethics of Humanitarian INGOs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 18.
482 Further approaches that integrate ‘applied ethical and applied social sciences’ have been advanced in different 
forms for instance by: David Wiens, ‘Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012): 53; Friedrich Kratochwil and Jörg Friedrichs, ‘On Acting and Knowing: How 
Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology’, International Organization 63, no. 4
(2009); Shmuel Nili, ‘Global Justice and Global Realities’, Journal of International Political Theory 12, no. 2 
(2016): 205; Valentini, ‘The Natural Duty of Justice in Non-Ideal Circumstances’; Laura Valentini, ‘Ideal vs. Non-
Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map’, Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012): 654–64; Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), xi–xii, 15; A. John Simmons, ‘Ideal and Nonideal Theory’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 20.
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mechanisms  driving  violence  and  instability  in  them  might  vary,  whereby  also  the  conflict
prevention and mitigation policies,  which consumers could support by their  purchase decisions,
might differ across cases. Accordingly, and second, chapters 8 and 9 will focus on armed conflicts
in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria. Whether the insights accrued through these two steps are
generalisable  to  other  conflicts  linked  with  natural  resources  remains  ultimately  an  empirical
question.  At  the very least,  an in-depth look into two conflicts  enables  articulating factors and
resources that can be considered in future studies mapping consumers’ capacity to act upon other
conflicts.483 
Congo and Nigeria deserve the attention, because both constitute an integral link in global supply
chains governed by multinational corporations, and because the raw materials they produce are
used in wide-spread products that are legally sold to consumers across the world. To unpack the
reasoning, I have selected cases in which multinationals tap on the natural resources in the area,
because zooming in on two well-known cases in which supply chains linking the war-torn areas
with consumers are governed by MNCs allows me to include an important category of actors and
their relative responsibilities to the analysis. Most transnational initiatives trying to alleviate armed
conflicts in global supply chains target MNCs as the key actors.484 While multinational corporations
do not play a part in all conflicts that involve extraction and trade of natural resources, for instance
when the products are aimed for national or regional markets, their involvement adds an important
factor to the analysis.
483 Cf. Evans, Welch, and Swaffield, ‘Constructing and Mobilizing “the Consumer”: Responsibility, Consumption and 
the Politics of Sustainability’, 1398.
484 I use the conventional operational definition of a multinational corporation as an entity that ‘owns (in whole or in 
part), controls and manages income generating assets in more than one country’, e.g.: Emeka Duruigbo, ‘The World
Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 26 (2005): 29.
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Another factor in choosing the cases is that both oil from Nigeria and minerals from Congo end up
in products sold to final consumers in  affluent  democracies.  My initial  focus is  on consumers’
capacities to alleviate the conflicts by market-based action, that is, by purchasing or refraining from
purchasing a commodity, or by indicating to the market actors running the supply chain that they
might do either. While the discussion will quickly involve the relation between market-based and
political capacities of individuals in affluent democracies, the initial focus is on consumers’ market-
based capacity to make a difference by their purchases. Suitably, Congo and Nigeria provide raw
materials for global supply chains that provide consumers with daily commodities ranging from
fuels to electronic devices.
Third, the resources in question are used to produce commodities that are sold to final consumers in
a  legal  and  widespread manner.  Leaving  out  commodities,  such  as  heroin  stemming  from
Afghanistan, the sale and purchase of which is illegal around the world, I ensure that the ethical
considerations  around buying a  product  are  not  reducible  to  the  deceivingly  simple  distinction
between legal and illegal products.485 On a similar vein, focusing on wide-spread commodities, such
as minerals and oil, increases the probability that at least some scholarship and public discussion on
the ethical aspects of the resource in question exists, which I can draw on with reasonable effort.
Adding a commodity less known or of illegal nature will be left for further work.
Fourth, there are useful similarities and differences between the Congo and Nigeria to examine in
the close study. Both are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which in 2018 was the region second-
most affected by highly violent conflicts.486 While adding a case from another continent, such as
cocaine from Colombia, would provide geographical diversity, the case selection is guided by a
485 Such a distinction is difficult to make in many cases, in which raw materials travel across several legislations and 
intermediaries: Carolyn Nordstrom, Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
486 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, ‘Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
Conflict Barometer’, 2019, 13, https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en.
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presumption that considerations related to consumer responsibility are not that likely to be affected
by the exact geographical location of the exporting country. As the next chapters show, natural
resources interweave in different ways with other factors, such as elite competition and international
trade policies, elaborating the conjunctures of which can tease out the kinds of factors relevant to
consumers' remedial capacity. 
The case selection emulates a 'most likely' research design by choosing two cases that are likely to
yield moral attention and controversy.487 Congo and Nigeria match the criteria. Wenar uses both
countries to illustrate a morally unsustainable situation in which consumers buy 'stolen goods' from
countries suffering from the resource curse.488 Barry and Øverland draw a parallel between the two
countries to exemplify situations in which empirical contingencies complicate normative reasoning
on who should act to resolve the situation and on what grounds.489 Further, both conflicts are well-
known. Many of the best-publicised international initiatives to control trade in ‘conflict resources’
have focused on eastern Congo. Nigeria was a target for international campaigning especially in the
early 1990s, although the attention has arguably shifted from sporadic violence in the Niger Delta to
the Boko Haram movement in the north.490 The concepts of ‘conflict’ and ‘blood’ resources are used
in connection to violence both in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria.491
Besides a review of academic literature on the resource curse and the two conflicts, the close study
draws on fieldwork conducted mostly in  Congo and Nigeria  in  autumn 2017,  consisting of 59
487 Cf. Michael Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?’, Journal of Peace Research 41, 
no. 3 (2004): 337–56.
488 Wenar, ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’, 5–6; Wenar, Blood Oil, 54–64.
489 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 145.
490 Interview #52: Godwin Aseku Ojezele, Former Participant in the Presidential Amnesty Program.
491 Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, ‘Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram 
Uprisings’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 50, no. 2 (1 April 2015): 208–22.
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interviews  with  practitioners  and  participant  observation  in  five  stakeholder  meetings.  The
practitioners  are  broadly  defined  as  non-academic  individuals  that  through  their  professional,
voluntary or other activities are informed about efforts to make the global supply chains that draw
on raw materials from the Congo and Nigeria as 'conflict-free'. They consist of three groups that can
be  suspected  of  nurturing  valuable  but  differing  views  on the  role  that  consumers  play  in  the
conflicts: 1) policy-makers involved with legal and political initiatives to fight the resource curse; 2)
representatives  of  corporations  involved  with  international  trade  in  the  resources;  and  3)
representatives  of  civil  society  organisations  and affected communities  who advocate  efforts  to
make supply chains 'conflict-free'. The interviewees include members of all three groups reached
through snowballing sampling as well  as  some not  falling neatly  to any of  the categories  (see
Appendix I: List of interviews and meetings).
To be sure, while the close study focuses on conflict dynamics, which is a familiar territory to the
study  of  International  Relations,  other  important  dimensions  would  also  deserve  attention.  For
instance,  consumers’ self-perceptions  of  their  own or  other  agents’ capacities,  factors  affecting
under what conditions consumers are motivated to purchase 'ethically' produced products, domestic
conditions under which consumers joining together brings the best results, and the international
power dynamics between companies, states, and international institutions to which consumers ought
to focus, are elements subjected to research in political, sociological and marketing studies. While
generally speaking such research could be included to an evaluation of consumers’ capacities, the
emphasis  on  conflict  dynamics  in  the  exporting  countries  is  a  field  in  which  the  toolbox  of
International  Relations  is  at  its  strongest.  The  close  study  does  not  aim  to  be  an  exhaustive
treatment  of  consumers’ capacities.  Rather,  the  fieldwork-based  approach  sheds  light  on  the
complex conflict dynamics, which are currently recognised as a major impediment and disincentive
to normative theorising on consumer responsibility for armed conflicts in general.492 Drawing a
492 Herzog, ‘Who Should Prevent Sweatshops?’, 2, 5.
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‘map’ of consumers’ remedial capacities involves giving more attention to some stages over others
in the connection between consumers  and violence;  a  cartographer’s  pain is  to include enough
without adding too much.
More precisely, the substantial close study has two aims. First, by examining academic scholarship
on the recurrent  conflicts  and conducting semi-structured interviews with practitioners who are
informed about the efforts to make the extraction and trade of the natural resources originating from
the areas ’conflict-free’, I develop an informed understanding of the conflict dynamics. The purpose
of the fieldwork is not to carve out new empirical discoveries on the role that international demand
of raw materials plays in the conflicts rather than to ensure that I have an informed view that helps
articulate a normative argument on consumers' capacity. Second, interviewing practitioners exposes
me to alternative ways to think about the complicated moral position in which consumers find
themselves,  as  they  purchase products  directly  or  indirectly  originating from such questionable
sources.  I  treat  the practitioners  as  moral  theorists  in  their  own right  with potentially  valuable
insights to the topic in hand, rather than as informants or data points as would be adequate for
approaches such as ethnographic research.493 Engaging with the practitioners enables me to connect
the theoretical apparatus built over the previous chapters with the very tangible empirical landscape
of the conflicts,  and helps conceptualise practice-based insights on consumers’ potential  role in
alleviating the conflicts.
6.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I first paved the way for the second part of the thesis by introducing a pragmatist
normative  approach  that  places  a  hypothetical  emphasis  on  capacity  in  assessing  consumers’
responsibility in the context of global supply chains. The approach draws on Deweyan situationism,
493 Rubenstein, Between Samaritans and States, 22–23.
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the  pluralist,  experimentalist  and  transformative  underpinnings  of  which  distinguish  it  from
monistic, ideal-based consequentialism. These underpinnings are usefully complemented with tools
from mid-level theorising in global ethics, which uses empirical research to reconceptualise topical
ethical  challenges  in  order  to  manage  them.  Second,  I  argued  that  a  capacity-based  approach
benefits from a close study that generates insights on consumers’ remedial capacities with regards to
the resource curse and armed conflicts in some supply chains. I suggested that the resource-linked
conflicts in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria constitute a promising target for such research, and
introduced the two-step research design through which I explore their dynamics.
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7 RESOURCE CURSE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I explore the resource curse, a phenomenon that covers diverse societal and political
challenges including slow economic growth, authoritarian regimes, failing institutions, and armed
conflicts. What is meant by the curse has to be established for calibrating the close study. First, I
describe the recent initiatives to include consumers among the international actors who should join
together to fight the phenomenon. I reiterate and strengthen the point made in the introductory
chapter, according to which consumers’ connection to resource-related armed conflicts comprises a
challenge to everyday thought and action that calls for an ethical inquiry.
Second,  I  explore empirical  scholarship  on the  connection  between the trade and extraction of
natural resources and the wide array of pathologies described above. Broadly, quantitative studies
indicate that there is a basis for treating abundant natural resources, especially oil, as conducive to
armed conflicts. I argue that to develop efficient policies for alleviating particular conflicts, and to
articulate the role that consumers can play in advancing such policies, insights generated by large-N
studies are usefully deepened through case analyses and by embracing wider theoretical standing
points.
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7.2 JUSTIFYING THE FOCUS
To apply the typology I introduced in the first chapter, the resource curse phenomenon is primarily a
harm that is faced by societies rather than workers and the planet, and of a kind that can be further
divided  into  three  kinds  of  ‘pathologies’:  slow  economic  growth,  authoritarianism  and  weak
institutions, and armed conflicts. Since the 1980s, academics have discussed whether countries with
high-value  natural  resources,  such  as  oil,  gas,  and  minerals,  are  inclined  to  be  facing  such
challenges, and while many countries diagnosed as suffering from the curse are in Africa or the
Middle East, the phenomenon is claimed to bear global validity.494 In this section, I justify the focus
on the resource curse, and especially on armed conflicts linked with it. 
One might suspect that looking at the phenomenon unhelpfully shifts the gaze from consumers to
states, international institutions and non-state groups, which are more typically diagnosed as playing
a pivotal role in both feeding and resolving such miseries. Below I show that this is not the case. 495
Consumers’ alleged connection to ‘resource wars’ upstream illustrates how globalisation brings new
issues to individuals’ moral horizon, creating pressure to reconsider the prevalent conceptions and
practices  of  allocating  responsibilities  to  act  upon  such  harms.  Karen  Ballentine  and  Heiko
Nitzschke  suggest  somewhat  provocatively  that  most  natural  resources  fuelling  conflicts  are
destined for licit and illicit consumer markets in the developed world.496 Be their claim accurate or
494 Leif Wenar, ‘Fighting the Resource Curse’, Global Policy 4, no. 3 (2013): 298; Michael Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder 
Democracy?’, World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325–61.
495 Flagship cases in normative treatises on ethical consumerism remain sweatshop labour and climate change. E.g. 
Herzog, ‘Who Should Prevent Sweatshops?’; Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’; Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, ‘It’s Not My Fault: Global  Warming and Individual Moral Obligations’, in Perspectives on Climate 
Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth (Amsterdam; 
London: Elsevier, 2005), 285–307; As before, Wenar’s work is a notable exception: Blood Oil.
496 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimension of Civil War, 
Project of the International Peace Academy (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 4.
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not, consumers are increasingly ushered to use their purchase power to shape the rules and patterns
of international trade seen to exacerbate this specific symptom of the resource curse.497 They are to
join a ‘coalition’, to fight the resource curse  alongside civil society organisations, governments,
international institutions, and transnational corporations.
To illustrate, since the early 2000s several western NGOs have drawn attention to armed conflicts
ongoing  in  several  countries  that  provide  raw  materials  for  consumer  products.  Although
campaigning coalitions have varied over the years, some of them have been central in bringing the
resource-conflict  connection  to  the  international  agenda.  Global  Witness,  an  investigative  NGO
based in London, pressures corporations and governments to adopt 'conflict mineral' and ‘conflict
resource’ policies in order to help war-torn countries, such as Congo, Afghanistan, and Myanmar.498
Amnesty International and other major human rights NGOs have subsequently adopted global trade
in natural resources as an item in conflict resolution campaigns.499 The cause of Global Witness
intertwines with that of The Enough Project, a campaign in the United States aiming to build a civil
movement to end genocide and poverty in Africa. The Project has been vocal in arguing that the
imports of Congolese minerals in Europe, United States, and elsewhere must be better regulated,
because 'there will be little chance for peace in Congo until the world figures out a way to purchase
that country’s minerals without fueling horrific violence'.500
497 Philippe Le Billon, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 226; Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
498 Global Witness, ‘Conflict Minerals’.
499 Amnesty International and Global Witness, ‘United States of America: Digging for Transparency: How U.S. 
Companies Are Only Scratching the Surface of Conflict Minerals Reporting’, 2015, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR51/1499/2015/en/.
500 John Prendergast, ‘Eastern Congo: An Action Plan to End The World’s Deadliest War’ (Enough Project, 2009), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/eastern-congo-action-plan-end-worlds-deadliest-war.
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Partially as a reaction to public attention generated by these and other NGOs, such as the Natural
Resource Governance Institute, several governments and other public organisations have supported
transnational  'soft  law'  regulation,  such as  the  UN Guiding Principles on Business  and Human
Rights and the OECD guidelines, which guides but does not legally obligate corporations to avoid
contributing  to  violence  in  their  operating  countries.501 A more  robust  example  of  regulatory
initiatives is  the Kimberley process, an international certification scheme endorsed by the United
Nations  to  prevent  trade  in  diamonds  that  are  used  to  finance  a  civil  war  against  legitimate
governments.502 Initiated in 2003 as a response to parties to a conflict in Angola and Sierra Leone
financing their operations through the diamond business, the Kimberley Process refers to a joint
partnership scheme between states, corporations, and civil society actors, which strives for a better
control of the diamond supply chain by legislation, trade controls, and exchange of information. 503
The theme issue has been taken up in Hollywood films to the extent that in popular imagination
‘blood  diamonds’ arguably  remains  a  blueprint  of  an  issue  that  connects  shopping  malls  with
warzones.504
The conflict resource approach, however, stretches beyond diamonds. The EITI and the Publish
What You Pay initiative illustrate attempts to establish transparency in the handling of revenues
from the extractive industries. Legal measures, such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States,
501 UN, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (New York; Geneva, 2011); OECD, ‘Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct’ (Paris, 2018); OECD, ‘Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’, 2018
502 Kimberley Process, ‘About’, 2018, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about.
503 Franziska Bieri, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global Diamond 
Industry (Farnham Surrey: Ashgate, 2010); Kimberley Process, ‘About’.
504 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, chapter 4; Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist 
Consumer’; Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway, 
2004); Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on 
Imported Petroleum (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007); Ian Smillie, Blood on the Stone (London, New 
York: Anthem Press, 2010).
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oblige  corporations  to  report  the  due  diligence  measures  they  have  taken  to  ensure  that  their
products do not contain 'conflict minerals' from the Congo or neighbouring countries. Whereas at
the time of writing the conflict mineral sections of the Act is resisted by the Trump administration,
the forthcoming legislation by the European Union not only retains its purpose but expands the
scope from the Great Lakes region in Africa to the imports of certain minerals from all countries.505
Such  measures  are  spreading  beyond  affluent  democracies:  in  2015,  the  China  Chamber  of
Commerce  of  Metals,  Minerals  &  Chemicals  Importers  &  Exporters  published  its  own  due
diligence recommendations, according to which individual companies in Chinese mineral trading
sector have a responsibility to address conflicts and human rights abuses around the world.506
As  the  efforts  above  already  indicate,  NGOs  and  public  regulators  usually  focus  on  pushing
corporations governing the global supply chains into adopting policies that mitigate their suspected
role in contributing to the resource curse.507 The trend accentuated after the Dodd-Frank Act: to
illustrate, in 2014 the semiconductor giant Intel introduced ‘conflict-free’ due diligence schemes to
ensure and evidence that the extraction and trade of minerals used in their products does not fuel
wars upstream.508 At the same time, new players enter the markets, such as Fairphone, a Dutch
advocacy campaign evolved into a phones company, which sources the minerals needed in products
505 European Parliament, ‘Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers’, 22 November 
2016, https://goo.gl/bGX9o7; Supply Chain Dive, ‘SEC Suspends Conflict Mineral Rule Enforcement’, 11 April 
2017, https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/SEC-conflict-mineral-rule-dodd-frank-enforcement/440175/.
506 OECD, ‘Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains’, 2018, 
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/chinese-due-diligence-guidelines-for-responsible-mineral-supply-chains.htm.
507 Elisabet Garriga and Domènec Melé, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory’, Journal of
Business Ethics 53, no. 1–2 (2004): 51–71; Archie B. Carroll and Kareem M. Shabana, ‘The Business Case for 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice’, International Journal of 
Management Reviews 12, no. 1 (2010): 85–105.
508 Intel, ‘Conflict Free Minerals and Intel’, 2018, http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/corporate-
responsibility/conflict-free-minerals.html.
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as  transparently  as  possible,  thus  putting  'ethical  values'  first.509 Due  to  increased  pressure,
companies are varyingly embracing the view that they can contribute either to peace or war in
conflict zones, and have taken up measures to show that they honour the obligation bestowed on
them to work towards the former.
Ethical consumerism constitutes a vital part of this pressure. Civil society, public, and corporate
actors  alike  have  called  for  consumers  in  affluent  democracies  to  bear  some  of  the  costs  of
ameliorating  the  armed  violence  upstream  in  supply  chains.510 Consumers,  invigorated  by  the
revelations of activists and journalists about the questionable origins of their purchases, are to take
the potential roots of products in conflict-related zones into account in their purchase decisions.511
For  instance,  they  are  provided with  action  guides,  which  rank corporations  according to  how
'responsibly' their minerals are sourced, and encourage to utilise boycotts and buycotts as one of the
potential  tools  through which wider  reforms can be realised.512 The advocates diagnose several
armed  conflicts  in  countries  providing  raw  materials  to  global  supply  chains  as  being  fed  by
resource  curse,  and  continue  that  some  of  its  symptoms  can  be  alleviated  by  shaping  the
international demand of these raw materials.
Accordingly, there seems to be a rough empirical hypothesis, surely voiced in different strengths
and forms, implicit in the calls for consumer action: instability and violence recurring in some areas
that produce raw materials for global supply chains to which consumers in affluent democracies are
509 Fairphone, ‘Fairphone’, 2018, https://www.fairphone.com/en/.
510 Tom Burgis, The Looting Machine (London; New York: William Collins; PublicAffairs, 2015).
511 For publications that serve this attention, see Ethical Consumer reports on conflict minerals, for instance: Ethical 
Consumer, ‘Cobalt Mining’, 2016, http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalreports/mobilesreport/cobaltmining.aspx;
Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds (New York: Westview Press, 2002).
512 Responsible Sourcing Network, ‘Mining the Disclosures’, 2017, https://www.sourcingnetwork.org/mining-the-
disclosures-2017; Enough Project, ‘Conflict Minerals Company Rankings | RAISE Hope for Congo’, 2017, 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company-rankings-0.
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connected  can  be  alleviated  by  shaping  the  international  demand  of  these  raw  materials.  The
following  section  explores  the  empirical  underpinnings  of  this  rudimentary  hypothesis  by
investigating the causal link between natural resources and armed conflicts. An informed view of
the empirical processes surrounding the harm that this amorphous international ‘coalition’ fights
against is needed, if consumers’ capacity to make a positive impact is to serve as a yardstick of their
remedial responsibilities; one needs a 'curse' to fight, after all. 
7.3 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REGIMES
To be sure, the discussion in this section does not exhaust the ‘immensely popular’ field of research,
as the resource curse scholarship is vast and constantly growing.513 However, by describing three of
its  variants it  draws the main lines of the current knowledge as the first  step in elaborating an
informed argument on consumers’ capacity to act upon the curse. In this section, I discuss those
variants  linked  with  economic  growth  and  regime  type  and  quality.  Consumers’ connection  to
armed conflicts is the focus of the close study, whereby I will explore the resource-conflict variant
in a separate section.
One of the best-known uses of the concept is in the Economist, a magazine, which used the term
‘Dutch disease’ to refer to the economic issues that followed a discovery of natural gas fields in
Groeningen in the Netherlands in the 1970s.514 Broadly, the extractive sector attracted capital from
abroad as well as from other domestic sectors, such as manufacture and agriculture, upon which the
appreciating currency as well as the rising production costs in non-extractive businesses damaged
the  international  competitiveness  of  other  sectors.  However,  the  economic  effects  of  abundant
513 C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte, ‘Linking Natural Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict’, Science 
320, no. 5876 (2008): 616–17.
514 Economist, ‘What Dutch Disease Is, and Why It’s Bad’, 5 November 2014, https://www.economist.com/the-
economist-explains/2014/11/05/what-dutch-disease-is-and-why-its-bad; for further examples, see: Ross, The Oil 
Curse, 47.
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natural resources gained much more academic attention in the wake of studies published by Jeffrey
Sachs and Andrew Warner in 1995. They suggested on a more general level that a high level of
exports of natural resources slows down the economic growth of a country: possessing riches, such
as oil, gems or fertile lands, is not necessarily beneficial in terms of economic growth.515
Research by Sachs and Warner joined wider work emerging in the 1990s, which established the
terms ‘paradox of plenty’ and ‘resource curse’ for academic use.516 Further studies emphasise that
the resource curse does not  always seem to occur.  Norwegians enjoy a high level  of affluence
provided by their oil wealth, and Botswana has put its diamonds to good use.517 The quality of
economic and political institutions affects the outcome: if resources are well managed and the risk
of abuse controlled by a system of check and balances, the riches can lead to sustained economic
development.518 Resource abundance or dependence per se seem less likely to cause the curse, as
factors such as the institutional setting at the time of the discovery matter. Norway was a strong
democracy  already  when  oil  was  first  commercially  discovered  in  1969,  and  diamonds  were
discovered  in  Botswana  in  the  post-independence  era,  gaining  the  country  more  leverage  to
515 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner, ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’, NBER Working Paper
No. 5398, 1995.
516 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997); Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London: 
Routledge, 1993); Richard Auty, Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight Developing Countries 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Alan et al Gelb, Oil Windfalls - Blessing or Curse? (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988); Thorvaldur Gylfason, ‘Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development’, 
European Economic Review 45, no. 4 (2001): 847–859.
517 Roland Hodler, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries’, European Economic Review 50, no. 
6 (2006): 1367–86; James Robinson, ‘Botswana as a Role Model for Country Success’ (UNU-WIDER, 2009).
518 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, ‘Institutions and the Resource Curse’, Economic Journal 116, no.
508 (2006): 1–20; David Wiens, ‘Natural Resources and Institutional Development’, Journal of Theoretical Politics
26, no. 2 (2014): 197–221.
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negotiate good deals with international companies than, for instance, Sierra Leone and Liberia had
when diamonds where discovered there.519
Subsequently, the original thesis has been improved and qualified.520 A consensus on the impact of
natural  resources  on economic  growth or  its  underlying  causal  mechanisms remains  absent,  as
recent  meta-analyses and literature surveys find arguments for different  interpretations.521 Some
indicate that despite more than two decades of scholarship there is no agreement that a negative
effect on economic growth persists, whereas others conclude that the evidence is nuanced but strong
enough to affirm that some kind of a curse exists.522 Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke suggest that the
older resource curse literature is not to be relied on too much, as it suffers from shortcomings in
research design and methodology. Recent work offers more quantitative evidence on the economic
resource curse by introducing  careful caveats to the oft-heard claim that oil, often a resource of
choice in such studies because of its prevalence, geopolitical importance and value, leads to slower
economic growth. Without such caveats, the curse argument is likely to ‘fall prey to some common
fallacies’, such as a restricting the time period to the troubled 1970-1990 period and misinterpreting
519 Philippe Le Billon, ‘The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, Political Geography 
20, no. 5 (2001): 565; Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, ‘Exorcizing the Resource Curse: Minerals as a Knowledge 
Industry, Past and Present’, Working Papers (Stanford University, 2002).
520 Jonathan Isham et al., ‘Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political 
Economy of Economic Growth’, The World Bank Economic Review 19, no. 2 (2005): 141–74; James Robinson, 
Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier, ‘Political Foundations of the Resource Curse’, Journal of Development 
Economics 79, no. 2 (2006): 447–68; Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’, 
European Economic Review 45, no. 4–6 (2001): 827–38.
521 Michael Alexeev and Robert Conrad, ‘The Elusive Curse of Oil’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 91, no. 3 
(2009): 586–598; Jeffrey A. Frankel, ‘The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some 
Prescriptions’, 2012; Frederick van der Ploeg, ‘Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 49, no. 2 (2011): 366–420.
522 Tomas Havranek, Roman Horvath, and Ayaz Zeynalov, ‘Natural Resources and Economic Growth: A Meta-
Analysis’, World Development 88 (2015): 134–51; Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi Hooi Lean, and Jeremy Clark, 
‘The Evolution of the Natural Resource Curse Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey’, Resources Policy 51 (2017): 
123–34.
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the causal mechanisms.523 As Michael Ross, referring partially to his own seminal work with which
I engage below, suggests, there is  ‘little evidence for some of the claims made by earlier studies:
that extracting oil leads to abnormally slow economic growth, or makes governments weaker, more
corrupt, or less effective’.524
For instance,  Philippe Le Billon writes that empirical evidence for the economic resource curse
argument is strong, although ‘historically and institutionally contingent’.525 Paul Collier calls the
economic  challenges  of  oil  producers  ‘predominantly  a  missed  opportunity’,  a  depiction  Ross
expands to argue that the economic growth of countries with abundant oil resources has neither
been slower nor faster than the rest of the world.526 Oil revenues tend to affect economic growth, as
they are associated with fewer women gaining access to job markets, and with increased volatility
in state revenues.527 However,  taking into account the increase in government  revenues that  oil
production usually brings, the status of being ‘cursed’ in the economic sense has to be carefully
defined. As Ross puts it: ‘The real problem is not that growth in the oil states has been slow when it
should have been “normal” but rather that it has been normal when it should have been faster than
normal, given the enormous revenues these governments have collected.’528 
Also the second pathology of the curse faces constant specification. Ross discusses under the term
‘political resource curse’ broadly the adverse effect that resource wealth is suspected to have in the
523 Ross, The Oil Curse, 13, 221.
524 Ross, 3.
525 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 29.
526 Paul Collier, The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity With Nature (London: Viking Adult, 2010), 44; 
Ross, The Oil Curse, 198; Paul Collier, ‘Is Aid Oil? An Analysis Of Whether Africa Can Absorb More Aid’, World 
Development 34, no. 9 (2006): 1482–97.
527 Ross, The Oil Curse, 13; Indra De Soysa and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, ‘The Natural Resource Curse and the 
Spread of HIV/AIDS, 1990–2008’, Social Science & Medicine 77, no. C (2013): 90–96.
528 Ross, The Oil Curse, 13.
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form of authoritarianism, weak institutions, and civil wars.529 I will discuss the first two elements
below and focus on civil wars in the next section. The resource curse argument on authoritarianism
overlaps with Hossein Mahdavi's early articulation of the rentier state theory, as per which states
whose  governments  gain  revenues  mostly  through  the  extraction  of  natural  resources  face
institutional problems.530 One variation of the rentier state argument is that these governments are
less accountable to their citizens and more prone to follow policies that favour themselves and their
immediate allies instead of the general population.531 Vice versa, as citizens pay less taxes they are
less likely to instil pressure on the government to respond to their needs; a ‘rentier mentality’ takes
over, making it possible to ‘bribe’ people into accepting the regime by offering extensive social
programmes.532 Abundant  natural  resources  might  lead  to  sectional  and  inefficient  economic
policies, which are then ruinous for sustainable economic development.533
529 Michael Ross, ‘The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review’, in Oxford Handbook of the Politics of Development,
ed. Carol Lancaster and Nicholas Van de Walle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); several ways to define 
and generate measures of a country’s natural resource endowments exist, which in turn affect the findings: Michael 
Ross, ‘What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?’, Annual Review of Political Science 18, no. 1 (2015): 
240–43.
530 Hossein Mahdavy, ‘The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran’, Life 
1000, no. 1 (1970); Beblawi has later refined this definition, noting that in a rentier state rents are paid by foreign 
actors directly to the state, and ‘only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being 
only involved in the distribution or utilization of it’. Hazem Beblawi, ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’, Arab 
Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (1987): 51; Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, 329.
531 Uriel Abulof, ‘“Can’t Buy Me Legitimacy”: The Elusive Stability of Mideast Rentier Regimes’, Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 2015; Leonard Wantchekon, ‘Why Do Resource Dependent Countries 
Have Authoritarian Governments?’, Journal of African Finance and Economic Development 2 (2002): 57–77.
532 Beblawi, ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’.
533 Richard Auty and Alan Gelb, ‘Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States’, Resource Abundance and 
Economic Development, 2001, 126–44; Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier, and James Robinson, ‘Kleptocracy and 
Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule’, Journal of the European Economic Association 2, no. 2–3 (2004): 
162–92; Toke S. Aidt, ‘Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
25, no. 2 (2009): 271–91; Omar Al-Ubaydli, ‘Natural Resources and the Tradeoff between Authoritarianism and 
Development’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81, no. 1 (2012): 137–52; Sarah Chayes, Thieves of 
State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016).
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While the early research focused mostly on the Middle East region, more quantitative and globally
oriented studies have emerged to study natural riches as i) making state institutions perform less
well and/or ii) preventing transitions to democracy.534 As it comes to the first claim, despite there
being diverse ways to define ‘institutions’ and to measure their performance, several studies suggest
that certain forms of corruption, institutional degradation, rent-seeking and patronage are linked
with resource and especially oil wealth.535 For instance, based on their study of Soviet successor
states, Luong and Weinthal claim that it is the ownership structure of mineral reserves which shapes
the  quality  of  institutions,  especially  fiscal  regimes.536 To Ross,  however,  the  broad claim that
government quality suffers from oil revenues is backed by ‘little prima facie evidence’, as at least
two fallacies abound: first, its advocates sometimes implicitly indicate that the institutions of newly
enriched countries can be expected to quickly attain the same quality as the more mature institutions
of established middle- and high-income states; and second, diagnosing poor revenue management in
oil-rich states as caused by the government’s institutional weakness ignores that managing vast and
volatile oil reserves instead of a smoother flow of tax receipts might need strong rather than just
‘normal’ institutions.537
534 Lisa Anderson, ‘The State in the Middle East and North Africa’, Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (1987): 1–18; 
Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1999); also: Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: 
The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Currency, 2013).
535 Edward L Glaeser et al., ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’, Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2004); Ivar Kolstad and Tina Søreide, ‘Corruption in Natural Resource Management: Implications for Policy 
Makers’, Resources Policy 34, no. 4 (2009): 214–26; Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, ‘It’s the Rents, Stupid! The 
Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, Energy Policy 37, no. 12 (2009): 5317–25; Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, 
‘Testing The Pearl Hypothesis: Natural Resources and Trust’, Resources Policy 37, no. 3 (2012): 358–67; Carlos A. 
Leite and Jens Weidmann, ‘Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth’, 
SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1999); Kevin M. Morrison, ‘Oil, Nontax
Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability’, International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 
107–38.
536 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
537 Ross, The Oil Curse, 212–16.
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Ross suggests that whereas petroleum wealth seems to increase certain types of corruption,  the
latter claim has wide empirical support:  higher levels of oil wealth make autocratic governments
more stable and hinder a transition to democracy.538 As per him, today’s  oil states are 50 percent
more likely to be ruled by autocrats.539 Especially poor countries seem to suffer from oil discoveries
in a way that is not associated with other natural resources, meaning that countries such as Nigeria
might have hard time in their  democratisation efforts  because of their  oil  wealth.540 Surely, the
debate on the connection between natural wealth and regimes continues.541 Rosser points out that
there seem to be political and social factors that enable some countries to utilise their resources to
promote development: governments in resource-abundant countries, such as those in Malaysia and
Botswana,  are  not  running ‘predatory,  factional  or  rentier  states’.542 Dunning attempts to  refine
different  mechanisms  through  which  oil  and  other  forms  of  mineral  wealth  can  fuel  both
538 Ross, ‘What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?’, 243; Ross, ‘The Politics of the Resource Curse: A 
Review’.
539 Ross, The Oil Curse, 2.
540 Ross, ‘What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?’, 248; for a criticism, see: Michael Herb, ‘No 
Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy’, Comparative Politics 37, no. 3 (2005): 
297–316; Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’
541 Anar K. Ahmadov, ‘Oil, Democracy, and Context: A Meta-Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 9 
(2014): 1238–67; Jørgen Andersen et al., ‘Petro Rents, Political Institutions, and Hidden Wealth: Evidence from 
Bank Deposits in Tax Havens’, Working Paper (CAMP, BI Norwegian Business School, 2013); Rabah Arezki and 
Markus Brückner, ‘Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions’, European 
Economic Review 55, no. 7 (2011): 955–63; Kazim Kazimov, Kirk Hamilton, and Rabah Arezki, ‘Resource 
Windfalls, Macroeconomic Stability and Growth: The Role of Political Institutions’, IMF Working Papers 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011); Pedro C. Vicente, ‘Does Oil Corrupt? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in
West Africa’, Journal of Development Economics 92, no. 1 (2010): 28–38; John Clark, ‘Petro-Politics in Congo’, 
Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 62–76.
542 Andrew Rosser, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse : A Literature Survey’, IDS Working Paper 268, 
2006, 22; Robert T. Deacon, ‘The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Theory and 
Evidence’, Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 7, no. 2 (2011): 111–208.
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authoritarianism  and  democracy,  suggesting  that  in  Latin  America  such  riches  have  affected
democracy positively.543
A major qualification to the anti-democratising variant of the curse is suggested by Stephen Haber
and Victor Menaldo, who introduce an original long-time series data extending from 1800 to 2006
to argue that oil and mineral reliance are not associated with dictatorship in the long run. Rather, a
resource blessing of a kind is a better characterisation of the connection, and no sweeping, law-like
statements on the resource curse are to be made.544 Accordingly, Ross and Anderson have refined
their claim: the effects of oil wealth on authoritarianism have appeared after the 1970s at the time of
‘the big oil change’, when the global petroleum industry experienced a wave of nationalisations.
Only since then have governments had access to oil revenues to the extent that affects the regime
type, and after this turning point the deteriorating effects emerge.545 Hence, the anti-democratising
effect of oil wealth is a historical phenomenon shaped by the contingent relationship between oil
and governments, which affects several contemporary oil-abundant states.546
543 Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
544 Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, ‘Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource 
Curse’, American Political Science Review 105, no. 01 (2011): 25; also Mehmet Gurses, ‘State-Sponsored 
Development, Oil and Democratization’, Democratization 16, no. 3 (2009): 508–29; Cf. David Wiens, Paul Poast, 
and William Roberts Clark, ‘The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical Re-Evaluation’, Political Research 
Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2014): 783–94.
545 Jørgen Andersen and Michael Ross, ‘The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis’, 
Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 7 (2014): 993–1021; Ross, ‘What Have We Learned about the Resource 
Curse?’, 240.
546 For a more detailed treatment of the debate, see: Jørgen Andersen and Silje Aslaksen, ‘Oil and Political Survival’, 
Journal of Development Economics 100, no. 1 (2013): 89–106; Silje Aslaksen, ‘Oil and Democracy: More than a 
Cross-Country Correlation?’, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 421–31; Jørgen Andersen and Silje 
Aslaksen, ‘Constitutions and the Resource Curse’, Journal of Development Economics 87, no. 2 (2008): 227–46; 
Anca Cotet-Grecu and Kevin K. Tsui, ‘Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross Country Evidence Really Show’, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5, no. 1 (2013): 49–80; Anca Cotet-Grecu and Kevin K. Tsui, 
‘Resource Curse or Malthusian Trap? Evidence from Oil Discoveries and Extractions’, SSRN Scholarly Paper 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2009); Kristopher W. Ramsay, ‘Revisiting the Resource Curse: 
Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy’, International Organization 65, no. 3 (2011): 507–29; Martin 
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7.4 ARMED CONFLICTS
The close study to follow will focus on armed conflicts, or the third ‘pathology’ of the resource
curse.547 Instances of armed violence and war are arguably the most acute of problems related to the
curse, as they indicate that peaceful mechanisms of resolving disputes and conflicting interests in
the area have no purchase. The Conflict Barometer by the Heidelberg Institute for International
Conflict Research lists ‘resources' as being the third-most frequent conflict item, playing a role in
62 out of the 213 violent crises, limited wars and wars observed in 2018.548 Ross suggests that
studies  exploring  the  connection  between  natural  resources  and  civil  wars  diverge  from other
resource curse scholarship. Whereas research on the economic growth and regimes was inspired by
studies on primary commodities and rentier states conducted between the 1950s and the 1980s, the
third vein of research was invigorated by a wave of violent conflicts in the 1990s, such as those in
Angola,  Cambodia,  Colombia,  the  DR Congo,  Liberia,  Sierra  Leone,  Indonesia,  and  Sudan.549
During the Cold War, the parties to different armed conflicts had often been financed by the United
States and Russia. After its end, belligerents in low-income countries started exploring other sources
Gassebner, Michael J. Lamla, and James Raymond Vreeland, ‘Extreme Bounds of Democracy’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 57, no. 2 (2013): 171–97; Wilson Prichard, Paola Salardi, and Paul Segal, ‘Taxation, Non-Tax Revenue 
and Democracy: New Evidence Using New Cross-Country Data’, World Development 109 (2018): 295–312.
547 As per academic convention in this subfield, I use the terms civil war, armed conflict and violent conflict 
interchangeably. Cf. Ross, The Oil Curse, 145.
548 The more frequent conflict items are ‘System & Ideology’ and ‘Subnational Predominance’, occurring in 90 and 64 
out of 213 cases, respectively. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, ‘Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research Conflict Barometer’, 15–16.
549 David Keen, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars’, Adelphi Papers 38 (1998): 1–89; William Reno, 
Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); William
Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, Colorado: Lynner Rienner Publishers, 1998); Le Billon, ‘The 
Political Ecology of War’; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’, Oxford Economic 
Papers 50, no. 4 (1998): 563–573.
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of  financing.550 This  apparent  change  in  conflict  dynamics  caught  the  attention  of  several
researchers.
Much work is methodologically inspired by economic theories of conflicts, such as early work by
Collier and Hoffman, according to which conflicts can usually be explained by parties to conflict
wanting  to  improve  their  financial  position;  resources  in  the  country  are  tempting  to  rebels,
criminals and separatists alike. Making a comparison with murder detection that presumes a motive
and an opportunity as necessary conditions for a crime, their influential approach suggests that the
latter component explains many of the conflict onsets.551 In their later work, Collier et al refine their
claim,  suggesting that  where a rebellion is  feasible it  will  occur,  whereby looking into distinct
motivations, which include both greed and grievances, is less useful in explaining any outbreak of
violence. The surrounding debate on whether any variant of the greed argument or the grievance
argument, or an attempt to overcome this distinction (including work by Collier and his colleagues)
establishes  a  plausible  theory  of  armed  conflict  outbreak,  serves  as  a  referent  point  to  much
subsequent scholarship, including both detailed case studies and cross-country research.552
To illustrate, David Keen retains a critical view of the ‘greed’ hypothesis: the existence of financial
incentives  strengthens  the  reasons  to  resolve  existing  grievances  by  violence,  and  an  overtly
determinist focus on economic predeterminants of conflicts masks these more nuanced processes.
Zooming in on the Sierra Leonean civil war, he suggests that some conflicts are orchestrated rather
than antagonistic, and that belligerents have an incentive to continue rather than to conclude the
550 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 
568–69.
551 Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’.
552 Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (World Bank 
Publications, 2003); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
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‘state  of  emergency’.553 Mary  Kaldor  reconceptualises  war  in  order  to  develop  more  effective,
cosmopolitan responses to contemporary conflicts. She claims that ‘new wars’ are characterised by
actors, goals, methods and forms of finance different from those in traditional, state-centred ones,
and better described as ‘mutual enterprises’ than Clausewitzian clashes of wills.554 Ballentine et al
suggest that in some cases economic incentives may motivate conflict, whereas in others financial
incentives merely contribute to ‘root causes’ lying elsewhere.555 These studies advance the position
that  the  conceptual  framing  of  civil  wars  being  driven  solely  by  scarcity  or  greed  is  overly
simplistic.556
Varyingly  responsive  to  these  theoretical  frameworks,  large-N studies  have  articulated  general
patterns in the connection between natural resources and civil wars. Ross suggests that oil states of
today are more than twice as likely to face civil wars than non-oil states.557 However, the connection
between natural resources and war differs from the pathologies set above in three respects. First,
553 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War’, 
Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27; David Keen, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, International 
Affairs 88, no. 4 (2012): 757–777; Keen, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars’; David Keen, 
Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005).
554 Mary Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 
(2013); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 
2013); Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg, and Jonathan Hall, ‘Are “New Wars” More Atrocious? Battle Severity, 
Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War’, European Journal of 
International Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 505–36.
555 Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman, and International Peace Academy, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: 
Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
556 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 61; Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight by Richard Ned Lebow (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Indra De Soysa, ‘Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-
99’, Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 4 (2002): 395–416; J. Herbst, ‘Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and 
Conflict in Africa’, Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94.
557 Ross, The Oil Curse, 2; J.D. Colgan, ‘Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War’, Petro-Aggression: When Oil 
Causes War, 2011, 1–312.
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resource type matters. Oil wealth seems to increase the likelihood of civil war, and the abundance of
alluvial  diamonds  seemed to  have  the  same effect  in  relation  to  ethnic  conflicts  in  the  1990s.
However, other resources, such as gemstones, timber, and drugs and narcotics, do not affect the
likelihood of conflict  onset,  although some might affect its  duration,  as I  will  discuss below.558
Second, even in the case of oil the relation with conflict onset is not linear but U-shaped: Basedau
and Lay argue that countries with high oil wealth per capita are protected from the negative effects
of oil dependency, whereas middle- and low-income countries are not.559 As Le Billon writes: ‘you
had better be rich if you are resource dependent’, as in rich countries governments can either pay off
rivals or boost the security apparatus to eliminate them.560 Third, location matters. Oil increases the
likelihood of conflict if it is located onshore and in a region that is poor compared to the national
average as well as inhabited by an ethnic minority.561 To compare, offshore oil does not increase
conflict  risk,  and  actually  oil  exploitation  outside  the  conflict  zone  tends  to  shorten  conflict
duration.562
558 Ross, The Oil Curse, 29; Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 31–32.
559 Matthias Basedau and Jann Lay, ‘Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil 
Dependence on Violent Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 6 (2009): 774; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed 
and Grievance in Civil War’; Ross, ‘What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?’, 252; Indra De Soysa and 
Eric Neumayer, ‘Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset: Results from a New Dataset of Natural 
Resource Rents, 1970—1999’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, no. 3 (2007): 201–18.
560 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 5.
561 Yu-Hsiang Lei and Guy Michaels, ‘Do Giant Oilfield Discoveries Fuel Internal Armed Conflicts?’, Journal of 
Development Economics 110, no. C (2014): 139–57.
562 Ross, The Oil Curse, 65–66; Ross, ‘The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review’, 210–13; Cotet-Grecu and Tsui, 
‘Oil and Conflict’; Paivi Lujala, ‘Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the 
Severity of Armed Civil Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 1 (2009): 50–71; Paivi Lujala, ‘The Spoils
of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources’, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 
(2010): 15–28.
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However, fuzz remains around these three arguments about the onset of conflict, as well as on the
impact of natural resources on conflict duration and severity.563 For instance, Buhaug, Gates and
Lujala suggest that civil wars involving resources last longer and are more likely to restart than
those that do not.564 To Mildner, Lauster and Wodni, studies pointing out that abundant resources
contribute to conflicts are hard to compare for the simple reason that they lack general definitions of
scarcity,  abundance  and  conflict.565 Yet  other  researchers  contemplate  on  whether  resource
abundance explains roots of conflicts in the first place, taken that also resource scarcity in relation
to challenges such as environmental degradation has been associated with conflicts.566 In a seminal
article  published  in  Science,  Brunnschweiler  and  Bulte  distinguish  resource  abundance  and
dependence, igniting yet another fierce debate on whether the curse is a ‘red herring’ and natural
resources  a  potential  blessing for their  owner.567 The remaining uncertainties  lead  Le Billon to
suggest that the presence of valuable natural resources generally prolongs armed conflicts, but the
563 E.g. James D. Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?’, Journal of Peace Research 
41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301; Eleonora Nillesen and Erwin Bulte, ‘Natural Resources and Violent Conflict’, Annual 
Review of Resource Economics 6 (2014): 69; Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, ‘A Price Worth 
Fighting for? Natural Resources and Conflict Recurrence’, Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 4 (2012): 531–546.
564 Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala, ‘Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict’:, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009; Rustad and Binningsbø, ‘A Price Worth Fighting For?’
565 Stormy-Annika Mildner, Gitta Lauster, and Wiebke Wodni, ‘Scarcity and Abundance Revisited: A Literature 
Review on Natural Resources and Conflict’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence 5, no. 1 (2011): 155–72.
566 E.g. Michael D. Beevers, ‘Peace Resources? Governing Liberia’s Forests in the Aftermath of Conflict’, 
International Peacekeeping 22, no. 1 (2015): 26–42; Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, ‘Climate Change, 
Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict’, Political Geography, Climate Change and Conflict, 26, no. 6 
(2007): 674–94; Vally Koubi et al., ‘Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict?’, 
Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 227–43.
567 Brunnschweiler and Bulte, ‘Linking Natural Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict’; a criticism: Frederick 
van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, ‘The Pungent Smell of “Red Herrings”: Subsoil Assets, Rents, Volatility and 
the Resource Curse’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 60, no. 1 (2010): 44–55; Anne D. 
Boschini, Jan Pettersson, and Jesper Roine, ‘Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability’, Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 109, no. 3 (2007): 593–617.
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connection is not ‘universally accepted and requires careful qualification’: statements have to be
precise and focus on specific resources, their locations and their modes of exploitation.568
Accordingly, the resource-conflict connection is becoming tackled through more and more nuanced
subquestions. To illustrate, one major approach maps the impact of price shocks on conflicts. Based
on studies of oil and coffee sectors in Colombia, Dube and Vargas argue that rising prices in high-
rent and low-employment resources sectors can increase violence, in contrast to a situation in which
low-rent and high-employment sectors, such as cash crops, face a cut in prices.569 Another  vein
explores whether the type of actor that benefits from the resources matters to the conflict dynamics.
Rebel organisations can gain an opportunity to finance a rebellion or enrich themselves by looting,
and governments might become more repressive through additional revenues and thus increase the
chance  of  an  escalating  conflict.570 In  individual  cases,  however,  making  clear-cut  divisions  is
difficult. For instance, in Angola offshore oil production was tapped by the government at the same
time as rebels used diamonds to finance their activities.571 
What to make of the discussion so far? Again, the chapter does not exhaust the literature but paves
the way for an empirically informed analysis of consumer responsibility by building an overview on
three broad pathologies of the resource curse sometimes treated without much differentiation. That
said,  the  overview  indicates  qualified  support  for  the  claim  that  some  resource  endowments,
568 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 155; Macartan Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution 
Uncovering the Mechanisms’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 508–37; Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 625–
633.
569 Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas, ‘Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia’, The 
Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 4 (2013): 1384.
570 Mildner, Lauster, and Wodni, ‘Scarcity and Abundance Revisited’, 162–63.
571 Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, 778–79; Assis Malaquias, 
‘Diamonds Are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy’, Third World 
Quarterly 22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25.
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especially oil, increase the likelihood of civil wars, and that the access of belligerents to revenues
from some resources,  most  clearly alluvial  diamonds,  prolongs armed conflicts.572 This specific
variant  of  the  curse  is  a  scourge  to  which  consumers  in  affluent  democracies  are  indirectly
connected,  as  many  natural  resources  from conflict-prone  areas  are  used  as  raw materials  for
producing goods and services for their habitual use. This empirical insight suggests taking seriously
the initial role set for consumers in a wide international coalition to alleviate armed conflicts in
supply chains,  and provides  a  stepping stone towards  assigning to  consumers  a  capacity-based
responsibility to act upon these conflicts. 
However, whether consumers can sensibly do something about the curse cannot be simply inferred
from the  discussion  above.  Quantitative  studies  say  little  about  the  potential  of  consumers  in
affluent  democracies  to  either  perpetuate  or  mitigate  the  resource  curse  phenomenon. Mostly,
consumers are mentioned in passing.573 Here, approaches that move beyond the large-N approaches
possess a certain edge, as some of them not only take steps towards conceptualising consumers’
capacities  in  relation  to  conflicts,  but  help  devise  solutions  tailored  to  specific  conflicts  that
consumers can advance. Such studies are launched from a variety of theoretical premises. Nillesen
and Bulte point out that over the recent years research has developed from cross-country conflict
models towards micro-level analyses, and argue that this step leads to an enhanced understanding of
the relation between resources and conflicts.574 Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis recognise that while the
572 Ross, ‘The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review’; Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 15–18, 37, 185; Håvard Hegre 
and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 508–35; Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, ‘Civil War’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 48, no. 1 (2010): 3–57; Emma Gilberthorpe and Elissaios Papyrakis, ‘The Extractive Industries and 
Development: The Resource Curse at the Micro, Meso and Macro Levels’, The Extractive Industries and Society 2, 
no. 2 (2015): 383–85.
573 E.g. ‘These countries suffer from authoritarian rule, violent conflict, and economic disarray because they produce 
oil - and because consumers in oil-importing states buy it from them.’ Ross, The Oil Curse, 3.
574 Nillesen and Bulte, ‘Natural Resources and Violent Conflict’.
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macro and meso literature on the resource curse has been populated by economists, micro resource
curse literature is advanced by anthropologists and other social scientists that adopt more diverse
approaches.575 They are joined by the insight that large-N studies by themselves provide only a
partial guide to finding solutions to particular instances of the resource curse.
To  illustrate,  Le  Billon  conceives  the  term  ‘resource  wars’ as  conceptually  ‘reductionist’.576
Although large-N studies and case studies combined have managed to generate strong evidence on a
connection between oil and wars, and to some extent on a connection between diamonds and wars,
one  should  move  away  from  any  deterministic  or  generalised  reading  of  the  resource  curse
argument:  it  is  plausible  only  when  understood  as  not  applying  equally  to  all  resources  and
societies.577 Economic and geopolitical approaches have dominated international policy-making on
natural resources, but there is a need to be more self-reflective of the interests that are served by
choosing these  or  other  perspectives  and methodologies.578 To him,  geopolitical,  economic  and
political ecology perspectives, the last of which he utilises, are to be joined in order to produce
reflective insights about the so-called resources wars and ways to alleviate them for purposes of
security as well as social and environmental justice.579
An important aspect of Le Billon’s work is his analysis of ‘blood diamond’ campaigns surrounding
the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola.580 He points out that the official wording of ‘conflict
diamonds’ agreed on by the UN General Assembly,  as per which conflict  diamonds are ‘rough
575 Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, ‘The Extractive Industries and Development’.
576 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 41.
577 Le Billon, 5, 9, 82; Gavin Bridge and Philippe Le Billon, Oil (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2012); Philippe Le 
Billon, ‘Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars’, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 98, no. 2 (2008): 348.
578 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 41–42.
579 Le Billon, 42.
580 Le Billon, 116.
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diamonds  used  by  rebel  movements  or  their  allies  to  finance  conflict  aimed  at  undermining
legitimate governments’, conceals many sources and forms of violence.581 While adopting a narrow
definition helped conclude the Kimberley Process and legitimise the rest of the industry, it did not
address the ‘cleaning up’ and ‘legalization’ processes in Angola’s diamond industry, which involved
Angolan  security  forces  engaging  in  the  forced  deportation,  abusing  and  shooting  of  artisanal
diamond diggers. By recognising only the violence by rebel movements ‘aimed at undermining
legitimate governments’, the Kimberley Process carefully filtered which acts of violence and by
whom mattered.582 More generally, Le Billon advocates that in studying the connection between
natural resources and violence the focus should be expanded. The studies ought to cover not only
killings  and forced displacement  often  seen  as  the  characteristic  forms  of  armed conflicts,  but
mismanagement, corruption, racism, ethnocentrism, environmental and social impacts of resource
extraction, as well as cycles of resistance and repression linked with the rights of people to control
their resources. Such forms of violence are less pertinent in the kinds of analyses that take battle-
related deaths as an indicator of a conflict and its severity.583 
To improve analysis, Le Billon builds on Macartan Humphreys’s influential categorisation of causal
links between resources and conflicts to suggest that the relation between them is often articulated
only in one or two of the three possible ways. The first one is the ‘resource curse’ argument, as per
which being dependent  on resources  weakens the economic growth as  well  as social  and state
institutions  of a country,  rendering it  vulnerable to armed conflict.  The second is  the ‘resource
conflict’ argument, based on which grievances, conflicts and violence associated with the control
and exploitation of natural resources increase the risk of larger-scale armed conflicts. The third
variant  is  the  ‘conflict  resource’ argument,  which  treats  the  opportunities  that  abundant  and
581 Kimberley Process, ‘World Diamond Council’, 2018, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/world-diamond-
council.
582 Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, 790–92.
583 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 6.
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especially  ‘lootable’ natural  resources  provide  to  belligerents  to  finance  their  activities  as  a
manifestation of the curse.584
Each argument is, in turn, connected to a distinct characterisation of a given conflict. The resource
curse argument points at the vulnerability to conflict of a given society, which accentuates as state
institutions become weaker, less dependent on taxation and less supportive of social cohesion and
regional integration. The resource conflict argument centre on the risk of conflict increasing on the
basis  of  factors  such as  higher  income inequality,  grievances  over  socio-cultural-environmental
externalities of the industry, and greater rewards for secession or state capture. The conflict resource
argument,  then,  points  at  the  opportunity provided  to  belligerents  to  finance  armed  hostilities
through natural resources.585 The triad framework resists the essentialising tendency of discussions
on ‘resource wars’: resources are social processes, whereby neither absolute resource scarcity nor
abundance determines the conflict dynamics.586 Taken singly, any of the three components fails to
capture the complexity of the politically and socially mediated relationship between resources and
wars. For instance, Humphreys and Le Billon criticise policies built on a one-sided emphasis on the
‘greedy rebels’ mechanism aligned with a risk-based conflict analysis.587 When adopted together for
analytical  purposes,  the  three  arguments  help  explain  how ‘resource  endowments,  exploitation
practices,  social  entitlements, and discursive representation’ contribute to shaping the countries’
vulnerability to, the risk of, and the opportunities for armed conflicts.588
584 Le Billon, 13; Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Mechanisms’; 
Michael Ross, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases’, International 
Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 35–67.
585 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 17.
586 Le Billon, 12–42.
587 Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Mechanisms’.
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Such typologies are always contingent, to be refined following the various purposes for which they
are harnessed. Le Billon uses his to generate categories of conflict outcomes, which emphasise the
geographical propensities of different resources.589 I highlight  Le Billon’s three-part typology of
resource curse, resource conflict, and conflict resource arguments for three reasons. First, his work,
drawing on political  ecology, exemplifies  the diverse  standing points from which contemporary
studies on the resource curse phenomenon are launched. The means in use include ethnographic,
political economy, commodity chain analysis, and spatial science methods, thus stretching beyond
the econometric tool box.590 Second, I will draw on his triad framework in the following chapters to
suggest that existing approaches to mobilise consumers into alleviating conflicts upstream in Congo
and  Nigeria  mask  various  understandings  of  the  resource  curse  phenomenon,  and  that  the
sometimes  implicit  choices  made  between  policies  guided  by  these  understandings  affect
consumers’ remedial  capacities.  Finally,  the framework showcases that  reconceptualisations  can
help attain useful perspectives to well-established conundrums, in Le Billon’s case to the resource
curse, or, as I illustrate in the last part of the thesis, to consumer responsibility.
7.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I presented the empirical underpinnings of holding the resource curse phenomenon
as a harm that consumers may be capable of alleviating. In the first part, I argued that the curse has
emerged as  an  issue to  be  fought  against  by  international  means  including coordinated  import
policies,  corporate  due  diligence  efforts,  civil  society  advocacy  campaigns,  and  consumers’
589 Le Billon, 29; for a criticism regarding a shallow treatment of capital accumulation and powerful actors in the 
framework, see: Michael Watts, ‘Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources. Book Review.’, 
Journal of Agrarian Change 15, no. 2 (2015): 286–98; Michael Watts and Nancy Peluso, ‘Resource Violence’, in 
Critical Environmental Politics, ed. Carl Death (New York: Routledge, 2014), 193–94.
590 Le Billon’s own political ecology approach is devised as a ‘radical critique against the apolitical perspective and 
depoliticising effects of mainstream environmental and developmental research and practice’. Le Billon, Wars of 
Plunder, 12–13, 22–23, 563.
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purchase action. I highlighted that the linkage between consumers and armed conflicts deserves
attention from normative theorists, as consumers are increasingly included among the actors in this
international ‘coalition’ to fight resource-related  violence upstream in supply chains. 
In the second part, I examined the current state of research on the resource curse by discussing three
pathologies:  slow  economic  growth,  authoritarian  regimes  and  failing  institutions,  and  armed
conflicts. The literature, albeit not without its ambiguities, supports taking seriously the general
argument that the trade and exploitation of high-value resources, especially oil, increases the risk,
duration and/or severity of a violent conflict in a given area or country. Such findings, in turn,
support  the  idea  that  consumers  may  have  a  capacity-based  responsibility  to  act  upon  some
conflicts:  global  supply  chains  connect  their  purchases  raw  materials  originating  from  many
conflict-prone  areas.  I  suggested  that  zooming  in  on  individual  conflicts  and embracing  wider
theoretical standing points will enable exploring whether and how this connection can be harnessed
for alleviating the conflicts.
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8 CONGO
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on an area that provides raw materials for making products to consumers in
affluent democracies while suffering from recurring violent conflicts often diagnosed as symptoms
of the resource curse.591 In my examination of the role that conflict minerals have in perpetuating
the  violence  in  eastern  Congo,  I  highlight  that  the  results  of  the  recent  international  thrust  to
alleviate violence and instability in the region by isolating armed groups from mineral supply chains
remain mixed. A form of resource curse pertains in eastern Congo. However, the ‘blood mineral’
narrative often taken up to persuade consumers to join the remedial efforts predominantly focuses
the attention on minerals as a means and a motive for armed groups to conduct acts of violence.
The conflict in eastern Congo is linked with the failing state apparatus captured by political and
economic elites rather than the armed groups’ greed for mineral revenues per se. Applying Philip Le
Billon’s framework, I suggest that ameliorative policies guided by ‘conflict resource’ and ‘resource
conflict’ diagnoses of the relation between natural resources and violence are to be complemented
with policies stemming from the ‘resource curse’  analysis which, while not promising fast results,
would place a  heavier  emphasis on tackling corruption in public  mineral revenue management,
illicit financial flows, and the way elites have militarised their competition for power and profit. A
comprehensive set of international strategies, which is now gradually unfolding, can be helpful in
tackling these wider ramifications.
591 I am grateful to participants in the Congo Research Network Conference at St. Antony’s College, University of 
Oxford, in April 2018, for their extensive comments on this chapter.
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8.2 RICHES AND STRIFE
Natural resources have always been crucial to the Congolese economy. The estimated value of the
country’s  untapped mineral wealth amounts to $24 trillion.592 Congo produces approximately 60
percent of the world's cobalt, possesses around 8 percent of global coltan reserves, and serves as a
major source of many other minerals, such as copper, tin, gold, and tungsten, which have several
uses in global production processes.593 To name some applications, cobalt’s world prices soared in
2017, as demand for electric cars and subsequently for lithium-ion batteries, which contain cobalt,
soared.594 The demand for tantalum, extracted from coltan, exploded in the early 2000s. The metal
can be found in gadgets such as smartphones and video game consoles, and as an alloy for carbide
tools  and  jet  engine  components.595 Gold  is  used  in  making  jewellery,  but  also  in  electronic,
communications,  and aerospace  equipment.  Tungsten is  used in  lightning,  heating and welding
applications, whereas tin is applied in alloys, plating and solders for pipes as well as electronic
circuits.596
In Congo, mining these much-sought riches is done by the big and small alike. Companies with
access to finance operate large-scale industrial sites with modern technology and heavy machinery.
592 Zoë Marriage, ‘The Elephant in the Room: Offshore Companies, Liberalisation and Extension of Presidential 
Power in DR Congo’, Third World Quarterly 39, no. 5 (2018): 893.
593 BGR, ‘Cobalt from the DR Congo - Potential, Risks and Significance for the Global Cobalt Market’ (Hannover, 
2017); BGR, in DR Congo, 2018, https://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/CTC/Mineral-Certification-
DRC/CTC_DRC_node_en.html.
594 David Pilling, ‘Clean Electric Cars Are Built on Pollution in Congo’, Financial Times, 26 July 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/427b8cb0-71d7-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c.
595 Christoph Vogel and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace? The Congolese Mining Frontier and the Fight
Against “Conflict Minerals”’, Antipode 48, no. 4 (2016): 1107.
596 Celia Taylor, ‘Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation’, Harvard Business Law Review Online, 2012, 
107, footnotes, http://www.hblr.org/2012/01/conflict-minerals-and-sec-disclosure-regulation/.
196
Yet, approximately 800,000 miners and from 8 to 10 million people across the country are directly
or indirectly dependent on small-scale mining.597 Small-scale and artisanal mining is an arduous and
sometimes dangerous profession: miners operate in deep tunnels and remote sites using manual
tools,  and serious accidents are not uncommon. As years of unrest  have shrunk industrial-scale
mining, the World Bank estimates that artisanal miners produce 90 percent of the minerals exported
from the country.598 Although exact numbers are not available, it is difficult to overstate the role of
the mining sector in the Congolese economy.599 Nationally,  around 80 percent of Congo’s total
export earnings are made up by two metals, cobalt and copper. EITI accounts that the extractive
industry  contributes  97.5  percent  of  exports,  20  percent  of  GDP,  24.7  percent  of  government
revenue  and  23.9  percent  of  employment  in  the  country.600 Locally,  ‘everybody  depends  on
mining!’, according to Aloys Tegera of the Pole Institute based in Goma.601
To draw the main lines of the complicated supply chain linking its minerals with consumers in
affluent democracies, eastern Congo belongs to the economic region of the Great Lakes and East
Africa rather than that of Kinshasa, the distant capital in the west. A large share of tin, tungsten, and
tantalum extracted in the artisanal mining sites of the Kivu provinces are brought first by foot, then
by motorbike, car, truck, and finally by plane to the export centres, such as the cities of Bukavu,
Butembo, Goma, and Uvira, from where they transit through Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda,
and Tanzania to Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, the great eastern African ports. Loaded onto cargo
ships, they are then shipped to Asia and Europe to solder and electronics contract manufacturers,
597 Ben Radley and Christoph Vogel, ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo? The Ambiguous Impact of the “Conflict 
Minerals” Movement’, The Extractive Industries and Society 2, no. 3 (2015): 406.
598 World Bank, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Growth with Governance In the Mining Sector’, 2008, 10.
599 MakeITfair, ‘Report on “Roundtable on Conflict Minerals Legislation”’, 2011, https://www.somo.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Roundtable-on-conflict-minerals-legislation.pdf.
600 EITI, ‘2015 Democratic Republic of Congo EITI Report’, 2017, 14; EITI, ‘2014 Democratic Republic of Congo 
EITI Report’, 2015, 65; Global Witness, ‘Regime Cash Machine’, 2017, 7.
601 MakeITfair, ‘Report on “Roundtable on Conflict Minerals Legislation”’.
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who turn them into usable components for a wide range of applications described above. Gold is so
valuable that its supply chain differs from those of other minerals extracted in Congo: its main
destinations are in United Arab Emirates, from which gold travels elsewhere.602
Most  exports,  regardless  of  the  mineral,  remain  non-regulated.603 The  products  are  gradually
formalised as they pass downstream, yet estimates made in the 2000s suggest that up to 90 percent
of mineral production and export in eastern Congo is beyond state control.604 There are no reliable
statistics on actual exports  and imports  from and into North Kivu; goods exported to Asia and
Europe leave via  East  African ports  often outside the attention and control  of the state.605 The
emergence of international certification schemes has improved the situation with regards to tin,
tantalum and tungsten. However, challenges in the mineral sector remain widespread: in August
2017, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a UN body reporting to the
Security Council on the sanctions regime established on the country, estimated that over 98 percent
of the Congolese gold is smuggled abroad.606
While Congo has enjoyed periods of economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s, the Congolese
have seen no benefit that one might expect from a country endowed with such natural riches. On the
contrary, the devastation in the Democratic Republic is multi-pronged. In the Human Development
Index,  Congo falls  to the lowest  decile,  ranking 176 out of 187 countries.607 In the Corruption
602 Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development: Utilising the Trade in Minerals from 
Eastern DR Congo for Development.’ (Resource Consulting Services, 2009), 23; Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo,
123.
603 Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development’, 27.
604 Aloys Tegera and Dominic Johnson, ‘Rules for Sale: Formal and Informal Cross-Border Trade in Eastern DRC’ 
(Goma, Congo: Pole Institute, 2007), 5–6.
605 Tegera and Johnson, 15, 22.
606 UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10 August 2017’, 10 August 2017, 23.
607 UNDP, ‘Human Development Index - DR Congo’, 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.
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Perceptions  Index  maintained  by  Transparency  International,  Congo  retains  a  similarly  low
position, 161th out of the 180 countries observed.608 Recently, outbreaks of Ebola and cholera have
ravaged some of its rural parts.609 Over its recent history, the country has gone through multiple
wars; the United Nations peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, has operated in the country since
1999.610 Being labelled  the  ‘rape  capital  of  the  world’ by  Margot  Wallström,  the  UN’s special
representative on sexual violence in conflict, rape remains a tragic feature of the ongoing conflicts
in the Congo.611
Among the many calamities, the persistent violence in its eastern region has arguably gained the
most  persistent  international  attention.  Milli  Lake alludes  to  the  complexity  of  the  reasons for
violence by noting that Congo is  unique among protracted low-intensity armed conflicts  for its
’large number of operative armed groups‘, and that the conflict is best understood through ‘geo-
political  master  cleavages  overlaid  against  a  collection  of  micro-level  conflicts  involving  a
multitude of discrete interests’.612 The complicated landscape of violence involves recurrent human
rights violations. Mass rape has been used as a weapon of war; children kidnapped and forced to
join the brutal militant groups; and civilians subjected to slave labour and exploitation.613 No faction
608 Transparency International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 2018, 
https://www.transparency.org/country/COD.
609 BBC, ‘Ebola-Hit DR Congo Begins Vaccination’, 21 May 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44194065.
610 Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011).
611 BBC, ‘DR Congo Is World “Rape Capital”’, 28 April 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8650112.stm.
612 Milli Lake, ‘Building the Rule of War: Postconflict Institutions and the Micro-Dynamics of Conflict in Eastern DR 
Congo’ 71, no. 2 (2017): 289, 291.
613 E.g. UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10 August 2017’, 32–34; Amnesty International, ‘DR Congo’, 2018, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/report-democratic-republic-of-the-
congo/; Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2018: Rights Trends in Democratic Republic of Congo’, 2 January 
2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo; Stearns, Dancing in the
Glory of Monsters.
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has a monopoly of violence in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and
Katanga, whereby such deeds often go unpunished.614 Since the transition period of 2003-2006 that
followed  the  Second  Congo  War,  the  security  situation  in  eastern  Congo  has  remained  either
unchanged or has deteriorated, a trend to which I will return below.615
As discussed in the previous chapter, the strongest association between natural resources and armed
conflicts identified by large-N scholarship concerns crude oil and alluvial diamonds, whereas the
relation  between conflicts  and other  minerals  remains  more  ambiguous.  Yet,  there is  a  general
consensus that mineral wealth comprises one of the diverse factors that Lake describes as shaping
eastern Congo’s dire situation.616 Global Witness suggests that the concept of conflict resources well
captures the role that minerals play in the Kivus and the surrounding regions, defining them as
‘natural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to,
benefit  from or  result  in  the  commission  of  serious  violations  of  human  rights,  violations  of
international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under international law’.617 Since
the early 2000s the exploitation of three ‘T’ metals, tantalum, tungsten, and tin, and gold, together
known as the 3TG minerals, has gained the most international attention.618 The challenges related to
cobalt differ somewhat from those linked with 3TGs, as most cobalt is industrially extracted and
614 Michael Nest, Coltan (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 67; Clementine Burnley, ‘Natural Resources 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Question of Governance?’, Sustainable Development Law & 
Policy 12, no. 1 (2011): 8.
615 For general trends, see reports by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1533/work-and-mandate/expert-reports
616 Jason Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict: Tracing the Origins of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo’, Peacebuilding 
2, no. 2 (2014): 167.
617 Global Witness, ‘Sinews of War: Eliminating the Trade in Conflict Resources’, 2006, 1; the definition has 
subsequently been adopted in the European Parliament: ‘European Parliament Resolution of 16 April 2013 on 
Advancing Development through Trade (2012/2224(INI))’, 5 February 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013IP0119.
618 Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development’, 5; Vogel and Raeymaekers, ‘Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace?’
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mainly in other parts of the country. However, while not listed as a ‘conflict resource’ in major
public policy initiatives, cobalt’s rising global demand has brought increasing attention to human
rights concerns and problems in its extraction.619
In  2010,  the  UN Group of  Experts  on the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo reported  to  the
Security Council  that almost every mining deposit  in the South and North Kivu provinces was
controlled  by  armed  groups.620 Based on data  collected  by  the  International  Peace  Information
Service (IPIS),  a  Belgian think  tank,  in  2009-2010 around 57 percent  of  the  tin,  tantalum and
tungsten (3Ts) miners was being controlled or being regularly visited by armed actors.621 To date,
revenues generated by the mining of 3Ts and gold (3TGs) remain important to all  sides in the
conflict: the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) is heavily involved
with the mining business, and a major source of insecurity by itself.622 While accurate estimates are
difficult, armed groups and army brigades rely on mineral revenues on varying degrees, ranging
from 15 to 95 percent of their total revenues.623 The mines constitute a useful source of revenue for
a  range  of  purposes,  from paying salaries  of  fighters  and  boosting  state  budget  to  reinforcing
criminal networks or local rebel rule.624
619 Global Witness, ‘Regime Cash Machine’; Annie Callaway, ‘Powering Down Corruption’ (Enough Project, 2018); 
Amnesty International, ‘Time to Recharge’, 2017.
620 UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25 May 2010’, 25 May 2010, 17.
621 IPIS, ‘Analysis of the Interactive Map of Artisanal Mining in Eastern DR Congo, 2015 Update’ (Antwerp: IPIS, 
2015), 40.
622 Dominic P. Parker and Bryan Vadheim, ‘Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? US Regulation of Conflict Minerals 
and Violence in the Congo’, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 4, no. 1 (2017): 
8.
623 Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development’, 6.
624 Jason Stearns and Christoph Vogel, ‘The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo’ (New York: Congo 
Research Group, New York University, 2015).
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8.3 REMEDIES
In the 2010s,  ‘breaking the link between conflict  and trade in natural resources’ has become a
visible part of the efforts to assist the war-torn eastern Congo.625 According to Laura Seay, there was
no sustained advocacy attention on eastern  Congo prior  to  the late  2000s.626 While  the United
Nations  and  other  international  actors  acknowledged  that  minerals  were  boosting  war  funding
already during the First and Second Congo Wars, one indicator of change was a report by the UN
Group of Experts, which the Security Council requested after large-scale violence again broke out
in the Kivus in March 2008. In the dramatic report,  the Panel recommended all  states to ‘take
measures, as they deem appropriate, to ensure that importers, processing industries and consumers
of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and
on the origin of the minerals they purchase’.627 The report was significant in the sense that the
concept of ‘due diligence’ entered the vocabulary used in the Security Council’s resolutions for the
first time: it framed the Congolese government as unable to address the exploitation of the country’s
natural resources, and other states as bearing a responsibility to ensure that companies under their
jurisdiction were doing their best to alleviate the violence in their supply chains.628
Civil society campaigners based in North America and Europe were crucial in amplifying the call
for due diligence measures. Michael Nest writes that the activists are best understood as a network
sharing the idea that the course of the Congolese war can be shaped by affecting mineral trade, and
625 Enough Project, ‘A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals - Strategy Paper’, 2009, 7, 
https://enoughproject.org/reports/comprehensive-approach-conflict-minerals-strategy-paper.
626 Laura Seay, ‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Western Advocacy’, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
2012), 18.
627 UN Security Council, ‘S/RES/1857, Para 15(g).’, 22 December 2008.
628 Louise Arimatsu and Hemi Mistry, ‘Conflict Minerals: The Search for a Normative Framework’ (Chatham House, 
2012), 16–17.
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variously engaging in strategic cooperation to push the agenda further.  While before the 2000s
Congolese minerals, such as coltan, were little known among western campaigners, a few years
later they were framing consumer electronics connected to violence in Congo.629 Two organisations
had a pivotal role in this change of lens. Global Witness, operating in London, had since the early
2000s highlighted the role of multinational companies in perpetuating the status quo by buying
minerals from armed groups.630 Seay emphasises the role of the Enough Project, an American NGO
created in 2007 to develop an American constituency to end and prevent conflicts in Africa.631 The
Enough Project quickly engaged with coalition-building and advocacy work to gain publicity for
the  connection  between  everyday  electronics  and  sexual  violence  linked  with  the  Congo.  Its
rhetoric, captured in the title of a 2009 paper ‘Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict
Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the World’, was varyingly taken up in other western
campaigns, such as No Blood on my Mobile and Fatal Transactions.632
The so-called conflict minerals approach, elevated by campaigning, a threat of consumer boycotts
and investigative journalism, has since evolved into public policies. In 2010, both the OECD and
the UN published their  due diligence guidelines for companies to avoid doing harm in conflict
areas.633 Campaigners gained a major victory the same year, as the United States Congress passed
the Section 1502, or the Conflict Minerals Provision, of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.634 Successfully advocated by a coalition of NGOs, including the Enough
Project,  the  Section  1502  obliges  corporations  registered  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange
629 Nest, Coltan, 105, 148.
630 Global Witness, ‘Conflict Minerals’; Global Witness, ‘Same Old Story’, 2004.
631 Seay, ‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?’, 9.
632 Prendergast, ‘Can You Hear Congo Now?’; Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the 
(Anti)Terrorist Consumer’.
633 Vogel and Raeymaekers, ‘Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace?’, 1100.
634 Parker and Vadheim, ‘Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed?’, 8–11.
203
Commission (SEC) to investigate and report the extent to which their supply chains sourcing from
Congo  and  its  neighbouring  countries  are  ‘conflict-free’.635 Compiled  in  the  aftermath  of  the
financial crisis, the Act ignited a major revamp in the electronics industry, as companies operating
in the United States were obliged to scrutinise their sourcing practices in order to avoid not only
reputational damage but also legal repercussions. Similarly, in 2017 the European Union agreed on
regulatory guidelines on importing resources from conflict countries. The legislation, which comes
to full force in 2021, is drafted on the blueprint of the Section 1502, but is global in scope where the
Dodd-Frank Act focuses on the Great Lakes region.636 Such public efforts are gradually taken up
elsewhere: China, to which many of the Congolese minerals are exported, has encouraged Chinese
companies to take steps towards responsible mineral supply chains.637
Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Intel, Nokia, Microsoft, and Dell were among the first consumer-facing
electronics giants to announce that they, together with mining and smelting companies, would build
sector-wide  certification  systems  to  ensure  their  supply  chains  are  not  affected  by  ore  mined
‘illegally’ in  Congo.638 Such  schemes  are  implemented  in  Congo  to  ensure  that  minerals  are
extracted and traded in a way that human rights are not violated and armed groups funded through
635 Emily Veale, ‘Is There Blood on You Hands-Free Device: Examining Legislative Approaches to the Conflict 
Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 
21 (2013 2012): 505; Shannon Raj, ‘Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation That Could 
Cleanse the Trade’, Southern California Law Review 84, no. 4 (2011): 981; for the purpose of ranking companies, 
the Enough Project defines ‘conflict-free minerals’ as ‘minerals that do not directly or indirectly finance or benefit 
armed groups, including state military units from Congo as well as other predatory regional governments.’ Annie 
Callaway, ‘Demand the Supply: Ranking Consumer Electronics and Jewelry Retail Companies on Their Efforts to 
Develop Conflict-Free Minerals Supply Chains from Congo’ (Enough Project, November 2017), 4.
636 European Parliament, ‘Conflict Minerals’.
637 OECD, ‘Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains’; Global Witness, ‘Global 
Witness Welcomes Progressive New Chinese Mineral Supply Chain Guidelines’, 2 December 2015, 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/press-releases/global-witness-welcomes-progressive-new-chinese-mineral-
supply-chain-guidelines/.
638 Seay, ‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?’, 9–10; Reinecke and Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems’.
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their businesses.639 Over the last decade, the picture of ‘blood minerals’ feeding the long-lasting
conflict in Congo has entered popular imagination and evolved into consumers demanding products
that come through ‘closed’ supply chains, and companies risking reputational damage and loss of
revenue through boycotts if they fail to provide them. In the future, the conflict mineral approach
may manifest for instance as import bans on consumer goods containing minerals sourced from the
Congo; blanket commodity sanctions; targeted sanctions on companies and individuals; mandatory
mineral  certification  of  origin  schemes  by  mine  or  country;  and  mandatory  due  diligence
processes.640 For now, the mineral traceability schemes remain its best-known policy product.
8.4 IMPLEMENTATION
Trump threatened to suspend the ‘conflict minerals’ provision of Dodd-Frank. That might actually
be good for Congo.641
While Section 1502 of Dodd Frank was not well conceived and did create significant harm, the
situation in the 3T sector has overcome these various hurdles and is now on a positive trend. On
balance, repeal of the Rule would now have further negative, rather than positive effects.642
639 The main schemes to ensure the transparency and legality of the mineral supply chain in eastern Congo are the 
iTSCi scheme by the International Tin Research Association, the certification scheme by the German Federal 
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), and the scheme facilitated by the International Conference 
of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to certify mineral origins: Interview #21: Yannick Weyns, Natural Resources 
Expert, MONUSCO.
640 Garrett and Mitchell, ‘Trading Conflict for Development’, 13.
641 Nik Stoop, Marijke Verpoorten, and Peter van der Windt, ‘Trump Threatened to Suspend the “Conflict Minerals” 
Provision of Dodd-Frank. That Might Actually Be Good for Congo.’, Washington Post, 27 September 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/27/trump-canceled-the-conflict-minerals-
provision-of-dodd-frank-thats-probably-good-for-the-congo/?utm_term=.f166b11624d0.
642 iTSCi, ‘Comments on January 31, 2017, Statement on the Commission’s Conflict Minerals Rule’, 2017, 6–7, 
https://www.itsci.org/2017/03/27/itri-letter-sec-acting-chairman-piwowar-march-2017/.
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Although  the  machinery  of  responsible  mineral  supply  chains  is  becoming  more  and  more
embedded within the international trade agenda, attempts to readjust the trajectory of the eastern
Congo  towards  peace  and  development  by  curbing  trade  in  conflict  minerals  have  also  met
criticism.643 The  debate  accentuated  since  the  US Trump administration  began  dismantling  the
sections of the Dodd-Frank Act it  considers ineffective or too damaging to American corporate
interests.644 The critics of the conflict minerals approach, who comprise academics, activists and
policy-makers,  are not  necessarily  in favour of the deregulatory trend.  However,  some of them
concede that dismantling the Section 1502 might be a correct step, albeit, as per Sara Geenen, it is
currently done ‘for all the wrong reasons’.645 The critics have advanced roughly two claims: i) the
conflict-free mineral policies have been implemented in a way that has had unintended, harmful
consequences on local livelihoods, and ii) the conflict mineral approach cannot effectively alleviate
the violence because it lies on a misunderstanding of the conflict. In this section, I focus on the first
claim, and turn to the more fundamental second claim in the next one. Together, dissecting the two
claims facilitates  the third part  of  the thesis:  the analysis  enable assessing the extent  to  which
consumers are capable of helping reduce violence and instability in eastern Congo by aligning their
purchases to support the conflict mineral approach as it currently stands.
643 Séverine Autesserre, ‘Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences’, 
African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012): 202–222; Jeroen Cuvelier et al., ‘Analyzing the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act 
on Congolese Livelihoods’, Social Science Research Council, 2014; Jeroen Cuvelier, Jose Diemel, and Koen 
Vlassenroot, ‘Digging Deeper: The Politics of “Conflict Minerals” in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’, Global Policy 4, no. 4 (2013): 449–451; Radley and Vogel, ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo?’; Seay, 
‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?’; See also an open letter signed by 72 Congo experts, academics, and 
activists. ‘An Open Letter’, 2014, https://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/09092014-open-letter-final-and-list-
doc.pdf.
644 iTSCi, ‘Trump Administration Recommends Dodd-Frank “Conflict Minerals” Disclosure Repeal’, 10 December 
2017, https://www.itsci.org/2017/10/12/trump-administration-recommends-dodd-frank-conflict-minerals-
disclosure-repeal/.
645 Sara Geenen, ‘Trump Is Right on Congo’s Minerals, but for All the Wrong Reasons’, The Conversation, 22 
February 2017, http://theconversation.com/trump-is-right-on-congos-minerals-but-for-all-the-wrong-reasons-
73320.
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To start with the first claim, much of the criticism targets the immediate aftermath of the Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010, which most scholars treat as the starting point to major policy efforts. An early
critic is Seay, who argues that the Act was conducive to creating a  ‘de facto ban’ on Congolese
mineral  exports,  which  was  further  solidified  by  President  Joseph  Kabila’s  six-month  ban  on
artisanal mining between September 2009 and March 2010 aimed at increasing pressure towards
formalising the sector.646 Although the growing NGO advocacy in the 2000s had already led to some
companies suspending all purchases of tin from Congo, such national and international attention
pushed more major companies towards taking a ‘Congo-free’ instead of a ‘conflict-free’ approach to
sourcing raw materials.647 A drop in demand of resources put anywhere from tens of thousands up to
2 million Congolese miners out of work in the eastern region, causing loss of livelihoods among
those already in a precarious situation.648
The damage done to local livelihoods in the first years has been widely acknowledged. A recent
quantitative study at UNU-WIDER, a UN think-tank, indicates an increase of at least 143 percent in
the probability of infant deaths in villages close to the mines that were ‘treated’ by the regulation.649
To Parker, Foltz and Elsea, the increased infant mortality occurring after the Act calls to question
whether  such a  top-down measure  can  have  a  purely  positive  impact,  as  infant  mortality  rose
potentially in those villages that were not dependent on minerals benefiting armed groups. The
International Tin Association (ITA, formerly known as ITRI), an industry organisation that runs
iTSCi, the most prevalent traceability scheme of 3T minerals in Congo, has equally acknowledged
646 Seay, ‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?’, 16; Sara Geenen, ‘A Dangerous Bet: The Challenges of 
Formalizing Artisanal Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Resources Policy 37, no. 3 (2012): 326; Vogel
and Raeymaekers, ‘Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace?’, 1111.
647 Radley and Vogel, ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo?’, 407.
648 Radley and Vogel, 409; Seay, ‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?’
649 Dominic P. Parker, Jeremy D. Foltz, and David Elsea, ‘Unintended Consequences of Economic Sanctions for 
Human Rights’, Working Paper (UNU-WIDER, 2016).
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that the Dodd-Frank measures caused ‘significant harm’ in their early stages.650 Data gathered by
IPIS confirms the socio-economic damage inflicted on artisanal miners.651
While advocates of the legislation lament the harm done to miners, they maintain that the trend has
since  become  more  positive.  Civil  society  organisations  are  doing  their  best  to  ensure  that
‘accompanying  measures’ are  taken up in  the  forthcoming EU legislation.652 As  per  Koch  and
Kinsbergen, the ‘dominant narrative’ of the de facto embargo hurting the population lingers on,
although this early, ‘intended’ and maybe even necessary stage to ‘flush out the rebels’ is over.
Generally, those advocates suggest that the benefits of the legislation ultimately outweigh the costs
inflicted on the local population. For instance, the ITA claims that although costs involved with due
diligence,  traceability,  improving  governance  and  other  measures  are  inevitable,  ‘these  actions
certainly lead to better working and living environments for many thousands of individuals and it
would surely be impossible to argue against these benefits of formalisation of the artisanal mining
sector’.653
To counter, the critics state that the current way of implementing the traceability schemes is unlikely
to deliver the reduction in violence without disproportionately damaging the locals. Until 2018, the
Congolese authorities identified the iTSCi scheme as the only accredited traceability mechanism,
effectively making a membership in it a necessary condition if one wanted to export 3T minerals
from Congo. In the Kivu provinces, the iTSCi scheme has pushed down miners’ revenues, as they
650 Enough Project, ‘Resource Page - Conflict Minerals: A Broader Push for Reform Is Essential’, The Enough Project 
(blog), 2014, https://enoughproject.org/one-pager/resource-page-conflict-minerals-a-broader-push-for-reform-is-
essential; iTSCi, ‘Comments on January 31, 2017, Statement on the Commission’s Conflict Minerals Rule’, 7.
651 IPIS, ‘Mapping Artisanal Mining Areas and Mineral Supply Chains in Eastern DR Congo’ (Antwerp: IPIS, 2019).
652 EURAC, ‘Accompanying Measures to the EU Regulation on Responsible Mineral Sourcing’ (European Network 
for Central Africa, 2017).
653 iTSCi, ‘Comments on January 31, 2017, Statement on the Commission’s Conflict Minerals Rule’, 3.
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can sell the minerals they dig up only to one buyer.654 Accordingly, those most vulnerable in the
global supply chain, the miners, local producers and local governments, are still bearing the brunt of
the iTSCi-centred reform processes.655 The European Network for Central Africa, an NGO network,
suggests that in the current arrangement ‘it is the artisanal miners, and not the multinationals that
process and market minerals, who ultimately bear the cost of the iTSCi.’656
The  efforts  can  be  nevertheless  be  defended.  Yannick  Weyns,  a  natural  resource  expert  at
MONUSCO, reminds that  some of the decrease in the price miners get is  due to an increased
control and regulation of the sector in accordance with Congo’s updated mining code rather than a
direct consequence of the due diligence schemes.657 Further, alternative traceability schemes, such
as  the  Better  Sourcing  programme,  are  emerging  to  dismantle  the  monopsony  status  of  the
pioneering  iTSCi  initiative.658 Yet,  critics  doubt  whether  any  scheme  can  fully  overcome  the
contextual difficulties inherent to eastern Congo. Radley and Vogel state that  the iTSCi scheme
remains porous, which implies that small-scale miners pay the industry for a process that ultimately
does not isolate armed groups from the supply chain.659 In 2014, the Group of Experts suggested
that the pattern of smuggling continues with regards to 3T minerals, and in 2017 documented that
iTSCi, 'while well intentioned and designed — has shortcomings in its implementation, enabling
654 Radley and Vogel, ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo?’, 409; Interview #28: Seremi Chibashimba, President of 
Surveillance Commission, Former President of Cooperative, COMIKA; IRIN News, ‘Who Pays the Hidden Price 
for Congo’s Conflict-Free Minerals?’, IRIN, 14 February 2017, 
https://www.irinnews.org/investigations/2017/02/14/who-pays-hidden-price-congo-s-conflict-free-minerals.
655 EURAC, ‘Accompanying Measures to the EU Regulation on Responsible Mineral Sourcing’, 26; Several authors, 
‘Open Letter: Broader Push for Reform Is Essential’, 2014, 4, 
https://enoughproject.org/files/OpenLetterConflictMinerals_October_2014.pdf.
656 EURAC, ‘Accompanying Measures to the EU Regulation on Responsible Mineral Sourcing’.
657 Interview #21: Yannick Weyns, Natural Resources Expert, MONUSCO.
658 Reuters, ‘Congo Miner SMB Leaves ITSCI Responsible-Sourcing Scheme over Cost’, Reuters, 8 January 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-itsci-congo-idUSKCN1P20OV.
659 Radley and Vogel, ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo?’, 408; Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo, 208.
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different actors to intentionally or inadvertently facilitate smuggling‘.660 Breaches of the chain of
custody and ongoing sale of bag tags on the black market in North Kivu persist, although their role
is downplayed by advocates.661 Low prices weaken the incentive for artisanal miners to comply with
the scheme, creating an impetus to sell minerals to smugglers heading to Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda
and other neighbouring countries, and encouraging a shift to less regulated commodities, especially
lucrative gold.662
Critics continue that even strengthened due diligence schemes cannot serve their purpose in the
unruly eastern Congo. Government troops do not have an effective control over the Kivu provinces.
In  a  violence-prone environment,  a time-consuming,  difficult,  costly  and sometimes  dangerous
follow-up is necessary to ensure that the validation process of mines really indicates the origins of
the minerals.663 A mine validated as ‘green’ might be controlled by an armed group soon after a visit
by a joint validation team, complicating the process to ascertain that the minerals are not benefiting
a militant group upstream.664 Seay suggests that the feasibility of the iTSCi and other traceability
660 UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 23 January 2014’, 23 January 2014, 42; UN Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 10 August 2017’, 2.
661 For an industry response, see: iTSCi, ‘ITRI Comments on the UN Group of Experts Final Report’, 2017, 
https://www.itsci.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ITRI-Letter-Comments-on-UN-GOE-report-040917-.pdf; Toby 
Whitney, ‘Conflict Minerals, Black Markets, and Transparency: The Legislative Background of Dodd-Frank 
Section 1502 and Its Historical Lessons’, Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 2 (2015): 183–85.
662 UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 18 December 2018’, 18 December 2018, 2; UN Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 10 August 2017’, 6, 18, 21.
663 Interview #17: Bali Barume and Martin Neumann, Project Manager & Project Officer, BGR Bukavu; Barume’s 
view is that the certification and due diligence schemes can reduce the potential for conflict in South Kivu. The 
disagreement among the practitioners interviewed well illustrates the complexity of the situation.
664 Radley and Vogel, ‘Fighting Windmills in Eastern Congo?’, 409; Interview #17: Bali Barume and Martin Neumann,
Project Manager & Project Officer, BGR Bukavu
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schemes aiming to create closed supply chains from originating from mines in a ‘failed state’ such
as Congo is negligible: whereas the Kimberley Scheme, acclaimed for having helped resolve the
Sierra  Leone  conflict,  was  enacted  in  a  more  or  less  functional  state,  there  are  no  means  of
effectively tracing and monitoring the passage of minerals in eastern Congo.665
Here, the advocates point out that there are signs of success despite the challenging circumstances.
In 2017, the UN Group of Experts highlighted that despite severe challenges mineral traceability
schemes have ‘considerably reduced  instances  of armed groups  directly benefiting  from  the
exploitation  and  trade  of  tin,  tantalum  and tungsten’.666 Further, opportunities for armed groups
to benefit indirectly from the minerals are reducing, and it is now possible for international buyers
to source minerals from eastern Congo that are free of armed group interference.667 Quantitative
analyses updated in 2015 and 2019 by IPIS support this claim: although armed groups continue to
profit from mining indirectly, for instance by installing roadblocks, they are less present in 3TG
mines than prior to the Dodd-Frank Act.668 Accordingly, as around 80 percent of artisanal miners in
the eastern DRC works in the gold sector, which iTSCi does not cover, the Enough Project has
urged the international community to extend due diligence efforts to gold, where the armed group
presence remains strong.669 Reflecting on these advances, ITA underlines that ‘[s]takeholders who
665 Seay, ‘What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?’, 19.
666 UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10 August 2017’, 2.
667 UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 18.
668 IPIS, ‘Analysis of the Interactive Map of Artisanal Mining in Eastern DR Congo, 2015 Update’; IPIS, ‘Mapping 
Artisanal Mining Areas and Mineral Supply Chains in Eastern DR Congo’; IPIS, ‘Assessing the Impact of Due 
Diligence Programmes in Eastern DRC: A Baseline Study’ (Antwerp, Toronto: IPIS, 2019).
669 IPIS, ‘Analysis of the Interactive Map of Artisanal Mining in Eastern DR Congo, 2015 Update’, 4; ‘Although the 
conflicts began for other reasons, and significant political and other dynamics are key factors in them, the gold trade
is a central driver of both conflict and corruption.’ Sentry, ‘The Golden Laundromat’ (Enough Project & Not on Our
Watch, 2018), 5.
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lose sight of the general objective and expect total solutions to illegality and total elimination of risk
will contribute to further harm to the situation in the DRC.’670 
The change in 3TG mines is remarkable: both critics and advocates of the approach appreciate the
reduced presence of armed groups since the Dodd-Frank Act. Yet, the former group emphasises that
one cannot infer that the access of armed groups to funds has subsequently been reduced. Especially
earlier campaigners understated how the financial base of armed groups is never solely reliant on
minerals. As Nest writes with regards to coltan as financing violence in the 2010s: ‘…following the
price  boom,  coltan  returned  to  being  just  one  of  many  sources  of  income  for  armed  groups,
including,  gold,  tin,  tungsten,  manganese,  timber,  cattle,  other  livestock,  wildlife,  taxation  of
commerce, theft of consumer goods, theft of agricultural produce and control of international border
posts.’671 Timber, charcoal, agricultural products and other mostly locally or regionally sold items
can constitute a major source of funding for armed groups, a business in which tightening import
regulation in Europe and North America makes little difference. Recent reports by IPIS remind that
it  is  the commodification of not  only minerals  but any resource,  including people’s labour  and
movement, which constitutes a key node in the conflict.672
Surely, minerals, especially gold, are an extremely attractive target because of their value. However,
at  least  in the short  run the weakening presence of armed groups in 3T mines has not directly
contributed to peace. Rather, the IPIS 2019 report maintains that armed violence in eastern Congo is
currently not often related to interference in the artisanal mining sector.673 In a recent study, Parker
670 iTSCi, ‘ITSCi Views on Al Jazeera Fault Lines “Conflicted: The Fight Over Congo’s Minerals”’, 2015, 3, 
https://www.itsci.org/2015/11/14/itsci-views-al-jazeera-fault-lines-conflicted-fight-congos-minerals/.
671 Nest, Coltan, 183.
672 Vogel and Raeymaekers, ‘Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace?’, 1114; IPIS, ‘“Everything That Moves Will Be Taxed”: The 
Political Economy of Roadblocks in North and South Kivu’ (Antwerp: IPIS and DIIS, 2017); IPIS, ‘Mapping 
Artisanal Mining Areas and Mineral Supply Chains in Eastern DR Congo’.
673 IPIS, ‘Mapping Artisanal Mining Areas and Mineral Supply Chains in Eastern DR Congo’, 8.
212
and  Vadheim  use  IPIS  data  to  geographically  locate  the  mines  affected  by  the  Dodd-Frank
regulation. They argue that the policies ‘increased the likelihood that armed groups looted civilians
and committed violence against them’ by breaking down the ‘stationary bandit’ equilibrium, and by
pushing armed groups to looting civilians beyond the vicinity of the 3T mines, and to battle over
gold-mining territories.674 To them, the findings indicate a ‘cautionary tale’ against making strong
assumptions about the way natural resources are linked with the motivations of combatants: ‘We
join others in concluding that the resource curse, as it pertains to violent conflict,  is a complex
phenomenon that is unlikely to be solved by international trade embargoes, boycotts, or certification
programs that reduce the value of a country’s resource endowment.’675
Armed groups shifting their business to extorting civilians and occupying gold mines, together with
the increased infant mortality discovered by Parker et al, are some of the documented local effects
of the due diligence schemes, which emerged after the Dodd-Frank Act. To emphasise, both are
short-term effects, which in the long run may unfold as a necessary pain that preceded the good
effects of the due diligence schemes. Koch and Kinsbergen use this argument to claim that Parker
and Vadheim rely on dated data: the negative consequences are likely to weaken in the middle and
long term, whereby Parker et al provide undeserved ammunition for the (often corporate) supporters
of the Trump administration plan to shoot down the conflict mineral legislation.676 Yet, so far no
change is in sight. Stoop, Verpooten and van der Windt take up a larger IPIS dataset and expand the
time  horizon  to  2015.  They  suggest  that  violence  against  civilians,  alongside  rioting,  strongly
increased in mining areas targeted by the Act, and that fighting seems to have been concentrated
around gold sites since 2010.677
674 Parker and Vadheim, ‘Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed?’, 44.
675 Parker and Vadheim, 45.
676 Dirk-Jan Koch and Sara Kinsbergen, ‘Exaggerating Unintended Effects? Competing Narratives on the Impact of 
Conflict Minerals Regulation’, Resources Policy 57 (2018).
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Again, one may interpret the situation as calling for persistence by international actors, and for
subjecting the gold sector under the same treatment in order to deprive armed groups of access to
funds.678 Surely, whether the Section 1502 reaches its aim, as articulated by one of its defenders, of
‘reducing the size of the black market and… reduce the funding of violence while making progress
on governance, peace, and security issues more possible’ should be assessed in timeframes of ten or
twenty years rather than based on the first eight years.679 However, to critics the outcomes so far are
ambivalent enough to suggest that the armed groups’ reduced presence in 3T mines,  which the
conflict mineral approach has indeed managed to achieve, does not go hand in hand with reduced
violence  and  instability  in  eastern  Congo.  The  consequences  faced  by  locals,  no  matter  if
unintended,  anticipated  or  necessary,  maintain  the  heated  debate  on  whether  the  benefits  of
implementing the conflict minerals approach in its current form truly offset its costs.680
8.5 ELITES AND MINERALS
In this section, I turn to the broader claim that the conflict minerals approach, by overlooking other
drivers of the violence, is unlikely to contribute to ameliorating the conflict in the long run. I use Le
677 Nik Stoop, Marijke Verpoorten, and Peter van der Windt, ‘More Legislation, More Violence? The Impact of Dodd-
Frank in the DRC’, PLOS ONE 13, no. 8 (2018): 14–15, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0201783.
678 IRIN News, ‘In Support of Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Regulation’, IRIN, 28 February 2017, 
https://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2017/02/28/support-dodd-frank-conflict-minerals-regulation.
679 Whitney, ‘Conflict Minerals, Black Markets, and Transparency’, 184.
680 Geenen, ‘Trump Is Right on Congo’s Minerals, but for All the Wrong Reasons’; Stoop, Verpoorten, and Windt, 
‘Trump Threatened to Suspend the “Conflict Minerals” Provision of Dodd-Frank. That Might Actually Be Good for
Congo.’; IRIN News, ‘How Advocacy Gave Trump Ammunition on Conflict-Free Minerals’, IRIN News, 6 April 
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minerals; IRIN News, ‘In Support of Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Regulation’; Global Witness, ‘Global Witness 
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Billon’s  framework as  a  tool  to  argue  the  claim is  only  partially  valid:  advocacy  on resource
validation  policies  emphasises  the  ‘conflict  resource’ and  ‘resource  conflict’ diagnoses  of  the
violence,  whereas strengthening the interwoven ‘resource curse’ diagnosis could direct remedial
efforts towards tackling the militarised competition among Congo’s economic and political elites,
the corruption in public mineral revenue management, and illicit financial flows. 
To start, there is an implicit but pertinent view among some critics of the conflict mineral approach
that it is underlined by a greed-based theory of war, as per which, to continue from the previous
chapter, the ‘true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force
of greed’.681 Louise Arimatsu and Hemi Mistry suggest that  the early UN resolutions, with their
emphasis  on  curbing  the  financing  of  non-state  actors  through  mineral  trade,  constitute  ‘an
unfortunate  legacy  of  an  influential  theoretical  approach  which  dominated  and  shaped  policy
thinking:  that  greed  rather  than  political  grievance  lies  at  the  root  of  civil  wars.’682 In  their
assessment, policies that follow this analysis have been conducive to opportunities for improvement
lost in Congo.683 While varying in tone, similar concerns have been voiced by others. Christoph
Vogel and Jason Stearns suggest that an overt emphasis on greed as the driving force of conflicts
masks ‘identities, trajectories, and ideas’, or factors that have to be taken into account in efforts to
stabilise the region.684
To be sure, greed-based theories of civil war are not to be portrayed in overtly simplistic terms. 685
However,  in  what  follows I  side with the critics  by recognising the need for wider  theoretical
underpinnings in order to build policies to alleviate individual conflicts, such as the one in eastern
681 Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well out of War’ (World Bank, 1999), 8.
682 Arimatsu and Mistry, ‘Conflict Minerals: The Search for a Normative Framework’, 17.
683 Arimatsu and Mistry, 17.
684 Christoph Vogel and Jason Stearns, ‘Kivu’s Intractable Security Conundrum, Revisited’, African Affairs 117, no. 
469 (2018): 706.
685 E.g. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance’.
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Congo. Greed-based explanations are by standard underlined by large-N studies, the bird’s-eye view
of which is less sensitive to processes, actors and events that might be crucial in making sense of,
and acting upon, individual conflicts.686 As I discuss in chapter 10, the narrative of greedy rebels
fighting over minerals has been a powerful tool for gathering momentum behind conflict minerals
policies  in  affluent  democracies:  Cuvelier,  Diemel  and Vlassenroot  write  that  advocacy groups
successfully used it to increase an awareness of the links between economic globalisation and the
exploitation  of  natural  resources  by  belligerents  in  Congo,  as  well  as  to  pressure  international
companies towards adopting more corporate social responsibility policies. At the same time, the
campaigners have not been performing that well in informing the public about the complexity of the
Congolese conflict and tools needed to ameliorate it.687
Indeed, the campaigners’ dilemma is one of having to provide a solution that seems persuasive and
effective enough to convince the public to support it,  while remaining honest about the diverse
challenges that the eastern Congo faces.688 Greed-based explanations are handy in balancing the two
values,  and  resonate  with  the  undeniable  fact  that  mineral  wealth  remains  a  central  source  of
revenue for the Congolese central government, the FARDC and militants alike. Advocates recognise
that  due  diligence  policies  can  deliver  a  more  stable  security  situation  only  if  implemented
alongside security sector reform, military engagement with the major armed groups, anti-corruption
reforms, free and fair elections, and other measures. Yet, Stearns suggests that while by default
underlining  a  holistic  approach,  when the  time comes  to  choose  which  policies  are  to  get  top
priority, the advocates often tend to advocate the mineral factor over others.689
686 Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’, 157–59; Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 61.
687 Cuvelier, Diemel, and Vlassenroot, ‘Digging Deeper’, 451.
688 Nest, Coltan, 18, 122, 182, 213; Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist 
Consumer’, 780.
689 Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’, 159–60; Fidel Bafilemba, Timo Mueller, and Sasha Lezhnev, ‘The Impact of 
Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals Reforms on Eastern Congo’s Conflict’ (Enough Project, 2014), 1.
216
Taking up process  tracing,  Stearns  offers  an alternative  lens  by distinguishing three  competing
explanations  that  may  guide  conflict  prevention  and  mitigation  in  eastern  Congo.  While  the
advocates of each are aware that a mono-dimensional view focusing only on any single explanation
ill captures the reality, he suggests that they are willing to argue that a focus on their favourite
would  be  ‘sufficient’  in  generating  a  drastic  change  in  the  violence  and  instability.690 One
explanation  is  indeed focused on natural  resources  and armed mobilisation  driven by financial
interests. Stearns remains sceptical of the most blatant versions of this narrative, suggesting that
‘minerals were not the origin of the conflict in Congo and solving the conflict minerals issue is not
going to bring an end to the conflicts’.691 Surely, formalising trade and natural resources sector can
contribute  to  cutting  the  funding  of  armed  groups  as  well  as  of  key  politicians  and  army
commanders  affiliated  with  them.  Here,  however,  guilt-based  claims  targeted  at  affluent
democracies and their consumers might not be less convincing; buyer countries would be more
accurately accused of stepping aside in critical junctures than of contributing to the bloodshed by
engaging in  mineral  trade.692 The second explanation highlights local  grievances,  such as those
related to ethnic tensions, clashes between artisanal and industrial miners, and disputes over fishing
and land rights, as comprising the micro-dynamics feeding violence in eastern Congo. Séverine
Autesserre  locates  the  roots  of  the  conflict  to  local  disputes  over  land  and  power.693 Stearns
acknowledges that local motivations play a role, but remains doubtful on whether they manage to
explain the tumultuous 25 years of conflict in eastern Congo, especially without fully appreciating
690 Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’.
691 George Fominyen, ‘Mineral Certification: The Path to End Congo’s Violence?’, Thompson Reuters Foundation, 6 
May 2011, http://news.trust.org/item/20110506185600-yknec/; Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’.
692 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, xxiii, 304, 334.
693 Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 134; E.g. Judith Verweijen and Justine Brabant, ‘Cows and Guns. Cattle-
Related Conflict and Armed Violence in Fizi and Itombwe, Eastern DR Congo’ 55, no. 1 (2017): 1–27; Ann 
Laudati, ‘Beyond Minerals: Broadening “Economies of Violence” in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, 
Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 135 (2013): 32–50.
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the  role  of  self-interested  elites  in  using  local  grievances  to  mobilise  people  for  their  own
purposes.694
The third  explanation  is  the  weakness  of  the  Congolese  state.  Stearns  and Vogel  highlight  the
linkages between armed groups and the economic and political elites provincially, nationally and
regionally. While the weak Congolese state, ‘a lame but living Leviathan’ and its troops deployed in
the Kivu provinces, have been a resource tapped by self-interested elites since President Mobutu’s
era, armed groups are becoming more and more connected with the elites.695 This marks a shift in
the dynamics in eastern Congo: regional interference from neighbouring countries, such as Rwanda
and  Uganda,  is  less  prominent,  whereas  domestic  elites  bolstering  their  stature  and  political
importance use armed groups for their own interests. An insight in an early article by Vlassenroot
and  Rayemaekers  remains  topical:  the  Congolese  state  has  not  ‘failed’ but  is  actually  very
successful in extracting benefits to those at the top.696
This  third  explanation  enables  analysing  armed  groups  not  as  driven  and  financed  by  mineral
wealth, but their motivations having shifted and diversified since the Rwandan genocide. Indeed,
the whole concept of ‘armed groups’ is a shorthand category: while most groups are a direct product
of the two Congo Wars, they encompass not only the FARDC but older and newer political rebel
groups,  local  and  village  defence  militias,  military  movements  with  political  structures,  and
bandits.697 Elites, informed by local grievances and conflicts, use these groups to gain leverage in
694 Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’, 161; Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the 
Failure of International Peacebuilding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
695 Vogel and Stearns, ‘Kivu’s Intractable Security Conundrum, Revisited’, 700.
696 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Kivu’s Intractable Security Conundrum’, African Affairs 108, no. 
432 (2009): 475–84.
697 Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen, and Maria Eriksson Baaz, The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern 
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their power struggles: ‘In many cases, local conflicts and grievances are not merely drawn upon but
actively manipulated by elites, to legitimize their actions and maintain a power base.’698 Greed for
financial wealth plays a role in the conflict but in a socially and politically mediated manner. In this
sense, Stearns likens Congo to Niccolo Machiavelli’s sixteenth century Italy, populated by small
warring city-states and factions, more than to any modern twenty-first century state.699
Accordingly, if  one concedes that Congo’s major narrative is one of  state weakness and failure
extended over four centuries of political disintegration, and that the militarisation of political and
economic competition between regional, national and provincial elites constitutes a recent twist in
it, an effective strategy would include, for instance, addressing the incentives that drive elites to turn
to violence.  The third explanation, however, does not deliver an elegant solution to the conflicts.
Stearns, Verweijen and Baaz emphasise that no single explanation in isolation from others suffices.
Violence  results  when  state  weakness  occurs  with  factors  ranging  from  local  conflicts  and
grievances to failed demobilisation and reintegration strategies and a lagging army reform. This
conundrum is blurred by the discussion on ‘root causes’ of the conflict,  be they minerals, local
conflicts  or state weakness; in this  sense, ‘there is  a surprising disjuncture between analysis  of
conflict dynamics and advocacy work’.700 Equally, Stearns and Vogel offer no reason for optimism.
While the due diligence mechanisms do not transform the corrupt Congolese state into a transparent
one, neither do state reforms, such as security sector reforms, legislative updates, fair elections, and
administrative  transparency,  matter  as  long  as  elites  have  an  incentive  to  turn  to  violence  for
personal gain. ‘In the DRC’s current political order, violence is an effective strategy to obtain power
and control resources.’701
698 Stearns, Verweijen, and Eriksson Baaz, The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo, 38.
699 Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, xxiii, 304, 334.
700 Fominyen, ‘Mineral Certification’; Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’, 171.
701 Stearns, Verweijen, and Eriksson Baaz, The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo, 8.
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As I  suggested  in  the  previous  section,  there  are  no  unambiguous  indications  of  an  improved
situation since the mineral traceability schemes were set up. The armed groups of the eastern Congo
are fragmenting and clustering: around 120 groups operated in the two Kivu provinces alone in
2017, in contrast to 70 different groups in 2015.702 The fragmentation of armed groups, Congo’s
fractionalised security apparatus, and its weak state institutions constitute a long-term challenge that
will take years to address, needing political rather than technical forms of cooperation between the
Congolese,  regional  and  international  authorities.703 This  lack  of  optimistic,  clear-cut  solutions
invokes Salter and Mthembu-Salter to defend the ongoing traceability schemes. To them, critical
voices appear as a call from an ivory tower ‘in which the Congolese state appears to be presented
both as the source of the deeper problems, and, paradoxically, as the solution.’704 In the absence of a
clear alternative policy framework, shaking the hard-fought resolution to extend the due diligence
schemes to gold and other minerals is a mistake. Straw man arguments abound: the campaigners
and  policy-makers  have  never  portrayed  minerals  as  a  root  cause  of  the  conflict  rather  than
conceded that international companies can and should play a ‘supporting role’ in the larger drama of
the  region’s  history  starred  by more important  factors.705 While  there  are  undeniably costs  and
suffering faced by the locals, it is a better alternative to continue the due diligence efforts than to let
armed  groups  profit  from mineral  funds  as  they  did  prior  to  2011.  Ideally,  there  would  be  a
formalisation strategy that better compensated for the loss of livelihoods faced by artisanal miners.
However, at the end of the day it is the process of industrialisation that historically has got people
off the ground, despite alarms sounded by Luddites of the past or the present day.706
702 Jason Stearns and Christoph Vogel, ‘The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Fragmented, 
Politicized Networks’ (New York: Congo Research Group, New York University, 2017), 5.
703 Vogel and Stearns, ‘Kivu’s Intractable Security Conundrum, Revisited’, 707.
704 Thomas Salter and Gregory Mthembu-Salter, ‘A Response to Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace? The Congolese Mining 
Frontier and the Fight against “Conflict Minerals”’, Suluhu Working Papers No. 2, 2016, 6.
705 Salter and Mthembu-Salter, 3.
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Salter and Mthembu-Salter enter a ‘cacophonic’ debate,  as one practitioner calls  the discussion,
regarding the functioning of the conflict minerals approach.707 Not only in academia but also in the
Congolese civil society voices remain mixed.708 There are optimistic practitioner, such as Joel Omar,
a senior researcher at the Bukavu-based civil society organisation Justice for All, adamant that if all
supply chains were certified, there would be no armed conflicts.709 More carefully placed opinions,
such  as  that  of  Bony  Shanvu,  President  of  PRODES,  an  NGO  in  South  Kivu,  suggest  that
certification may help reduce armed groups but not get rid of them.710 And there are critics, such as
senior researcher Leopold Rutinigirwa Muliro at the Pole Institute in North Kivu, who pertains that
the conflict minerals approach downplays the roots of the problems in failing national and local
governance.711 Salter and Mthembu-Salter aptly highlight the developmental potential provided by
Congo’s  mineral  riches.  However,  they also leave open the ultimate question:  does the current
model of formalisation as advanced through due diligence schemes harness the mineral wealth of
the eastern Congo for the benefit of the nation in a way that avoids local short-term harm, such as
increases in infant mortality and marauding armed groups, from escalating when it coincides with
706 Salter and Mthembu-Salter, ‘A Response to Terr(It)or(Ies) of Peace? The Congolese Mining Frontier and the Fight 
against “Conflict Minerals”’.
707 Interview #19: Congo researcher working for an NGO; Several authors, ‘An Open Letter’; Several authors, ‘Open 
Letter: Broader Push for Reform Is Essential’; Enough Project, ‘11 Letters from Congolese Civil Society Groups in 
Support of the U.S. Conflict Minerals Law’, 4 April 2017.
708 C.f. Annie Callaway suggests that 99 percent of the nearly 12,000 comments sent to SEC Acting Chair Michael 
Piwowar, who in early 2017 requested comments to clarify whether the Conflict Minerals Rule serves its purpose, 
called for ‘enforcement and continued implementation of the rule’. On the Enough Project’s website, only affirming
entries are included among the selection of 11 letters sent by the Congolese civil society to the SEC: Callaway, 
‘Demand the Supply: Ranking Consumer Electronics and Jewelry Retail Companies on Their Efforts to Develop 
Conflict-Free Minerals Supply Chains from Congo’, 9; Enough Project, ‘11 Letters from Congolese Civil Society 
Groups in Support of the U.S. Conflict Minerals Law’.
709 Interview #9: Joel Omar, Senior Researcher/Programme Coordinator, Justice for All
710 Interview #32: Bony Shanvu, President, PRODES
711 Interview #27: Leopold Rutinigirwa Muliro & Adili Amani Romuald, Researcher & Researcher, Pole Institute
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other  factors,  such  as  changes  in  elite  power  dynamics  potentially  triggered  by  the  recent
presidential elections?
While a comprehensive answer to the question above lies beyond the scope of this work, a viable
development in the conflict mineral policies seems to be emerging. The advocates of the conflict
minerals approach are subtly enriching their rhetoric in two ways. First, companies and activists
frame the  due diligence  policies  as  a  process  worthy by itself  rather  than  to  be judged by its
outcomes. As per this new narrative, companies are to guarantee to consumers that they have proper
traceability schemes in place to minimise the risk of funding armed groups rather than to promise
that  their  sourcing policies  will  help end the conflict.  As Roel  Nieuwenkamp,  former Chair  of
Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct at OECD, notes:  ‘[E]ven if it does not help that
much,  companies  still  should  do  it,  because  it’s  a  morally  binding instrument.  It’s  not  legally
binding but it’s morally binding. So trying to do your best to change things… it is in effect only an
endeavour not a result guaranteed.’712
Secondly, and more importantly, minerals are increasingly treated not only as a booty of armed
groups  but  as  a  prize  for  elites  profiting  from  the  dysfunctional  state.  Le  Billon’s  three-part
framework helps pinpoint this sea change. In mobilising public support for the mineral validation
schemes in the 2010s, the narratives that framed consumers abroad as financing and incentivising
horrid acts of violence were overlaid on the ‘conflict resource’ and ‘resource conflict’ narratives of
the violence in eastern Congo. However,  recent NGO investigations are more visibly embedding
resource validation measures, such as advocating gold traceability schemes, within a framework
that focuses on state functions. Data on natural resources management policies collected by EITI is
712 Interview #2: Roel Nieuwenkamp, Chair, OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct; J.A. Diemel and
D.J.M. Hilhorst, ‘Unintended Consequences or Ambivalent Policy Objectives? Conflict Minerals and Mining 
Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Development Policy Review, 2018.
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used to evidence the need for structural reforms.713 Global Witness has focused on riches siphoned
off at Gécamines, a state-owned company that dominates the Congolese mineral industry.714 The
Enough  Project  aims  to  tackle  the  ‘kleptocratic  state’ and  ‘grand  corruption’,  suggesting  that
‘strategic pressure’ has to be applied on the Congolese regime in order to support a change of
trajectory in Congo.715 In its more recent report,  IPIS suggests that ‘responsible sourcing efforts
have  not  sufficiently  recognised  the  dire  need to  improve governance’.716 Traceability  schemes
constitute an item rather than a key node in these improved efforts.
Embracing the public management of mineral revenues in tackling the conflicts is definitely linked
with the increasing global importance of cobalt. The mineral is not labelled as a ‘conflict resource’
and  industrially  rather  than  artisanally  mined,  but  allegations  over  child  labour  pertaining  its
extraction  have  attracted  international  scrutiny.717 The  ‘resource  curse’ and  ‘resource  conflict’
diagnoses, the first of which interprets low-income, resource-dependent countries as vulnerable to
armed conflict because financial dependence on natural resources weakens state institutions and
socioeconomic linkages, and the second as such countries facing a higher risk of larger-scale armed
conflicts  because of the social  tensions and grievances associated with the production,  seem to
underlie the recent initiatives.718 The emphasis on vulnerability and risk is becoming more and more
prominent in comparison to the view that minerals provide an opportunity for violence due to their
‘lootability’ and other characteristics. In practical conflict mitigation efforts, the three attributes of
713 EITI, ‘2015 Democratic Republic of Congo EITI Report’.
714 Global Witness, ‘Regime Cash Machine’.
715 Sentry, ‘The Golden Laundromat’; Callaway, ‘Powering Down Corruption’; Sasha Lezhnev and John Prendergast, 
‘Strategic Pressure’ (Enough Project, 2017).
716 IPIS, ‘Mapping Artisanal Mining Areas and Mineral Supply Chains in Eastern DR Congo’, 54.
717 William Clowes, ‘Congo Triples Levy on Cobalt With Strategic-Minerals Decree’, Bloomberg, 3 December 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-03/congo-triples-levy-on-cobalt-with-strategic-minerals-decree.
718 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 5.
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vulnerability, risk, and opportunity will remain interwoven.719 However, an added emphasis on the
first two is  generating a  momentum to tackle state deficiencies and harmful elite incentives in a
more comprehensive fashion.
To highlight another policy that would align with this wider perspective, Zoë Marriage points out
that  the illicit  flow of  capital  from and to Congo is  an ‘elephant  in  the room’,  which sets  the
interests  of  foreign  business  and  the  political  elite  against  those  of  the  rest  of  the  Congolese
population. The channels of capital flight are receiving more attention as an indirect explanans of
not only the conflicts but the extension of presidential tenure.720 While longer-term consequences of
the  December  2019  presidential  elections,  in  which  Joseph  Kabila  was  succeeded  by  Félix
Tshisekedi,  are  yet  to  be seen,  so far  there are  no visible,  major  outbreaks  of  violence  due to
ruptures  in existing patronage networks.721 Marriage indicates transnational financial  flows as a
piece in the puzzle of dismantling the elite networks that instrumentalise the violence in eastern
Congo for power and profit. While these and other policies related to mineral revenues, including
anti-corruption  measures  such  as  the  EITI  initiative,  which  works  to  reform  the  Congolese
extractives  sector  as  a  whole,  have  remained  largely  in  the  shadow  of  the  compelling  ‘blood
mineral’ imagery, they deserve a chance for helping alleviating the conflicts.
These means illustrate rather than exhaust the means aligned with a shift towards vulnerability-
based analyses of the conflict in eastern Congo. In general, attempts to tackle corruption in the
public  management  of  mineral  revenues  and  illicit  capital  flows  resonate  with  a  welcome
719 Enough Project, ‘A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals - Strategy Paper’, 15; John Prendergast 
et al., Congo Stories: Battling Five Centuries of Exploitation and Greed (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 
2018).
720 Marriage, ‘The Elephant in the Room’.
721 Max Bearak, ‘Félix Tshisekedi’s Improbable Inauguration Leaves Congo in a Confused Daze’, Washington Post, 24
January 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/felix-tshisekedis-improbable-inauguration-leaves-
congo-in-a-confused-daze/2019/01/24/36f51a84-1cf1-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html.
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reconsideration of what is understood by ‘conflict’ and ‘blood’ minerals. While in the early 2000s
the campaigners on Congo forcefully entered the popular imagination in affluent democracies by
different variants of the ‘blood minerals’ narrative, the imagery has never fully captured the role of
elites and other political and social actors, institutions and trends that intermediate the connection
between shopping malls and conflict zones.722 The momentum generated then is being and should
be calibrated to push through resource-related efforts to tackle the institutional weakening of the
Congolese state and the militarised competition among its elites.
8.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I explored Congo as a case in which consumers are being connected to an armed
conflict abroad by their purchases. The country is often diagnosed as suffering from the resource
curse, and I assessed the extent to which international due diligence policies have been helpful in
curbing black markets, violence and instability in its eastern parts since 2010. The effectiveness of
the traceability schemes is important, because it constitutes an important component in evaluating
whether consumers, by supporting such policies through their purchase decisions, can help alleviate
the ongoing violence upstream in supply chains.
While fewer 3TG mines are now controlled by armed militants than prior to the mineral traceability
efforts, the due diligence schemes have not yet gone hand in hand with a reduction in general levels
of  violence  and  instability.  The  mixed  consequences,  including  the  deterioration  of  local
livelihoods, may be offset by a longer-term positive trend yet to unravel. While acknowledging this
possibility, I  drew on Le Billon’s framework to suggest that policies treating minerals narrowly as
providing armed groups with means and motives to conduct acts of violence ought to be embedded
within  efforts  to  tackle  the  resource  curse  as  manifesting  in  the  corrupt  management  of  state
722 Stearns, ‘Causality and Conflict’.
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revenues  and  the  militarisation  of  competition  for  power  and  profit.  Elite  power  dynamics,
Congolese  state  enterprises,  and  capital  flows  are  some of  the  items  on which  such improved
conflict-alleviating efforts could concentrate.
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9 NIGERIA
9.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses another area that provides raw materials for making products to consumers in
affluent democracies at the same time as it suffers from recurring violent conflicts often diagnosed
as symptoms of a resource curse. In the early 1990s, environmental and human rights campaigners
voiced calls to boycott international oil companies operating in southern Nigeria due to the alleged
involvement of companies with corruption, loss of local livelihoods and environmental disasters. In
the 2000s, diverse armed groups have emerged in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, intermittently
attacking state and corporate facilities and stealing oil to amplify and finance their for fairness,
compensation, and justice. 
A range of solutions, including military action, oil traceability initiatives, amnesty programs, and
social corporate responsibility schemes, have been suggested and attempted to mitigate the Niger
Delta violence. In this chapter, I suggest that narrow understandings of the ‘blood oil’ in the Niger
Delta risks directing mitigation efforts away from tackling the institutionalised oil theft and cross-
cutting networks of patronage, which often underlie the seemingly antagonistic violence. While the
two  conflicts  require  individual  responses,  as  in  eastern  Congo  a  stronger  emphasis  on  the
vulnerability to conflict that resource wealth creates through weakening state institutions and social
cohesion would guide affluent democracies to adopting remedial efforts that better resonate with the
political economy of the Niger Delta conflicts.
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9.2 RICHES AND STRIFE
Nigeria is one of the major economies of sub-Saharan Africa, dominating the western coast with its
vast  population and economic and political  weight.723 The late  history of the country is  woven
around oil:  the  much-sought  resource  was first  discovered  in  Ogoniland in  1957,  and the  first
barrels of crude oil destined for the world market left Port Harcourt on 17 February 1958. 724 Since
the Biafra civil war in 1967-70, Nigeria’s soaring production of oil and gas has devoured other
industries, transforming the country into an unbridled petroleum economy.725 Over the recent years,
the country has been ranked as the 12th largest producer of petroleum in the world, the 8th largest
exporter,  and  its  proven  oil  reserves  have  been  appraised  as  the  8th  largest  globally.  Despite
attempts  to  diversification,  the  national  economy is  dependent  on  crude  oil:  petroleum exports
earnings account for over 90 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, and almost half of
federal revenues.726
723 Michael Watts, ‘Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’, Geopolitics 9, no. 1 
(2004): 63; Wenar, Blood Oil, 98; World Bank, ‘Nigeria | Data’, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria?
view=chart; to the OPEC, oil was first struck in Oloiribi in the Bayelsa State in 1956: OPEC, ‘Nigeria’, 2018, 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm.
724 Watts, ‘Resource Curse?’, 52. Following conventional use, I refer to ‘oil’ when discussing gas and oil, as their 
production goes hand in hand.
725 Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, Review of 
African Political Economy 39, no. 132 (2012): 297.
726 Exact numbers vary as per source; it is the scale that matters. Cf. Christina Katsouris, ‘Buhari’s Second Chance at 
Oil and Gas Reform in Nigeria’, Chatham House, 4 April 2019; OPEC, ‘Crude Oil Reserves’, 2018, 
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm; Alex Gboyega et al., ‘Political Economy of the Petroleum
Sector in Nigeria’, Policy Research Working Paper (World Bank, 2011), 7; CIA World Factbook, ‘Crude Oil 
Production’, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html; CIA 
World Factbook, ‘Crude Oil Exports’, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html; Ismail O. Fasanya and Abosede E. Ogundare, ‘Trivariate Analysis of Oil 
Revenue, Government Spending and Economic Growth in Nigeria’, OPEC Energy Review 42, no. 2 (2018): 108; 
Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report Q3 2018’, 2018, 4, 
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Most of the oil reserves discovered are located in the Niger Delta, a region characterised by a dense
network of mangrove forests, creeks, rivers, and rivulets running down the Gulf of Guinea.727 Oil
extraction  in  the  Delta  is  centralised  into  the  hands  of  international  oil  companies,  which  is
characteristic of the capital-intensive industry. Shell accounts for almost half of Nigeria’s daily oil
production, while other big internationals, such as Agip-ENI, Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil, and
Total,  extract roughly the rest.728 The Nigerian state  partners with the international  business by
owning more than half of the shares in the Nigerian companies of seven oil majors - Shell Nigeria,
Mobil  Nigeria,  Chevron  Nigeria,  Agip  Nigeria,  Elf  Nigeria,  Texaco  Nigeria,  and  Pan  Ocean.
Despite  the recent  rise  of Asian and South American as well  as  indigenous oil  companies,  the
western international oil companies (IOCs) still dominate the industry.729
Just as oil is important for Nigeria, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of oil and its derivatives
for the global economy. Utilised in engines, heating, industrial machinery, agricultural pesticides,
medicine, and plastic products, among other things, the infrastructure of modern societies runs on
oil.730 Nigerian oil is ‘Bonny sweet crude’, a type that needs little refining to be suitable as fuels and
in industrial use. While some of this much-sought variety is traded to neighbouring countries, the
biggest buyers are beyond the high seas. Recently, the top buyer of Nigerian oil has been India.731
Over one-third of the exports go to Europe, another one-third to Asian countries, and around 16.5
http://nigeria.opendataforafrica.org/NGNBSNGDPPTO2016/nigerian-gross-domestic-product-report-q3-2018; 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ‘Nigeria EITI’, 2019, https://eiti.org/nigeria.
727 While most oil production is centred in the states of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta, there are altogether six or nine oil 
producing states in the south, depending on the geographical definition used: Judith Burdin Asuni, Blood Oil in the 
Niger Delta (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Washington, 2009).
728 Cyril Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict’, Africa 
Development 34, no. 2 (2009): 118.
729 Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Country Strategy Note: Nigeria’ (London, 2016), 3.
730 Wenar, Blood Oil, chapter 1.
731 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Nigeria: Looking beyond Oil’, 2016, 9; Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Nigeria 
(NGA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners’, 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/nga/#Exports.
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percent to North America,  such as the United States, to whom Nigeria was its ninth-largest oil
supplier  in  2018.732 While  non-renewable sources  of energy,  such as solar  and tidal  power,  are
increasingly challenging the dominance of oil in the global economy, oil remains unmatched in its
transferability and energy value, whereby also the international demand for Nigerian reserves is
likely to remain high.733
Nigerians have not enjoyed an even distribution of the fossil wealth. As per a figure cited by several
scholars, about 80 percent of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues accrue to one per cent of the country’s
population and the remaining twenty percent received by 99 percent of Nigerians.734 Although exact
statistics are hard to generate, it is evident that the bulk of Nigeria’s oil wealth has not benefited the
general  population,  more  than  half  of  which  lives  below  the  poverty  line  and  44  percent  in
conditions of extreme poverty. Since the country’s independence, the life expectancy in Nigeria has
gone up to 53 years, an increase of only half as much as the increase in general life expectancy in
neighbouring countries lacking vast extractive industries, such as Benin and Togo. Indeed, even in
absolute numbers Nigeria has recently become the country with most people in extreme poverty in
the world, more than in India or China.735
732 Daniel Workman, ‘Nigeria’s Top 10 Exports’, World’s Top Exports, 3 April 2018, 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/nigerias-top-10-exports/; Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Nigeria (NGA)
Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners’; U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products
Imports’, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm. The U.S. imports
of Nigerian oil have fluctuated, and are likely to decrease in the future as the U.S. aims towards self-sufficiency in 
the energy sector: Katsouris, ‘Buhari’s Second Chance at Oil and Gas Reform in Nigeria’.
733 Wenar, Blood Oil, chapter 1.
734 E.g. Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 123; Mgbeodichinma Eucharia Onuoha and Isa Olalekan Elegbede, ‘The Oil 
Boom Era: Socio-Political and Economic Consequences’, in The Political Ecology of Oil and Gas Activities in the 
Nigerian Aquatic Ecosystem, ed. Prince Emeka Ndimele (London, United Kingdom: Academic Press, 2018), 89.
735 Wenar, Blood Oil, 57; Jesús Crespo Cuaresma et al., ‘Will the Sustainable Development Goals Be Fulfilled? 
Assessing Present and Future Global Poverty’, Palgrave Communications 4, no. 1 (2018): 29; World Poverty 
Clock, ‘Extreme Poverty in Nigeria May Increase by 2030’, 2018, https://worldpoverty.io/blog/index.php?r=12.
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Such problems manifest in the Niger Delta, a region to which scholars often refer as ‘paradoxical’,
because  it  remains  one  of  the  poorest  and least  developed parts  of  the  country  despite  its  oil
wealth.736 Waters, forests, and the air are polluted by oil extraction, and the livelihoods of traditional
communities, which rely on fishing and farming, are compromised.737 As Adam Nossiter illustrates
in a New York Times article, an oil damage assessment in the Delta suggested that over the last five
decades 546,000 million gallons of oil has been spilled into the Niger Delta, which is comparable to
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska taking place each year for 50 years.738 Besides deprived of
livelihoods, the local communities suffer from social disintegration linked with the influx of foreign
influence and money to the region.739 Larry Boms, Head and Resident Representative of the United
Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in Nigeria, describes: ‘When these people
come to these communities they completely disrupt the local economies because they come with US
dollars, they spend US dollars, so they take basically control of the local economy.’740 Nationally, a
combination of high fertility rate and slow economic growth indicates that between 2018 and 2030
the Nigerian youth under 25 may face a nine percent decrease in their disposable income.741 For the
youth in the Niger Delta, either being employed by or extorting the oil sector often appear as the
736 Augustine Ikelegbe, ‘Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil 
Society for a Regional Resource Struggle’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3 (2001): 437.
737 Oluwatosin M. Olarinmoye, Obih A. Ugwumba, and Folalu O. Awe, ‘Background Information on Petroleum 
Industry Activities and the Nigerian Environment’, in The Political Ecology of Oil and Gas Activities in the 
Nigerian Aquatic Ecosystem, ed. Prince Emeka Ndimele (London: Academic Press, 2018), 13; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 
‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 301.
738 Adam Nossiter, ‘In Nigeria, Oil Spills Are a Longtime Scourge’, The New York Times, 16 June 2010, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html.
739 Interview #44: Florence Kayemba-Ibokabasi, Program Manager, Stakeholder Democracy Network; As Dandyson 
Harry Dandyson, a project officer at GASIN, an NGO based in Port Harcourt, puts it: ‘The local community 
resolution mechanism has been eroded. Local governance, local community leadership has actually been trampled 
upon, it has been, to look for the right word, it has been distorted by the activities of the multinationals and even the
Nigerian government.’’ ’Interview #46: Dandyson Harry Dandyson, Project officer, GASIN
740 Interview #48: Larry Boms, Country Head and Resident Representative, UNITAR
741 World Poverty Clock, ‘Extreme Poverty in Nigeria May Increase by 2030’.
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most promising ways to climb up the social ladder. Those who, one way or another, manage to tap
on the oil industry are looked up as heroes who escape the gloomy trajectory.742
The complex problems have stirred social unrest since the military defeat of the Biafra Republic in
1970. In the late 1990s, the Niger Delta saw its first major surge of oil activism, as the powerful
ethnic groups mobilised to ‘agitate’ against  ‘the Big Oil’.  The demands for cleaning up the oil
damage and redistributing more oil revenues to the local communities were spearheaded by the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, and culminated into the prosecution and hanging
of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of the Movement by government troops in 1995, an act
in which Shell has been accused of being compliant. The uprising continued in 1998-1999, as the
Ijaw people,  the  region's  largest  ethnic  group,  mobilised  into  a  social  campaign termed as  the
Operation Climate Change. This campaign also ended in bloodshed, as the government sent in its
military troops to calm the situation: supposedly hundreds of villagers were killed, whole villages
destroyed and the military obtained a reason to remain in the area to exploit the population and the
oil wealth. While, the clashes in the 1990s were internationally well-reported, enticing calls for
boycotts  of  the IOCs,  the living conditions  remain dire  for  many Niger  Deltans.743 Complaints
frequent that reforms, such as establishing the River Delta Ministry and realising the suggestions of
the Niger Delta Technical Committee, have been implemented in a lacklustre way.744
In the 2000s, the region saw the emergence of armed groups, which steal oil, assault oil facilities
and kill and kidnap their workers. Judith Asuni writes that the groups have varying demands: the
environmental degradation of the Delta ought to be stopped; communities that previously held the
742 Aderoju Oyefusi, ‘Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation Among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, 
Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008): 539–55.
743 Gboyega et al., ‘Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria’, 23.
744 Coventry Cathedral, ‘The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta’ (Coventry: International Centre
for Reconciliation, 2009), 186–87.
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land now used by companies should receive better compensation; political leaders supporting the
armed groups are to be released from custody; the military troops that have harassed and extorted
local communities ought to be punished; and all foreigners alongside their companies should leave
the  country.  Accordingly,  the  armed  groups  mix  ideological  aims  with  criminal  activities,
kidnappings, and oil theft known as ‘bunkering’, sharing an amorphous discontent with the way the
region has been exploited and neglected.745 Michael Watts has called the period from the late 1990s
up to 2009 as a time when the oil fields of the Niger Delta were ‘ungovernable’ or ‘home to a full-
blown insurgency’, with several armed confraternities, street cult groups, and militias conducting
acts of violence and stealing oil to finance their activities.746 While such a description did not apply
to all parts of the Delta evenly, at times the unrest effectively halted Nigeria’s oil production: in
2009 production was down to 800,000 barrels per day from a peak of 2.2 million barrels per day
three years earlier.747 Two militia groups stood out by their extensive operations and international
recognition:  Niger  Delta  People’s  Volunteer  Force  (NDPVF)  and  the  Movement  for  the
Emancipation  of  the  Niger  Delta  (MEND).  The latter  targeted  oil  platforms  both  offshore  and
onshore, killing and kidnapping workers and destroying facilities as far as 120 kilometres off the
Nigerian coast. The proclaimed aim of such activities echoed by the diverse militants in the region
745 Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, 3–4; Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 307; ‘There’s militancy who have [..] a cause to fight for, but there’s also criminality, who 
want to make profit... criminals blowing up pipeline, lot of the kidnapping is more criminality than anything. This is
a good way to make money, easy way to make money.’ Interview #40: Arinze Agbim, Former Executive Director at
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited
746 Andrea Behrends, Stephen Reyna, and Günther Schlee, Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil (New York, 
Berghahn Books, 2011), 59; Michael Watts, ‘Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the 
Niger Delta’, Review of African Political Economy 34, no. 114 (2007): 639.
747 Augustine Ikelegbe and Nathaniel Umukoro, ‘Exclusion and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: An 
Assessment of the Presidential Amnesty Programme’, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 11, no. 2 (2016): 
26.
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was to hold the oil companies and the Nigerian state accountable for the lack of future faced by the
River Deltans.748
In 2009, the hostilities were calmed down by the Presidential Amnesty Programme. Announced on
the 25th June by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, the amnesty included forgiveness and automatic
freedom  from  any  form  of  prosecution  to  those  militants  who  surrendered  their  arms  and
ammunition within the initial 60-day period. With around 30,000 individuals participating in the
programme and receiving financial support, vocational training and other measures to reintegrate
ex-militants, the amnesty policy was praised for its immediate effect of removing militants from the
creeks.  However,  with  regards  to  its  wider  disarmament,  demobilisation,  rehabilitation  and
reintegration goals, it has been criticised of being exclusive and failing to deliver its promises under
President Muhammadu Buhari’s lead. Since late 2014, attacks and militancy by groups such as the
Niger  Delta  Avengers  and  the  Koluama  Seven  Brothers  have  resumed,  slowing  down  oil
production: for instance, in the first half of 2016, the total oil production was down to 1.82 million
barrels  per  day  from the  targeted  2.2  million  barrels  per  day  largely  due  to  the  resurgence  of
attacks.749 Ikelegbe and Umukoro,  among others,  suggest that  the amnesty scheme,  while  to be
praised for being a major non-military initiative to tackle the Niger Delta hostilities, was an ad hoc
measure  that  has  not  been  complemented  with  more  needed  measures  to  tackle  poverty,
environmental degradation and pertinent youth unemployment in the Niger Delta.750
748 Fidelis Paki and Kimiebi Imomotimi Ebienfa, ‘Militant Oil Agitations in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the Economy’, 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 1, no. 5 (2011): 142; Aghedo and Osumah, ‘Insurgency in 
Nigeria’.
749 Akintayo Eribake, ‘Attacks on Oil Facilities: How Nigeria Economy Lost N1.0trn in Six Months’, Vanguard News 
Nigeria (blog), 6 July 2016, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/07/attacks-oil-facilities-nigeria-economy-lost-n1-
0trn-six-months/.
750 Ikelegbe and Umukoro, ‘Exclusion and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, 148; Ernest Omokhoa 
Imongan and Augustine Ikelegbe, ‘Amnesty Programme in Nigeria : The Impact and Challenges in Post Conflict 
Niger Delta Region’, OSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science 21, no. 4 (2016); Francis Chinwe Chikwem 
and John Chikwendu Duru, ‘The Resurgence of the Niger Delta Militants and the Survival of the Nigerian State’, 
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Through these intermittent waves of violence, Nigeria has become linked with the term ‘blood oil’
to represent the many troubles permeating the country’s vast oil wealth.751 As I elaborate below,
Asuni suggests that Nigerian oil deserves to be called as such, because the ‘sale of stolen oil from
the Niger Delta has had the same pernicious influence on that region’s conflict as diamonds did in
the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone’.752 She is stern about the significance of blood oil: it is not
only a source of violence in the River Delta but undermines security in the whole Gulf of Guinea as
well as creates instability on world energy markets more generally.753 Its  social ramifications are
manifold, including not only the high number of unemployed youths in the Niger Delta and the
presence of armed ethnic militias who know the networks of rivers from which the unprotected oil
pipelines can be accessed, but also the ineffective and corrupt officials who have a high threshold of
prosecuting  oil  bunkerers;  the  protection  or  patronage  of  senior  government  officials  and
politicians, who source from the illegal oil trade for their political campaigns; the ease in which oil
industry staff is corrupted or threatened into getting involved with oil bunkering; the presence of
international  markets for stolen oil  with a global  network of partners;  and the overall  endemic
corruption that enables bribing almost everyone from local communities to navy officials.754 Watts
is more concise, articulating the problem of ‘blood oil’ in the Niger Delta as ‘a perfect storm of
The Round Table 107, no. 1 (2018): 45–55; Ndubuisi Nwokolo and Iro Aghebo, ‘Consolidating or Corrupting the 
Peace? The Power Elite and Amnesty Policy in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’, Chinese Political Science 
Review 3, no. 3 (2018); Interview #52: Godwin Aseku Ojezele, Former Participant in the Presidential Amnesty 
Program.
751 The concept is routinely used to refer to challenges in Nigerian oil, for instance in: Michael Watts, ‘Blood Oil’, in 
Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil, ed. Andrea Behrends, Stephen Reyna, and Günther Schlee (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2011); Sebastian Junger, ‘Blood Oil’, Vanity Fair, 2007, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/02/junger200702.
752 Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, 2.
753 Asuni, 1.
754 Asuni, 4.
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waste,  corruption,  venality  and  missed  opportunity’.755 Both  depictions  highlight  the  deep
connection between oil and violence in the Delta region.756
9.3 REMEDIES
In this section, I discuss policies that have been suggested and implemented to tackle the concerning
situation. The Nigerian government has made efforts to fight back bunkerers and traffickers of oil
by force. Nigeria was governed by a series of military regimes until 1999, after which the level of
bunkering increased, potentially as the military presence in the area weakened. To this day, an oft-
used government response to tensions has been to increase the military presence in the Delta.757 As a
side effect of this strategy, however, soldiers have been accused of forceful repressions of protesters
against oil companies, shootings, mass attacks of villages, arson, and rape, while at the same time
maintaining a system of patronage and corruption that has given space for oil theft to thrive. The
Joint Task Force, the Nigerian state’s primary military unit in the Niger Delta based in Warri, is seen
by  many  Niger  Deltans  as  an  occupying  force  reminiscent  of  the  colonial  ‘pacification’
approaches.758
755 Watts, ‘Blood Oil’, 64.
756 As Chris Nku, a project officer at GASIN, an NGO based in Port Harcourt, summarises: ‘The resources bring the 
conflict, it is because of the resources the conflict exists… and the region that houses these resources is the Niger 
Delta.’ Interview #45: Chris Nku, Project officer, GASIN.
757 Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of 
Stolen Oil’ (London: Chatham House, 2013), 19; Aghedo and Osumah, ‘Insurgency in Nigeria’, 208; Aghedo and 
Osumah, 214.
758 Gboyega et al., ‘Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria’, 23; Interview #43: Dandy Mgbenwa, Pastor
in Okwuzi, Ekbocha Community in Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni Government Area in Rivers State; Charles Ukeje, 
‘Changing the Paradigm of Pacification: Oil and Militarization in Nigeria’s Delta Region’, in Oil and Insurgency in
the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, ed. Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (London: 
Zed, 2011); Idowu Bankole, ‘We Watched in Horror as Soldiers Chasing Oil Thieves Burnt Our Community – 
Ijansa Residents’, Vanguard News Nigeria, 27 January 2019, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/01/we-watched-
in-horror-as-soldiers-chasing-oil-thieves-burnt-our-community-ijansa-residents/.
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A more socially inclined path to alleviate the tensions has been to tweak the sharing of revenues
towards the River Delta in order to address the long-lasting grievances.759 Distributing oil wealth
among  interest  groups  separated  by  ethnic,  political  and  religious  differences  is  a  dominant
narrative  of  Nigeria’s  modern  political  history,  and  the  official  federal  system  of  oil  revenue
‘derivation’ and ‘allocation’ has  fuelled  grievances  for  decades.760 As per  Zira  John Quaghe,  a
country officer at the Natural Resource Governance Institute, there are four levels of oil revenue
distribution: a federal allocation of oil revenues between all states; funds redirected to the Niger
Delta states because they produce the oil; funds directed to the Delta Ministry the sole purpose of
which  is  to  develop  the  region;  and  a  community  development  fund  to  which  IOCs  have  to
contribute. However, while the Niger Delta region officially gets twice more funds than any other
region, these flows are distorted by parallel distribution channels.761 The actual share that the Niger
Deltans receive does not translate into better conditions for local communities, whereby calls for
stronger federalism and breaking away from the authority of the capital Abuja are frequent.762
The oil companies have taken up action. Initially reluctant to engage with local communities, the
IOCs changed their approach after the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders led to
international boycotts against Shell and other oil companies in 1995. In 2003, Shell acknowledged
in an internal report that company practices and assumptions had led to conflicts, which could have
been avoided by careful community engagement.763 Gradually, each major company has introduced
community development programmes, which often consist of providing access to electricity, basic
services and jobs to the host communities. However, complaints persist that companies make deals
759 Coventry Cathedral, ‘The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta’, 293–95.
760 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 115, 119.
761 Interview #35: Anne Chiwenze & Zira John Quaghe, Nigeria Officer & Nigeria Officer, Natural Resource 
Governance Institute.
762 Interview #46: Dandyson Harry Dandyson, Project officer, GASIN.
763 WAC Global Services, ‘Peace and Security in the Niger Delta, Working Paper for SPDC’, 2003.
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with  ex-militants  for  security  and  bribe  traditional  leaders  of  communities  to  ensure  smooth
operations. The projects remain divisive. To some, companies undertake philanthropic gestures to
avoid well-planned sustainability projects truly benefiting the local communities. Yet, to others they
are nevertheless an improvement from the past times: Dr Arinze Agbim, a former executive director
at  Mobil,  notes  that  previously  companies  shoved  all  remedial  responsibility  to  the  Nigerian
government.764
Finally, the governments of the countries importing oil from Nigeria might be able to improve the
situation  in  the  Delta.  In  a  report  exploring  the  toolbox that  importing  countries  have  in  their
disposal, Katsouris and Sayne suggest that although currently oil theft is ‘almost totally off the
international community’s radar’, an ‘intelligent multi-state campaign’ could close off markets and
financial centres for stolen oil and raise the cost of theft.765 Foreign governments could do more by
controlling physical movements of oil,  regulating oil  sales,  and tracing flows of illegal  money.
However, there are many ways to go wrong: for instance, the analysts warn against the idea of
emulating the policies against conflict diamonds or conflict minerals, as this would not be a strategy
based on ‘fact or law’.766 Differing from Asuni’s view, they suggest that the problems are grave but
local: oil theft has contributed to the destabilisation of the Niger Delta, but it does not pose a major
security risk to Nigeria or West Africa in general. Further, the variant of the ‘blood oil’ narrative in
which armed groups break into pipelines to pump oil onto barges and vessels, while largely correct,
is ‘oversimplified’, as oil ‘bunkered’ by armed groups is but one manifestation of a multi-layered
system of oil theft.767
764 Interview #40: Arinze Agbim, Former Executive Director at Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited
765 Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude’, 9.
766 Katsouris and Sayne, ix, 59–60.
767 Katsouris and Sayne, iix–ix; Cf. Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 61.
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In  what  follows,  I  expand  on  the  view  by  Katsouris  and  Sayne  to  enable  some  rudimentary
comparisons  between  the  means  that  affluent  democracies  have  in  their  disposal  to  alleviate
violence in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria. Earlier, I referred to Asuni’s statement that oil
plays a similar role in Nigeria as raw diamonds and minerals  in Sierra Leone and Congo. The
analysis  by  Katsouris  and  Sayne  is  more  fine-tuned.  As  Asuni  points  out  herself,  oil  theft  is
pervasive in Nigeria, ranging from small-scale pilfering of petroleum products to be sold in local
markets to an excess lifting of oil beyond the licensed amount in tacit cooperation with oil company
staff and state officials.768 The pervasiveness of oil theft has been highlighted  by area specialists,
such as Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou, who reminds that oil theft in Nigeria has been a characteristic of
the economy since the oil  discoveries.  She emulates David Keen’s reading of the Sierra Leone
conflict  to  suggest  that  the  Delta  ‘insurgency’ is  one  rehearsed  scenario  among  a  plethora  of
possible ways the violence could unfold.769 The conflicting factions orchestrate the clashes, and
casualties rise often from disagreements over access to illegal oil bunkering routes, which are an
integral source of income for all parties and their patrons.770
While the region is often portrayed as suffering from a clash between government and company
security forces and the militants, the conflicts might not ultimately be that antagonistic. Similarly,
efforts to ameliorate the  violence by curbing the access of armed groups to oil money might go
astray in a sense that the line between legally and illegally produced Nigerian oil is fundamentally
blurred.  Legal and bunkered oil are two sides of the same coin, even to the extent that to some
authors the legal industry may prefer having the prices high and including the losses from oil theft
768 Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, 4–5; Coventry Cathedral, ‘The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the 
Niger Delta’, 151.
769 Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 307.
770 Anna Zalik, ‘The Niger Delta: “Petro Violence” and “Partnership Development”’, Review of African Political 
Economy 31, no. 101 (2004): 401–424.
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to  their  production costs  over  taking up risky sectoral  reforms.771 Already in  the 1970s,  Terise
Turner recognised that the ‘unofficial’ channels of distributing oil revenues link politicians, soldiers,
civil servants, and businesspeople to oil company personnel via powerful local intermediaries. As
one  acknowledges  that  these  actors  also  belong  to  networks  shaped  around  kinship,  ethnicity,
religion,  and community,  the concealed nature of oil  wealth distribution that diverges from the
official channels becomes more apparent.772
Obi states that oil theft, in which the armed groups in the Delta surely participate, constitutes a
‘parallel’ economy structuring the Nigerian states since the early days of the oil  boom.773 Such
studies, often highlighting the importance of taking into account the ‘longue durée’ and ‘critical
breaks’ in understanding the drivers of violence, are prone to accuse conflict analyses focusing on
‘greed’ as simplistic.774 To them, armed groups are not enemies of the ‘Big Oil’ rather than partners
in a common enterprise, which makes it hard to banish the violence through means, often involving
use of force, focusing only on the militants’ means and motives. For instance, powerful politicians
provide  patronage to  armed groups involved with  oil  bunkering  in  order  to  use  raise  funds  to
finance political campaigns. Such a relationship is advantageous to the groups, but, as Nwajiaku-
Dahou summarises, the ‘wholesale buying up of would-be rebels by politician patrons alters their
fundamental  character.’775 To  her,  while  oil  companies  could  work  together  to  empower  local
communities  and  reduce  reasons  for  the  conflict,  they  instead  prefer  to  sustain  the
‘protection/extortion culture’ that perpetuates insecurity in the area.
771 Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 296.
772 Terisa Turner, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian State’, Review of African Political 
Economy 3, no. 5 (1976): 63–79; Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta’, 299.
773 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 108–9.
774 E.g. Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 297–99.
775 Nwajiaku-Dahou, 307.
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Oil plays a role, but of a more nuanced kind than as a fuel and a motive to sides to a conflict. Watts
calls for moving beyond antagonistic dichotomies between the rebels and the oil industry, lamenting
the lack of analytical attention given to the role of oil companies in greed-based analyses. Further,
he  reminds  that  identities  are  important  in  building  juxtapositions.  Petro-nationalisms  of  local
communities, such as that of the Ijaw minority, emerged as oil united the otherwise diverse groups.
The state failed to address the rising nationalism without use of violence, and the militant groups
sprouted  further  as  the  state  supported  massive  ‘electoral  thuggery’ to  the  disadvantage  of  the
minority  groups.  Oil  theft  business  enabled  the  groups  to  arm  themselves  to  attack  the  oil
companies,  which were corrupting local elites and hiring local groups as security forces. Watts
emphasises that while oil definitely relates to the machinery of the conflict, it did not simply predate
or  produce  violence.  Rather,  petro-capitalism  undermines  the  prospect  of  secular  modern
governance  by  reshaping  incompatible  communal  identities.776 Understanding  the  roots  of  the
conflict as a greed-based antagonism blurs this social process forming the identities of the parties to
the conflicts.
From these underpinnings,  the tools  that  affluent  democracies  use to  act  upon the Niger  Delta
conflicts  have  to  be  picked wisely,  aware  of  the  risks  involved with  ignoring  the  networks  of
patronage linking militants with the elite, neglecting the local movements’ critique of the country’s
political economy, and dismissing militants as criminals per ‘the worst colonial traditions’.777 A
flawed diagnosis  guides  importing  countries  to  tackle the  funding and access  to  arms of  these
groups without  recognising the roots  of  the  deep sense of  injustice prevalent  among the Delta
communities.778 As Nwajiaku-Dahou elaborates: ‘as long as the militarisation continues, poverty
776 Watts, ‘Resource Curse?’, 69; Michael Watts, ‘Antinomies of Community: Some Thoughts on Geography, 
Resources and Empire’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 29, no. 2 (2004): 195–216.
777 Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, 795.
778 To be sure, some interviewees emphasise that the use of force to retaliate the armed groups’ activities is necessary 
in a wider strategy to resolve the conflict: 'You see in Nigeria, an average Nigerian person needs an iron hand. What
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remains constant, the oil industry remains largely unregulated and urban cultures of violence go
unchecked,  new MEND aficionados will  resurface.’779 Obi  suggests  that  while  the  Niger  Delta
hostilities in the late 2000s are oil-related, their roots lie in the ‘nature of the Nigerian state and the
depredations  of  the  ruling  political  elite’.780 Such insights  underline  that  some resource-related
measures  foreign  governments  can  take  up  resonate  with  the  complicated  situation  better  than
others. For instance, to Katsouris and Sayne maritime security reforms, supply chain due diligence
initiatives, and active anti-bribery and money-laundering law enforcement can form components in
an  intelligent  multi-state  strategy,  whereas  genetic  fingerprinting  of  oil  to  trace  the  thieves  or
banning Nigerian oil imports are likely to be impossible or even harmful.781
What, then, would be at least an improved approach for foreign governments to support a decrease
in  instability  and violence  in  the  Niger  Delta?  As  in  Congo,  different  sets  of  policies  can  be
advanced  by  weighing  differently  the  need  to  tackle  the  vulnerability  to,  the  risk  of,  and  the
opportunity for violence linked with resources in the Niger Delta. Above, I have highlighted that the
youth of the Delta are exposed to toxic living conditions, lack of future prospects, and inherit an
intergenerational grievance against both the government and the international oil companies.782 The
unique  characteristics  of  Nigeria’s  political  economy,  which  reproduce  such  social  dynamics,
I mean by iron hand is that you need to get aggressive with him. If you kiss […] he’s not going to listen. Before 
[President] Buhari sent the battalions the boys were already coming up.’ Interview #52: Godwin Aseku Ojezele, 
Former Participant in the Presidential Amnesty Program.
779 Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 308.
780 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 107–8.
781 Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude’, xi.
782 ‘Every child in the community has been brought up to know that they’ve been marginalised. Brought up to know 
that someone is sitting on our wealth. That resentment is there…. If I’m to answer, they say that justice delayed is 
justice denied.’’ ’Interview #49: Thompson Pere & Gerald N Ezeka:, Chief, Obunagha Community, Gbarain 
Kingdom, Yenagoa Local Government Area in Bayelsa State & Community Youth Leader, Onelga in Rivers State; 
Uwafiokun Idemudia, ‘Business and Peace in the Niger Delta: What We Know and What We Need to Know’, 
African Security Review 26, no. 1 (2017): 49.
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include networks of patronage sustaining diverse forms of export oil theft. I concur with Katsouris
and Sayne that drawing a simple parallel between ‘blood oil’ of Nigeria and ‘blood minerals’ of
Congo hides  more  than  it  reveals.783 As  I  elaborate  in  the  next  section,  the  individual  conflict
dynamics have to be taken seriously when fleshing out means through which affluent democracies,
and ultimately consumers in them, can act upon the intermittent violence in the Niger Delta.
9.4 OIL’S ROLE
Le Billon’s three-part typology is again useful in creating some analytical rigour among the policy
sets available: I suggest that emphases on the ‘resource curse’ and ‘resource conflict’ views of the
curse,  that is,  on aspects such as the weakening of state  institutional and social  socioeconomic
linkages, as well as greed and grievances related to the distribution of local social-environmental
costs and benefits involved with the oil production, pave the way for viable solutions to the Niger
Delta  violence.784 Surely,  the  framework  cannot  provide  fixed  guidelines  on  which  particular
policies affluent democracies ought to advance. Further, the two conflicts remain unique and wildly
complicated:  the remedies have to be tailored to the particular characteristics of the socially and
politically mediated conflict-resource connection in the area. 
Nevertheless, noting some differences, such as that the connection between resources and violence
is  more  pervasive  in  the  Niger  Delta  than  in  the  Kivu  provinces,  helps  such  remedies.  By
pervasiveness I do not mean that the Delta conflict is reducible to natural resources. As in Congo, a
discussion on ‘root causes’ of violence masks social, political and economic conjunctures. While
since the 2000s the situation has sporadically escalated from protest-based resistance to attacks by
heavily  armed  groups,  calls  for  self-determination,  autonomy,  and  ethnic  minority  democracy,
783 Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude’, 4.
784 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 17; Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution Uncovering the 
Mechanisms’.
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which inhabited the agenda of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people and other protest
movements of the past, were voiced already during the Biafra war.785 As Cyril Obi writes in relation
to the stage of violence until 2009:
[A]lthough the conflict in the Niger Delta in its most recent phase is oil-related, its
background lies deeper in the nature of the Nigerian state and the depredations of
the ruling political elite. Also critical is a long-festering sense of grievance and
marginalisation  by  the  ethnic  minorities  of  the  Niger  Delta  region  which  has
continued to fuel agitation for self-determination and control of the resources of
the region.786
Pervasiveness does not mean that the conflict can be reduced to a mere scramble for riches. Yet, the
central role of oil is not to be played down either. Wole Akinyosoye, Zonal Operations Officer at the
Department of Petroleum Resources in Lagos states when asked about the importance of oil in the
conflict: ‘That’s what drives the budget of Nigeria. So that will drive its politics. So to answer you
so simply, yes, oil is the driving force of the conflict.’787 Also Obi concludes his statement above by
claiming that ‘whichever way it is viewed, oil defines the high stakes involved, both in terms of
politics  and  power  in  the  Nigerian  context’.788 While  strong  ethnic  cleavages  in  Nigeria  feed
violence,  a  common  sense  of  grievance  about  oil  unites  most  inhabitants  of  the  Niger  Delta,
regardless of whether insurgents of today are motivated by a wish to draw attention to the plight of
the communities or to  enhance their  own living standards.789 The pervasive oil  industry,  or the
785 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 103; Okey Ibeanu and Robin Luckham, ‘Nigeria: Political Violence, Governance and 
Corporate Responsibility in a Petro-State’, in Oil Wars, ed. Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl, and Yahia Said (London:
Pluto Press, 2007).
786 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 107–8.
787 Interview #41: Wole Akinyosoye, Zonal Operations Controller, Department of Petroleum Resources
788 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 107.
789 Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, 3.
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‘goose that lays the golden egg’,  as Akinyosoye phrases it,  sets  the predominant  frame for the
conflict,  because the Niger Delta political economy has developed to serve the whole country’s
thirst for oil revenues.790
To compare,  Congo’s  mineral  resources  are  vast  and  dominate  the  stalling  economy,  but  they
remain an item among other sources of profit and power the competition over which elites have
militarised.791 Nigeria’s oil, by serving both as a source of suffering and a promise of a better life,
deserves a central role in explaining contemporary violence in the Niger Delta.792 In the former,
failures in resource governance do not feed the deadly spin alongside other factors, as one could
characterise the violence in the Kivus. Rather, the distribution of costs and benefits involved with
oil production is a fundamental source of contemporary grievances in the Niger Delta. To Le Billon,
who rejects the greed and grievance explanations of the conflict as simplistic, ‘the risks of conflict
in the Niger Delta appear to be primarily related to distribution of the benefits of oil production
(including the centralisation of oil revenue away from producing areas following the Biafra war)
and  its  costs  (such  as  rising  socio-environmental  impacts)’.793 Watts  criticises  applications  of
Collier’s  thesis  on the Niger  Delta  situation,  but  emphasises  that  the ‘oil  complex’ comprising
military  and  security  forces,  local  and  global  civil  society,  transnational  oil  businesses,  local
political  forces,  multinational  development  agencies,  and  the  criminal  underworld,  shapes  the
failures of the Nigerian petro-state to tackle social problems in the Niger Delta.794
790 Interview #41: Wole Akinyosoye, Zonal Operations Controller, Department of Petroleum Resources
791 Understandably, the prevalence of the informal sector in both countries makes exact comparisons difficult. The IMF
suggests that the mining sector generates around 20 percent of the GDP and has accounted for 33 percent of the 
growth recorded in Congo since 2004. International Monetary Fund, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: Staff 
Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation’, 2015, 20.
792 Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, 115; Interview #43: Dandy Mgbenwa, Pastor in Okwuzi, Ekbocha Community in 
Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni Government Area in Rivers State
793 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 80.
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The pervasiveness of oil  in the Niger Delta conflict shapes the measures that actors in affluent
democracies  can  take  up  and  support.795 The  oil  companies  are  some  of  the  key  players.  For
instance, the IOCs, whose workers are being targeted and kidnapped by armed groups, are actively
present  in  the  Nigerian  conflict.796 As  described  above,  the  processes  of  social  disintegration
produced by the mere presence of the powerful oil industry perpetuate a situation in which the
agitators, oil bunkerers, kidnappers, and bandits rising to take from the companies, are conceived as
the local heroes.797 Larry Boms suggests even that the IOCs have the last say on the way the oil
wealth is governed; ‘if you go deeper into the control and governance, oil companies are actually in
control’.798 Accordingly,  companies  have  been  the  primary  target  of  consumer  action,  such  as
boycotts, taken up affluent democracies.
However, the role of the IOCs might be changing.  The share of Nigerian oil imported directly to
North America and Europe is decreasing as India grows as a major buyer. Further, China is gaining
ground in the Nigerian oil markets, which may reduce the influence that Western oil majors have on
the Nigerian state. While China does not have a stake in as many Nigerian oil sites as, for instance,
in Angola, the growing economy is buying assets in the petroleum industry in order to strengthen its
security  of  supply  and access  to  the  global  flows  of  raw materials.799 Le  Billon  suggests  that
794 Watts, ‘Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the Niger Delta’, 643, 649–50; Watts, 
‘Resource Curse?’, 52.
795 Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Mechanisms’, 508.
796 WAC Global Services, ‘Peace and Security in the Niger Delta, Working Paper for SPDC’, 5.
797 Interview #47: Nigerian Army Colonel
798 Interview #48: Larry Boms, Country Head and Resident Representative, UNITAR; for a recent example of the 
allegations that Shell is involved with bribery, see: ‘Shell Knew’, 10 April 2017.
799 David E. Brown, ‘Africa’s Booming Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Production: National Security 
Implications for the United States and China’ (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College 
Press, 2013), 76, 202–3; Guardian Nigeria, ‘China’s Investment in Nigeria’s Oil Sector to Hit $17 Billion’, The 
Guardian Nigeria Newspaper - Nigeria and World News (blog), 16 July 2018, https://guardian.ng/news/chinas-
investment-in-nigerias-oil-sector-to-hit-17-billion/; Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, ‘Chinese Oil 
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depicting  the  increased  competition  for  oil  in  Africa  as  a  geopolitical  struggle  over  an  ever-
decreasing pie,  which feeds a ‘race to the bottom’ in sustainability and human rights efforts, is
limited. The competition might lead, at least on a short term, to complementarity than conflict, as
aggregate oil supplies increase, and as the emergence of Chinese companies pushes Western-based
oil companies to promote more sustainable practices all over the sector in order to secure a level
playing field.800 Even if this more benign scenario unfolds, the more diverse playing field indicates
that the IOCs cannot be diagnosed as having a ‘stranglehold’ over the governance of the Niger Delta
oil.
Companies, just as any other actor involved, are neither simply heroes nor villains. Katsouris and
Sayne remind that simplistic ideas on companies as ‘change agents’ or ‘reformers’ disregard that
IOCs are complex institutions burdened by challenges related to internal share of information, red
tape and competing agendas. A roadmap involving close cooperation with all stakeholders is needed
for tackling the resource-related drivers of the conflicts, once they are accurately identified.801 As Le
Billon suggests, in getting the resource management right it is vital to ensure that responsibilities
are distributed in an optimal fashion among companies, political authorities, financial institutions
and consumers.802 The acts and omissions of IOCs are an important but only one part in a wider
prescription for the resource curse.
Some policies are available that involve such a coalition of stakeholders to tackle the vulnerability-
inducing aspects of resources. As an important step, the central concepts guiding measures taken by
Corporation Taps into Nigerian Resources’, 3 February 2019, 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/PublicRelations/NNPCinthenews/tabid/92/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/209/Chine
se-Oil-Corporation-taps-into-Nigerian-resources.aspx.
800 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 62; Theodore H. Moran, ‘Promoting Universal Transparency in Extractive Industries: 
How and Why?’ (Washington, D.C: Center for Global Development, 2011).
801 Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude’, 21–22.
802 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 226.
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all actors deserve a revision. Writing in the context of rough diamonds, Le Billon suggests that
capturing  the  wider  dimensions  of  violence  would  entail  adopting  the  definition  of  ‘conflict
resources’ by  Global  Witness  as  natural  resources  the  control,  exploitation,  trade,  taxation,  or
protection  of  which  contributes  to,  or  benefits  from,  the  context  of  armed  conflict.803 Policies
developed  on  such  an  understanding  would  widen  the  repertoire  of  actors  involved  with  the
violence from ‘illegal armed actors’ to actors prolonging hostilities by their economics activities,
including companies,  governments,  and consumers.804 To apply his  suggestion in the context of
Nigeria, a parallel, wider redefinition of ‘blood oil’ would emphasise the vulnerabilities to alongside
the risks of and the opportunities for violence involved with the fossil wealth. Such a redefinition
would guide efforts away from policies that treat oil primarily as a motive and a means for acts of
violence by militants.
Such a  redefinition  is  also  required  with  ‘blood  oil’.  Leif  Wenar  discusses  under  this  concept
Nigeria’s corruption, slow economic growth, and, in general, the complicated failure of the regime
to  provide  wellbeing  for  its  population.  Describing  Nigerian  politics  as  a  ‘vertical  system  of
descending and even-smaller pipes of patronage’, his macro-level analysis treats the violence as an
indirect, cascading symptom of flaws in the international system of trade and property rights.805 In
Nigeria  and  elsewhere,  contemporary  resource  management  policies,  including  anti-corruption
laws, transparency mechanisms, commercial disengagement, and revenue distribution schemes, are
steps  towards  and  indicators  of  a  need  for  wider  measures  to  reform  this  system.806 Such  a
reconceptualisation  of  ‘blood  oil’  does  not  reduce  the  salient  characteristics  of  resources  to
consumers  feeding  violence  through  their  indirect  purchases.  Rather,  it  points  at  the  conflict-
803 Le Billon, 27.
804 Le Billon, 27.
805 Wenar, Blood Oil, 57.
806 Wenar, 320–21.
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inducing characteristics of the legal and political arrangements in place not only on the local and
national but the international level.
As Katsouris and Sayne suggest, supply chain due diligence initiatives and active anti-bribery and
money-laundering law enforcement can form components in an intelligent multi-state strategy as
long as they are well  designed and complemented with other  measures.807 I  point  at  two more
immediate approaches. First, affluent democracies could strengthen their support to oil legislation
and  regulation  reforms  in  Nigeria.  Currently,  many  of  the  commercial,  regulatory  and
administrative functions of resource governance are realised by the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. Assigning these functions to the
same entities provides an opportunity for the misuse of oil revenues; as Edward Obi, a catholic
priest and the director of GASIN, an NGO working on gas flaring, phrases, ‘so as long as the oil
wealth  is  readily  available  to  whoever  is  in  a  political  position,  we  can  never  go  anywhere
Norway.’808 Since the early 2000s, the Petroleum Industry Bill has been under reform to decrease
the politicisation and systemic corruption in  the sector  by,  for instance,  unbundling the NNPC,
creating new entities responsible for awarding exploration licenses, and clarifying the role of local
community hearings when new oil extraction plants are built.809 Surely, the IOCs have been resistant
to some of the changes. Abdulmumin Abubakara of NEITI provocatively states: ‘Some of them are
even responsible, if you allow me, undermining some of these processes, because the bill is almost
17 years old.’810 Further, the analysis by Katsouris and Sayne indicates that oil-importing countries
807 Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude’, xii.
808 Interview #34: Edward Obi, Catholic Priest, National Coordinator of NACGOND, Director of GASIN
809 Meeting #2: Stakeholder engagement on issuance of petroleum and mining licenses; Neil Munshi, ‘Nigeria Passes 
Major Oil Reform Bill after 17 Year Struggle’, Reuters, 18 January 2018; Neil Munshi, ‘Nigerian Presidential 
Hopeful Vows to Rewrite Oil Deals’, Financial Times, 23 January 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/8da566ac-
1a46-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21.
810 Interview #33: Abdulmumin Abubakar, Audit Officer, NEITI
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have  not  held  the  Nigerian  reforms  in  oil  governance  high  on  their  agenda  either.811 The
governments  of  affluent  democracies  could  set  higher  expectations  both  on  the  IOCs  and  the
Nigerian  administration  to  bring  through  the  reforms,  and  in  this  way  help  crumble  the  tacit,
patronage-based system of revenue and cost distribution harmful to the Niger Delta.
Another, related measure deals with the opportunities international law provides to gear company-
state relations to being more conducive to the Delta. Recently, civil societies such as Global Witness
have taken up widely publicised lawsuits against IOCs, which aim to pierce the ‘corporate veil’
separating  parent  companies  and  their  subsidiaries.812 Winning  legal  cases  against  the  parent
companies of big oil conglomerates, often situated under the jurisdiction of affluent democracies
such as the Netherlands, Italy, and the United States, on the grounds of companies’ involvement
with  bribery,  human rights  violations  or  environmental  damage in Nigeria,  has  been attempted
before and remains far from an easy task. Nevertheless, Jennifer Zerk argues that clarifying the
corporate law principle of ‘limited liability’ or ‘separate corporate responsibility’ is a key element in
developing new strategies to regulate multinational corporations beyond national borders. Further, it
is often the most promising avenue for enforcing the human rights obligations of multinationals.813
Liesbeth Enneking suggests that legislative changes making it easier to sue the parent companies in
their host countries rather than their subsidiaries in Nigerian courts would facilitate disincentives
and tougher penalties on IOCs caught in misconducts.814 At best, foreign direct liability claims could
811 Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude’.
812 See a campaign by Global Witness that has led to legal investigations: ‘Shell Knew’; Global Witness, ‘Take the 
Future’, 26 November 2018; Interview #54: Senior Campaigner #2 at Global Witness.
813 Jennifer Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International 
Law (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 54, 305.
814 Liesbeth Enneking, ‘The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch 
Shell Nigeria Case’, Utrecht Law Review 10, no. 1 (2014): 48.
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provide an interim step towards a comprehensive regime of international norms, which could be
enforced on the international level.815 
Although Macartan Humphreys’s call is dated and retains a general level, in the case of the Niger
Delta the need for a ‘redirection of policy priorities’ remains topical: 
Policy priorities from previous research have focused on protecting assets from capture
and cutting off rebel financing. While these initiatives are important… greater gains
could be achieved by focusing more on better management of the extraction process and
better usage of resource revenues that are controlled by states.816
Signalling a need for the Petroleum Act and taking up the full arsenal of international tort and
criminal law during President Muhammad Buhari’s second term are only some of the redirected
efforts through which affluent democracies can help alleviate the violence in the Niger Delta.817 I do
not  highlight  these  recent  initiatives  as  a  panacea  to  the  complicated  and  enduring  instability.
Rather, they illustrate the wider kinds of conflict resource policies available, and the interaction
between different actors needed to realise them. The efforts of affluent democracies to help alleviate
the conflict and instability in the Niger Delta can be built on narrow ‘blood oil’ diagnoses, which
conceive oil theft primarily as an opportunity and a motive for armed groups to enrich themselves
and  prolong  the  fighting,  or  on  more  comprehensive  diagnoses,  which  point  towards  the
vulnerability to conflict through institutional and social erosion involved with the tacit networks of
patronage and wealth distribution. The latter path shows more promise in tackling the resource-
conflict connection.
815 Enneking, 52; Liesbeth Enneking, ‘Paying the Price for Socially Irresponsible Business Practices?’, Aktuelle 
Juristische Praxis / Pratique Juridique Actuelle 26, no. 8 (2017).
816 Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Mechanisms’, 534.
817 Katsouris, ‘Buhari’s Second Chance at Oil and Gas Reform in Nigeria’.
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9.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I explored the connection between crude oil and the intermittent waves of violence
in  southern  Nigeria.  The  international  oil  companies  operating  in  the  Niger  Delta  have  been
subjected  to  waves  of  international  consumer  action,  such  as  boycotts,  due  to  their  alleged
involvement with the lack of local livelihoods, environmental degradation and corruption in the
area. In the 2000s and again in the late 2010s, militant groups have used violence to amplify their
calls  for justice,  compensation and reforms. A wide range of policies  have been suggested and
experimented on to tackle oil theft and in this way improve the security situation in the Delta.
I suggested that curbing armed groups’ access to oil funds is not likely to prevent new groups from
surfacing.  A wider  conceptualisation  of  the  resource  curse  helps  capture  the  way  the  state,
companies and militants are enmeshed in a dysfunctional parallel economy in which oil theft is
pervasive. To reapply Le Billon’s framework, endorsing a stronger emphasis on the vulnerability to
conflict involved with the weakening of state institutions and social cohesion would direct affluent
democracies to support wider measures, including new definitions of ‘conflict resources’ and ‘blood
oil’, reforms in the Nigerian petroleum legislation, and pathways for international law as a tool of
regulating multinational enterprises.
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PART III
10 GUILTY CONSUMER
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The second part of this thesis drew contours of the resource curse and its symptoms with regards to
armed conflicts  in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria.818 Based on this  groundwork, it  is now
possible  to  weave  an  empirically  informed  normative  argument  on  consumers’  capacity  to
ameliorate armed conflicts. In so doing, the third part of this thesis zooms in on the second research
question: which factors affect consumers' responsibility to alleviate armed conflicts that persist in
some countries  from  which  the  raw materials  of  their  purchases  originate? In  this  chapter, I
articulate the ‘guilt consumer’ argument as one of the mid-level considerations to guide ethical
thought and action on this question. I suggest that assignations of responsibility drawing on guilty
consumer claims are best evaluated by focusing on consumers’ remedial capacity, and flesh out the
approach by suggesting that this evaluation  can be split to two components, influence and costs,
each of which has two further components. 
As it comes to influence, I refer to the findings of the previous part to suggest that armed conflicts
in the extractive stages of supply chains are a challenging target for consumer action, and that the
actual  influence  of  consumers  over  a  given  armed  conflict  is  shaped by the  soundness  of  the
solution or policy behind which civil societies, governments and companies at any given time strive
818 Different versions of this chapter have been presented in the APSA Annual Meeting in San Francisco, September 
2015, in the 18th Annual Africa Conference at the University of Austin, Texas, March 2018, and in the ISA Annual 
Convention in San Francisco, April 2018. I thank especially Farid Abdel-Nour and Steve Torrente for helpful 
comments. 
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to mobilise them.  As it comes to costs, in trying to act upon armed conflicts consumers face the
problem  of  intermediate  goods:  making  personal  purchase  decisions  to  disengage  from  raw
materials that are societally critical cannot be done without significant personal costs. Evaluating
the balance between actual and potential influence as well as acceptable and excessive costs helps
consider  whether  any particular  assignation of  responsibility  advanced using a  guilty  consumer
argument is to be endorsed over others.
10.2 THE CLAIM
In the first and fourth chapters, I referred to conflicts in eastern  Congo and southern Nigeria as
harms which consumers are sometimes portrayed to be feeding and maintaining by their purchases.
This kind of rhetoric is wide-ranging, and varyingly adopted by activists, researchers and policy-
makers:
The  time  has  come  to  expose  a  sinister  reality:  Our  insatiable  demand  for
electronics  products  such as  cell  phones  and laptops  is  helping fuel  waves  of
sexual violence in a place that most of us will never go, affecting people most of
us will never meet.819
People need to think that when they turn their heat on in Europe they’re spilling
pollution into the Niger Delta.820
Every  time  you  use  a  cell  phone  or  log  on  to  a  computer,  you  could  be
contributing to the death toll in the bloodiest, most violent region in the world: the
eastern Congo.821
819 Prendergast, ‘Can You Hear Congo Now?’, 1.
820 A Nigerian activist cited in: Wenar, Blood Oil, xviii.
821 An advertising summary of Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo.
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These  countries  suffer  from authoritarian  rule,  violent  conflict,  and  economic
disarray because they produce oil - and because consumers in oil-importing states
buy it from them.822
Without knowing it, tens of millions of people in the United States may be putting
money in the pockets of some of the worst human rights violators in the world,
simply by using a cell phone or laptop computer.823
I refer to assignations of remedial responsibility presented in this general form as guilty consumer
arguments. My intention is not to discuss the legitimacy of individual claims or campaigns using
them; such claims can be harnessed for different purposes. Le Billon refers to the narratives that
surfaced to mobilise support for conflict diamond policies in Sierra Leone and Angola as ‘consumer
dystopias’, stating that they were valuable in strengthening the enforcement of the UN sanctions
and institutional changes within the diamond industry that aimed to end wars in the two countries,
just as the narrative of ‘terrorist’ consumers who fund extremism by purchasing ‘blood diamonds’
helped tip the balance for installing new legislation.824 The citations above are to illustrate that
similar claims are also harnessed in relation to Congo and Nigeria. As Reinecke and Ansari phrase
it:  ‘By  focalizing  the  emotionally  ‘hot’ issue  of  rape  and  linking  it  with  the  use  of  “conflict
minerals” in mobile phones, NGOs constructed a causal link that brought the deadly violence in a
far flung part of Congo close to consumers’ lives.’825 In the case of the Niger Delta, parallel rhetoric
portrays consumers filling their petrol tanks and heating up their houses as complicit in the loss of
livelihoods and recurrent violence.
822 Ross, The Oil Curse, 3.
823 United States Senator Richard J. Durbin cited in: Reinecke and Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems’, 306.
824 Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’.
825 Reinecke and Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems’, 301.
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The aim of this  chapter  is  to  sketch a  way to assess whether  any assignation of  responsibility
articulated in this form is persuasive in relation to other, similarly voiced claims. I argue that guilt-
based vocabulary collates together two morally relevant elements of consumers having a causal role
in  the  conflicts  and  consumers  being  able  to  ameliorate  them,  and  that  such  claims  are  best
evaluated by focusing on actors’ remedial capacities. Actors who emphasise consumers’ everyday
purchases as contributing to conflicts simultaneously allude that the very same purchases can play a
role in ameliorating them. As John Prendergast of the Enough Project crystallises this logic:
Because we are all  unconsciously part  of the problem in Congo, all  of us can
consciously become part of the solution. Collectively, American consumers have
enormous leverage over the companies from which we purchase our electronics.
We can marshal that power to press them to play a positive role to protect and
empower Congo’s women.826
Guilty consumer arguments embody the pragmatist  idea that forward-looking considerations are
inexorably  a  part  of  assigning  backward-looking,  or  retrospective,  responsibility.  The
interwovenness emerges in two stages. In constructing guilty consumer claims, campaigners first
engage in a causal inquiry in order to identify the agents through whose action the conflicts in
question could be alleviated, and second, having identified consumers as such a group, frame their
relation with the harm in blame-based terms in order to generate moral motivation for ameliorative
action. To be sure, such a two-stage division is an abstraction. However, it helps pinpoint the logic
behind my argument that an analysis of an actor’s capacities makes sense also when demands for
remedial action are made on the grounds of liability for and contribution to a harm.
Further, guilty consumer claims are presented to illustrate that a strict categorisation between the
various grounds of responsibility dissolves when responsibility is assigned in practice. Smiley uses
826 Prendergast, ‘Can You Hear Congo Now?’, 3.
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the adjective ‘dialectical’ to refer to the interwovenness of the process in which the ‘adjudicator’, or
the  actor  who is  assigning blame-based responsibility,  is  affected  by  its  understanding of  who
belongs  to  the  potential  responsibility-bearer’s  community  and  where  the  boundaries  of  the
community lie.827 In her work on future-looking collective responsibility, she in turn emphasises a
group’s capacity to ‘get things done’ as a criterion for establishing whether the group ought to be
treated as a moral collective agent to whom remedial responsibilities can be assigned.828 These do
not exclude rather than reflect the plurality of considerations that shape any assignation of remedial
responsibility.829 Likewise, capacity-based and communal considerations merge in guilty consumer
arguments, as such claims aim to mobilise more resources to prevent harms and to expand the
boundaries of one’s moral community by including new actors to such activities.830
By highlighting how actors’ capacities weave into guilty consumer claims, I bring closer to practice
several ideas on responsibility discussed in the previous chapters. I move beyond the argument by
Barry  and Macdonald  as  I  carve  out  capacity  as  an  important  yardstick  even if  one harnesses
powerful conventions of blame and guilt as a ground of assigning responsibilities to consumers. My
suggestion diverges from Wenar’s similar but monistic and ideal-based approach by recognising
that assigning responsibility takes place in a pluralist setting, in which people strive towards diverse
ends-in-view,  and  in  unique  situations  in  which,  to  draw  on  Rubenstein’s  vocabulary,  diverse
grounds  of  responsibility  join  together  as  context-specific  constellations.  Further,  instead  of
following Iris Marion Young in carving out a distinct form of political responsibility and using four
827 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 180, 257 My reading is that Smiley refers to a 
connection being ‘dialectical’ in a non-technical manner, which resembles the colloquial use of the terms 
‘interactive’ and ‘two-directional’, and which differs from its Hegelian or Marxist uses.
828 Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 6.‐
829 I thank Marion Smiley for clarifying this point.
830 Smiley’s concept of the adjudicator begs an interesting point on the kind of an actor that can blame others: Marilyn 
Friedman, ‘How to Blame People Responsibly’, The Journal of Value Inquiry 47, no. 3 (2013): 271–284.
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parameters of understanding to distribute it among different agents, my preferred form of analysis
retains a focus on liability-based assignations of responsibility, and uses potential responsibility-
bearers’ remedial capacities to evaluate the relative weight to be given to them.
In the next section, I flesh out two components, influence and costs. David Miller suggests that
using  an  actor’s  remedial  capacity  as  a  moral  ground for  responsibilities  involves  two factors,
effectiveness and costs, and making trade-offs between the two.831 While the division is plausible,
calling the former as effectiveness somewhat confusingly implies a calculus of costs, which then
conflates the two components. I suggest replacing the term effectiveness with ‘influence’ as the first
component  of  evaluating  consumer  capacity.832 Somewhat  similar  to  the  function  the  four
parameters  of  understanding  serve  in  Young’s  account  to  help  differentiate  actors’  political
responsibilities, influence and costs constitute tools for prioritising among the diverse guilt-based
arguments  used  to  burden consumers  with  obligations  to  act  upon harms  in  global  production
processes.
10.3 INFLUENCE
To start with a reminder, there is much more to ethical consumption than pressuring companies to
change their ways.833 The power of purchase action cannot be evaluated by looking only at the
market-based incentives created to companies, because this perspective ignores that purchases have
indirect social contagion and signalling effects, forming a part of larger political agenda-setting and
awareness-rising  campaigns.  Micheletti  and  Stolle  suggest  that  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of
political consumer activism requires treating the campaigns as ‘multi-level processes’, in which at
831 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 103–4.
832 To be sure, my usage differs from the way Barry and Macdonald use the concept.
833 Barnett, Clarke, and Cloke, ‘Whatever Happened to Ethical Consumption’, 6.
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least  four  levels  are  to  be  taken  into  account.834 First,  one  can  ask  about  the  impact  that  the
campaigns, such as boycotts and buycotts, have on consumers’ awareness of the issue in hand as
worth solving. Second, one can look for potential changes in business practices, such as changes in
the number and quality of CSR schemes, corporate-NGO partnerships and ethical businesses. Third,
one can explore whether campaigns have managed to push the issue to governmental agenda and
policy-making. And fourth, one can analyse the real-life situation itself and ask whether activism
has had a positive impact on the ground.835
Treating political consumer campaigns as multi-level processes ensures that no particular campaign
is  not  evaluated  only  against  a  single  desired  outcome,  such  as  a  reduction  in  violence  and
instability,  but  against  the  kinds  of  responses  that  the  action  creates  in  various  stakeholders,
including the public, the media, corporations and governments. With this caveat in mind, Micheletti
and Stolle review existing research to suggest that the outcomes of activism on the first three levels
are  generally  positive.  On  the  level  of  raising  consumer  awareness,  several  surveys  show  an
increased attention that western consumers pay on ethical, environmental or political issues when
purchasing  products,  even  if  this  attention  does  not  translate  as  strongly  into  actual  purchase
decisions.  Regarding  the  impact  on  corporations,  Micheletti  and  Stolle  discuss  five  further
indicators.  While  there  is  a  rising  trend  in  the  number  of  CSR  schemes  and  corporate-NGO
partnerships, the third indicator, that of the impact of boycotts on corporate policies and practices, is
notoriously hard to pinpoint: studies often focus on successful and effective cases, and scholarship
remains scarce on the factors and mechanisms that explain when boycotts are generally effective.836
The fourth indicator, the emergence of ‘ethical’ businesses, boasts several prominent enterprises, as
834 Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism, 265; Dietlind Stolle, ‘Response to Richard Locke’s Review of 
Political Consumerism: Global Responsibility in Action’, Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 2 (2016): 520–521.
835 Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism, 211, 220.
836 Stolle and Micheletti, 222; they refer to N. Craig Smith’s work, which distinguishes boycott success and 
effectiveness: Morality and the Market.
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well as the fifth indicator of major retailers introducing ethical lines, although critics sometimes
view the latter trend as ‘greenwashing’ threatening to delegitimise all types of labels.837 
As  it  comes  to  political  consumerism affecting  governments,  campaigns  have  pushed  through
sustainable procurement policies in many OECD countries as well as helped increase the number of
sustainable  towns,  cities,  local  institutions  and  other  jurisdictions,  which  in  turn  undertake
consciousness-raising  and  agenda-setting.838 The  fourth  level  of  real-life  outcomes  is  of  most
interest  to  this  thesis,  as  it  can  indicate  consumers’ capacity  to  ameliorate  concrete  challenges
upstream in supply chains. Here, Micheletti and Stolle suggest that there is variation across different
problems  in  supply  chains.  To  illustrate,  although  the  overall  evidence  on  the  effects  of  anti-
sweatshop campaigns on the wages of workers is mixed, selected case studies show that in certain
conditions  campaigns can  advance wage increases  for  workers.839 In  reducing child labour,  the
effectiveness of consumer action is highly conditioned by the local economic conditions, such as
the structure of labour markets and the situation of the family, suggesting that supporting policies
directly  tackling  poverty  might  comprise  a  more  successful  approach  than  consumer  action.840
Further, fair trade coffee farmers generally enjoy a significantly higher income than conventional
coffee farmers, although there seem to be limits to the market share fair trade products generally
capture in affluent democracies, as well as to the way fair trade schemes can affect the structural
conditions, such as poverty, often characterising small-scale agricultural production in developing
countries. Yet, generally the income and social effects indicate fair trade production as an efficient
way to improve the farmers’ share of value-added.841
837 Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism, 226–27.
838 Stolle and Micheletti, 212–32.
839 Stolle and Micheletti, 234.  
840 Stolle and Micheletti, 236.  
841 Stolle and Micheletti, 241–42.
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Where do attempts to reduce violence and instability in the extractive stages through consumer
activism stand out in all this? The example most reminiscent of the situations in eastern Congo and
southern  Nigeria  is  that  of  the  ‘blood diamond’ campaigns  on  civil  wars  in  Sierra  Leone  and
Angola, which helped establish the Kimberley Process. Generally, the boycotts and the subsequent
regulation are depicted as having had a positive impact in ending the civil war. More precisely, the
interpretations of the role they had in peace efforts vary from the ensuing diamonds regulation
having served as a ‘catalyst’ of peace to the regulation having complemented the peace efforts after
heavy-duty work was done by soldiers.842 Anthonius de Vries, who acted as the negotiator for the
European Commission  in  the  Kimberley  Process,  suggests  that  the  latter  interpretation is  more
accurate: although the rebels were aware of the ongoing attempts to curb their access to diamond
trade,  a  point  of  agreement  in  the  negotiations  was  reached  only  after  the  worst  fighting  had
subsided.  To him,  no wide generalisations  regarding other  conflicts  can  be made based on the
unique Kimberley Process.843
Nevertheless, the findings in the previous part help articulate consumers’ influence on some armed
conflicts on a level of detail sufficient to address the second research question.844 I suggested that
although the two conflicts explored could be ameliorated, if not completely resolved, by tackling
the function that the extraction and trade of natural resources plays in them, there are differences in
the precision and suitability of the conflict resource policies that can be taken up for this purpose. In
the  Kivu provinces  and the surrounding area,  the mineral  traceability  schemes are designed to
reduce black markets and to prevent armed groups from financing their activities through the trade
842 ‘[I]t was a consumer campaign against blood diamonds that was the catalyst for a change in the logic of war and 
violent exploitation to a logic of peace and stability.’ Prendergast, ‘Can You Hear Congo Now?’, 6; for a different 
view, see: Le Billon, ‘Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer’, 794.
843 Interview #59: Antonius de Vries, Former negotiator for the European Commission in the Kimberley Process.
844 The discussion has similarities with the debate on the effectiveness of sanctions. For instance, Stoop et al approach 
Congo’s due diligence schemes as an (ineffective) targeted sanction. Stoop, Verpoorten, and Windt, ‘More 
Legislation, More Violence?’
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and extraction of  3TGs.  However,  the  persistence  of  armed groups is  rooted  to  the  militarised
competition for power and profit among the political and economic elites, in which minerals serve
as an important but only one of the commodified resources over which struggles persist. In the
Niger  Delta,  the  intermittent  attacks,  kidnappings  and oil  theft  against  the  oil  sector  by armed
groups escalated until 2009 and have recently shown signals of continuing, enticing discussions on
whether  affluent  democracies  ought  to  act  upon  the  persistent  oil  theft.  Yet,  the  attacks  are
underlined by disputes regarding who wins and who loses in a pervasive parallel system of tacit
patronage and wealth distribution, in which antagonisms often do not align armed militants on the
one side and the state and the oil companies on the other.
In both cases, I suggested that policies that focus on preventing armed groups from controlling
mines or bunkering oil are unlikely to tackle the socially and politically mediated resource-conflict
linkage.  More comprehensive  policies  that  affluent  democracies  can  take  up  originate  from an
awareness of and an emphasis on the vulnerability to conflict that natural resources involve. In the
case  of  Congo,  these  measures  include  helping  tackle  the  endemic  corruption  of  state-owned
enterprises and preventing illicit capital flight, two important channels through which the country’s
mineral riches turn into an item of elite competition and social disintegration. In the case of Nigeria,
they include enabling legal and regulatory reforms that tackle ‘white-collar’ oil theft, which in turn
is a key component in the parallel system of distributing costs and revenues of the oil production. A
key component in both cases is to embrace a definition of ‘blood resources’ and ‘conflict resources’
that is sensitive to these mechanisms. Surely, initiatives taking up different lenses do not exclude
each other, nor adopting a more comprehensive approach to the resource curse will in any way be
easy. The main insight is that even if affluent democracies subscribe to the fight against the violence
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and instability linked with the curse, there are policy sets of varying effectiveness that have been
and can be taken up for this purpose.845
With regards to the research question, this analysis helps conceptualise that consumers’ influence
over the conflicts is shaped by the efficiency of the means behind which they are being mobilised.
As Bartley et al summarise:  ‘Even the most conscientious consumer is only as effective as the
standards  he  or  she  supports.’846 Micheletti  and  Stolle  suggest  that  it  is  the  existence  of  a
‘reasonable choice architecture’ fostered by governments,  NGOs, corporations, and civil  society
networks that makes it possible for consumers to act upon different issues.847 The plausibility of the
ameliorative policies and practices that consumers can advance by making the ‘ethical’ choice in the
markets,  be it  buycotting,  boycotting,  or  a more comprehensive change in  lifestyle,  shapes  the
influence they can exercise over a harm in supply chains. The importance of sound policies to be
advocated through purchase decisions was captured in the last part, which laid out the complicated
dynamics of the two conflicts. Even a staunch advocate of the due diligence schemes recognises
that  armed  conflicts  linked  with  raw  material  extraction  do  not  constitute  an  easy  target  for
consumer action. This is not to say that it is impossible. Rather, I highlight that some harms in
supply chains require much more complicated and nuanced policy sets to be alleviated, and that
these differences shape the challenge that campaigners, corporate strategists and policy-makers face
when they try to come up with the kinds of standards that consumers can support by making an
‘ethical’ choice in the markets.
845 Enough Project, ‘A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals - Strategy Paper’, 15; Lezhnev and 
Prendergast, ‘Strategic Pressure’; Callaway, ‘Powering Down Corruption’; Katsouris and Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s 
Criminal Crude’.
846 Bartley et al., Looking behind the Label, 59.
847 Michele Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action (Basingstoke; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 23.
263
To be sure, and to return to the framework by Micheletti and Stolle, one can question whether the
reduction in violence and instability is ultimately a valid measure against which the efficiency of
the existing schemes, and accordingly consumers’ influence, is to be measured. To illustrate with
examples  from  Congo,  some  campaigners  suggest  that  by  ‘demanding  transparency  and
accountability from the world’s largest electronics companies, consumers can fundamentally change
the  logic  of  Congo’s  conflict  and  end  the  scourge  of  conflict  minerals’.848 To  compare,  other
advocates frame the desired outcome of the Dodd-Frank Act, the main tool promoted by conflict
mineral campaigners, as to ‘reduce the size and volume-by-weight of the minerals black market’ in
Congo and its neighbouring countries, which is then to provide an ‘opportunity to stem some of the
violence,  while  not  of  course fixing Central  Africa’s  myriad governance problems’.849 The  two
statements  come with very  different  ambition  levels,  loading different  expectations  on  the  due
diligence schemes. Surely, in both of them ameliorating violence nevertheless plays a role, albeit a
more indirect one in the latter. Defining and redefining the goals of the conflict mineral and other
resource management policies will surely continue to feed debate on their effectiveness.850
A more important qualification is, however,  that the viability of the conflict  mitigation policies
behind  which  consumers  are  currently  mobilised  does  not  necessarily  indicate  the  level  of
consumers’ influence in the future. For instance, as per my analysis above, consumers’ influence
would increase if their choice architecture included a purchase option through which to promote
wider natural resource management policies, just as consumer action could be more effective in
reducing child  labour  if  purchase  choices  were  somehow harnessed  behind policies  that  tackle
poverty often underlying it. Yet, one has to start from somewhere. The resource traceability schemes
in Congo and Nigeria could be seen as a first step in the process that will increase consumers’
848 Enough Project, ‘A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals - Strategy Paper’, 15.
849 Whitney, ‘Conflict Minerals, Black Markets, and Transparency’, 184.
850 Diemel and Hilhorst, ‘Unintended Consequences or Ambivalent Policy Objectives? Conflict Minerals and Mining 
Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’.
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influence over the conflicts. The momentum that campaigners manage to build partly by providing
a persuasive but potentially narrow solution to a complicated situation could help generate more
nuanced and effective resource policies. It  is very hard to start  a movement,  but afterwards its
direction can be recalibrated. A ‘snapshot’ of the means that consumers can advance through their
purchase  decisions  in  any  specific  moment  somewhat  conceals  the  dynamic  nature  of  actors’
influence over any harm in global production processes.
Indeed,  the  view  of  consumer  influence  I  portray  here  is  somewhat  static.  On  a  daily  basis,
consumers in affluent democracies raise concerns about the inadequacies of ‘ethically’ produced
products in shops, demanding retailers to introduce more and better standards and products that fill
their expectations. For instance, if a consumer thinks that the due diligence schemes do not capture
the full potential of conflict resource policies that ethical consumerism can help realise in Congo, he
can  ask  companies  for  better  products  and  standards  that  advance  such  a  cause.  In  this  way,
exercising one’s  influence as  a  consumer  means not  only preferring  ‘ethical’ products  in  one’s
choice architecture but shaping the very architecture itself.  Surely,  exercising the latter  kind of
influence is more demanding.  Micheletti and Stolle remind that political consumerism is at times
impossible  and in  other  times  difficult  to  invigorate,  as  it  presumes  that  activist  networks  and
labelling institutions constantly inform consumers about the choices available.851 Yet, consumers are
also challenged if they want to exercise influence in this wider, dynamic sense. They have to be
ready  and  willing,  for  instance,  to  look  for  background information  on brands,  standards,  and
policies, to demand more and better products from retailers if the selection is poor, and to engage
with campaigners to help map the best way to ameliorate the harm upstream.
Because of these dynamics, it becomes even harder to pinpoint the level of  consumers’ influence
now or in the future that would qualify treating a particular guilty consumer claim as plausible.
851 Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism, 254–55.
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However,  as  a  rudimentary tool,  I  suggest  a  distinction between actual  influence and potential
influence.  Conceptualised  in  the  latter  sense,  consumers’ influence  is  more  detached  from the
existing means in the choice architecture at any given time and more geared towards the remedial
means consumers could acquire by shaping the architecture.  The difference can be articulated as
two variations of the same guiding question:
1) Are the policies and practices to mitigate resource-related armed conflicts that consumers can
currently advance by their purchases effective?
or
2)  Are  there  effective  measures  and  practices  to  mitigate  resource-related  armed  conflicts  that
consumers could advance by their purchases?
Both  questions  are  inquiries  into  consumers’ influence.  My hesitancy regarding the  use  of  the
second variation as a component in evaluating their remedial capacities is aligned with my concern
regarding the definition of ‘causal influence’ by Barry and Macdonald, which I discussed in chapter
4.  To remind, they suggest that an assessment of consumers’ causal influence over an injustice
includes not only information over an injustice and capacities to avoid acting in a harmful way that
consumers might have at any given time, but also information and capacities to which they might
have  access  ‘with  reasonable  effort’.852 Although  Barry  and  Macdonald  consider  their  view as
‘restrictive’ in comparison to Young’s view, the wide understanding of capacity they advocate may
inflate  the  subsequent  responsibilities,  a  characteristic  of  the  situation  faced  by  consumers  in
affluent democracies that this thesis set out to help resolve in the first place. Similarly, in chapter 3 I
discussed  Lawford-Smith’s  claim that  consumers  have  a  responsibility  to  build  collectives  that
852 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’, 9–10.
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would  be  capable  of  acting  upon  harms  in  supply  chains.853 However,  when  the  realm  of
possibilities within consumers’ reach includes possibilities that the collectives they can establish are
able to realise, a capacity-based analysis becomes further and further detached from the immediate
outcomes that consumers can bring forth through their everyday decisions, which complicates using
it as a guideline for prioritising between competing projects.
These are not unsurmountable challenges. However, they highlight that careful conceptual footwork
is needed if consumer responsibilities are grounded on their remedial capacities.  Besides arguing
that making a distinction between actual and potential influence can be useful in this context, I
suggest placing a tentative emphasis on the former in an evaluation of any guilty consumer claim,
as such an emphasis serves to tame some of the inflationary tendencies of which capacity-based
accounts are sometimes accused. Surely, the line between actual and potential influence is never
razor-sharp. It requires constant deliberation in particular cases, and taking into account the costs of
remedial action, as I describe in the next section.
10.4 COSTS
FSC timber might be good timber, but the glue might be horrible.854
Costs constitute the flip side of influence in an analysis of guilty consumer claims. Consumers’
capacity to alleviate the conflicts is shaped by the personal costs incurred by using their purchase
power, and as with influence and potential influence, a rudimentary line can be drawn between
acceptable  costs  and  excessive  costs.  While  high  costs  do  not  absolve  consumers  of  remedial
responsibility, including costs to the analysis serves as a further component to help prioritise among
853 Lawford-Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’.
854 Interview #57: Rob Harrison, Director, Ethical Consumer. On responsibly sourced furniture.
267
the many harms in supply chains that seem to call for their attention and resources, and to indicate
the degree to which capacity-based responsibilities are to be discharged.
As Barry and Øverland write, ‘we appeal to cost all the time in justifying our refusal to do things we
think ourselves as having reason to do.’855 Yet, costs are often treated as an awkward caveat to moral
‘oughts’: not doing the morally desirable thing because it would be costly, troublesome or difficult
is often read as a judgment that the moral goal lacked value in the first place. To illustrate, Global
Witness campaigners defend their policies against a Forbes writer’s negative view on the Dodd-
Frank Act:
Is he implying, as it appears, that there is a cost barrier beyond which it ceases to
be worthwhile for companies to make sure they are not funding rape and war
through their purchases? What is the maximum a company should spend on its
supply chain controls to avoid sponsoring a mass-rapist or murderer?  How about
putting some dollar signs against the suffering of victims of the armed groups that
finance themselves  through the global  minerals  trade?   Or maybe these  fuzzy
human impact costs don't count?856
On a closer look, costs permeate much moral thinking. Barry and Macdonald include a clause that a
‘reasonable  effort’ is  required  from  consumers  to  build  capacities  to  help  workers  toiling  in
sweatshops. Erskine, although not defining a specific threshold, acknowledges costs as a component
in  building  coalitions  of  the  willing:  an  obligation  of  individual  states,  non-state  actors  and
nongovernmental  organisations  to  work together  in  order  to  enhance  their  capacities  to  protect
vulnerable populations is valid on the presumption that the costs of such action are not unacceptably
855 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 99.
856 Mike Davis, ‘Global Witness Responds to Tim Worstall Post’, Forbes, 3 November 2011, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/coatesbateman/2011/11/03/global-witness-responds-to-tom-worstall-post/.
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high.857 Rubenstein refers to costs in passing, suggesting that poverty-alleviating burdens set on an
actor  cannot  be  overtly  costly  in  absolute  terms,  because  this  would  be  ‘unfair  to  and/or
disrespectful of that actor’.858 Goodin suggests that much of what motivates the distinction between
imperfect and perfect duties is that the former kind of a duty requires too much of a sacrifice, either
when discharged individually or when there are too many occasions with similar morally relevant
characteristics to be performed in all occasions.859 Wenar places ‘excessive costs’ as a ramification
to applying the least-cost principle in assigning responsibilities: if the actor most capable of fixing a
problem would have to bear enormous costs to do so, the heavy burden might serve as a justified
reason not to require him or her to discharge the responsibility.860
An appeal to costs does not lead to absolving an actor of a remedial responsibility, or rejecting the
moral value of the action altogether. Barry and Macdonald suggest that people not always being
able to do what they should do is a fact that has to be accepted. Even if one’s intuitive reaction
against ‘wrongful harms’ in global supply chains, such as modern slavery, would be to stop buying
products made in such conditions altogether, it would be very hard to do so as these harms are
woven into several complicated and fragmented global supply chains.861 The solution Barry and
Macdonald indicate towards is not to do nothing but to aim to take ‘countervailing measures’ to
redress  harm,  for  instance,  by  supporting  political  parties,  joining  a  social  movement,  and
continuing to look for the most promising ways to mitigate the harms. An appeal to the cost of
disengaging from a harm does not render the harm in question as not deserving remedial action.
857 Erskine, ‘Coalitions of the Willing and Responsibilities to Protect’, 135, 145.
858 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’, 796.
859 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 224; on perfect and imperfect duties: Goodin, Utilitarianism as
a Public Philosophy, 28–30.
860 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, 7–8.
861 There is also the challenge of a boycott potentially doing more harm than good: Powell and Zwolinski, ‘The Ethical
and Economic Case Against Sweatshop Labor’.
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Acting on one’s responsibility is not a binary but a scalar issue.862 Rather, the high costs of remedial
action might guide someone trying to discharge his or her responsibility towards exploring other,
less demanding ways to act, and take them up to the extent possible while bearing costs in mind.
To further illustrate what an appeal to costs means in the context of consumer responsibility, I take
up the problem of ‘complex’ or ‘intermediate’ goods.863 As per Wenar, the fact that many essential
functions of people’s lives in industrialised societies, from agriculture to transport, hobbies, heating,
and work, are indirectly made possible by Nigerian oil, Congolese minerals, and other raw materials
potentially originating from ‘cursed’ countries, makes disengaging from such intermediate goods
through  private  consumption  choices  very  difficult.864 Oil  is  a  pervasive  raw  material  par
excellence, a fact well heeded by the campaigners wary of urging consumers to boycott oil. As a
senior campaigner at Global Witness notes: ‘It’s so deep in supply chains that it’s kind of tricky…
There is a consumer element but whether there is a desire to start boycotting an oil company or the
other, especially when none of them are particularly better  than the others, it’s  questionable.’865
Similarly,  Heather  Webb,  a  researcher  at  Ethical  Consumer,  notes  on  her  organisation  giving
consumers guidelines to pick a ‘responsible’ oil company:
We haven’t really focused on the petrol industry, which is where BP and Shell and
others operate, because there isn’t really an ethical choice there so we haven’t
done a product guide for ages. We try to keep subscribers informed on the issues,
the problem is that there isn’t often a very viable alternative other than saying
862 Goodin, ‘Responsibilities’.
863 Bartley et al., Looking behind the Label, 248.
864 Wenar, Blood Oil, xx.
865 Interview #54: Senior Campaigner #2 at Global Witness
270
‘don’t drive a car’, ‘don’t do this’, so we try not to keep too negative about it,
because consumers want an option, not to be told that they can’t do something.866
The campaigners recognise the troubles that consumers face when they try to disengage from oil
through individual  purchase decisions.  Webb alludes  that,  for  instance,  preferring company A’s
petrol station over company B’s is ethically of little relevance, because extracting and consuming
oil nevertheless damages the environment. The Global Witness campaigner emphasises that even if
a consumer subsequently took a step further and got rid of his car, he would remain reliant on oil in
indirect ways, for instance when buying agricultural products or traveling by train or airplane.867
Barnett et al remind that even academic literature on consumer activism often presumes a somewhat
straightforward mechanism, as per which spreading information on harms and injustices in global
supply chains to wider audiences leads to increased pressure on companies and governments to
tackle harms in supply chains.868 However, the voices above point towards a more basic challenge:
disengaging from oil  of  questionable  origins  would require  rejecting  many functions  taken for
granted in industrialised societies, an allegedly high cost that makes the campaigners hesitate before
urging consumers to take up boycott action.
To be sure, the problem of intermediate goods manifests especially with regards to oil, and not all
raw materials are alike.869 One factor that binds costs and influence together is the  elasticity of
consumer demand for the resource: in case of high elasticity such as diamonds, consumer boycotts
may create more anxiety in the industry that leads to reforms, whereas in the case of low elasticity,
866 Interview #5: Heather Webb, Researcher, Ethical Consumer
867 On branding business as ‘responsible’, see: Reinecke and Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems’, 313.
868 Clive Barnett, Globalizing Responsibility: The Political Rationalities of Ethical Consumption (Chichester, UK: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 11.
869 Christopher Kutz, ‘Collective Resource Control and the Power of Complicity’, in Beyond Blood Oil: Philosophy, 
Policy, and the Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018), 87.
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such  as  with  oil,  industry  might  be  initially  less  responsive  to  consumer  action.870 A senior
campaigner  at  Global  Witness  points  at  different  prospects  of  consumer  pressure  affecting
international trade in conflict diamonds and gold:  ‘So in terms of changing the jewellery sector,
fine,  you might be able to tinker with that, but in terms of trading gold sector at large… most
consumers I know of do not have hedge funds and understand international banking swaps.’871 To
apply to cases in hand, the Congolese 3TG minerals are closer to oil than diamonds in their role as
intermediate goods.872 Much akin to oil, they are omnipresent and very hard to disentangle from by
changing one’s shopping routines. They penetrate industrialised societies in many more ways than
as  components  of  smartphones,  laptops,  and other  gadgets  the  making  ‘conflict-free’ of  which
campaigners have conveyed as symbolising the fight against conflict minerals.
From this perspective, consumer action with regards to armed conflicts in the extractive stages of
supply chains seems costly to the extent to cross the blurred line between acceptable and excessive
costs. Bartley et  al  suggest that ‘unreflective’ shopping that people conduct is an important but
opaque component to all but the most committed ethical consumers. They suggest that harms are
especially invisible in the mining sector, such as the extraction of oil, natural gas and coal, whereby
it might be easier for consumers to work through traditional political channels, such as contacting
politicians, signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, and, as a mixed strategy, pressuring
public institutions to change their procurement policies. Consumers may still take up secondary
870 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 181 A further inquiry could make the analysis of influence and costs more sensitive to 
the interwovenness of the two components. For instance, in the Nigerian case the oil companies arguably recognise 
that it is costly for consumers threatening with a boycott to ‘walk the walk’, which then diminishes consumers’ 
actual influence over corporate conduct.
871 Interview #6: Senior Campaigner #1 at Global Witness  . 
872 Gold is distinct, because it preserves its value across time and cultures better than most minerals, whereby it is used 
in financial investment. Certification schemes for gold are mainly being piloted: Interview #17: Bali Barume and 
Martin Neumann, Project Manager & Project Officer, BGR Bukavu; also IMPACT, ‘First Supply Chain Free of 
Conflict Gold in Eastern Congo – Just Gold Project’, 2017, https://impacttransform.org/en/first-responsible-and-
conflict-free-artisanal-gold-supply-chain-operational-in-eastern-congo/.
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boycotts,  targeting  companies  that  source  from these  companies,  although  alternative  purchase
choices might not be readily available in the markets.873
This might still not sound excessive. In facing some harms, it really seems that pointing at a poor
balance between influence and costs is a bad excuse. Even if consumers’ influence over conflicts
was low, are there no good enough reasons to buy differently anyway? And even if consumer action
is costly,  is  it  not the case that such high costs  ought to be borne when the harms are serious
enough? Violence unfolds in different forms in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria. However, the
problems are of very serious nature, as depicted by news on serious human rights violations ranging
from mass rapes to tortures, kidnappings, and wanton killings over the years. One could well argue
that any effort to put a stop to such atrocities ought to be taken, and a refusal to do so on the
grounds of the action potentially failing to have a positive impact to be condemned. As Margot
Wallström, the UN’s former special representative on sexual violence in conflict, writes in defence
of  the  Dodd-Frank  Act  that  faced  public  criticism because  of  its  unintended  consequences  on
demand of Congolese minerals: ‘inaction is not an option’.874
This position is to be taken seriously. To illustrate, one might subscribe to the view that the resource
curse is a complex phenomenon which is hardly  to be solved by efforts including ‘international
trade embargoes, boycotts, or certification programs that reduce the value of a country’s resource
endowment’, but still hold a boycott of Nigerian oil as a tempting option, because no other policy
has  led  to  a  comprehensive  policy  change  over  the  past  few decades.875 Disagreeing  with  the
campaigners’ emphasis  on  the  conflict  minerals  approach in  Congo ought  not  to  be  read  as  a
suggestion to close one’s eyes to minerals as a major source of financing for armed groups, or to
873 Bartley et al., Looking behind the Label, 18, 246.
874 Margot Wallström, ‘A Conflict Over “Conflict Minerals” in Congo’, The New York Times, 15 August 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/opinion/a-conflict-over-conflict-minerals-in-congo.html.
875 Parker and Vadheim, ‘Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed?’, 45.
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ignore that formalising artisanal trade might be a potential way to get ‘off the ground’ a region that
has become a graveyard of many a development and peace project in the past.876 A deontologist can
summon the rhetoric of tainted hands to suggest that there are valid reasons for a boycott anyway,
just as a non-deontologist can insist that the harms being so grave justifies purchase action even if
its influence was low and costs high.
To answer, I am not suggesting a specific threshold, to be calibrated based on the severity of the
harm, applying the influence-cost analysis against which would then demarcate when an actor’s
capacities  qualify  for  a  remedial  responsibility.  Theorists  of  global  ethics,  especially  of  the
consequentialist vein, tend to debate about the acceptable level of costs that an individual can be
asked to bear in order to discharge a capacity-based responsibility to alleviate suffering far away.
For instance, Peter Singer’s early claim on the responsibility of individuals in rich countries for
global poverty is demanding: he suggests that discharging one’s positive duty means helping others
to the point  of marginal utility,  in which sacrificing from one’s  own any further would tilt  the
balance  of  aggregate  benefit  so that  more suffering would ensue  in  the world.877 The  effective
altruism movement,  inspired by Singer’s work,  calls  its  members to donate 10 percent of their
annual income to highly effective charities that tackle global poverty and other severe challenges.878
The exact articulations of the threshold between ‘reasonable’ or ‘acceptable’ and ‘excessive’ costs
vary.879
876 Yannick Weyns, a natural resource expert at MONUSCO, suggests that looking simply from a developmental 
perspective, artisanal mining is not going to get the eastern Congo ‘off the ground’. Interview #21: Yannick Weyns, 
Natural Resources Expert, MONUSCO.
877 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’.
878 Giving What We Can, ‘About’, 2018, https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/about-us/.
879 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 14; Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of 
Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour Injustices?’, 10.
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I suggest that thresholds do not serve well as practical guidelines for ethical thought and action,
because remedial responsibility  is  a relative notion which serves the social  function of helping
determine who among the many potential candidates ought to bear costs for resolving a given moral
project.  This  function  also includes  considering  to  which  of  the many potential  moral  projects
available one ought to use her scarce resources. Consumers have to pick their battles. Michael Nest
reminds that  no individual  harm in  the  global  context  appears  to  consumers’ moral  horizon in
isolation from others: ‘The global justice ‘marketplace’ is crowded and NGOs advocating on coltan
and the Congo face competition from blood diamonds, ‘dirty gold’, Darfur, Burma, Tibet, Palestine,
the Amazon, fair trade, Third World debt, imprisoned writers, slavery, gorillas, elephants, whales
and  climate  change.’880 He  continues:  ‘The  difficulty  in  knowing  what  to  do  is  partly  about
confusion around the cause-and-effect relationships between coltan, other minerals, armed groups,
mobile phones and violence in the DRC, but also partly about there being so many global justice
issues in which to get involved and whether involvement can make a difference.’881
Many harms,  both  local  and global,  seem worthy of  consumers’ time and money.  Consumers’
appeal to cost does not indicate that  the conflicts  are  not severe enough to generate  a  need to
ameliorate them. Were such an argument accepted as valid, the debate would quickly succumb to a
‘race to the bottom’ of ethical conduct, in which harms each of which is severe enough to call for
urgent action are evaluated against each other on criteria that do not support efforts to resolve them.
Rather, the two-part analysis suggested in this chapter is to help prioritise between harms all worthy
of remedial action, which, as Nest illustrates, are aplenty. Prioritising rather than meeting idealised
thresholds as key conduct in ethical action is an insight emphasised by non-ideal theorists, who
argue that political theory often, at least implicitly, has a lot to say about what ought to be done, but
880 Nest, Coltan, 106.
881 Nest, 153.
275
less about what to do  first.882 Many harms call for consumers’ attention, and often these calls are
vested as guilty consumer claims. Placing them on a constantly calibrated scale, in which remedial
responsibilities can be realised to different degrees, and in which an appeal to too high costs does
not  mean  rejecting  the  ethicality  of  remedial  action,  serves  as  a  better  guideline.883 Treating
consumers’ remedial  capacity,  analysed  through  influence  and costs,  as  a  basis  for  prioritising
among the challenges responds to what Irving, Harrison, and Rayner allude as ‘conscience fatigue’,
which threatens when the causes to be supported by consumers proliferate.884 
This answer lines with the starting point of the thesis. Assigning responsibility might cease to fulfil
its  function  of  helping  create  a  better  world  and better  individuals  if  consumers  come to  bear
remedial responsibilities regardless of it being very costly to discharge them and the prospect of
their action actually making a positive difference is low. Prioritising involves reflecting on one’s
capacity to alleviate a specific harm against other harms rather than thinking of them in isolation
from each other. Consumers in affluent democracies have a responsibility to do something about the
resource-related conflicts upstream, if such an assignation can be established on a sound diagnosis
of the role that the raw material in question plays in the conflicts, and an accurate prognosis that
appreciates the relative costs to consumers that discharging the responsibility involves. The toolbox
of  actual  and  potential  influence  and  acceptable  and  excessive  costs  constitutes  one  guideline
available for this task, which I will complement with two further perspectives in the chapters to
follow.
882 Nili, ‘Global Justice and Global Realities’, 2016, 205.
883 Cf. Barry points out that consumers could do at least a bit better even if they do not have the choice of buying ‘Fair 
Trade’ oil. Christian Barry, ‘Blood Oil and the Individual Consumer’, New Symposium: Leif Wenar’s Blood Oil: 
Tyrants, Violence and the Rules That Run the World (blog), 2 March 2019, http://jamesgstewart.com/blood-oil-and-
the-individual-consumer/.
884 Irving, Harrison, and Rayner, ‘Ethical Consumerism - Democracy through the Wallet’, 14.
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10.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I unpacked the 'guilty consumer' claims sometimes harnessed to motivate consumers
in affluent democracies to act upon armed conflicts taking place in global supply chains. To enable
prioritising among the diverse moral projects consumers are required to take up using such claims, I
suggested  a  focus  on  the  influence  and  costs  of  consumer  action  required.  Together,  the  two
components do not constitute an exact formula but serve as a rudimentary guideline for thought and
action  in  situations  in  which  several  harms  in  supply  chains  call  for  consumers’ attention.  I
elaborated this distinction in relation to the armed conflicts in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria. 
Consumers’ influence over a conflict is shaped by the suitability of the policies that consumers have
a chance to support by their purchase decisions. A further distinction between consumers’ actual and
potential  influence  follows  a  distinction  between  the  policies  consumers  can  advance  by  their
purchases and the policies they can help bring among the choices that can be supported by purchase
decisions. As it comes to costs, a distinction between acceptable and excessive costs highlighted
that responsibilities place burdens of different weights on actors, and that a high burden may justify
an actor’s appeal to discharge them to a lesser degree. For instance, consumers cannot disengage
from  raw  materials  of  suspicious  origins  by  personal  purchases  without  accruing  significant
personal costs.
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11 BLAME GAMES
11.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter on guilty consumer claims, I pointed at prioritising between different moral
projects as an important component in devising guidelines for consumers’ ethical thought and action
regarding armed conflicts in some supply chains. However, the chapter  gave little regard to the
relation  between  responsibilities  held  by  consumers  and  actors  such  as  companies,  states,  and
international institutions usually taken as key players in conflict mitigation efforts. In this chapter, I
harness the capacity-based approach to address this issue. More precisely, I engage with Iris Marion
Young’s conception of shared responsibility, articulating the concept of ‘blame games’ to pinpoint
the challenges of assigning to consumers a responsibility to collectivise.
I suggest that as an unstructured collective agent consumers lack the structured agents’ conflict-
alleviating potential, and argue that in order to avoid blame games it is sometimes better to let such
less capable actors off the hook than to suggest that every actor involved shares a responsibility to
act upon them. Structured collective agents, such as companies, host states, and importing states,
are first ones on the line were the conflicts in question to be alleviated. This does not imply that all
remedial responsibilities are to be shifted from individuals to collective agents. Rather, I suggest
that  it  is  more  appropriate  to  oblige  individuals  to  harness  ‘their’ collectives  to  act  upon  the
conflicts than to expect consumers to engage in building new ones.
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11.2 BLAME GAMES
I think it’s always companies, consumers and the government and they have to work in tandem…
it’s not just consumers. It’s interlinked.885
So everybody is pointing accusing fingers at each other and nothing gets done.886
This chapter engages with relative capacities of other actors. Even if policies and practices that
consumers  can  support  to  ameliorate  a  conflict  were  not  the  most  efficient  ones  imaginable,
consumers could still be in a relatively better position to make a positive impact than many other
actors. In the introductory chapter, I suggested that having a remedial responsibility means being
obliged to bear higher costs than other actors to alleviate a harm in question. If an actor’s remedial
capacity to alleviate the harm is an important criterion for assigning her remedial responsibility,
then understanding the relative capacities of at least the most obvious other candidates to alleviate
the harm in question is an integral part of the analysis.887 
Yet, such exploration is not a task taken up by theorists of global ethics with any frequency, as they
tend to  work on one agent’s  responsibility  for  one harm at  a  time.888 While  these projects  are
valuable, a practice-based account should provide tools to thought and action that are sensitive to a
situation in which more and more challenges seem to call for attention of consumers in affluent
democracies. By their purchases, consumers are linked with a variety of harms faced by people,
societies  and  the  planet,  but  so  are  other  agents.  Retail  brands,  shipping  companies,  traders,
885 Interview #5: Heather Webb, Researcher, Ethical Consumer
886 Interview #37: Multi-stakeholder working with NEITI
887 Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 7.‐
888 Exceptions remain, for instance: Matt Peterson and Christian Barry, ‘Who Must Pay for the Damage of the Global 
Financial Crisis?’, in Global Financial Crisis: The Ethical Issues (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 158–84.
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shareholders, international trade institutions, state governments, border officials, and factory safety
inspectors, just to name some of the agents involved with the vast supply chains, also have their
responsibilities to manage. Questions on consumer responsibility are interwoven with questions on
responsibilities of other actors, and have to be treated accordingly. 
In this chapter, my main discussant is Iris Marion Young, whose social connection model offers one
way to include the diverse actors to the analysis. As I elaborated in chapter 4, Young builds her
model on the insight that the conventional or  ‘liability’ view of responsibility is too narrow for
making sense of responsibility in the global context of supply chains. If one follows the liability
view, only the actors closest to the harm bear responsibility, although efforts by those indirectly
connected to the harm would be needed. Young’s answer is to argue that those structurally involved
share  a  responsibility  to  come together  to  act  upon  the  problem.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of
sweatshop  labour  a  shared  responsibility  extends  beyond  the  factory  owners  and  managers  to
include  apparel  manufacturers,  institutional  apparel  purchasers,  individual  consumers,  and  the
victims themselves, thus complementing the liability notion by involving a wider range of agents to
resolving the injustices.889
To Young, recognising that a form of responsibility is shared is the best way to create action to
alleviate the harms. While I broadly agree with her on the challenges that the liability conception
faces in the context of global supply chains, I highlight the problem that ensues if her view is
adopted.  Expanding  the  sphere  of  actors  potentially  responsible  while  not  differentiating  their
responsibilities leads to a blame game, that is, a situation in which actors, each of which seems to
have at least some capacity to act towards resolving a harm, displace responsibility to do so to
others. Blame games gain their conceptual feeding ground once one rejects the liability model and
acknowledges that the structurally involved actors ought to play a role in alleviating the conflict.
889 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’; Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice’.
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They constitute a symmetrically opposite problem to the one faced by the liability conception of
responsibility:  whereas  the  liability  account  lets  too  many off  the  hook,  the  shared  conception
includes so many actors that it becomes impossible to differentiate their respective responsibilities.
My criticism of Young’s shared account of responsibility stems from a differing psychological and
sociological view on whether being singled out as obliged to act or being pushed towards acting
together with others constitutes a stronger source of moral motivation or way to help alleviate the
harms, and how well the latter strategy works in a context that transcends communal boundaries.
The factual underpinnings of the debate are not resolved in this chapter; it suffices to say that both
sides have their supporters, and the aim here is to conceptualise how these two initially plausible yet
diverging starting points play out in relation to consumer responsibility.890 In what follows, I argue
that if actors’ responsibilities in global supply chains are not differentiated, effective remedial action
to resolve harms and injustices are less likely to be generated.891 Young’s social connection model
cannot  effectively  single  out  the diverse actors’ relative responsibilities.  Lack of  differentiation
feeds the blame game dynamics, which hinder resolving the armed conflicts.
Blame game is a concept often summoned in the context of harms in global supply chains. For
instance,  Roel  Nieuwenkamp,  former  Chair  of  OECD Working Party  on  Responsible  Business
Conduct  describes the fight against  labour right  violations in the garment  industry:  ‘consumers
blame the companies, companies blame the consumers that they don’t want to pay more, and the
factories blame the guys in brands, brands are blaming the consumers on the ground, so this is a
890 For instance, Rudiger Bittner suggests that humans tend not to take responsibility at all when it is divided to too 
many actors. Doing Things for Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
891 Cf. Goodin’s argument that ‘[w]hat is no one’s responsibility is everyone’s. If it is right that something be done, and
no one particular has been assigned responsibility for doing it, then we are all responsible for seeing to it that be 
done.’ His argument leaves open who is ‘everyone’ in a transcommunal context, where disagreement prevails on the
primary collective agent responsible. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, 32.
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complete  flawed  blame  game.’892 Theoretical  treatments  are  scarce.  For  instance,  Jack  Balkin
describes how in courtrooms defendants and plaintiffs resort to rhetoric devices such as broadening
or narrowing the causal focus, framing the causal linkage as concrete or abstract, and expanding or
contracting the time frame discussed, in order to re-characterise facts known about the case to their
advantage.893 Deborah Stone points out that there is always an alternative story to be told about
causes of a harm, and that such stories are used as frames to control events and distribute costs.894
While these treatises emphasise that causal stories are used as frames, they do not highlight the
negative impact that blame games have on realising morally salient projects.
I  suggest  that  blame  games  can  be  summarised  in  three  tenets.  First,  they  are  detrimental  to
alleviating harms in global supply chains, because instead of tasks being allocated among actors, the
disagreement on whether a given allocation is justified inhibits the use of some or all the resources
available.  Second,  they  commence  in  the  register  of  the  contribution  principle:  in  the  guilty
consumer argument communal and capacity considerations are woven into contributory language to
ground consumers’ remedial responsibility, and such interaction characterises also the competing
narratives that place costs on other actors. Third, they are a conceptual rather than an empirical
problem,  because  the  disagreement  on  which  among  the  many  causal  narratives  that  pinpoint
different actors as remedially responsible ought to guide the allocation of costs  stems from the
impossibility of establishing common criteria for making such a decision on a purely factual basis.
The first  and second tenets are relatively straightforward,  but the third requires an explanation.
Indeed, some disagreements on who ought to remedy a harm seem to derive from lack of facts on
causes of harms. To conjure a simple example, if a fire that destroys several homes is first suspected
892 Interview #2: Roel Nieuwenkamp, Chair, OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct
893 J. M. Balkin, ‘The Rhetoric of Responsibility’, Virginia Law Review 76, no. 2 (1 March 1990): 197–263, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1073202.
894 Stone, ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas’.
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to be lit by a lightning but then investigators discover evidence that it was an act of arson by a
malicious neighbour, a larger share of the costs of repairing the damage done is likely to be placed
on the neighbour. In chapters 4 and 10 I elaborated how even such a seemingly factual inquiry
geared towards allocating costs is guided by many considerations. For instance, the neighbour could
have been suffering from mental problems, to which he had unsuccessfully sought help at the health
centre nearby. Such a narrative complicates the view that the neighbour ought to bear the costs
because he caused the fire; also the medical staff, or the managers who calibrate the criteria for
accepting patients, or even the clinic owners setting the budget of the health centre, could be framed
as having played a causal role in the damage done. Deciding whether their causal role ought to be
treated as relevant involves, then, other considerations such as the costs that the community as a
whole wants to absorb, the values it wants to maintain, and the neighbour’s ability to bear the costs
of repairing for the damage she inflicted. 
A pragmatist reading I take up in this thesis highlights that because 'causal' is a category that cannot
be exhausted with a single definition, or established by subjecting connections between agents and
harms  to  a  uniform  test,  a  factual  inquiry  does  not  tell  which  actor  ought  to  bear  remedial
responsibility. The arson example constitutes a case familiar to courtrooms, in which the rules and
practices for allocating responsibility have developed to being inclined towards cutting the causal
chain leading to liability before it extends to the medical staff of the health centre and beyond. The
context of global supply chains is very different: rules reminiscent of cause-in-fact and proximity
theories,  as  Honoré  refers  to  the  tools  used  in  the  legal  context,  are  rudimentary.895 Surely,
international  treaties  declare that  states have the primary responsibility  to  protect  human rights
within their respective territories and that companies have a responsibility to respect human rights
when  doing  business.  These  principles,  however,  are  not  criteria  for  allocating  remedial
responsibility among the many agents involved in situations such as eastern Congo and southern
895 Honoré, ‘Causation in the Law’.
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Nigeria, in which, as I depicted in earlier chapters, neither state nor company efforts have sufficed
to prevent human rights violations.
A conceptual disagreement on rules to establish actors’ causal roles in bringing forth a harm as
morally  relevant  rather  than  lacking  facts  on  the  causal  process  drives  blame  games.  In  the
following section, I will introduce a competing narrative that emphasises the role of companies,
host states, and importing states over that of consumers in the conflicts in Nigeria and Congo. The
section is not meant to capture all the arguments in the debates, to belittle the importance of local,
sub-national or regional factors in the conflicts, let alone to reduce the drivers of the conflicts to
economic processes in global supply chains. Rather, the aim is to illustrate that alternative causal
narratives that shift remedial costs on other actors than consumers are readily available.
11.3 COMPETING NARRATIVES
As  per  my  elaboration  of  guilty  consumer  claims  in  the  previous  chapter,  consumers  have  a
remedial responsibility to act upon the conflict in Congo, which they can discharge by preferring
products  containing  only ‘conflict-free’ Congolese minerals.  Likewise,  as  per  the same general
argument consumers have a remedial responsibility to act upon the conflict in the Niger Delta,
which  they  can  discharge,  for  instance,  by  buying  only  Nigerian  oil  that  has  been  adequately
identified as not feeding the conflict. In both cases, discharging the responsibility involves costs by
accepting to pay higher prices on ‘conflict-free’ consumer products and using time and money to
disengage  from  products  and  services  that  are  of  suspicious  origins.  However,  the  remedial
responsibility and the ensuing costs can be borne at least partly or completely also by other actors,
such as multinational companies, host countries, and importing countries. I illustrate that each actor
can be brought to the spotlight in a blame-based causal narrative that shows them as bearing a
weightier remedial responsibility than others.
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As depicted in the close study, the international companies sourcing raw materials from Nigeria and
Congo are a class of actors sometimes seen as contributing to the violence. In the Niger Delta, the
international oil companies have been accused of causing environmental damage that deprives the
local  communities  of  their  traditional  livelihoods,  and  of  fuelling  corruption  that  prevents  the
communities  from defending their  interests  by other  means than through violence.  Jana Hönke
suggests that state-company collusion inhibits companies working for peace in the Niger Delta.
Companies allegedly use their financial wealth to support favourable candidates into positions of
power, which in a poor country such as Nigeria aligns the political system with company interests to
the detriment of the larger population.896 The dependency of the Nigerian state on revenues from
joint ventures and other long-standing collaborations gives the IOCs significant negotiating power,
which they exploit to advocate policies beneficial for them but detrimental to most Nigerians.897 
Likewise,  electronic  device  brands which  source  raw materials  from eastern  Congo have  been
blamed for feeding instability by engaging indirectly into business with any group that can provide
3TG minerals. The few international mining companies developing industrial-scale mining in the
Kivus,  such  as  Banro  and  Alphamin,  face  accusations  of  having  driven  artisanal  miners  from
resource-rich areas in collusion with the state.898 As per this narrative, also in Congo companies use
the opportunity to leverage profitable but locally detrimental deals with the government. Were their
responsibilities emphasised, the costs of making supply chains ’conflict-free’ ought to be financed
through smaller profit margins or internal reforms so that consumers would not face higher price
tags or calls for action.
896 Interview #43: Dandy Mgbenwa, Pastor in Okwuzi, Ekbocha Community in Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni Government 
Area in Rivers State
897 Jana Hönke, ‘Business for Peace? The Ambiguous Role of “Ethical” Mining Companies’, Peacebuilding 2, no. 2 
(2014): 176.
898 Interview #26: Tachi Assami Idrissa & Amzati Newa Waliuzi, Cooperative Representatives, COCABI; Judith 
Verweijen, ‘Luddites in the Congo?: Analyzing Violent Responses to the Expansion of Industrial Mining amidst 
Militarization’, City 21, no. 3–4 (2017): 466–482.
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This emphasis can be contested. Zaid Kolawole, Government Relations Manager at Total, pushes
the causal emphasis on the more immediate actors by pointing out that the oil spills in the Niger
Delta that have made some areas inhabitable do not result from company neglect rather than from
sabotage.899 As per estimates  agreed also by GASIN, a  civil  society organisation based in  Port
Harcourt, around 75 percent of the oil spills are man-made whereas 25 percent are due to other
failures.900 The narrative, often preferred by companies, suggests that even if companies disrupt the
local economies and social cohesion by their presence, those breaking into the pipes ought to be
held responsible, as they are indicated as guilty by the conventional liability view of responsibility.
Such a shift of emphasis is often conjoined by capacity-based arguments. Godswill Ihetu, Chairman
of the Petroleum Club based in Lagos,  states that  mismanaged expectations create  tensions,  as
companies attract demands merely by being a powerful collective actor in an undeveloped area
where the state is largely absent.901 While companies sometimes provide basic services to local
communities  as they build their  own facilities,  doing more would disincentivise the state  from
realising its basic functions. Companies neither cause the conflicts nor are in a position to alleviate
the dire socio-economic conditions linked with the two conflicts, whereby blame ought to be borne
by someone else.
If such arguments are accepted, the national governments appear as suitable bearers of remedial
responsibility, especially if one takes the government’s failure to soothe the violence as rising from
domestic factors. For instance, the dismal conditions in the Niger Delta can be traced to Nigeria’s
‘limited’ statehood  rather  than  oil  company  operations.902 The  Nigerian  state,  which  gained its
independence  only some years  after  Shell  started  the  first  large-scale  exploitation of  oil  in  the
899 Interview #38: Zaid Kolawole, Government Relations Manager, Total E&P Nigeria Limited
900 Interview #46: Dandyson Harry Dandyson, Project officer, GASIN
901 Interview #50: Godswill Ihetu, Chairman of the Petroleum Club, Former Group Executive Director in Engineering 
and Technology Directorate of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
902 Hönke, ‘Business for Peace?’
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1950s, has failed to distribute the oil money in a way that benefits the Nigerian population as a
whole. Only some of the funds targeted to developing the Niger Delta region actually filter through
the  patronage-based,  corrupt  political  system.903 The  tacit  system  of  patronage  creates  strong
feelings of unfairness, which the federal, regional and local governments fail to manage, and which
has little to do with companies’ activities. As Arinze Agbim, a former Executive Director in Mobil
Producing Nigeria, suggests: ‘The problem is internal, because there is corruption and theft within
the country, by the local government… corruption is mostly government’.904
Similarly, in Congo diverse domestic factors, such as the ‘kleptocratic’ elements of the governance
structure, underpaid armed forces, failed diplomacy with the neighbouring countries, ethnic rivalries
preventing long-term policy planning, and the proliferation of small arms, hinder the country’s rise
from its current disarray. As Remy Kasindi, founder of an NGO, states: ‘It is the weakness of the
government,  which  makes  final  consumer  victim  of  what  is  going  on… Final  consumers  are
victims.  Producers  are  also  victims.’905 As  per  this  view,  the  companies  exploiting  the  mineral
wealth in the Congo are not feeding or exacerbating the conflicts. Rather, the international brands
are more bystanders than active perpetrators in the effective disintegration of the Congolese state,
the very entity that ought to be maintaining a monopoly of violence where armed factions now rule.
Yet,  national  governments  also  operate  within  enabling  and  constraining  conditions  set  by  the
international  economic  system,  and  especially  by  the  states  taking  advantage  of  Nigerian  and
Congolese raw materials. As per Wenar, countries importing raw materials from Nigeria and Congo
or products made using them subscribe to the unjust international 'might makes right' rule, as by
upholding legislation that allows imports from authoritarian regimes and conflicted areas, the buyer
903 Interview #35: Anne Chiwenze & Zira John Quaghe, Nigeria Officer & Nigeria Officer, Natural Resource 
Governance Institute
904 Interview #40: Arinze Agbim, Former Executive Director at Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited.
905 Interview #18: Remy Kasindi, Founder, CRESA
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countries maintain the resource curse upstream in supply chains. The importing countries could,
however,  enact  legal  reforms  to  reform  international  demand  and  thus  remove  a  factor  that
maintains  such conditions.906 This  narrative  portrays  the  international  companies  sourcing  from
Congo and Nigeria as agents in harmful international arrangements maintained by the powerful
importing countries. Not only North American and European countries are among the culprits, as
China increasingly hosts companies, such as Huawei, who tap on raw materials in conflicted parts
of Africa in order to make products to consumers around the world.907
As before, such a narrative can be countered by, for instance, returning the causal emphasis to the
domestic drivers of the conflict;  portraying the multinational companies  as entities independent
from  the  interests  of  importing  states;  arguing  that  change  imposed  by  foreign  actors  is
unpredictable;  underlining  that  domestic  actors  have  the  best  means  available  in  resolving  the
conflicts; and so on. The rhetoric devices such as those Balkin and Stone describe apply also in the
context of global supply chains, underlining that there is no factual reason why one narrative ought
to be preferred over others.
11.4 UNSTRUCTURED COLLECTIVES
I argue that Young’s conception of shared responsibility does not have a solution to blame games,
because in her work the sphere of responsibility is expanded to a global context without sufficiently
developed guidelines being in place for differentiating between actors’ responsibilities. Her social
connection model does not manage to indicate which of the many actors involved with the harm or
injustice in question ought to pay for mitigative and preventive action, a gap which is conducive to
fewer resources being mobilised for such a purpose. Hence, I suggest another answer: by conceding
906 Leif Wenar, ‘Clean Trade in Natural Resources’, Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2011): 27–39.
907 Wenar, Blood Oil, 308–10.
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that consumers have lower capacity to act upon the conflicts in Congo and Nigeria than structured
agents, remedial responsibilities are usefully assigned to these other actors, which then drops one
potential suspect out of the recurrent blame games.
Why would consumers be less capable than other actors? In chapter 3, I adopted a concept used by
Christopher  Kutz to  discuss  consumers  as  an  unstructured collective  agent.908 Consumers  are  a
category  of  individuals  not  bound  together  by  a  common  identity,  geographical  location,
citizenship, culture, or any other attribute beyond their habit of engaging with markets to purchase
products for their own use. From a widely Kantian view of moral agency, such a group cannot
constitute a moral agent, as it lacks vital attributes such as a unified self and common intentions.
However, based on the future-looking collective responsibility framework I adopted, any group that
is  capable  of  ‘doing  and  taking  responsibility’  can  constitute  a  moral  collective  agent.909
Accordingly, these chapters can be read as explorations of whether consumers’ potential to bring
forth changes in global economy by coordinated purchase action, a scenario held dear by several
civil society campaigners and academics, is strong enough to justify assigning to them a shared
responsibility to form together a collective actor or actors serving that purpose.
Developing the analysis further, I argue that compared with the  potential of structured agents to
realise such moral projects, consumers’ potential is limited, as they lack common decision-making
mechanisms and an identity. Lacking a better theoretical term to capture their potential, events in
the  global  supply  chains  happen  for  consumers  rather  than  because  of them.  The change of  a
preposition echoes what Marion Smiley underlines when she argues that in order to qualify as a
moral agent a group does not have to be able to act, which is a strong mode of causing events in the
world, rather than to do something, which means being able to produce a change in the world.910 For
doing something, a  group needs to have ‘coordinating control’ over group members, and that the
908 Kutz, Complicity.
909 Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 7.‐
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group rather than its  individual members must be necessary for the harm to come about.911 By
emphasising that events take place for consumers, I suggest that the way consumers affect change
through their purchase action fails to meet what Smiley refers to as ‘doing’. Consumers cause things
in the sense that production processes emerge and exist for them, as companies strive to meet the
consumers’ real or alleged desires. However, their disaggregated form of agency implies that the
contemporary modes of global production, or any changes in them, do not happen due to consumers
acting in a morally relevant way.
This  rather  theoretical  conceptualisation  of  consumers’ relative  capacity  to  act  upon the  armed
conflicts, inspired by Aristotle’s division between efficient and final causes, guides my answer to
the  blame  games.912 The  guilty  consumer  argument,  for  instance,  is  guided  by  its  advocates
recognising that if enough consumers changed their shopping patterns, crucial actors in the supply
chains  would  be  incentivised  to  act  differently.  Yet,  the  analysis  goes  astray  in  the  sense  that
although  consumers  together  constitute  a  causally  relevant  agent,  the  causal  story  that  binds
consumers as agents capable of alleviating the conflicts lacks a protagonist. To refer to the puzzle
that drives this thesis, the tremendous but elusive capacity they possess to change global production
processes remains untapped as long as there are no prospects of a collective moral agent that could
coordinate purposeful action which would qualify as doing something.
Structured  collective  agents  are  more  appropriate  responsibility-bearers  because  no  existing
institution  that  could  do  something  reigns  over  consumers’ collective  capacity.  Onora  O’Neill
suggests  that  there  is  more  potential  in  burdening  existing  institutions  than  individuals  with
910 Smiley leaves the concept of ‘producing’ unelaborated. I suggest the for-because distinction to move beyond this 
ambiguity. 3.
911 Smiley, ‘From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs’, 197–98.
912 The for-because differentiation is reminiscent of Aristotle’s division between efficient and final causes, although the
distinction I make is more appropriately called Aristotelian-inspired than Aristotelian: Milja Kurki, Causation in 
International Relations : Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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responsibilities,  because institutions can better  predict  consequences,  keep more systematic  and
accurate memories, as well as carry through plans and influence other agents.913 Wenar adds that
institutions may be able to impose on individuals demands that would ‘be unreasonable to expect
individuals to place on themselves’.914 Building on such work, my argument to prefer burdening
existing structured collective agents over asking consumers to create new ones unfolds in two ways.
First, arguing that consumers share a responsibility to collectivise into an entity or entities that can
make a positive difference, the specification of consumer responsibility I discussed in chapter 3, is
exposed to a rebuttal that the positive difference is more likely to be realised by harnessing existing
collective agents to take up action. Second, arguing that consumers share a remedial responsibility
with companies and states is exposed to a rebuttal that blame games accentuate when responsibility
is shared in the global context, and that blame games lead to fewer resources being available to
resolve the harm in question.
Of course, the focus of this thesis is on consumers in affluent democracies rather than consumers
per se. Young’s work, however, is not sensitive to this difference, usually referring to individual
consumers in a wide sense. Hence, Hannah Arendt’s statement ’where all are guilty, nobody in the
last analysis can be judged’ that she wrote when articulating the notion of political responsibility to
describe  ordinary  Germans’  relation  to  Nazi  crimes,  implies  a  valid  criticism  of  Young’s
approach.915 Arendt’s notion of political responsibility, which she developed as an alternative to the
guilt-based approach, has the potential to motivate collective action, because remedial responsibility
in  the  case  she  discusses  is  shared  by  members  of  a  clearly  demarcated  political  community.
Young’s social connection model, however, does not have the advantage of a confined context, as
she discusses agents’ responsibility to act together upon structural injustices in global production
913 O’Neill, Faces of Hunger, 37–38; Leif Wenar, ‘Contractualism and Global Economic Justice’, Metaphilosophy 32, 
no. 1 2 (2001): 82.‐
914 Wenar, ‘Contractualism and Global Economic Justice’, 82.
915 Arendt, ‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility’, 150.
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processes. In her context of choice, a myriad of agents across the world, including groups such as
consumers that lack a structure under which to come together to make a difference in the world, are
assigned a part of the burden, which accentuates the blame game dynamics to the detriment of
resolving the harms.
11.5 CRITICISM
My argument  can  be  attacked  at  least  on  three  grounds.  First,  it  might  be  accused  of  being
erroneous, as already several successful boycotting campaigns have been conducive to companies
and governments taking up measures to avoid human rights violations, environmental degradation,
and  other  harms  linked  with  global  production  processes.  It  seems  that  consumers  can  come
together to bring forth change in the supply chains. To answer, in the next chapter I will further
expand  my  view  that  consumers,  as  a  wide  disaggregated  group  across  the  world,  are  not
necessarily  the  actors  with  whom such success  stories  are  accurately  associated.  Rather,  larger
campaigns that involve purchase action, but also political advocacy, mass demonstrations, high-
level diplomacy, and so on, have been advanced by individuals in different roles, for instance as
citizens of affluent democracies who mobilise their political capacity for various purposes. While a
part  of  campaigns,  an  overt  emphasis  on  purchase  action  in  explaining  success  stories
mischaracterises  larger  advocacy  campaigns  as  an  activity  in  which  consumers  are  the  central
actors.
Second,  my  answer  might  seem  conservative  by  taking  for  granted  that  consumers  are  not
organised, although new forms of consumer activism might be possible in the future. To answer, I
agree  that  there  currently  being  no  powerful  consumers’ associations  orchestrating  the  use  of
collective purchase power to incentivise actors to reforms in production processes does not mean
that  such  entities  could  not  emerge  to  wield  considerable  influence  over  supply  chains.  Holly
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Lawford-Smith, to whose work I referred in chapter 3, suggests that consumers’ responsibility is to
create such collectives rather than to alleviate harms.916 Purchase decisions can be conducive to this
effort, as a consumer’s costly enough ‘ethical’ purchases act as signals to other consumers that he is
willing to create such an entity together with others. Consumers’ responsibility to form formidable
collectives is independent of the capacity of states, companies, and other agents to act upon harms
in global supply chains, because it is not grounded on their capacity to achieve the same purpose.  
Lawford-Smith’s ‘indirect difference-making’ approach to consumer responsibility, as Julia Nefsky
aptly calls it, gets many things right.917 Lawford-Smith recognises that capacity is an important, or
in  her  consequentialist  account  a  fundamental,  element  in  determining  agents’  respective
responsibilities, and by introducing the need to collectivise acknowledges that structured collectives
are better positioned to realise moral projects than unstructured ones. However, replacing harm-
prevention with collectivisation as the desired outcome of consumer action does not mean that
harm-prevention  is  not  the  ultimate  goal  of  collectivisation  in  Lawford-Smith’s  argument.  A
responsibility to collectivise can be read as a responsibility to develop a capacity to realise goals
such as the alleviation of conflicts in supply chains, that is, to develop instruments that can be used
together to such a purpose. As suggested in the previous chapter, I find that her move blurs the line
between actual and potential influence, making it difficult to establish the basis on which consumers
ought to prioritise between the various moral projects they could realise together. If consumers have
a  responsibility  to  form collectives  to  resolve  problems  in  global  supply  chains,  why  are  not
individuals in general responsible for building collectives to realise all kinds of moral projects? To
remind, Samuel Scheffler points out that consequentialist  accounts of responsibility suffer from
non-restrictiveness, which involves that the scope of individual responsibility easily extends to all
916 Lawford Smith, ‘Does Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?’; Lawford-Smith, ‐
‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’.
917 Nefsky, ‘Consumer Choice and Collective Impact’, 270–72.
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kinds of moral projects.918 Assigning consumers a responsibility to collectivise is vulnerable to the
same problem: it  is  difficult  to  pinpoint  why consumers  are  the responsible  actors  and how to
prioritise between the many projects upon which they could act as a collective.
Third, my answer might be read as absolving individuals of all responsibility, because structured
collective agents are not only more capable of realising moral projects than consumers but generally
more capable of realising them than individuals. However, assigning remedial responsibility only to
collectives is not what I argue, because any responsibility that the structured collective agents bear
sifts down to individuals who are in a position to shape the conduct of the collective in question.
Consumers are an unsuitable group for bearing responsibilities, because they are not in a position to
efficiently harness the potential of any structured collective agent to act for moral purposes. To be
sure, this is a relative, contingent claim: consumers’ capacity to harness a structured agent is to be
reflected against, for instance, the capacity of shareholders to affect company decision-making. As a
limited,  identifiable  group,  which  can  in  varying  degrees  influence  executive  decisions,
shareholders have the potential to harness company capacity in a manner that is beyond consumers’
reach.
Shareholders  as  an  alternative,  more  capable  group  of  individuals  is  presented  here  only  for
illustrative purposes, paving the way to the third perspective on ‘citizen-consumers’, which explores
individuals’ varying capacities to harness collective actors in different roles. The emphasis of this
chapter has been to carve out the distinction between unstructured and structured actors as a useful
tool to dissolve some, if surely not all, of the blame game dynamics. I have referred to violent
conflicts in Congo and Nigeria to illustrate that remedial responsibility ought not to be shared by
too many actors, because responsibility spread too thin might lead to problems being solved in a
918 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 43.
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very inefficient fashion, if at all. An interviewee phrases this rather theoretical point in relation to
consumers’ role in the Niger Delta violence as follows: 
I don’t say that they don’t have the blame but I don’t blame them… Because if I
start  chasing those  people I  miss  the point.  Once you are able  to  address  the
system that makes it possible for stolen oil to find its way to a developed country
or  refined  and  sold  in  the  international  market,  before  even  getting  to  the
consumer, that system is what makes it possible for that consumer to get access to
the stolen oil, that’s the system I am bothered about.919
Letting  consumers  off  the  hook  has  the  potential  to  direct  resources  towards  identifying  and
burdening  actors  who  are  more  capable  of  acting  upon  the  weaknesses  of  ‘the  system’.  An
individual  consumer  has  negligible  capacity  to  act  upon violent  conflicts  through  markets;  the
unstructured agent that they together constitute is too weak compared to other collectives to be
assigned  a  responsibility;  and  consumers’ responsibility  to  organise  themselves  to  a  powerful
structured agent to alleviate the conflicts cannot be easily grounded on their capacity only. This
might  appear  as  a  harsh  conclusion,  potentially  read  as  a  suggestion  to  absolve  consumers  of
responsibilities to conceive other than price and quality in their purchases. However, this is not the
case, as I will elaborate in the discussion on overlapping roles in the next chapter.
11.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I expanded the analysis of consumer responsibility to the relative capacities of other
agents. My main discussant was Iris Marion Young, who recognises in her model of responsibility
that many harms taking place in global supply chains are conditioned by other actors who avoid
919 Interview #37: Multi-stakeholder working with NEITI, interview
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remedial responsibilities if the contribution-based, liability conception of responsibility adopted is
taken as the dominant concept. I argued that if her social connection model is adopted, the harms
remain unresolved, as blame games between the many agents accentuate when their capacities are
not  adequately  differentiated.  A too  rigid  notion  of  liability  borrowed  from  courtrooms  shifts
excessive responsibility on some actors while others receive none, whereas a shared notion inflates
the gallery of responsible actors to the extent that the moral projects remain unrealised.
I suggested that a pragmatist, capacity-based approach to responsibility mitigates some of the blame
games that proliferate in this global context. The approach I advocate recognises that consumers do
not have a capacity to act upon violent conflicts in global supply chains comparable to those of
structured  collective  actors.  Consumers’ lack  of  capacity  stems from their  disaggregated  form,
which is captured by the description that processes in the supply chains take place for consumers
rather than because of them. In some cases, responsibility is better assigned on structured collective
actors, such as companies and nation-states, and those individuals who are in a better position than
consumers to harness ‘their’ collectives’ potential to act upon armed conflicts in supply chains.
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12 CITIZEN-CONSUMERS
12.1 INTRODUCTION
In the two previous chapters, I explored consumers’ capacity to make a positive impact on armed
conflicts upstream in supply chains and the relation of these capacities to those of other actors. This
chapter  engages  with  Dewey’s  work  to  expand  the  inquiry  from  the  positive  difference  that
consumers  can  make  as  a  ground  of  their  remedial  responsibility  to  changes  brought  forth  in
consumers themselves as they are assigned a remedial responsibility. Bearing a responsibility to
ameliorate a harm has a transformative dimension, as responsibilities that individuals bear are to
guide the development of critical intelligence they use to orient amidst the situations, disruptions
and conflicts calling for an ethical inquiry. Hence, assignations of responsibility are to be evaluated
based on whether they more widely support such human growth, which involves moral inclusion
and the strengthening of individuals’ capacities to ameliorate exploitation, suffering and violence. 
In  this  chapter,  I  suggest  that  the  concept  of  the  ‘citizen-consumer’  helps  pinpoint  this
transformative dimension of assigning responsibility. I explore the distinction between citizens and
consumers in affluent democracies, two roles which several writers including Dewey tend to see as
juxtaposed, but which in practical efforts to mobilise individuals to act upon harms in supply chains
interweave with each other. The overlaps between the two roles are illustrated by the way citizens
use purchase action to  signal  a need for remedial action on harms that  they perceive as worth
tackling by harnessing the state apparatus. Shifts and prioritisations in assigning responsibilities to
individuals in various roles are underlined by different understandings of the kinds of individuals
that can best orient among new situations brought forth by the vast processes of globalisation.
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12.2 ROLES
Ethical consumerism has been accused of allowing individuals to ‘tune in but drop out’ from more
demanding forms of acting upon social injustices, and gearing social and political activism towards
catering privileged specialty products to well-doing consumers.920 Already in the first chapter,  I
highlighted that narrow conceptualisations of ethical consumerism often underlining such claims
are too restrictive. Consumers do not have capacities only in the markets, although they surely can
create an economic incentive for companies to change their business practices. Barnett, Clarke and
Cloke argue that being a consumer is not reducible to a ‘choice’ between products in the markets:
shopping is done as parents, partners, football fans, good friends, and so on, which underlines that
‘the consumer’ is not a macro-sociological, universal figure recognisable across cultural, historical
and institutional settings.921 Further, consumers are not naïve enough to imagine that they bring
forth change simply by exercising pressure in the markets. They see purchase action as ‘a way of
raising awareness, of aligning their own commitments with the routines of everyday life, and of
demonstrating to  others  that  everyone could make a  little  difference’,  a  tool  of political  action
alongside campaigning, demonstrating, contacting legislators, and voting.922 
Whereas  the  previous  chapters  elaborated  perspectives  on  the  way  assessing  consumers’
responsibilities using remedial  capacities as a  yardstick involves prioritisations  between various
moral  projects  and  a  sensitivity  to  the  responsibilities  of  other  actors,  this  chapter  takes  up  a
capacity-based approach to explore the practice of ethical consumerism as embedded in political
920 Raymond L Bryant and Michael K Goodman, ‘Consuming Narratives: The Political Ecology of “Alternative” 
Consumption’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 29, no. 3 (2004): 344–66; Kate Soper, ‘Re-
Thinking the `Good Life`: The Citizenship Dimension of Consumer Disaffection with Consumerism’, Journal of 
Consumer Culture 7, no. 2 (2007): 205–29.
921 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, 35.
922 Barnett, Clarke, and Cloke, ‘Whatever Happened to Ethical Consumption’, 6.
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action.  Frank Trentmann argues that treating ethical consumerism as inferior to civic activity has
little historical resonance. Those valourising public participation over private consumption struggle
to explain why social movements since the first half of the twentieth century find consumer politics
an increasingly appealing way to overcome barriers to full democracy, social justice and material
well-being.923 Portraying  a  zero-sum game between  upholding  public  civic  values  and  making
private consumption choices hides that consumer choice has been harnessed not only by global
justice campaigners  but  for  purposes  such as  nationalism and imperialism.924 Consumers  might
become more assertive and involved precisely because they want to support the community, or to
realise purposes that are not achieved otherwise.
Ethical consumerism understood this way poses an interesting challenge to Dewey’s views, because
his overarching attitude towards consumption is  one of suspicion.  Dewey places high value on
democratic  practices  through which  individuals  coordinate  their  social  efforts  to  solve  specific
situations  that  they  come  across.  To  him,  participating  in  equal  and  accountable  democratic
processes is an integral part of individuals nurturing one’s critical intelligence, as it is the most
effective way of mobilising individual resources for together managing situations they face. The
transformative  nature  of  participating  in  democratic  practices  and  collective  deliberation  is
conducive to growth, whereas modern consumer culture cultivates wrong kinds of aspirations:
Man is a consuming and sportive animal as well as a political one . . . the movie,
radio, cheap reading matter and motor car with all they stand for have come to
stay.  That  they  did  not  originate  in  deliberate  desire  to  divert  attention  from
political interests does not lessen their effectiveness in that direction. The political
923 Frank Trentmann, ‘Beyond Consumerism: New Historical Perspectives on Consumption’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 39, no. 3 (2004): 399.
924 Frank Trentmann, ‘Citizenship and Consumption’, Journal of Consumer Culture 7, no. 2 (2007): 148–50; 
Trentmann, Empire of Things; M. J Daunton and Matthew Hilton, The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture 
and Citizenship in Europe and America, Leisure, Consumption, and Culture (Oxford: Berg, 2001).
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elements  in  the  constitution  of  the  human  being,  those  having  to  do  with
citizenship, are crowded to one side. In most circles it is hard work to sustain
conversation on a political theme; and once initiated, it is quickly dismissed with a
yawn. Let there be introduced the topic of the mechanism and accomplishment of
various makes of motor cars or the respective merits of actresses, and the dialogue
goes on at a lively pace.925
Here, it is useful and legitimate to move beyond Dewey’s negative verdict of popular and consumer
culture in the early 20th century United States.926 Again, too  stark normative distinctions between
civic  and consumer action ‘reproduce the binaries  of  consumption,  instrumental  rationality  and
autonomy  on  the  one  side,  and  collective  values,  altruism  and  public  life  on  the  other’,  a
moralisation  that  deserves  to  be  challenged.927 Surely,  critics  can  maintain  that  approving
consumers’ ethical purchases gradually transforms individuals to isolated entities to whom shopping
decisions is the most convenient way to make a difference in the world. Yet, civic action with a
traditional  focus  on  campaigning  and  conventional  politics  is  not  to  be  valorised,  because,  as
Schudson points out, it is often bound with calculations of self-interest rather than public-spirited
behaviour.928
There are different ways to move beyond the strict, moralising distinction often implicitly drawn
between  citizens  and  consumers.  The  concept  of  the  ‘citizen-consumer’ has  emerged  as  one
925 John Dewey and Melvin L. Rogers, The Public and Its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 116–17; Schudson, ‘The Troubling Equivalence of Citizen and 
Consumer’, 197.
926 Surely, Dewey left some space for improving consumer sentiments: ‘Courts do not allow the government to supply 
more healthful dwellings, and hence the ultimate remedy appears to be in the general education of the consumer to 
demand a different type of dwelling.’ Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 434.
927 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, 33.
928 Schudson, ‘The Troubling Equivalence of Citizen and Consumer’, 193–204.
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conceptual device to capture the way individuals bear both economic and political capacities. Josée
Johnston claims that the ‘citizen-consumer’ is a hybrid actor who compensates for the failure of the
state-based system by adopting market mechanisms as an alternative medium to advance moral and
political  projects  she  sees  worth  pursuing on a  global  scale.929 Such an  actor  seems implicitly
prevalent  in  campaign  rhetoric.  For  instance,  campaigners  aiming  to  build  a  movement  in  the
United States to alleviate the conflict in eastern Congo do not shy away from framing individuals
either in market or civic terms. Annie Callaway, Advocacy and Activist Manager at the Enough
Project, describes their choice of calling for consumer rather than citizen action:
Much of our language may skew towards the word 'consumer'  because of our
corporate  advocacy  work  -  companies  are  more  likely  to  care  about  their
customers than just the average citizen who doesn't purchase from them - but that
doesn't mean that citizens don't also have a role to play, especially when it comes
to lobbying for political change.930
In practice, campaigners do not limit themselves to engaging with consumers or citizens only. The
Enough Project has called for its supporters to buy ‘conflict-free’ electronics, to email producers to
demand that they avoid suspicious raw materials, to urge their universities and workplaces to buy
conflict-free electronics, and to recycle old electronics in order to reduce the demand of conflict
minerals.  At  the same time,  they have asked supporters  to  lobby politicians  to  reform mineral
import policies and to donate money to advocacy and campaigning projects in Congo.931 Here, the
campaigners use the kind of vocabulary that they diagnose as resonating among the agents they see
as important in tackling the problem in hand.
929 To Johnston, it remains questionable whether citizen-consumers can ultimately produce the outcomes they strive 
for: ‘The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid’.
930 Interview #3: Annie Callaway, Advocacy and Activist Manager, Enough Project
931 Nest, Coltan, 121.
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While the concept of citizen-consumer has gained foothold in civil society campaigns, the relation
between consumer and civic action remains relatively unexplored in normative theorising. Wenar
lays out a plan for western ‘statesmen, consumers, investors, leaders in civil society, and most of all,
for citizens’ to fight the resource curse.932 Rhetorically,  he  retains consumers as relevant actors in
the efforts to set up Clean Trade Acts and Trusts, because, among other reasons, consumers finance
and  incentivise  bloodshed  in  several  resource-rich  countries  by  their  purchases.933 However,
although consumers appear on the list of important agents, Wenar suggests that purchase action is
not an efficient way to tackle the resource curse upstream in supply chains, because ‘[t]racing most
materials through the world’s opaque, ever-shifting supply chains is too hard, especially since many
new raw materials are used as intermediate goods in the chains… As consumers, we are stuck’.934
What is the exact role of consumers and purchase action in the fight against the resource curse?
Highlighting that acting as a consumer is difficult does not equal to saying that individuals should
not take action.935  Shmuel Nili notes in a discussion on Wenar’s work that:
It  is  crucial  to  distinguish here our political  capacity  as  collectively sovereign
citizens from our economic capacity as individual consumers… First, consumers’
ability to discover the origin of each product they purchase is much more limited
than  governments’  abilities  to  designate  regimes  as  violating  their  peoples’
property rights. Second, governments will incur much smaller costs, comparable
to their resources, in disengaging at least from some severely oppressive regimes,
932 Wenar, Blood Oil, xxvii.
933 For instance, as per the summary of the book: ‘BLOOD OIL shows how citizens, consumers and leaders can act 
today to dissolve tomorrow’s crises - and how we can together create a more united human future.’ Wenar, ‘Book’; 
‘We hear faint cries from the distant ends of supply chains, where the huge weight of global consumer demand 
crushes down on the bodies of those tortured by authoritarians or raped by militiamen.’ Wenar, Blood Oil, xxiv.
934 Wenar, Blood Oil, xxiv.
935 Barry, ‘Blood Oil and the Individual Consumer’.
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than is the case with consumers who decide to boycott every good whose origins
might somehow be tainted, and therefore practically have no choice but to consign
themselves to almost survivalist modes of life.936
Nili’s distinction between political and economic capacities clarifies the situation somewhat, as it
teases out the high value Wenar places on citizens’ political capacity to affect policy-making in their
respective countries: a person in an affluent democracy is likely to disengage from raw materials
sold by authoritarian regimes and armed groups more effectively by using her political capacities as
a  citizen  than  she  would  by  using  her  economic  capacities  as  a  consumer.  However,  Nili’s
distinction is still somewhat misleading, as he compares consumers with governments. An argument
that an individual consumer is in an inferior position to fight the resource curse than governments
sheds no light on the capacities that individual citizens of affluent democracies possess, because, as
elaborated  in  the  previous  chapter,  collective  actors  are  by  default  more  capable  of  realising
different  projects  than  individuals  or  unorganised  groups.937 Comparing  consumers  with
governments does not pinpoint whether an individual citizen’s capacity to alleviate the conflicts in
Nigeria and Congo is higher than an individual consumer’s capacity to act upon the same purpose.
In what follows, I suggest that instead of merging citizens and consumers to citizen-consumers or
considering them as fundamentally opposed, it is analytically more useful to think of citizenship
and  consumership  as  two separate  but  overlapping  roles.  A role-based  approach  to  clarify  the
normative relationship between citizenship and consumership is needed, because few theorists who
discuss the responsibility of the citizens of ‘affluent states’, ‘western countries’, or ‘global North’ to
act upon global challenges such as poverty venture very far to articulate the role that consumption
936 Shmuel Nili, ‘Conceptualizing the Curse: Two Views on Our Responsibility for the “Resource Curse”’, Ethics & 
Global Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 110.
937 O’Neill, Faces of Hunger, 37–38; Wenar, ‘Contractualism and Global Economic Justice’, 82.
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plays in grounding or discharging such a responsibility.938 This gap is concerning, because silence
tacitly reinforces the conception that consumer action is juxtaposed to political action. Barnett et al
suggest that ‘consumerism has become the central reference point in a wide range of social science
arguments which diagnose a broad-based decline of civic life and public participation’.939 Ethical
consumerism is often seen as a symptom of a ‘post-political age’ in which the well-worn role of a
citizen is discarded as ill-equipped to resolve contemporary global challenges.940 A more balanced
account acknowledges the shifting and overlapping nature of what it means to be a citizen or a
consumer, and resonates with the actual practice of interchangeably assigning responsibilities to
individuals in both roles.
Roles have been taken up from a widely consequentialist perspective.941 As discussed in chapter 5,
Wenar  refers  to  roles  as  an  ordering  device  for  one-off  situations  and  on  a  systemic  level  to
distribute using the least-cost principle.942 Goodin suggests that responsibilities to realise common
goods are apportioned based on social  tasks, or roles.943 People act in various roles and switch
between them throughout their days. No one of these roles is primary, but they nevertheless help
orient  in  situations  in  which responsibilities  to do something that  is  together  decided as  worth
realising have to be allocated. For instance, being a parent comes with a special responsibility to
look after one’s children, and being a chief executive of a company comes with a responsibility to
938 E.g. Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’; Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2002; Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice; also Wringe, ‘From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional Obligations’.
939 Barnett, Globalizing Responsibility, 30.
940 Barnett, 12; Sassatelli, ‘Virtue, Responsibility and Consumer Choice’, 220.
941 Michael O. Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’, Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 7 (1994): 333–363; Ken Booth and Toni 
Erskine, ‘Conclusion: Responsibility, Risk, and IR Theory’, in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken 
Booth and Toni Erskine (Cambridge; Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2016); Role Ethics Network, ‘Literature 
Guide’, 2017, https://roleethics.org/literature-guide/.
942 Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’.
943 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Apportioning Responsibilities’, Law and Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1987): 167–185.
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ensure that the company generates profit to shareholders. Roles provide a way to allocate tasks
between many actors, and are thus socially useful. However, as individuals carry several roles, it is
ultimately up to them to decide which roles and which subsequent responsibilities they prioritise in
each situation.944
Yet, there is more to roles than consequentialist readings allude. Roles come with expectations to
build specific capacities, and the content of these expectations is not derived from actors’ current
capacities only. For instance, if one becomes a father, he is expected to develop the attributes that
the surrounding community values as characteristics of a good father. Such expectations are set not
only based on the father’s existing capacities – it is not just those who can be good fathers that
become fathers – but remain grounded on the kind of attributes that are conceived valuable in the
society as a whole. Similarly, anyone who is born as or becomes a citizen of a democratic political
community is expected to take part in civic action so that the political system remains functional.
However, not only those who qualify as ‘good’ citizens become citizens; rather, the roles come with
preconceived expectations on the kind of capacities those in them ought to nurture.945
Roles carry and encapsulate social expectations, conventions and valuations. As John Casey writes: 
It is by no means self-evident that the moral judgment in favor of a particular role
can always be expressed in utilitarian terms - that the exercise of a particular role
has, for instance, socially desirable consequences. It might rather be based on the
view  that  a  particular  role  or  particular  pattern  of  activity  embodies  certain
characteristic human excellences or virtues. The acceptance of a role might, then,
involve certain moral pre-suppositions, but might nevertheless not be vulnerable
944 Schmidtz and Goodin, Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, 196.
945 Goodin, ‘Apportioning Responsibilities’; also Young refers to Goodin’s concept of task responsibility as a way to 
help differentiate the actors’ responsibilities for structural injustices: ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, 
384; Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, 282.
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on  moral  grounds  to  re-examination  in  light  of  particular  consequentialist
considerations.946
Recognising  that  there  are  several  considerations  that  interweave  in  the  assignation  of
responsibilities based on social roles resonates with Dewey’s pluralism. Marion Smiley argues that
social roles which individuals inhabit are affected by what is considered as a morally blameworthy
causal connection with a harm.947 I complement this analysis by suggesting that also a capacity
analysis  interweaves  with  the  normative  expectations  Smiley  sees  as  linked  with  social  roles.
Having a specific role comes with an expectation to build a capacity to realise the aims that the
surrounding community considers as valuable, but actors’ capacities are among the considerations
that  shape  the  very  roles  and  remedial  responsibilities  linked  with  these  values.  Similar  to  a
consequentialist  reading,  the  pragmatist  approach  retains  capacity  as  an  important  element  in
shaping social roles, but rather than seeing roles as underlined by capacity-based considerations
only,  recognises the plurality  of  considerations that  are  involved with assigning responsibilities
based on them. The way roles are prioritised over each other in context-specific constellations is
similar  to  the  way  Rubenstein  depicts  several  moral  reasons  as  interacting  when  remedial
responsibilities are to be assigned. No general device to arrange the many roles into an order exists;
the  roles  overlap  with  each  other,  and  some  might  appear  stronger  in  specific  situations  than
others.948
As it comes to the many roles individuals inhabit, reflecting on consumership and citizenship is
illuminating for four reasons. First, despite acknowledging that being a consumer is not only about
a choice, treating consumership as a role allows retaining what Nili refers to as economic capacities
946 John Casey, ‘Actions and Consequences’, in Morality and Moral Reasoning: Five Essays in Ethics, ed. John Casey 
(Routledge, 2013), 195–96; Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 140–41.
947 Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, 208–10.
948 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’.
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as the defining channel of consumers’ capacities, which then intertwine with the traditional political
capacities vested in the role of a citizen. Second, role responsibility returns individuals among the
potential  bearers of a responsibility to act upon harms in global supply chains.  In the previous
chapter, I suggested that the individuals who for instance as shareholders or citizens have more
potential to harness the capacities of structured collectives bear a more stringent responsibility to act
upon  violent  conflicts  than  consumers,  who  are  members  of  an  unstructured  group.  Role
responsibility  articulates  this  view  better  by  establishing  that  individuals  may  have  different
responsibilities based on their different roles, for instance as citizens of rather than consumers in
affluent democracies. Third, a role responsibility approach acknowledges that ‘the consumer’ and
other roles are shifting and contested social creations to which responsibilities are linked based on
communal, causal, capacity-based and other considerations, at the same time as it retains capacity
as a hypothetically useful yardstick in allocating responsibilities based on them.949
12.3 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPACITIES
A role approach can be applied to the question of consumer responsibility at least in two ways. In
this section, I compare the capacities that a citizen and a consumer in an affluent democracy have to
ameliorate armed conflicts in eastern Congo and southern Nigeria.  Drawing on Nili’s distinction
above, I define an individual’s political capacity as the degree to which she can direct the state to
adopt certain policies by exercising her political  rights,  and economic capacity as the extent to
which she can direct companies to adopt certain policies by exercising her purchase power. Critics
of ethical consumerism are likely to argue that remedial responsibilities to alleviate violent conflicts
ought to be assigned to citizens rather than consumers, because individuals have better means to
ameliorate  violent  conflicts  in Nigeria  and Congo by using their  political  capacities.  There are
several arguments of varying strengths to ground this claim, which I will explore below.
949 Reinecke and Ansari, ‘Taming Wicked Problems’, 320–22.
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First, it is possible to argue that citizens face more bearable informational demands than consumers.
While  citizens  are  surely  expected  to  know  about  the  political  system,  the  parties,  and  the
politicians  of  their  country in  order  to  effectively  direct  their  efforts,  they  are  not  expected to
formulate individual policies rather than to elect representatives who are savvy enough to run the
hands-on policy work. To compare, consumers have to engage in a demanding calculation before
making  every  ’responsible’  purchase,  because  making  the  right  choice  requires  significant
knowledge about the origins of the products. This argument misportrays both sides. It ignores that a
democratic  system needs an active citizenry that  keeps itself  informed,  brings  up issues to  the
agenda,  holds  the  decision-makers  in  check,  and prevents  the system from becoming stagnant.
Equally,  it  underestimates  the  role  that  brands  play  in  lightening  the  informational  burden  of
consumers.  As Harrison points out, brands serve as ‘shortcuts’: consumers buy from brands that
have managed to convince them that their items are produced responsibly. In crude terms, when a
consumer buys from a brand she deems ethical, her purchase decision is better likened to voting for
a representative rather than to deciding on an individual policy.950 
Second, one can argue in favour of political capacities by claiming that alleviating conflicts  by
purchase decisions requires too many sacrifices from individuals compared to using one’s political
rights as a citizen. This claim is separate from the informational burden argument above, and linked
with the costs of disengaging from intermediate goods I discussed in relation to guilty consumer
claims. Nili argues that obliging a consumer to alleviate authoritarianism or violence abroad by
disengaging  from  natural  resources  of  questionable  origins  would  reduce  the  consumer  to
‘survivalist modes of life’, which to him is a supererogatory sacrifice unlikely to be realised.951 Yet,
Nili does not explain on what grounds the costs that citizens have to face when using their political
950 Interview #57: Rob Harrison, Director, Ethical Consumer. While it is another question whether a brand lives up to 
its promises, neither do representatives always realise the policies a citizen hopes to advance by voting for them.
951 Nili, ‘Conceptualizing the Curse’, 110.
308
capacities to advocate for ‘conflict-free’ importing policies are less dramatic. Even if one accepted
the  claim  that  governments  can  disengage  from  questionable  sources  more  efficiently  than
individual  consumers,  an  individual  citizen  of  a  state  can  devote  considerable  resources  to
promoting such a policy change. Nothing in Nili’s argument prevents such a determined citizen
from bringing himself to a ‘survivalist’ mode of life when engaging in cost-generating and time-
consuming activism.
Third, the primacy of political capacities can be specified to apply to the cases in which the costs
that one’s government faces when disengaging from suspicious sources of raw materials are not that
high. For instance, it might not be costly for the United States to disengage from oil sold by the
authoritarian Equatorial Guinea, whereas such a policy shift would be much more dramatic in the
case of Saudi Arabia, its strategic ally.952 As the argument goes, in cases such as the former one, a
citizen has a responsibility to advocate for policy changes.953 I agree with the shift towards more
specific  analysis,  but  point  out  that  such  an  argument  does  not  establish  citizens  of  affluent
democracies in general as bearers of a responsibility to engage in policy-driven action.  Not all
affluent democracies can change their policies without high costs: a variety of factors specific to the
state,  such  as  its  domestic  political  and economic  structure,  access  to  alternative  raw material
sources, and geopolitical positioning, affect the capacities that citizens of these states have in their
disposal. Hence, if the aim is to argue that the role of a citizen vests more capacities than that of a
consumer to act upon violent conflicts, the argument does only one part of the job.
Fourth, as of yet companies do not have a proven track record as peacemakers, whereby influencing
them might not be a worthy investment of one’s resources.954 Especially since the UN Guiding
952 Wenar, Blood Oil, 323.
953 To be sure, this is not Wenar’s argument.
954 Timothy L. Fort, ‘Introduction: The Corporate Contribution to One Planet Living in Global Peace and Security’, 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship, no. 26 (2007): 20–24; Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, ‘An Action Plan 
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Principles on Business and Human Rights published in 2011, as well as the launch of the Business
for Peace initiative by the UN Global Compact in 2013, the responsibility of companies to respect
human rights has become highlighted as a complementary responsibility to the responsibility of
states  to  protect  human  rights.955 Uwafiokun  Idemudia  points  out  that  although  companies  are
increasingly portrayed as active peacemakers,  whose responsibility is to be part  of the solution
rather  than  only  cease  being  part  of  the  problem,  guidelines  on  how  businesses  can  act  as
‘moneymakers and peacemakers’ remain ‘embryonic’.956 In his view, in the Niger Delta businesses
have been framed as conflict-alleviating agencies the operations of which the state is to facilitate.
However, the corporate social responsibility schemes as they currently stand are invalid tools for
advancing peace.957 Similarly, Hönke suggests that incorporating large mining companies, such as
Banro and Anglogold Ashanti in eastern Congo, into the peace agenda produces them as legitimate
authorities although at the same time companies deprive artisanal miners of their livelihoods by
taking over their mining pits.958
To critics, companies’ track record illustrates that a weightier emphasis should be placed on the
governments and other states to regulate the company conduct.959 Jason Miklian and Peer Schouten
for the Role of Business in Fostering Peace’, American Business Law Journal 44, no. 2 (2007): 359–77; Julien 
Barbara, ‘Nation Building and the Role of the Private Sector as a Political Peace-Builder’, Conflict, Security & 
Development 6, no. 4 (2006): 581–94; Jessica Banfield, Virginia Haufler, and Damian Lilly, ‘Transnational 
Corporations in Conflict-Prone Zones: Public Policy Responses and a Framework for Action’, Oxford Development
Studies 33, no. 1 (2005): 133–47.
955 Idemudia, ‘Business and Peace in the Niger Delta’, 42.
956 Idemudia, 41; also: John Forrer and John Katsos, ‘Business and Peace in the Buffer Condition’, The Academy of 
Management Perspectives 29, no. 4 (2015): 438; Jason Miklian and Peer Schouten, ‘Business for Peace: The New 
Paradigm of International Peacebuilding and Development’, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network, 2014).
957 Idemudia, ‘Business and Peace in the Niger Delta’, 52.
958 Hönke, ‘Business for Peace?’, 173.
959 Mats Berdal and Nader Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace: The Private Sector and the Challenges of 
Peacebuilding’, Survival 52, no. 2 (2010): 37–58.
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suggest that although extractive companies can act in conflict-inducing or conflict-reducing ways in
sensitive areas, tensions arise as the economic goal for business and wider political requirements for
a peace process become juxtaposed.960 Peace as a ‘hypergoal’ of companies has little purchase if the
more proximate goal of profit-making incentivises companies’ everyday operations.961 However, to
give companies a benefit of doubt, one cannot rule out that companies’ capacity and inclination to
act for peace could not change. To remind, the very concept of the state has evolved over the course
of its existence from the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
three centuries later.962 Rob Harrison of Ethical Consumer suggests that the whole concept of the
profit-making company, with its narrow notion of stakeholders, ought to be rethought.963 Ethical
consumerism might be a way to do just that.
The four arguments above indicate some of the difficulties that the critics of ethical consumerism
face in establishing that the remedial capacity of citizens is superior to that of consumers. Things
are not made any easier once one acknowledges that individuals in affluent democracies, either as
consumers or as citizens, are not the only players in the field.  As Dirk-Jan Koch, former Special
Envoy Natural Resources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, reminds:
You know what we have seen is that some of the ways activism has been done, it
is some kind of a white saviour industrial complex, as some authors argue. It is
only you as a white person buying a different phone that can solve problems of the
world. So it is sometimes simplified, non-empowering message because it doesn’t
put the local Congolese leaders in the driving seat. It puts the western consumer in
960 Miklian and Schouten, ‘Business for Peace’.
961 Thomas W. Dunfee and Timothy L. Fort, ‘Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and the Adapted Firm’, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 36 (2003): 563.
962 Wenar, Blood Oil, chapter 3.
963 Interview #57: Rob Harrison, Director, Ethical Consumer
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the driving seat, which disempowers the local population… Because I think it’s so
important to do activism, because otherwise nothing ever changes, but it’s also so
important to do it the right way. Otherwise you get the wrong results. It’s a very
fine balance.964
Koch cautions against the idea that putting an end to resource-related conflicts in supply chains
rests on the shoulders of western individuals only, be they consumers, citizens, or something else.
Disentangling the economic and political capacities vested in the two roles feeds into this macro-
level discussion on the relative burdens that international, regional and domestic actors are to bear
to alleviate harms related to the globalisation of production, as it illuminates that individuals in
affluent  democracies  are  simultaneously  connected to  a  variety  of  collective actors  in  different
ways.965 The above discussion has gestured that comparing the economic and political capacities
vested in the two roles is by itself not enough to show that individuals in either of them are better
equipped to ameliorate resource-related armed linked with some supply chains.
964 Interview #53: Dirk-Jan Koch, Professor, Special Envoy Natural Resources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Netherlands
965 E.g. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2002; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice; Cohen, 
‘Philosophy, Social Science, Global Poverty’, in Thomas Pogge and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).
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12.4 TRANSFORMATION
This section presents another way of applying a role-based approach by turning inwards to explore
the  transformative  dimension  of  assigning  responsibility.  It  aligns  the  capacity  analysis  with
Dewey’s key concept of growth as a transformative process that increases individuals’ capacities to
orient among the situations calling for an ethical inquiry they face in their lives. I suggest that the
assignations  of  responsibility  to  individuals  in  affluent  democracies  in  their  different  roles  are
guided by different understandings of the challenges that individuals will face in the vast processes
of globalisation, and the kinds of individuals that are best equipped to thrive amidst them.
Situationist theorising inspired by Dewey’s work is sensitive to this transformative dimension of
responsibility.  As per  the ‘weak’ normative foundation  of  a  pragmatist  account,  although those
habits, customs and practices that are conducive to growth are to be enhanced, identifying them is
not, as Joe Hoover puts it, only about ‘a trip out into the world’ to judge consequences of acts as per
addition  and subtraction,  but  about  engaging with  the  way these  conventions  shape  the  actors
themselves.966 Dewey emphasises that assigning retrospective responsibility for a state of affairs is
essentially a future-looking activity: framing some acts by a child as blameworthy and others as
praiseworthy is to guide the child to behave in a way that aligns with the socially accepted norms
and practices of living together with others.967 I  have articulated a parallel thought:  assigning a
responsibility to an actor in order to guide his or her transformation in the normatively desirable
process of growth, regardless of whether done using the retrospective vocabulary of blame and guilt
or in the prospective language of expectations, obligations and duties, is the paradigmatic function
of assigning responsibilities.
966 Hoover, Reconstructing Human Rights, 13, 126.
967 Dewey, ‘Ethics’, 304.
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A responsibility leaves a mark on its bearer. An evaluation of the outcomes that an actor is likely to
realise  if  she  is  assigned  a  remedial  responsibility  affects  whether  a  responsibility  should  be
assigned to her, but the dispositions and habits that bearing such a responsibility nurtures are valued
based on how they shape her capacity to resolve ethically challenging situations as a whole. An
actor’s capacity to ameliorate an external harm is  bound with her more comprehensive internal
transformation through behavioural expectations set on her. Surely, there is a hint of virtue ethics in
this  dimension.968 However,  the characteristics to be cultivated are experimental and contingent
rather  than  set  in  stone  or  even  on  communal  ideals.  Assigning  a  responsibility  is  to  guide
individuals to nurture the kind of critical intelligence that helps them resolve everyday situations as
a whole, and to orient among the plural, conflicting ends-in-view, which are brought forth by the
changing  contexts  and  the  irreducible  plurality  of  the  values  considered.  Hence,  behavioural
dispositions and characteristics are still to be evaluated on the basis of possible outcomes. However,
outcomes are understood in a wider sense than those that an individual can realise in a specific
situation,  and  evaluated  through  constant  experimentation  that  places  no  ideal-based  value  on
specific attributes beyond the ‘weak’ normative emphasis on those characteristics guiding people’s
use of their intelligence towards ameliorating suffering, exploitation, violence, and advancing moral
inclusion.969
The Deweyan notion of responsibility as a transformative process is important, because it can be
used to weave a fifth argument to favour the role of a citizen over consumers. To Sarah Irving, Rob
Harrison and Mary Rayner, one explanation for the rise of ethical consumerism is the lack of means
that democratic governments have to regulate corporate conduct in global production processes.
968 Dewey considers utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics as independent ‘factors’ with their own sources of 
evidence and methods for evaluating moral outcomes. Dewey, ‘Three Independent Factors in Morals’.
969 To Dewey, such ‘virtues’ of critical experimentation include ‘[w]ide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in 
the face of the disagreeable, balance of interests’. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 164.
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The failure of governments to govern entices individuals to take up acts such as switching a mobile
phone producer to compensate for the perceived lack of difference that casting a vote in elections
makes.970 As Heather Webb, a researcher at Ethical Consumer, describes the logic:
I think people feel like… because they’re quite powerless in the day to day of
running the world, we have no power over what’s occurring in the DRC. But then
if someone says, well actually, did you know your phone contains minerals that
you can buy from a company that’s  actually  doing some of  the  things  better.
Maybe it’s  about taking back that little bit  of control and thinking that you’re
doing something for the rest of the world. And that actually making a difference,
something along the way. I think personally I know that it’s not a perfect system,
buying ethically, you know there’s still  lots of injustices out there, and it’s not
necessarily  solving  the  issue,  but  I  think  it’s  what  you  feel  you’re  doing
something, and it’s better than doing nothing.971
An argument against the idea of ‘doing something’ is that a responsibility to act upon the conflicts
in  Congo and Nigeria  should  be  assigned primarily  to  citizens  of  rather  than  to  consumers  in
affluent democracies, because acting in the former role nurtures creative and critical intelligence
needed to resolve situations in the world more generally. While ethical consumerism is not only
about choice, the phone example illustrates that picking the most ‘ethically’ produced item from a
selection of products forms a core activity of a consumer discharging his responsibility. In relation
to guilty consumer claims, I used the term ‘choice architecture’ to highlight that diverse actors, such
as civil society campaigners, company strategists and policy-makers, are involved with shaping the
channel through which consumers’ choice of buying ‘ethical’ translates into ameliorative outcomes.
970 Irving, Harrison, and Rayner, ‘Ethical Consumerism - Democracy through the Wallet’, 3.
971 Interview #5: Heather Webb, Researcher, Ethical Consumer.
315
Now, in comparison with the versatile means of influencing policy-making that citizens of a well-
functioning affluent democracy have in their disposal, one could argue that a purchase decision does
not develop the kind of creative capacities needed to resolve ethical situations now or in the future.
To be sure,  choice is  an important  part  of democratic  procedures:  citizens  regularly vote for a
candidate  in  elections,  and  in  this  context  expressing  one’s  choice  is  very  much  valued.  Yet,
consumer action is reduced to a ‘choice’ to an extent that makes it a less appealing form of ethical
action to be cultivated more generally.
In a way, this argument is more convincing than the four presented above, which had their focus on
the immediate external outcomes that consumers can produce.  Schudsen and Dulrud suggest that
some concerns are better addressed as citizens, as much frustration and inefficient action follows if
the ‘new ideology of ethical consumption’ is taken up without keeping an eye for limits of such
action.972 Also Bartley et al suggest that ‘romanticized ideologies’ of conscientious consumerism are
to be rejected: as a rule of thumb, individuals ought to look for political rather than market means to
act  upon  social  and  environmental  issues.  The  latter  theorists  argue  that  some  practices  of
conscientious consumption can be useful in promoting fairness and sustainability, and in serving as
an entry point to more fruitful forms of remedial action through political means. Surely, Bartley et
al are very close to subordinating consumer action to citizen action. However, they nevertheless
acknowledge purchase  action  as  a  functioning tool  for  helping  resolve  some social  issues  that
individuals feel unable to manage through conventional politics.973
Further, the fifth argument weaves a new thread into the debate on the permissibility of ethical
consumerism in relation to democratic politics. To draw its main lines, Waheed Hussain argues that
ethical consumerism is acceptable and appropriate only when subordinated to formal democratic
972 Eivind Jacobsen and Arne Dulsrud, ‘Will Consumers Save The World? The Framing of Political Consumerism’, 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20, no. 5 (2007): 479–80.
973 Bartley et al., Looking behind the Label, 222–25.
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politics, and conducted under strict conditions, for instance when treated as proto-legislation that
helps push new issues on the political agenda.974 Barry and Macdonald take a critical view of the
hierarchy he draws, countering that consumer action can be advanced as long as ethical consumers
follow  certain  principles,  involving  a  respect  for  basic  liberties,  a  strive  towards  a  reasonable
conception of the common good, a readiness to question their own views and to seek for more
information as a basis for their choices, as well as a sensitivity to power disparities between them
and those whose lives they try to influence. Similarly, Nicole Hassoun suggests that as long as
democratic institutions are not fully serving their functions in real life, a ‘positive change’ model of
ethical  consumerism  is  permissible.975 The  latter  two  approaches  create  space  for  ethical
consumerism as a separate, justified form of action that is not subordinated to traditional means of
democratic  politics.  The  Deweyan  insight  on  the  internal  transformation  that  bearing  a
responsibility either as a citizen or as a consumer involves, and more specifically its implications to
the prospects of the flourishing and autonomy of individuals, as well as the future of democratic
societies as social mechanisms through which their problem-solving can be coordinated, remains
less highlighted in the ongoing debate.976
However, no fixed answers can be reached. Strong versions of the fifth argument, which would
suggest that citizen action is  by default  better  for human flourishing than consumer action,  are
vulnerable to the changes in the very roles themselves as the world exposes individuals to novel
challenges and situations requiring new tools of thought and action. I present an example. To apply
Lawford-Smith’s  argument  on  signalling,  purchase  action  is  not  a  pure  domain  of  action  for
consumers only, but a way for citizens to convince other members of the community that the state
974 Hussain, ‘Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigilantism?’
975 Hassoun, ‘Consumption and Social Change’; also: Christiano, ‘The Tension between the Nature and the Norm of 
Voluntary Exchange’.
976 For a further discussion, see: Hohl, ‘Ethical Consumerism: A Defense’, 193; Herzog, ‘Who Should Prevent 
Sweatshops?’, 21.
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ought to prioritise some moral projects over others.977 Purchase decisions function as signals that
citizens send to each other about the importance of alleviating armed conflicts and other harms in
global production processes, and about the need to harness the versatile state apparatus for such
purposes. By making signals costly enough, they show that their aspirations are authentic, which
creates a motivational basis for putting together the means they have to strive for a commonly
recognised goal.
Made in the role of a citizen, purchase action is not to push companies directly to take up new
practices  and  standards,  but  to  entice  and  inspire  citizens  and  policy-makers  to  use  the  state
apparatus  to  act  upon the  perceived issue.  Schwartz  suggests  that  an  ‘influencing effect’ more
generally  deserves  a  stronger  emphasis  in  philosophical  writings  on  consumerism,  because
cascading and contagion effects  are  now misleadingly treated  as  an ‘empirical  bolstering  point
rather than a normative foundation’.978 An illustrative example of this effect being put to use is
Michael Nest’s argument: it is not wise to enact boycotts against the Congolese ‘blood’ minerals if
their aim is to end the war, but if the aim of boycotts is to draw attention to the war in the Congo,
they may be effective as they sprout novel forms of action.979 From this perspective, Fairphone and
similar ethical companies and ethically branded products appear as campaigns to mobilise citizens
to such creative action. The international attention brought by civil society organisations on the
violence  in  eastern  Congo  may  well  invigorate  wider  policies  that  go  beyond  the  mineral
traceability schemes, which form a key component in the current conflict resources approach. 
Such wider schemes may be up to citizens rather than consumers to invent, initiate and maintain,
and in taking up purchase action to do so, individuals in affluent democracies engage in  political
977 Lawford-Smith, ‘Unethical Consumption and Obligations to Signal’.
978 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, 70–71, 75.
979 Nest, Coltan, 185.
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rather than ethical consumerism, again blurring the distinction between consumers and citizens.980
Hence, the fifth argument in favour of citizens over consumers as responsibility-bearers is not to be
tackled rather than readjusted as sensitive to the both roles being in flux. Global supply chains bring
new cases of exploitation, suffering, and violence to the moral horizon of individuals in affluent
democracies. In this situation, individuals’ critical intelligence may be cultivated by experimenting
on the practices of purchase action to ameliorate some of these harms. This does not necessarily
mean assigning remedial responsibilities to consumers, as purchase action can be taken up in either
role. More crucially, one has to look beyond the immediate outcomes that individuals in any of the
roles they come to play are capable of producing. The transformative dimension of responsibility
calls for reflecting on the degree to which assigning responsibility recasts actors as more generally
capable of coping with the challenges brought to the horizon of their moral appraisal by the global
production processes. As Dewey asks: ‘What sort of individuals are created?’981
12.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I introduced roles as the third perspective that weaves an analysis of consumers’
capacities with the existing practices of assigning responsibility in affluent democracies. I engaged
with the vehement idea that consumer action is damaging or subordinated to citizen action.  To
interrogate this position, I first suggested that instead of treating citizens and consumers as separate
entities,  or  as  a  single  entity  sometimes  referred  to  as  citizen-consumer,  their  relation  is  best
analysed  by  treating  them  as  two  overlapping  and  shifting  social  roles.  Second, I  discussed
arguments  juxtaposing  citizens’  political  capacities  with  consumers’  economic  capacities,
concluding that making an overarching argument for the superiority of either is challenging. 
980 To be sure, I use the term in a sense that differs from Clarke’s use. ‘From Ethical to Political Consumption’, 7.
981 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 198.
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Third, I pointed out that roles are to be explored through the Deweyan insight that the primary
function of assigning responsibility is to create a better  world and better  individuals.  Roles are
vested with specific capacities, but also come with expectations on the kind of intelligence and
capacities that individuals in them are to cultivate. Hence,  assignations of responsibility based on
roles are not guided only by an analysis of the immediate remedial capacities that individuals have
in them, but by considerations on the kinds of individuals they should become in order to orient
themselves  amidst  the  diverse  ethical  challenges  brought  forth  by  the  vast  processes  of
globalisation.
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13 CONCLUSION
13.1 PUZZLE
We should not think that we can do enough simply by buying fuel-efficient cars, insulating our
houses, and setting up a windmill to make our own electricity… It is better to enjoy your Sunday
driving while working to change the law so as to make it illegal for you to enjoy your Sunday
driving.982
I  just  see the  raw end of  capitalism operating  in  areas  of  Nigeria  and the  DRC, and I  think
capitalism makes consumer king.  If we want to make sure that this capitalist system works for
everybody it would be beneficial if the consumers took up this responsibility that this system has,
this opportunity the system has provided them with.983
Does the globalisation of supply chains give rise to consumers' moral responsibility to alleviate
harms abroad? I started this thesis with a concern that contemporary processes of globalisation
challenge the prevalent practices, habits, and conventions of assigning remedial responsibilities in
affluent democracies.984 As individuals’ ties extend further beyond communal and social boundaries,
harms far away ranging from climate change to poverty and armed conflicts enter the horizon of
their moral appraisal. Individuals in affluent democracies are increasingly often facing the question
of who should act upon such miseries to which they are linked through global production processes.
This thesis set out to explore whether there can be a notion of responsibility that provides practical
982 Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘It’s Not My Fault: Global  Warming and Individual Moral Obligations’, 304.
983 Interview #53: Dirk-Jan Koch, Professor, Special Envoy Natural Resources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Netherlands
984 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, chapter 3.
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guidelines to individuals’ ethical thought and action with regards to such commonly recognised
harms without succumbing to the problematic path of obliging individuals to act upon everything,
everywhere in this vast global context.
The approach that the previous chapters have taken up draws on John Dewey’s situationist ethics.
Pragmatist  thinking generally  conceives the situations,  challenges and tensions that  generate  an
emotional-visceral response in people’s everyday lives as the context in which a need for ethical
inquiry arises. Rather than being about applying traditional ethical theories to abstract and debate
the morally relevant characteristics of individual situations, pragmatism considers ethical inquiry as
the exploration and cultivation of the kinds of habits and conventions that help resolve challenging
situations as they emerge, and the reconsideration of such habits and conventions when they are
found as insufficient in new situations. Although pragmatism inspired by Dewey’s work thus rejects
the foundational status of any ethical theory, I suggest that it nevertheless sets a ‘weak’ normative
impetus for individuals in affluent democracies to cultivate their critical intelligence, individually
and together as a public, to resolve harms in global supply chains. A wild variety of miseries faced
by  workers,  societies  and  the  planet  in  global  production  processes  involves  exploitation,
oppression and violence. If growth, a central concept in ‘weak’ pragmatist ethics as conceptualised
by Molly Cochran, is taken to involve the moral inclusion of marginalised groups in international
politics, harms in global supply chains are potentially valid entrants into the horizon of individuals’
moral appraisal.985
Situationist ethics can help manage the perplexities that many consumers in affluent democracies
face  as  causal  chains  connecting  them  with  harms  far  away  grow  more  and  more  complex.
Consumer responsibility is very much a part of the living debate on globalisation, as academics,
activists and policy-makers frequently raise the claim that by buying differently, or threatening or
985 Dewey, ‘Ethics’; Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations.
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promising to do so, consumers can help mitigate at least some of these harms. Yet, consumers’
responsibility is elusive. Even if their purposeful, collective purchase action would help mitigate
and prevent at least some of the harms, as a group they do not match any standard definition of a
collective moral agent. Equally, as individuals with limited purchase power their capacity to shape
the  way  things  are  produced  in  complex  supply  chains  seems  negligible.  The  challenge  of
mitigating  these  harms  is  not  only  informational,  or  resolved  by  strengthening  consumers’
awareness of the problems. Once the problems become known, a question arises of who among the
diverse candidates shaping the production processes, including consumers, companies, international
institutions, and states, ought to bear the costs of mitigating harms taking place in them. As Barry
and Øverland write: ‘it is one thing to recognize a terrible problem and quite another to establish
who, if anyone, is responsible for doing something about it and what they might sensibly do.’986
Any answer to these wide questions has to be carefully articulated to do justice to the complexity of
the topic. The statements above by Walter Sinnot-Armstrong and Dirk-Jan Koch illustrate that there
are very different ways to think about the role of consumers and purchase action in ameliorating
some of the major challenges that the contemporary global economy presents. Furthermore, the
complicated ethical landscape is not only varied but constantly shifting, meaning that an answer that
now seems to provide a useful guide for thought and action may turn out as less convincing with
regards to another issue and at another point in time. From the perspective of Dewey’s situationist
ethics,  moral claims are not built  to last.  Ethical inquiry stems from a need to resolve specific
tensions in one’s everyday life, not from an impetus to contribute to an abstract, cumulative body of
knowledge, although surely the product of any inquiry might be useful in resolving reminiscent
challenges. Just as existing scholarship unfolds as a living collection of past situations and solutions
to them, the argument on consumer responsibility  developed in this  thesis  is  to be refined and
experimented on rather than taken as a truth set in stone.
986 Barry and Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty, 1.
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13.2 FINDINGS
The normative reading of Dewey’s pragmatist ethics I adopted in this thesis treats ethical inquiry as
emerging in situations that individuals face in their everyday lives but are unable to resolve through
existing means of thought and action; strives to provide existing guidelines to orient through such
situations, while conceding that the conceptual tools developed are fallible and tied to the problem
in hand rather than foundational and widely generalisable; and renders harms in supply chains as
potentially  requiring  moral  action  from consumers  due  to  its  ‘weak’ inclination  towards  moral
inclusion and the amelioration of violence, exploitation and suffering. With these underpinnings in
mind,  what  are  the  findings?  To  lay  them out  systematically,  in  the  first  part  of  this  thesis  I
conceptualised a pragmatist view of moral agency to define what I mean by consumers. Consumers
can be treated as individual moral agents or as a collective moral agent, but both approaches require
some theoretical footwork if consumers are to be vested with remedial responsibilities in global
production processes. I adopted a framework of collective future-looking responsibility to suggest
that as an unstructured group consumers can be held as collective moral agents capable of bearing
moral responsibilities if doing so helps resolve the moral projects in question. I suggested that the
content of the hypothetical responsibility that individual consumers share is a duty to collectivise
into an entity or entities that are better able to mitigate the harms in production processes than
individual  consumers  alone.  This  conceptualisation  of  consumers  as  moral  agents  and  their
hypothetical responsibility served as a stepping stone for asking why consumers would have such a
responsibility.
Accordingly,  I  engaged with four  principles  in  global  ethics  scholarship,  those of  contribution,
association,  benefit,  and capacity.  Those  drawing  on the  principle  of  contribution  suggest  that
whoever causes a harm has the primary responsibility to repair it. I claimed that Christian Barry and
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Kate  Macdonald,  whose  work  on global  labour  injustices  is  the  most  direct  application  of  the
principle to the topic in hand, do not tease out the diverse considerations, such as those related to
capacity, community, power, and fairness, which intertwine with any analysis in which agents are
held remedially responsible because of their causal role in bringing forth a harm.987 The principle of
association, as presented by Iris Marion Young, is meant to complement the contribution principle:
individual consumers share with other agents in global supply chains a political responsibility to
alleviate structural injustices, such as sweatshop labour, although their relationship to the harm is
not  causal.988 Young’s  notion,  in  turn,  falls  back  on  the  contribution  principle  when  actors’
responsibilities are to be differentiated from each other. 
As  per  the  benefit  principle,  consumers  have  a  responsibility  to  compensate  to  those  whose
suffering is  linked with global  supply chains,  because they involuntary benefit  from the unjust
transactions. I argued that the benefit principle, as defended by Daniel Butt, gives rise only to very
weak  obligations,  if  at  all.989 Finally,  according  to  the  capacity  principle,  consumers  have  a
responsibility to mitigate harms in global supply chains if they are able to do so more efficiently
than other actors and without excessive costs accrued to them. Leif Wenar builds a variant of the
principle  on  ideal-based  consequentialism,  which  to  me  captures  several  elements  of  a  useful
guideline to thought and action on consumer responsibility. However, it  does not recognise that
ethical inquiry is a plural, situationist and fallibilist activity that is not geared towards realising a
single ideal.990
987 Barry and Macdonald, ‘How Should We Conceive of Individual Consumer Responsibility to Address Labour 
Injustices?’
988 Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’; Young, Responsibility for Justice.
989 Butt, ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’; Butt, ‘“A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable”’.
990 Wenar, Blood Oil; Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’.
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In the second part of this thesis, I suggested that out of the tools explored a pragmatist variant of the
capacity principle may provide guidelines with regards to consumers’ remedial responsibilities. I
drew on work by Marion Smiley to suggest that although an analysis of actors’ remedial capacities
is interwoven with a myriad of moral considerations, remedial capacities can act as an experimental
rather than a fundamental yardstick in assigning responsibilities.991 I argued that the approach  keeps
a focus on outcomes while acknowledging the pluralist and situations nature of ethical inquiry in a
way that differs from that of ideal-based consequentialist accounts. Further, I suggested that such a
hypothetical approach can draw on mid-level theorising of responsibility as articulated by Jennifer
Rubenstein. The pluralist underpinnings of the approach emphasise that remedial responsibilities
are  assigned  by  using  context-specific  constellations  of  interwoven  moral  reasons,  and  that
reconceptualising existing problems can help make them more manageable and easier to resolve.992
Based on the approach taken, it  became meaningful to zoom in on a specific issue in order to
develop new perspectives to challenges to ethical thought and action faced by consumers in affluent
democracies.  I  suggested  that  normative  questions  linked  with  the  remedial  responsibility  of
consumers for resource-related armed conflicts upstream in the extractive stages of some supply
chains are indicative of many of these challenges. As per the advocates of the conflict resource
approach, the untamed global trade of raw materials such as minerals, oil, diamonds, and timber,
sometimes finances and incentivises armed violence in resource-rich countries. Many a campaigner
who wants  such conflicts  resolved has  adopted  the  view that  consumers,  as  the  final  users  of
products  made  using  these  raw materials,  ought  to  join  the  conflict  mitigation  and  prevention
efforts.993 Accordingly, I formulated the second research question as follows: Which factors affect
consumers' responsibility to alleviate armed conflicts that persist in some countries from which the
991 Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 1.‐
992 Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’; Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’.
993 Le Billon, Wars of Plunder, 22.
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raw  materials  of  their  purchases  originate? In  the  second  part  of  the  thesis,  I  engaged  with
scholarship on conflicts and the resource curse, undertook fieldwork, and conducted 59 interviews
with practitioners informed about ethical consumption and conflicts in eastern Congo and southern
Nigeria to understand the mechanisms through which consumers can act upon the conflict, as well
as  to  expose  myself  to  the  diverse  positions  that  can  be  held  with  regards  to  consumers’
responsibility for the two conflicts.
Having  amassed  an  informed  understanding  of  the  conflicts,  in  the  third  part  of  the  thesis  I
conceptualised three mid-level perspectives that use consumers’ remedial capacities to navigate the
contemporary practices of assigning responsibility. First, I discussed the ‘guilty consumer’ claims, a
form of a narrative or an argument that is sometimes used to motivate consumers to remedial action
by pointing at their contributory connection with a harm. I suggested that such arguments drawing
on guilt and blame are best evaluated by exploring consumers’ remedial capacities with regards to
different harms using two components, influence and costs. I referred to the conflicts in Congo and
Nigeria as examples to highlight that consumers’ influence over violent conflicts in the extractive
stages of supply chains is shaped by the suitability and precision of the conflict-alleviating policies
that those agents mobilising consumer pressure behind their campaigns choose to advocate. Further,
I suggested that exerting consumer pressure to alleviate conflicts in the extractive stages can be
costly:  an individual consumer does not easily disengage through individual purchase decisions
from oil and minerals imported to affluent democracies, if the materials indirectly underlie critical
social  functions.  The analysis  led  me to  suggest  a  rudimentary  distinction  between  actual  and
potential influence and acceptable and excessive costs to help prioritise between powerful guilty
consumer claims.
The second perspective of ‘blame games’ discussed the way consumers’ responsibility to realise a
particular moral project interacts with the responsibilities of other actors. Engaging with Iris Marion
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Young’s  shared conception  of  political  responsibility,  I  suggested that  a  remedial  responsibility
stretched  too  widely  among  actors  is  unlikely  to  be  realised.  Instead  of  treating  remedial
responsibility as shared by the many actors constituting the global supply chains, it  is better  to
recognise that consumers lack the collective structure and identity needed to orchestrate efficient
purchase action.  As they are not  a structured collective agent,  changes in  global  supply chains
happen for rather than because of them. The disparate form of consumers as a group affects their
capacity to push more powerful collective actors, such as states and companies, to take up conflict-
alleviating action. Other groups, such as the citizens of political communities and the shareholders
of companies, are more organised and hence usually better able to harness ‘their’ collective actors
for such purposes.
The  third  perspective  on  ‘citizen-consumers’ balanced  the  analysis  by  sensitivising  it  to  the
transformative  dimension of  assigning responsibility.  I  first  suggested  that  a  role  responsibility
approach enables comparing the political capacities vested in the role of a citizen of an affluent
democracy with economic capacities  possessed by a  consumer in  an affluent  democracy.  More
importantly,  however,  the  approach  highlighted  that  assigning  a  responsibility  to  consumers  is
shaped  not  only  by  an  assessment  of  consumers’  immediate  remedial  capacities  but  of  the
expectations on the kind of individuals they become as responsibility-bearers. Roles themselves are
overlapping and shifting as individuals strive to find means to cope with the situations, conflicts and
tensions  brought  forth  by  changes  in  the  surrounding  world,  in  this  case  the  globalisation  of
production. Prioritisations between different roles are shaped by diverse understandings of such
changes, and of the kind of individuals that are best positioned to cope in them.
I  believe  that  the  multi-faceted  answer  to  the  research  questions  articulated  through  three
perspectives reflects the complexity of assigning remedial responsibilities to consumers in practice.
The conclusion I draw points at consumers as an elusive bearer of remedial responsibilities, and
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purchase action as of potential use in helping alleviate some harms. More importantly, however, it
highlights that treating capacities as a guideline for assessing when consumers bear a responsibility
to act involves constant calibration between, for instance, responsibilities that consumers have with
regards to different projects, responsibilities that consumers have with regards to responsibilities
that other actors have,  and responsibilities that individuals in affluent democracies may bear in
other  roles.  The answer is  broadly  aligned with John Dewey’s  work by being sensitive  to  the
experimentalist and pluralist nature of ethical inquiry and the transformative dimension of assigning
responsibility. It appreciates and builds on the ‘weak’ normative edge in his work: human growth
involves developing one’s critical intelligence to ameliorate suffering, exploitation and violence,
and advancing the moral inclusion of marginalised groups in international politics. Consumers face
diverse demands to act upon harms faced by workers, societies and the planet, and addressing these
demands  deserves  an  inquiry  that  goes  beyond  a  blanket  endorsement  or  rejection  of  their
obligations. Surely, the perspectives developed in this thesis are contingent rather than generalisable
across all kinds of harms to which consumers are linked by their purchases. Yet, my close study on
the resource curse and two armed conflicts linked with the phenomenon has attempted to illustrate
that such analyses can nevertheless be helpful in ameliorating harms in supply chains.
I  believe there are three ways through which the thesis  has made a modest contribution to the
research questions. First, a pragmatist approach can alleviate the non-restrictiveness that lies at the
centre of the situation created by consumers in affluent democracies becoming increasingly aware
of and sensitive to global, transcommunal processes. Existing scholarship in global ethics does an
excellent  job  in  laying out  the  potential  approaches  through which  one can  think of  consumer
responsibility  with  regards  to  global  supply  chains.  Now,  instead  of  striving  towards  general
statements on consumers’ obligations,  harms faced by people,  societies,  and the planet  deserve
detailed individual studies. Grounds of responsibility emerge in context-specific constellations and
are varyingly useful in different situations.  I  have tried to show that in some of these contexts
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actors’ capacities to make a positive difference is useful as a yardstick in conceptualising their
remedial responsibilities.  If  this  approach is  to be adopted and deepened, making a convincing
argument requires gathering more empirical backing than political theorists are inclined to amass.
Further close studies to map out the remedial capacities that consumers have can help fill this gap.
Second, emphasising consumers as an unstructured collective agent and discussing the potential of
consumers’ purchase decisions and citizens’ policy-oriented action to make an impact on armed
conflicts has helped articulate the relation between an individual consumer and collective actors in
the global economy. Public discussion on consumer ethics often degenerates to a debate on the
consequences of individual purchase decisions, such as whether purchasing and consuming meat
products accelerates climate change more or less than other dietary choices. However, few activists
and academics really think that purchase action, understood purely as a market-based mechanism to
change corporate policies, is the most important function through which consumers can alleviate
harms in global supply chains. I have illustrated that purchase decisions are integrated to diverse
forms of remedial action, for instance when citizens use them as signals to harness the state for
remedial action.  Purchase action can be decoupled from the role of a consumer and utilised in
various roles to push structured agents, not only companies, to act upon harms in global supply
chains.
Third, I have suggested that treating roles, such as that of a citizen and a consumer, as juxtaposed
overlooks the transformative dimension of assigning responsibilities. In the opening citations of the
chapter,  Sinnott-Armstrong  underappreciates  the  indirect  impact  that  the  citizens  of  affluent
democracies can make by signalling through their consumption choices a willingness to bear the
costs of pro-environment legislative reforms. To compare, the hope Koch places on consumer action
is conditioned by the insight that purchase decisions remain to a large degree a choice between
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supporting or not supporting the policies that campaigners, company strategists and policy-makers
provide  them  in  the  form  of  the  ‘ethical’ alternative  in  the  markets.  Whether  the  increasing
emphasis on consumer action is a threat to or a step towards the creative kind of action needed for
wider  overhauls  in  the  global  economy remains  a  question  that  pertains  the  era  of  globalising
production processes.  Assigning responsibilities to individuals qua consumers or qua citizens is
guided  by  the  many  understandings  of  the  kinds  of  individuals  who  best  cope  among  the
complicated ethical situations emerging in the processes of globalisation, and of the function that
traditional democratic policies can serve in making such overhauls happen.
These  contributions,  and  the  process  through  which  they  were  developed,  deserve  further
refinement. A monist consequentialist thinker might yearn for a uniform principle rather than open-
ended  pluralism  to  guide  the  allocation  of  responsibilities.  Theorists,  for  instance,  of
poststructuralist or deontological inclinations might interpret the emphasis on capacity analysis in
this thesis as thinly-veiled consequentialism. Empirical students of the resource curse would prefer
a  stronger  empirical  inquiry  on  the  conflicts  in  Nigeria  and  Congo,  whereas  a  philosophically
minded reader might see already the current level of meddling with empirics as unnecessary. And to
some campaigners,  the approach developed here  might  seem simply  dangerous:  in  times when
nation-states lack the means to resolve global challenges, any voice that might be interpreted as
dampening calls for global action is counterproductive.
The first and second criticism constitute a pair of opposites. To answer the first one, an emphasis on
actors’ capacities is only one approach among the many possibilities rather than the underlying,
‘single-value’ logic based on which remedial responsibilities are always allocated.994 Pragmatism
takes advantage of such emphases in order to make sense of the interwoven considerations, such as
those on fairness, the boundaries of the community, power, fairness, and the values community
994 Smiley, ‘Future Looking Collective Responsibility’, 9.‐
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members strive to advance, underlying assignations of responsibility. As Smiley suggests, ‘we have
to make room for a host of other practical and normative judgments… we cannot privilege any one
of these considerations over the others theoretically by treating it as of overriding importance to
[assigning future-looking collective responsibility] in all cases’.995 The approach leaves space for
embracing  general  rules,  principles  and other  devices  as  methods  to  orient  in  particular  cases.
Surely, it lacks a foundation on which the various considerations could be arranged to a general
order.996 This thesis has tried to show that a multi-faceted and empirically informed analysis  of
actors’ capacities is nevertheless worth embracing in the context of finding out how consumers
ought to act and think as it comes to armed conflicts in the extractive stages of production.
The second concern represents the ‘opposite’ view, as one can argue that treating capacity as a
hypothetical grounds of responsibility does not manage to shake off the accusation that assigning
responsibility in this way is ‘purely utilitarian’.997 If assigning responsibility and agency is to be
done in order to ‘help to bring about a desirable (or better) state of affairs in the world’, there seems
to  be  nothing  else  than  a  calculus  of  benefits  and  costs  that  matters  when assigning remedial
responsibilities.998 Although I share with ideal-based utilitarian accounts the premise that actors’
remedial capacities constitute a criterion in the context of evaluating consumer responsibility for
global  supply  chains,  I  have  portrayed  other  considerations  as  interwoven  with  rather  than
underlined by such an analysis. For instance, by emphasising the interwovenness of considerations
on causation, capacity and community taking place in practical assignations of responsibility, I have
taken  seriously  Onora  O’Neill’s  point  that  consequentialists  cannot  replace  ‘quarrel  with
995 Smiley, 11.
996 Cf. Rubenstein, ‘Pluralism about Global Poverty’.
997 Smiley, ‘From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs’, 191.
998 Smiley and Zalta, ‘Collective Responsibility’.
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calculation’.999 To paraphrase Barry and Kirby, sacrificing pluralism is a very high price to pay for
precision.1000 Whereas monist consequentialists pick an ideal end as the benchmark for choosing the
means, advocates of situationist ethics treat the world as plural, recognising that there are various
morally desirable ends that interweave with the choice of means. Dewey’s pragmatism discusses the
ends and means emerging in existing practices that people have developed to orient themselves
through everyday moral challenges. In this way, Dewey
accommodates what is sound in the utilitarian intuition that we should act so as to
bring about the most good for the most people. But he does not get mired in an
ultimate moral principle or supreme maxim that, when applied formulaically, can
be  shown to  violate  basic  rights,  forgo colloquy,  ignore  cultural  and personal
differences, and forsake the direct satisfactions of moral engagement.1001
The third and fourth criticisms also constitute a pair. On one hand, the approach taken is likely to
disappoint  scholars  of  political  economy  and  conflict  studies  appreciative  of  a  more  nuanced
empirical  account  of  the  dynamics  between  consumer  pressure,  supply  chain  governance,  and
violent  conflicts.  On  the  other  hand,  my  answer  might  seem  unsatisfying  to  the  theoretically
inclined to whom my treatment of philosophical literature on responsibility appears as superficial.
To  answer  both  parties,  the  thesis  has  aimed  to  show that  middle  ground  has  value  in  itself.
Empirically oriented scholars often lack the conceptual tools to discuss the normative implications
of  their  findings,  whereas  philosophers  prefer  to  use  existing  frameworks  to  capture  new
phenomena rather than to develop new ones by engaging with the ways contemporary problems are
being conceptualised by those living them every day. This thesis joins a growing vein of mid-level
999 O’Neill, Bounds of Justice, 124.
1000Barry and Kirby, ‘Scepticism about Beneficiary Pays’, 9.
1001Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination, 100.
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studies,  trying to showcase that a work in global ethics can make use of empirical research to
rearticulate contemporary moral challenges in order to manage them.1002 
Finally, my  argument  can  be  read  as  dangerously  constraining  assignations  of  consumer
responsibility in a situation in which ethical consumerism has risen precisely to make up for the
shortcomings of the current state-based system and traditional means of democratic policy-making.
This has been neither my argument nor intention. Rather than suggesting that there are necessarily
trade-offs between, say, purchase action and political campaigning, my aim has been to highlight
that prioritising in one form or another remains inherent to moral thought and action in practice. I
have emphasised an inquiry into actors’ capacities, because they show prospects of helping in this
prioritisation process. For instance, the potential of consumer action to make a positive difference
on labour rights violations vis-à-vis violent conflicts; the remedial capacities that shareholders of
companies have vis-à-vis those of citizens; the function that  INGOs have in alleviating violent
conflicts vis-à-vis that of companies and states; and other comparisons are crucial in a non-ideal
world in which assigning remedial responsibilities to any actor involves prioritising rather than only
a binary choice.
To be sure, I think that one of the ways to bring the ‘raw end of capitalism’ envisioned by Koch
under control is through such comparison exercises. They include mapping out the critical junctures
of the processes that lead to harms in global supply chains, and the roles through which collective
agents can be efficiently harnessed to alleviate them, while acknowledging that pointing at actors’
remedial capacities is but one of the many ways through which alleviating such harms can enter or
exit  the  sphere  of  responsibilities  that  individuals  consider  as  worth  discharging.  Consumers’
purchase action may unfold as having a role to play in ameliorating such harms. This work has
provided one approach to manage a situation in which more and more harms enter consumers’
1002Rubenstein, Between Samaritans and States.
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horizon, challenging their habitual ways of thought and action regarding their moral responsibilities
in thinking about such issues in their shopping.
Dewey’s situationism embraces a ‘weak’ normative edge, according to which the development of
critical intelligence in a way that aligns with human growth involves the inclusion of previously
marginalised groups in international politics to the moral sphere in which individuals, together and
separately,  ought to ameliorate instances of suffering,  exploitation and violence.  This thesis has
explored the practical implications of this edge by keeping an eye on the many moral projects
calling for consumers’ and other agents’ resources, and on the transformative element in assigning
remedial responsibilities that extends the inquiry beyond any particular case in hand. The work as a
whole is linked with wider debates on the sphere of responsibilities borne by individuals as affluent
democracies become increasingly woven into processes of globalisation. This pragmatist  ethical
inquiry does not conclude them. Yet, the perspectives it yields may still constitute a result worth
appreciating: a temporary compass to help navigate some of the complicated and shifting ethical
landscape.
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS
The  59  interviews  were  conducted  between  May  2017  and  May  2019.  They  are  listed  in
chronological order. 23 interviews were conducted with practitioners primarily involved with the
public sector; 7 with those involved with business; 25 with non-governmental organisations; and 4
with practitioners who did not fall into any of the three preconceived groups.
1. Houttuin,  Guus:  Trade  Adviser,  European  External  Action  Service,  4  May  2017,  Paris,
France
2. Nieuwenkamp, Roel: Professor, Chair of OECD Working Party on Responsible Business 
Conduct, 19 May, phone
3. Callaway, Annie: Advocacy Manager, Enough Project, NGO, 23 May, email
4. Maréchal, Louis: Policy Advisor on extractives, OECD Responsible Business Conduct Unit,
24 May, phone, interviewed in his personal capacity
5. Webb, Heather: Researcher, Ethical Consumer, NGO, 6 June, London, UK
6. Senior Campaigner #1: Global Witness, NGO, 11 July, London, UK
7. Bulakali, Zacharie: Chargé de Liaison, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), 
NGO, 12 September, Bukavu, Congo
8. Mulinda, Bienvenu: Program Officer, L’Action pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits 
des Personnes Défavorisées (APRODEPED), NGO, 13 September, Bukavu, Congo
9. Omar, Joel: Senior Researcher/Programme Coordinator, Justice for All, NGO, 13 
September, Bukavu, Congo
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10. Kitungan, Raoul: Coordinator, Justice for All, 13 September, Bukavu, Congo
11. Mtaona, Antoine Imili: Provincial Director, Centre d’Expertise, d’Evaluation et de 
Certification (CEEC), 13 September, NGO, Bukavu, Congo
12. Bulindi, Apollinaire: Provincial Minister of Mining in South Kivu, 13 September, Bukavu, 
Congo
13. Myololo, Adolphe & Katapoi, Francois: Chef de Bureau & Mining Inspector, Ministry of 
Mining in South Kivu, 15 September, Bukavu, Congo
14. Tuta Wa Tuta, Michel Liete: Chief of Provincial Division, Ministry of Mining in South 
Kivu, 19 September, Bukavu, Congo
15. Bulongo, Safanto Lukendo: Coordinator, Max Impact,  NGO, 19 September, Bukavu, 
Congo
16. Eyonga, AJ John Tshonga: Provincial Director in South Kivu, Service d’Assistance et 
d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM), 20 September, Bukavu, Congo
17. Barume, Bali & Neumann, Martin: Project Manager & Program Officer, The (German) 
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources , 20 September, Bukavu, Congo 
18. Kasindi, Remy: Founder, Centre de Recherches et d’Etudes Strategiques en Afrique Centrale
(CRESA), NGO, 21 September, Bukavu, Congo
19. Congo Researcher working for an NGO: 27 September, phone
20. Gracie: Development & Liaison Officer, Kabare Region Administration, 27 September, 
Bukavu, Congo
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21. Weyns, Yannick: Natural Resources Expert, MONUSCO, 3 October, Goma, Congo
22. Ndimubanzi, Emmanuel: Head of Division, Ministry of Mining in North Kivu, 4 October, 
Goma, Congo
23. Kihangi, Prince: Secretary-General, Bureau d’Etudes, d’Observation et de Coordination 
pour le Développement du Territoire de Walikale (BEDEWA), NGO, 4 October, Goma, 
Congo
24. Kamate, Gaston & Semakuba, Corneille: Programme Director & Programme Manager, 
Centre de Recherche sur l’Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme 
(CREDDHO), NGO, 5 October, Goma, Congo
25. Musaidizi, Christine: Children’s Voice, NGO, 5 October, Goma, Congo
26. Idrissa, Tachi Assami & Waliuzi, Amzati Newa: Vice President & 1st Counsellor, 
Coopérative des Creseurs Artisanaux de Mpama Bisie (COCABI), mining cooperative, 5 
October, Goma, Congo
27. Muliro, Leopold Rutinigirwa & Romuald, Adili Amani: Researcher & Researcher, Pole 
Institute, 6 October, Goma, Congo
28. Chibashimba, Seremi: President de la Commission de Surveillance, Former Cooperative 
President, COMIKA, mining cooperative, 13 October, Nyabibwe, Congo
29. Zirhumana, Jackson: Technical Assistant, iTSCi (ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative), 13 
October, Nyabibwe, Congo
30. Dieudonné, Sango Sele: Programme Director, Centre National d'Appui au Développement et
à la Participation Populaire (CENADEP), 13 October, Ihusi, Congo
338
31. Camille, Kakule Kamulete: President, CONINYA, mining cooperative, 14 October, 
Nyawarunga, Congo
32. Shanvu, Bony: President, Programme du Developpement Sociale (PRODES), NGO, 14 
October, Nyawarunga, Congo
33. Abubakar, Abdulmumin: Audit Officer, Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), 30 October, Abuja, Nigeria
34. Obi, Edward: Catholic Priest, National Coordinator of National Coalition on Gas flaring and
Oil spills in the Niger Delta (NACGOND), Director of Gas Alert for Sustainable Initiative 
(GASIN), NGOs, 2 November, Abuja, Nigeria
35. Chiwenze, Anne & Quaghe, Zira John: Nigeria Officer & Nigeria Officer, Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI), NGO, 3 November, Abuja, Nigeria
36. Adeniyia, Omotola: Head of Macro-economic Analysis Department, National Bureau of 
Statistics, 6 November, Abuja, Nigeria
37. Multi-stakeholder working with NEITI: 6 November, Abuja, Nigeria
38. Kolawole, Zaid: Government Relations Manager, Total E&P Nigeria Limited, 7 November, 
Abuja, Nigeria
39. Giwa, Joshua: Chief Geophysicist, Department of Petroleum Resources, 9 November, 
Lagos, Nigeria
40. Agbim, Arinze: Former Executive Director at Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, 9 
November, Lagos, Nigeria
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41. Akinyosoye, Wole: Zonal Operations Officer, Department of Petroleum Resources, 13 
November, Lagos, Nigeria
42. Allen, Fidelis: Director, Centre for Conflict and Gender Studies, University of Port 
Harcourt, 15 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
43. Mgbenwa, Dandy: Pastor in Okwuzi, Ekbocha Community in Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni 
Government Area in Rivers State, 17 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
44. Kayemba-Ibokabasi, Florence: Program Manager, Stakeholder Democracy Network, 17 
November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
45. Nku, Chris: Project Officer, GASIN, 17 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
46. Dandyson, Harry: Project Officer, GASIN, 17 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
47. Nigerian Army Colonel: 18 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
48. Boms, Larry: Country Head & Resident Representative, United Nations Institute for 
Training & Research, 20 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
49. Pere, Thompson & Ezeka, Gerald N: Chief, Obunagha Community, Gbarain Kingdom, 
Yenagoa Local Government Area in Bayelsa State & Community Youth Leader, Onelga in 
Rivers State, 21 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
50. Ihetu, Godswill: Chairman of the Petroleum Club, Former Group Executive Director in 
Engineering and Technology Directorate of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 22 
November, Lagos, Nigeria
51. Sargentini, Judith: Member of the European Parliament, 23 November, phone
340
52. Ojezele, Godwin Asekun: Former Participant in the Presidential Amnesty Program, 23 
November, Lagos, Nigeria
53. Koch, Dirk-Jan: Professor, Special Envoy Natural Resources at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Netherlands, 27 November, phone
54. Senior Campaigner #2: Global Witness, 29 November 2017, London, UK & 15 May 2019, 
phone
55. Doubra, Michael: Former Participant in the Presidential Amnesty Program, 30 November, 
phone
56. European Commission Policy Offer: 6 December, phone
57. Harrison, Rob: Director, Ethical Consumer, 14 December, phone
58. Anonymous, Bukavu, Congo
59. De Vries, Anthonius: Former Negotiator for the European Commission in the Kimberley 
Process, 13 May 2019, phone
MEETINGS
1. The 11th Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains: OECD, 2-4 May 2017, Paris, 
France
2. Stakeholder Engagement on Issuance of Petroleum and Mining Licenses: NEITI and African
Development Bank, 8 November 2017, Lagos, Nigeria
3. Consultative Dialogue of the Rivers State Conflict Management Alliance: University of Port
Harcourt and Stakeholder Democracy Network, 16 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
341
4. Assessment of Omoku River in Ogba, Egbema, Ndoni Local Government Area in Rivers 
State: Multi-stakeholder meeting, 21 November, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
5. The 12th Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains: OECD, 17-20 April 2018, Paris, 
France
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